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	<title>Dissident Voice &#187; Privacy</title>
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		<title>Secret State Demands News Organization&#8217;s Web Logs, Gets Slapped Down</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/11/secret-state-demands-news-organizations-web-logs-gets-slapped-down/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 16:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Criminal Justice]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal/Constitutional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=11964</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[When the Independent Media Center (IMC) received a formal notice on January 30 from the Department of Justice, demanding they provide an Indianapolis grand jury with &#8220;details of all reader visits on a certain day,&#8221; the feisty left-wing news aggregators fought back, CBS News reported.
Investigative journalist Declan McCullagh revealed that the &#8220;change&#8221; administration&#8217;s legal eagles [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When the Independent Media Center (<a href="http://www.indymedia.org/en/index.shtml">IMC</a>) received a formal notice on January 30 from the Department of Justice, demanding they provide an Indianapolis grand jury with &#8220;details of all reader visits on a certain day,&#8221; the feisty left-wing news aggregators fought back, CBS News <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/11/09/taking_liberties/entry5595506.shtml">reported</a>.</p>
<p>Investigative journalist Declan McCullagh revealed that the &#8220;change&#8221; administration&#8217;s legal eagles issued an order that required the &#8220;Philadelphia-based Indymedia.us Web site &#8216;not to disclose the existence of this request&#8217; unless authorized by the Justice Department, a gag order that presents an unusual quandary for any news organization.&#8221;</p>
<p>Kristina Clair, IndyMedia&#8217;s Linux administrator, told CBS she was shocked to have received the subpoena with its flawed demand not to disclose its contents.</p>
<blockquote><p>The <a href="http://www.eff.org/files/subpoena.pdf">subpoena</a> from U.S. Attorney Tim Morrison in Indianapolis demanded &#8220;all IP traffic to and from www.indymedia.us&#8221; on June 25, 2008. It instructed Clair to &#8220;include IP addresses, times, and any other identifying information,&#8221; including e-mail addresses, physical addresses, registered accounts, and Indymedia readers&#8217; Social Security Numbers, bank account numbers, credit card numbers, and so on. (Declan McCullagh, &#8220;Justice Dept. Asked for News Site&#8217;s Visitor Lists,&#8221; CBS News, November 10, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>Talk about intrusive! While grand jury subpoenas of news organizations and journalists are not unprecedented, under long-standing guidelines these subpoenas are supposed to receive special handling given their sensitive nature, thus ensuring that even the <em>appearance</em> of prior restraint of a journalist&#8217;s ability to report the news is avoided.</p>
<p>In IndyMedia&#8217;s case however, DOJ&#8217;s ham-handed stipulation amounted to government meddling clearly prohibited by the First Amendment. Not that any of this seems to matter to an administration hell-bent on defending&#8211;and expanding&#8211;every illegal program of the previous regime.</p>
<p>McCullagh writes that one section of the guidelines state that &#8220;no subpoena may be issued to any member of the news media&#8221; without &#8220;the express authorization of the attorney general,&#8221; in this case, the secret state&#8217;s newest &#8220;best friend forever&#8221; Eric Holder.</p>
<p>Indeed, these draconian writs must be &#8220;directed at material information regarding a limited subject matter.&#8221; The government&#8217;s demand however, for virtually every piece of information held by IndyMedia on their contributors and readers hardly qualifies as &#8220;limited&#8221; even in today&#8217;s bizarro world of &#8220;national security&#8221; driftnet surveillance and data mining.</p>
<p>When queried by CBS as to what criminal investigation prompted their draconian demand for IP addresses &#8220;and any other identifying information&#8221; on IndyMedia users, U.S. Attorney Tim Morrison emailed CBS with a curt reply: &#8220;We Have no comment.&#8221;</p>
<p>But before proceeding further, let&#8217;s be clear on one thing: since the 1970s, the federal grand jury system where the prosecutor reigns supreme, has been an instrument wielded by the secret state to target dissent and to ensnare left-wing government critics in open-ended &#8220;investigations&#8221; whose sole purpose is to harass if not prosecute alleged &#8220;troublemakers.&#8221;</p>
<p>As the late, great defender of civil liberties, Frank Donner, described in his landmark work on America&#8217;s political intelligence system, during the lawless rampage against the left launched by the Nixon administration:</p>
<blockquote><p>A new attack [on dissent] would have to be secret, clothed with a more plausible justification than the [red-hunting congressional] committees&#8217; claimed legislative purpose, and aimed inwardly at the group and its members.</p>
<p>The White House entrusted the grand jury offensive to the Internal Security Division (ISD) of the Department of Justice. This unit, which had languished during the post-McCarthy years, was now enlarged from a complement of six to sixty as part of a master plan to deploy all available resources against the new dissenters. &#8230;</p>
<p>The secrecy of the grand jury proceeding cloaks abuses. Although secrecy historically served to protect the independence of the grand jury by insulating it from the pressures of the Crown, there can be little doubt that in the Nixon years grand jury secrecy became an instrument of the very evil it was intended to prevent. (Frank Donner, <em>The Age of Surveillance</em>, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980, pp. 355, 357)</p></blockquote>
<p>Today, with antiwar groups, anarchists, socialists, animal rights and environmental activists clearly focused in the secret state&#8217;s cross hairs, one can speculate that the DOJ&#8217;s reticence to reveal what &#8220;crime&#8221; they were allegedly investigating in all probability related to information surreptitiously obtained by a paid informant or provocateur.</p>
<p>This hypothesis is all the more compelling when one considers that DOJ attorney&#8217;s threatened Clair with obstruction of justice if she disclosed the existence of the subpoena, claiming it &#8220;may endanger someone&#8217;s health&#8221; and would have a &#8220;human cost.&#8221;</p>
<p>But shortly after receiving the onerous warrant Clair&#8217;s shock turned to anger, and the sysadmin contacted the San Francisco-based civil liberties group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (<a href="http://www.eff.org/">EFF</a>), who agreed to take on the government.</p>
<p>On November 9, EFF <a href="http://www.eff.org/wp/anatomy-bogus-subpoena-indymedia">published</a> a whitepaper outlining the shadowy nature of the secret state&#8217;s latest moves to subvert our constitutional rights. According to EFF&#8217;s senior staff attorney Kevin Bankston,</p>
<blockquote><p>Secrecy surrounds law enforcement&#8217;s communications surveillance practices like a dense fog. Particularly shrouded in secrecy are government demands issued under <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00002703----000-.html">18 U.S.C. § 2703</a> of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stored_Communications_Act">Stored Communications Act</a> or &#8220;SCA&#8221; that seek subscriber information or other user records from communications service providers. When the government wants such data from a phone company or online service provider, it can obtain a court order under the SCA demanding the information from the provider, along with a gag order preventing the provider from disclosing the existence of the government&#8217;s demand. More often, companies are simply served with subpoenas issued directly by prosecutors without any court involvement; these demands, too, are rarely made public. (&#8221;From EFF&#8217;s Secret Files: Anatomy of a Bogus Subpoena,&#8221; Electronic Frontier Foundation, November 9, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>Undeterred by the quickly broken promises of the Obama regime to &#8220;restore the rule of law,&#8221; like their Bushist predecessors, Obama&#8217;s Justice Department is the golden shield that hides from public view the high crimes and misdemeanors of America&#8217;s corporatist police state.</p>
<p>Readers of <em>Antifascist Calling</em> are urged to read EFF&#8217;s well-written analysis. It meticulously dissects the lawless behavior of administration attorneys who, without skipping a beat, attempted to brow-beat a news organization into submission, thus preventing them from doing what they do best: informing the public, not as court stenographers but, as the heroic Israeli journalist Amira Hass has averred by &#8220;monitoring the centers of power.&#8221;</p>
<p>Readers are also urged to read the government&#8217;s subpoena in its entirety, an exercise in overreaching and a clear violation of the state&#8217;s own guidelines governing the issuance of these onerous warrants.</p>
<blockquote><p>Grand jury subpoenas are very easy for the government to get&#8211;they are issued directly by prosecutors without any direct court oversight. Therefore, the SCA limits what those subpoenas can obtain, in contrast to a search warrant or other court order. Under the SCA&#8217;s 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2), grand jury subpoenas can only be used to get basic subscriber-identifying information about a target&#8211;e.g., a particular user&#8217;s name, IP address, physical address or payment details&#8211;and certain types of telephone logs; any other records require a court order or a search warrant. &#8230;</p>
<p>However, with the Indymedia subpoena, the government departed from the text of the law and the Justice Department&#8217;s own sample subpoena by inserting this demand: &#8220;Please provide the following information pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)]: All IP traffic to and from www.indymedia.us&#8221; for a particular date, including &#8220;IP addresses, times, and any other identifying information.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>In other words, the government was asking for the IP address of every one of indymedia.us&#8217;s thousands of visitors on that date&#8211;the IP address of every person who read any news story on the entire site.</strong> Not only did this request threaten every indymedia.us visitor&#8217;s First Amendment right to read the news anonymously (particularly considering that the government could easily obtain the name and address associated with each IP address via subpoenas to the ISPs that control those IP blocks), it plainly violated the SCA&#8217;s restrictions on what types of data the government could obtain using a subpoena. The subpoena was also patently overbroad, a clear fishing expedition: there&#8217;s no way that the identity of <em>every</em> Indymedia reader of <em>every</em> Indymedia story was relevant to the crime being investigated by the grand jury in Indiana, whatever that crime may be. (EFF, op. cit., emphasis in original)</p></blockquote>
<p>CBS reported that EFF wrote a series of letters to the DOJ. The <a href="http://www.eff.org/files/1st-letter-from-eff.pdf">first</a> detailed the flaws in the original subpoena while the <a href="http://www.eff.org/files/2nd-letter-from-eff.pdf">second</a> pointedly said that if the government needed to muzzle IndyMedia, it should apply for a formal gag order under the relevant section of federal law.</p>
<p>Hardly the sharpest knives in the drawer, DOJ higher-ups quickly caught on and realized that the group was about to challenge the law on First Amendment grounds. At that point, the state backed down and withdrew the subpoena. EFF wrote, &#8220;Obviously, that was a fight&#8211;and more importantly, a precedent&#8211;that the government wanted to avoid.&#8221;</p>
<p>The lesson here? When the state comes knocking, the first and best line of defense is to seek competent legal advice from the relevant civil liberties&#8217; organization.</p>
<p>Handing over information that the government is not legally entitled to, or indeed, answering questions posed by federal investigators trained in subtle interview techniques without an attorney present can&#8211;and has&#8211;resulted in &#8220;obstruction of justice&#8221; or a &#8220;lying to federal government agents&#8221; indictment, a crime under <a href="http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/18/I/47/1001">Title 18, United States Code, § 1001</a>. <em>Silence is always an option</em>.</p>
<p>A good place to start learning how to fight back against electronic spying practices is a working familiarity with EFF&#8217;s excellent handbook &#8220;<a href="https://ssd.eff.org/3rdparties/protect">Surveillance Self-Defense</a>.&#8221;</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Mind Your Tweets: CIA and European Union Building Social Networking Surveillance System</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/10/mind-your-tweets-cia-and-european-union-building-social-networking-surveillance-system/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/10/mind-your-tweets-cia-and-european-union-building-social-networking-surveillance-system/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human Rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Science/Tech]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=11458</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[That social networking sites and applications such as Facebook, Twitter and their competitors can facilitate communication and information sharing amongst diverse groups and individuals is by now a cliché.
It should come as no surprise then, that the secret state and the capitalist grifters whom they serve, have zeroed-in on the explosive growth of these technologies. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That social networking sites and applications such as Facebook, Twitter and their competitors can facilitate communication and information sharing amongst diverse groups and individuals is by now a cliché.</p>
<p>It should come as no surprise then, that the secret state and the capitalist grifters whom they serve, have zeroed-in on the explosive growth of these technologies. One can be certain however, securocrats aren&#8217;t tweeting their restaurant preferences or finalizing plans for after work drinks.</p>
<p>No, researchers on both sides of the Atlantic are busy as proverbial bees building a &#8220;total information&#8221; surveillance system, one that will, so they hope, provide police and security agencies with what they euphemistically call &#8220;actionable intelligence.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Build the Perfect Panopticon, Win Fabulous Prizes!</strong></p>
<p>In this context, the whistleblowing web site <em><a href="http://www.wikileaks.org/">Wikileaks</a></em> published a remarkable <a href="http://88.80.16.63/leak/indect-deliverable-4-2009.pdf">document</a> October 4 by the <a href="http://www.indect-project.eu/">INDECT Consortium</a>, the Intelligence Information System Supporting Observation, Searching and Detection for Security of Citizens in Urban Environment.</p>
<p>Hardly a catchy acronym, but simply put INDECT is working to put a human face on the billions of emails, text messages, tweets and blog posts that transit cyberspace every day; perhaps <em>your</em> face.</p>
<p>According to <em>Wikileaks</em>, INDECT&#8217;s &#8220;Work package 4&#8243; is designed &#8220;to comb web blogs, chat sites, news reports, and social-networking sites in order to build up automatic dossiers on individuals, organizations and their relationships.&#8221; Ponder that phrase again: &#8220;automatic dossiers.&#8221;</p>
<p>This isn&#8217;t the first time that European academics have applied their &#8220;knowledge skill sets&#8221; to keep the public &#8220;safe&#8221;&#8211;from a meaningful exercise of free speech and the right to assemble, that is.</p>
<p>Last year <em>The Guardian</em> <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jul/21/civilliberties.privacy">reported</a> that Bath University researchers&#8217; Cityware project covertly tracked &#8220;tens of thousands of Britons&#8221; through the installation of Bluetooth scanners that capture &#8220;radio signals transmitted from devices such as mobile phones, laptops and digital cameras, and using the data to follow unwitting targets without their permission.&#8221;</p>
<p>One privacy advocate, Simon Davies, the director of Privacy International, told <em>The Guardian</em>: &#8220;This technology could well become the CCTV of the mobile industry. It would not take much adjustment to make this system a ubiquitous surveillance infrastructure over which we have no control.&#8221;</p>
<p>Which of course, is precisely the point.</p>
<p>As researchers scramble for a windfall of cash from governments eager to fund these dubious projects, European police and security agencies aren&#8217;t far behind their FBI and NSA colleagues in the spy game.</p>
<p>The online privacy advocates, <a href="http://www.quintessenz.at/">Quintessenz</a>, published a series of leaked <a href="http://www.quintessenz.at/d/000100002344">documents</a> in 2008 that described the network monitoring and data mining suites designed by Nokia Siemens, Ericsson and Verint.</p>
<p>The Nokia Siemens Intelligence Platform dubbed &#8220;intelligence in a box,&#8221; integrate tasks generally done by separate security teams and pools the data from sources such as telephone or mobile calls, email and internet activity, bank transactions, insurance records and the like. Call it data mining on steroids.</p>
<p>Ironically enough however, Siemens, the giant German electronics firm was caught up in a global bribery scandal that cost the company some $1.6 billion in fines. Last year, <em>The New York Times</em> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html">described</a> &#8220;a web of secret bank accounts and shadowy consultants,&#8221; and a culture of &#8220;entrenched corruption &#8230; at a sprawling, sophisticated corporation that externally embraced the nostrums of a transparent global marketplace built on legitimate transactions.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to the <em>Times</em>, &#8220;at Siemens, bribery was just a line item.&#8221; Which just goes to show, powering the secret state means never having to say you&#8217;re sorry!</p>
<p><strong>Social Network Spying, a Growth Industry Fueled by Capitalist Grifters</strong></p>
<p>The trend by security agencies and their corporate partners to spy on their citizens has accelerated greatly in the West since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>This multi-billion industry in general, has been a boon for the largest American and European defense corporations. Among the top ten companies listed by <em>Washington Technology</em> in their annual ranking of the <a href="http://washingtontechnology.com/toplists/top-100-lists/2009.aspx">&#8220;Top 100&#8243;</a> prime government contractors, <em>all ten</em>&#8211;from Lockheed Martin to Booz Allen Hamilton&#8211;earned a combined total of $68 billion in 2008 from defense and related homeland security work for the secret state.</p>
<p>And like Siemens, all ten corporations figure prominently on the Project on Government Oversight&#8217;s Federal Contractor Misconduct Database (<a href="http://www.contractormisconduct.org/">FCMD</a>), which tracks &#8220;contract fraud, environmental, ethics, and labor violations.&#8221; Talk about a rigged game!</p>
<p>Designing everything from nuclear missile components to eavesdropping equipment for various government agencies in the United States and abroad, including some of the most repressive regimes on the planet, these firms have moved into manufacturing the hardware and related computer software for social networking surveillance in a big way.</p>
<p><em>Wired</em> <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/fbi-spyware-pro/">revealed</a> in April that the FBI is routinely monitoring cell phone calls and internet activity during criminal and counterterrorism investigations. The publication posted a series of internal <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/get-your-fbi-sp/">documents</a> that described the Wi-Fi and computer hacking capabilities of the Bureau&#8217;s Cryptographic and Electronic Analysis Unit (CEAU).</p>
<p><em>New Scientist</em> <a href="http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19025556.200?DCMP=NLC-nletternsref=mg19025556.200">reported</a> back in 2006 that the National Security Agency &#8220;is funding research into the mass harvesting of the information that people post about themselves on social networks.&#8221;</p>
<p>And just this week in an exclusive <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/21/gchq_eds/">report</a> published by the British high-tech publication, <em>The Register</em>, it was revealed that &#8220;the government has outsourced parts of its biggest ever mass surveillance project to the disaster-prone IT services giant formerly known as EDS.&#8221;</p>
<p>That work is being conducted under the auspices of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British state&#8217;s equivalent of America&#8217;s National Security Agency.</p>
<p>Investigative journalist Chris Williams disclosed that the American computer giant HP, which purchased EDS for some $13.9 billion last year, is &#8220;designing and installing the massive computing resources that will be needed to analyse details of who contacts whom, when where and how.&#8221;</p>
<p>Work at GCHQ in Cheltenham is being carried out under &#8220;a secret project called Mastering the Internet.&#8221; In May, a Home Office <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/05/03/gchq_mti/">document</a> surfaced that &#8220;ostensibly sought views on whether ISPs should be forced to gather terabytes of data from their networks on the government&#8217;s behalf.&#8221;</p>
<p><em>The Register</em> reported earlier this year that telecommunications behemoth Detica and U.S. defense giant Lockheed Martin were providing GCHQ with data mining software &#8220;which searches bulk data, such as communications records, for patterns &#8230; to identify suspects.&#8221; (For further details <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/05/spying-in-uk-gchq-awards-lockheed.html">see</a>: <em>Antifascist Calling</em>, &#8220;Spying in the UK: GCHQ Awards Lockheed Martin £200m Contract, Promises to &#8216;Master the Internet&#8217;,&#8221; May 7, 2009)</p>
<p>It seems however, that INDECT researchers like their GCHQ/NSA kissin&#8217; cousins in Britain and the United States, are burrowing ever-deeper into the nuts-and-bolts of electronic social networking and may be on the verge of an Orwellian surveillance &#8220;breakthrough.&#8221;</p>
<p>As <em>New Scientist</em> sagely predicted, the secret state most certainly plans to &#8220;harness advances in internet technology&#8211;specifically the forthcoming &#8217;semantic web&#8217; championed by the web standards organisation <a href="http://www.w3.org/">W3C</a>&#8211;to combine data from social networking websites with details such as banking, retail and property records, allowing the NSA to build extensive, all-embracing personal profiles of individuals.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Profiling Internet Dissent</strong></p>
<p>Pretty alarming, but the devil as they say is in the details and INDECT&#8217;s release of their &#8220;Work package 4&#8243; file makes for a very interesting read. And with a title, &#8220;XML Data Corpus: Report on methodology for collection, cleaning and unified representation of large textual data from various sources: news reports, weblogs, chat,&#8221; rest assured one must plow through much in the way of geeky gibberish and tech-speak to get to the heartless heart of the matter.</p>
<p>INDECT itself is a rather interesting amalgamation of spooks, cops and academics.</p>
<p>According to their web site, INDECT partners include: the University of Science and Technology, AGH, Poland; Gdansk University of Technology; InnoTech DATA GmbH &amp; Co., Germany; IP Grenoble (Ensimag), France; MSWiA, the General Headquarters of Police, attached to the Ministry of the Interior, Poland; Moviquity, Spain; Products and Systems of Information Technology, PSI, Germany; the Police Service of Northern Ireland, PSNI, United Kingdom (hardly slouches when it comes to stitching-up Republicans and other leftist agitators!); Poznan University of Technology; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Technical University of Sofia, Bulgaria; University of Wuppertal, Germany; University of York, Great Britain; Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republic; Technical University of Kosice, Slovakia; X-Art Pro Division G.m.b.H, Austria; and finally, the Fachhochschule Technikum, also in Austria.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know about you, but I find it rather ironic that the European Union, ostensible guardians of democracy and human rights, have turned for assistance in their surveillance projects to police and spy outfits from the former Soviet bloc, who after all know a thing or two when it comes to monitoring their citizens.</p>
<p>Right up front, York University&#8217;s Suresh Manadhar, Ionnis Klapaftis and Shailesh Pandey, the principle authors of the INDECT report, make their intentions clear.</p>
<p>Since &#8220;security&#8221; as the authors argue, &#8220;is becoming a weak point of energy and communications infrastructures, commercial stores, conference centers, airports and sites with high person traffic in general,&#8221; they aver that &#8220;access control and rapid response to potential dangers are properties that every security system for such environments should have.&#8221;</p>
<p>Does INDECT propose building a just and prosperous global society, thus lessening the potential that terrorist killers or other miscreants will exploit a &#8220;target rich environment&#8221; that may prove deadly for innocent workers who, after all, were the principle victims of the 2004 and 2007 terrorist outrages in Madrid and London? Hardly.</p>
<p>As with their colleagues across the pond, INDECT is hunting for the ever-elusive technological quick-fix, a high-tech magic bullet. One, I might add, that will deliver neither safety nor security but rather, will constrict the democratic space where social justice movements flourish while furthering the reach of unaccountable security agencies.</p>
<p>The document &#8220;describes the first deliverable of the work package which gives an overview about the main methodology and description of the XML data corpus schema and describes the methodology for collection, cleaning and unified representation of large textual data from various sources: news reports, weblogs, chat, etc.&#8221;</p>
<p>The first order of business &#8220;is the study and critical review of the annotation schemes employed so far for the development and evaluation of methods for entity resolution, co-reference resolution and entity attributes identification.&#8221;</p>
<p>In other words, how do present technologic capabilities provide police, security agencies and capitalist grifters with the ability to identify who might be speaking to whom and for what purpose. INDECT proposes to introduce &#8220;a new annotation scheme that builds upon the strengths of the current-state-of-the-art,&#8221; one that &#8220;should be extensible and modifiable to the requirements of the project.&#8221;</p>
<p>Asserting that &#8220;an XML data corpus [can be] extracted from forums and social networks related to specific threats (e.g. hooliganism, terrorism, vandalism, etc.),&#8221; the authors claim they will provide &#8220;different entity types according to the requirements of the project. The grouping of all references to an entity together. The relationships between different entities&#8221; and finally, &#8220;the events in which entities participate.&#8221;</p>
<p>Why stop there? Why not list the ubiquitous &#8220;other&#8221; areas of concern to INDECT&#8217;s secret state partners? While &#8220;hooliganism, terrorism, vandalism, etc.,&#8221; may be the ostensible purpose of their &#8220;entity attributes identification&#8221; project, surely INDECT is well aware that such schemes are just as easily applicable to local citizen groups, socialist and anarchist organizations, or to the innumerable environmental, human rights or consumer campaigners who challenge the dominant free market paradigm of their corporate sponsors.</p>
<p>The authors however, couldn&#8217;t be bothered by the sinister applications that may be spawned by their research; indeed, they seem quite proud of it.</p>
<p>&#8220;The main achievements of this work&#8221; they aver, &#8220;allows the identification of several types of entities, groups the same references into one class, while at the same time allows the identification of relationships and events.&#8221;</p>
<p>Indeed, the &#8220;inclusion of a multi-layered ontology ensures the consistency of the annotation&#8221; and will facilitate in the (near) future, &#8220;the use of inference mechanisms such as transitivity to allow the development of search engines that go beyond simple keyword search.&#8221;</p>
<p>Quite an accomplishment! An enterprising security service or capitalist marketing specialist need only sift through veritable mountains of data available from commercial databases, or mobile calls, tweets, blog posts and internet searches to instantaneously identity &#8220;key agitators,&#8221; to borrow the FBI&#8217;s very 20th century description of political dissidents; individuals who could be detained or &#8220;neutralized&#8221; should sterner methods be required.</p>
<p>Indeed, a surveillance scheme such as the one INDECT is building could greatly facilitate&#8211;and simplify&#8211;the already formidable U.S. &#8220;Main Core&#8221; database that &#8220;reportedly collects and stores&#8211;without warrants or court orders&#8211;the names and detailed data of Americans considered to be threats to national security,&#8221; as investigative journalists <a href="http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/07/23/new_churchcomm/">Tim Shorrock</a> and <a href="http://radarmagazine.com/from-the-magazine/2008/05/government_surveillance_homeland_security_main_core_01.php">Christopher Ketchum</a> revealed in two disturbing reports last year.</p>
<p>The scale of &#8220;datasets/annotation schemes&#8221; exploited by INDECT is truly breathtaking and include: &#8220;Automatic Content Extraction&#8221; gleaned from &#8220;a variety of sources, such as news, broadcast conversations&#8221; that identify &#8220;relations between entities, and the events in which these participate.&#8221;</p>
<p>We next discover what is euphemistically called the &#8220;Knowledge Base Population (KBP),&#8221; an annotation scheme that &#8220;focuses on the identification of entity types of Person (PER), Organization (ORG), and Geo-Political Entity (GPE), Location (LOC), Facility (FAC), Geographical/Social/Political (GPE), Vehicle (VEH) and Weapon (WEA).&#8221;</p>
<p>How is this accomplished? Why through an exploitation of open source materials of course!</p>
<p>INDECT researchers readily aver that &#8220;a snapshot of Wikipedia infoboxes is used as the original knowledge source. The document collection consists of newswire articles on the order of 1 million. The reference knowledge base includes hundreds of thousands of entities based on articles from an October 2008 dump of English Wikipedia. The annotation scheme in KBP focuses on the identification of entity types of Person (PER), Organization (ORG), and Geo-Political Entity (GPE).&#8221;</p>
<p>For what purpose? Mum&#8217;s the word as far as INDECT is concerned.</p>
<p>Nothing escapes this panoptic eye. Even popular culture and leisure activities fall under the glare of security agencies and their academic partners in the latest iteration of this truly monstrous privacy-killing scheme. Using the movie rental firm Netflix as a model, INDECT cites the firm&#8217;s &#8220;100 million ratings from 480 thousand randomly-chosen, anonymous Netflix customers&#8221; as &#8220;well-suited&#8221; to the INDECT surveillance model.</p>
<p>In conclusion, EU surveillance architects propose a &#8220;new annotation &amp; knowledge representation scheme&#8221; that &#8220;is extensible,&#8221; one that &#8220;allows the addition of new entities, relations, and events, while at the same time avoids duplication and ensures integrity.&#8221;</p>
<p>Deploying an ontological methodology that exploits currently available data from open source, driftnet surveillance of news, broadcasts, blog entries and search results, and linkages obtained through a perusal of mobile phone records, credit card purchases, medical records, travel itineraries, etc., INDECT claims that in the near future their research will allow &#8220;a search engine to go beyond simple keyword queries by exploiting the semantic information and relations within the ontology.&#8221;</p>
<p>And once the scheme is perfected, &#8220;the use of expressive logics &#8230; becomes an enabler for detecting entity relations on the web.&#8221; Or transform it into an &#8220;always-on&#8221; spy you carry in your pocket or whenever you switch on your computer.</p>
<p>This is how our minders propose to keep us &#8220;safe.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>CIA Gets In on the Fun</strong></p>
<p>Not to be outdone, the CIA has entered the lucrative market of social networking surveillance in a big way.</p>
<p>In an exclusive <a href="http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/10/exclusive-us-spies-buy-stake-in-twitter-blog-monitoring-firm/">published</a> by <em>Wired</em>, we learn that the CIA&#8217;s investment arm, <a href="http://www.iqt.org/">In-Q-Tel</a>, &#8220;want to read your blog posts, keep track of your Twitter updates&#8211;even check out your book reviews on Amazon.&#8221;</p>
<p>Investigative journalist Noah Shachtman reveals that In-Q-Tel &#8220;is putting cash into <a href="http://www.visibletechnologies.com/">Visible Technologies</a>, a software firm that specializes in monitoring social media. It&#8217;s part of a larger movement within the spy services to get better at using &#8220;open source intelligence&#8221;&#8211;information that&#8217;s publicly available, but often hidden in the flood of TV shows, newspaper articles, blog posts, online videos and radio reports generated every day.&#8221; <em>Wired</em> reported:</p>
<blockquote><p>Visible crawls over half a million web 2.0 sites a day, scraping more than a million posts and conversations taking place on blogs, online forums, Flickr, YouTube, Twitter and Amazon. (It doesn&#8217;t touch closed social networks, like Facebook, at the moment.) Customers get customized, real-time feeds of what&#8217;s being said on these sites, based on a series of keywords. (Noah Shachtman, Exclusive: U.S. Spies Buy Stake in Firm that Monitors Blogs, Tweets,&#8221; <em>Wired</em>, October 19, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>Although In-Q-Tel spokesperson Donald Tighe told <em>Wired</em> that it wants Visible to monitor foreign social media and give American spooks an &#8220;early-warning detection on how issues are playing internationally,&#8221; Shachtman points out that &#8220;such a tool can also be pointed inward, at domestic bloggers or tweeters.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to <em>Wired</em>, the firm already keeps tabs on 2.0 web sites &#8220;for Dell, AT&amp;T and Verizon.&#8221; And as an added attraction, &#8220;Visible is tracking animal-right activists&#8217; online campaigns&#8221; against meat processing giant Hormel.</p>
<p>Shachtman reports that &#8220;Visible has been trying for nearly a year to break into the government field.&#8221; And why wouldn&#8217;t they, considering that the heimat security and even spookier black world of the U.S. &#8220;intelligence community,&#8221; is a veritable cash-cow for enterprising corporations eager to do the state&#8217;s bidding.</p>
<p>In 2008 <em>Wired</em> reports, Visible &#8220;teamed-up&#8221; with the Washington, DC-based consulting firm &#8220;<a href="http://www.constrat.net/">Concepts &amp; Strategies</a>, which has handled media monitoring and translation services for U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to a blurb on the firm&#8217;s web site they are in hot-pursuit of &#8220;social media engagement specialists&#8221; with Defense Department experience and &#8220;a high proficiency in Arabic, Farsi, French, Urdu or Russian.&#8221; Wired reports that Concepts &amp; Strategies &#8220;is also looking for an &#8216;information system security engineer&#8217; who already has a &#8216;Top Secret SCI [Sensitive Compartmentalized Information] with NSA Full Scope Polygraph&#8217; security clearance.&#8221;</p>
<p>In such an environment, nothing escapes the secret state&#8217;s lens. Shachtman reveals that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) &#8220;maintains an Open Source Center, which combs publicly available information, including web 2.0 sites.&#8221;</p>
<p>In 2007, the Center&#8217;s director, Doug Naquin, &#8220;told an audience of intelligence professionals&#8221; that &#8220;&#8216;we&#8217;re looking now at YouTube, which carries some unique and honest-to-goodness intelligence&#8230;. We have groups looking at what they call &#8216;citizens media&#8217;: people taking pictures with their cell phones and posting them on the internet. Then there&#8217;s social media, phenomena like MySpace and blogs&#8217;.&#8221;</p>
<p>But as Steven Aftergood, who maintains the <a href="http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/">Secrecy News</a> web site for the Federation of American Scientists told <em>Wired</em>, &#8220;even if information is openly gathered by intelligence agencies it would still be problematic if it were used for unauthorized domestic investigations or operations. Intelligence agencies or employees might be tempted to use the tools at their disposal to compile information on political figures, critics, journalists or others, and to exploit such information for political advantage. That is not permissible even if all of the information in question is technically &#8216;open source&#8217;.&#8221;</p>
<p>But as we have seen across the decades, from COINTELPRO to Operation CHAOS, and from Pentagon media manipulation during the run-up to the Iraq war through driftnet warrantless wiretapping of Americans&#8217; electronic communications, the secret state is a law unto itself, a self-perpetuating bureaucracy that thrives on duplicity, fear and cold, hard cash.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Telecom Lobbying, Congress &amp; the National Security State</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/10/telecom-lobbying-congress-the-national-security-state/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/10/telecom-lobbying-congress-the-national-security-state/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 16:00:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democrats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GWB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal/Constitutional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=11273</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The bipartisan consensus that encourages unaccountable secret state agencies to illegally spy on the American people under color of a limitless, and highly profitable, &#8220;war on terror&#8221; was dealt a (minor) blow October 13.
Federal District Court Judge Jeffrey White denied a motion by the Obama administration that the court issue a 30-day stay to &#8220;release [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The bipartisan consensus that encourages unaccountable secret state agencies to illegally spy on the American people under color of a limitless, and highly profitable, &#8220;war on terror&#8221; was dealt a (minor) blow October 13.</p>
<p>Federal District Court Judge Jeffrey White denied a motion by the Obama administration that the court issue a 30-day stay to &#8220;release records relating to telecom lobbying over last year&#8217;s debate over immunity for corporate participation in government spying,&#8221; the Electronic Frontier Foundation <a href="http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/10/federal-court-denies-goverment-attempt-delay-relea">reported</a>.</p>
<p>The Justice Department had argued that the Bush, and now, the Obama administration&#8217;s Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Congress were exempt from releasing lobbying records under the Freedom of Information Act, since consultations amongst said grifters were protected as &#8220;intra-agency&#8221; records.</p>
<p>One might add, since the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, a well-funded surveillance-industrial-complex fueled by giant defense firms and the telecommunications industry have, as investigative journalist Tim Shorrock <a href="http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2005/01/spy-who-billed-me">reported</a> back in 2005 &#8220;fielded armies of lobbyists to keep the money flowing.&#8221;</p>
<p>White&#8217;s denial of a motion for a stay followed a startling admission by Department of Justice (DoJ) attorneys that America&#8217;s telecommunication firms are actually &#8220;an arm of the government&#8211;at least when it comes to secret spying,&#8221; <em>Wired</em> <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/att-doj-foia/">reported</a> October 8. The government had argued that:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;The communications between the agencies and telecommunications companies regarding the immunity provisions of the proposed legislation have been regarded as intra-agency because the government and the companies have a common interest in the defense of the pending litigation and the communications regarding the immunity provisions concerned that common interest.&#8221;</p>
<p>U.S. District Court Judge Jeffery White disagreed and ruled on September 24 that the feds had to release the names of the telecom employees that contacted the Justice Department and the White House to lobby for a get-out-of-court-free card. (Ryan Singel, &#8220;Telephone Company Is Arm of Government, Feds Admit in Spy Suit,&#8221; <em>Wired</em>, October 8, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>EFF had sued the state in order to discover what role telecom lobbyists played in persuading Congress to grant the nation&#8217;s telecommunications&#8217; giants retroactive immunity for their role in illegal spying as part of the Bush, and now, Obama regime&#8217;s Presidential Spying Program.</p>
<p>If congressional grifters who have reaped serious campaign contributions from deep-pocket telecoms had not granted companies such as AT&amp;T, Sprint, Verizon and other carriers retroactive immunity, potential privacy breaches and claims from EFF&#8217;s <em><a href="http://www.eff.org/nsa/hepting">Hepting vs. AT&amp;T</a></em>, and dozens of other lawsuits, could have potentially cost the firms billions in damages.</p>
<p>A federal district court judge dismissed <em>Hepting</em> in June, ruling that the companies had immunity from liability under provisions of the despicable FISA Amendments Act (FAA).</p>
<p>In dismissing the state&#8217;s motion for a stay in the telecom lobbying records case, EFF senior staff attorney Kurt Opsahl wrote,</p>
<blockquote><p>On October 8, the day before the documents were due, the DOJ and ODNI filed an emergency motion asking the Court of Appeals for a 30-day stay while the agencies continue to contemplate an appeal. Around noon on October 9, the Ninth Circuit denied their emergency motion, telling the government it had to file for a motion for a stay pending appeal in the district court first.</p>
<p>Later that afternoon, the government filed again in the federal district court, but once again did not seek a stay pending an actual appeal. Instead, for the third time, the government insisted it could delay the release of telecom lobbying records while it considered the pros and cons of appealing. Briefing was complete by noon today, and Judge White denied the third attempt at delay this afternoon. (Kurt Opsahl, &#8220;Federal Court Denies Government Attempt to Delay Release of Telecom Records. Again.,&#8221; Electronic Frontier Foundation, News Update, October 13, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>Judge White noted that the Obama administration&#8217;s cynical &#8220;directive on transparency in government&#8221; applied to &#8220;the warrantless wiretapping program&#8221; and insisted that the &#8220;public interest lies in favor of disclosure&#8221; of pertinent lobbying records.</p>
<p>The ruling is all the more remarkable when one considers that Judge White was appointed to the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, the most civil liberties&#8217; friendly court in the nation, by none other than world class war criminal and corrupter-in-chief, George W. Bush.</p>
<p><strong>Corrupting Congress, Subverting the Bill of Rights</strong></p>
<p>Last year, <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2008/06/fighting-democrats-rake-in-big-telecom.html">reported</a> that the congressional watchdog group, <a href="http://maplight.org/">MAPLight</a>, published a list of <a href="http://maplight.org/FISA_June08">campaign contributions</a> to congressional Democrats who had changed their votes on FAA&#8217;s crucial retroactive immunity provision.</p>
<p>Significantly, then congressman and current White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel, pulled-in some $28,000, &#8220;blue dog&#8221; Democrat Steny Hoyer &#8220;earned&#8221; $29,000 while House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, hardly a slouch when it comes to contributions from her &#8220;constituents&#8221;&#8211;grifting capitalists&#8211;raked-in $24,500 from the telecoms.</p>
<p>Analyzing the &#8220;change of heart&#8221; by congressional Democrats between between the March 14, 2008 vote which rejected retroactive immunity and the June 20, 2008 vote approving it, MAPLight researchers discovered that &#8220;Verizon, AT&amp;T, and Sprint gave PAC contributions averaging: &#8220;$8,359 to each Democrat who changed their position to support immunity for Telcos (94 Dems)&#8221; and &#8220;$4,987 to each Democrat who remained opposed to immunity for Telcos (116 Dems).&#8221;</p>
<p>According to MAPLight: &#8220;88 percent of the Dems who changed to supporting immunity (83 Dems of the 94) received PAC contributions from Verizon, AT&amp;T, or Sprint during the last three years (Jan. 2005-Mar. 2008).&#8221; The group reported that after the June 20 vote, &#8220;Verizon, AT&amp;T, and Sprint gave PAC contributions averaging (for all House members): &#8220;$9,659 to each member of the House voting &#8220;YES&#8221; (105-Dem, 188-Rep)&#8221; and &#8220;$4,810 to each member of the House voting &#8220;NO&#8221; (128-Dem, 1-Rep).&#8221;</p>
<p>Daniel Newman, MAPLight&#8217;s Executive Director said at the time: &#8220;Campaign contributions bias our legislative system. Simply put, candidates who take positions contrary to industry interests are unlikely to receive industry funds and thus have fewer resources for their election campaigns than those whose votes favor industry interests.&#8221;</p>
<p>Proving once again, that ours&#8217; is the best Congress money can buy.</p>
<p><strong>White House Planning &#8220;Limited Hangout&#8221;</strong></p>
<p>The saga over the release of secret state documents continues to rage out of public sight, even as the corporate media &#8220;reports&#8221; for endless hours on the (media manufactured) tale of the Colorado &#8220;balloon boy.&#8221;</p>
<p>So corrupt and degenerated has our political culture become that a simple Google search reveals that as of October 17 there are some <em>15,000,000</em> search results available for the term &#8220;balloon boy&#8221; while only 520,000 hits for the term &#8220;EFF warrantless wiretapping.&#8221;</p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.projectcensored.org/">Project Censored</a> notes, modern censorship is defined &#8220;as the subtle yet constant and sophisticated manipulation of reality in our mass media outlets. On a daily basis, censorship refers to the intentional non-inclusion of a news story&#8211;or piece of a news story&#8211;based on anything other than a desire to tell the truth. Such manipulation can take the form of political pressure (from government officials and powerful individuals), economic pressure (from advertisers and funders), and legal pressure (the threat of lawsuits from deep-pocket individuals, corporations, and institutions).&#8221;</p>
<p>Clearly, the series of lawsuits by EFF and other civil liberties&#8217; watchdogs challenging the secret state&#8217;s pervasive surveillance of the American people is a case study of &#8220;intentional non-inclusion&#8221; by corporate media.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the Electronic Frontier Foundation <a href="http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/10/once-again">reported</a> October 15, that the Director of National Intelligence and DoJ attorneys &#8220;filed yet another emergency motion with the Ninth Circuit, asking for a stay of the deadline to release telecom immunity lobbying documents, less than 24 hours before the documents are due to be released to the public.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to the government&#8217;s motion, the Executive Branch has refused to disclose the names of telecom lobbyists and company representatives because, get this, &#8220;the agencies &#8230; invoked Exemption 6 [to the Freedom of Information Act] which protects information about individuals whose disclosure &#8216;would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy&#8217;.&#8221; It doesn&#8217;t get any cheekier than that even by cynical Washington standards!</p>
<p>DoJ attorneys once again, have resurrected that old chestnut&#8211;national security&#8211;to conceal the identities of telecom shills and the politicians who do their bidding, claiming that &#8220;disclosure of such information would assist our adversaries in drawing inferences about whether certain telecommunications companies may or may not have assisted the government in intelligence-gathering activities.&#8221;</p>
<p>In other words, the public&#8217;s right to know how our rights are being systematically violated&#8211;and who profits&#8211;is, by inference, another &#8220;tool&#8221; that will allow al-Qaeda to kidnap your kids, impose sharia law and detonate a nuke in Wichita!</p>
<p>Indeed, the secret state&#8217;s new motion avers that &#8220;disclosure of the identities of those individuals and entities that may have assisted, or in the future may assist, the government with intelligence activities could impede the government&#8217;s ability to gather intelligence information.&#8221;</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <em>Politico</em> <a href="http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=5AE7EF9B-18FE-70B2-A85F970F07D609E8">reported</a> that the Obama administration &#8220;may be on the verge of a major concession in a long-running legal battle over records about so-called telecom immunity.&#8221;</p>
<p>A leaked email to the publication, probably by a friendly source inside the White House, reveals that the administration is preparing for &#8220;the possible release of <em>some</em> details of the Bush Administration&#8217;s lobbying for legislation giving telecommunications companies immunity from lawsuits over their involvement in warrantless domestic wiretapping.&#8221; (emphasis added)</p>
<p>However, the devil as they say, is in those closely-guarded details. <em>Politico</em> reports that the administration will continue its legal battle &#8220;to keep secret the identities of the companies involved in the program.&#8221; In other words having lost in the court&#8217;s, the administration will move into damage control mode by disclosing a few insignificant &#8220;facts&#8221; as it camouflages the scope of these illegal programs and continues to conceal the identities of telecom lobbyists and their congressional partners in crime from public scrutiny.</p>
<p>This is nothing less than an updated version of a classic Washington &#8220;limited hangout.&#8221; The Obama administration&#8217;s Justice Department, similar to President Nixon&#8217;s sacrificial offering of close advisers to congressional investigators at the height of the Watergate scandal, will leverage these paltry &#8220;facts&#8221; into an opportunity to <em>appear</em> &#8220;transparent,&#8221; even as it continues to obfuscate, delay and deny; thus continuing the cover-up.</p>
<p>House legal counsel Irv Nathan informed relevant congressional committees that the White House Counsel&#8217;s Office agreed to &#8220;provide lawmakers and their staffs with copies of the records being prepared for release in connection with a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by an internet-focused civil liberties group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation.&#8221;</p>
<p><em>Politico</em> reported that &#8220;the move could also be a litigating tactic to surrender some of the less sensitive information in the case in order to bolster the government&#8217;s credibility for a determined attempt to protect the most sensitive data: the names of the companies which were seeking immunity.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to Nathan, the Justice Department plans &#8220;to renew its motion for a stay in the Court of Appeals limited to a very small number of documents, not including the communications with Congress.&#8221;</p>
<p>Among the details leaked to <em>Politico</em>, Nathan wrote House leaders: &#8220;We understand that there are few, if any, communications from Members that are in the materials. &#8230; We have been previously advised that there is nothing very disturbing or embarrassing <em>in these particular communications</em>, but a generalized worry about the precedent this sets for future inter-branch communications.&#8221; (emphasis added)</p>
<p>Unfortunately, neither Mr. Nathan nor <em>Politico</em> have revealed what might prove &#8220;very disturbing or embarrassing&#8221; to members of Congress in the documents the Obama administration plans to withhold.</p>
<p>If past lobbying practices are a signpost for the present, one can hazard an informed guess and conclude that Congress and their Executive Branch counterparts have much to hide.</p>
<p>According to the Center for Responsive Politics OpenSecrets.org database, lobbying by the Telecom Service &amp; Equipment <a href="http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=B09&amp;year=a">sector</a>, the Telephone Utilities <a href="http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=B08&amp;year=a">sector</a> and the Computer/Internet <a href="http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=B12&amp;year=a">sector</a> amounted to <em>hundreds of millions of dollars</em> paid out to congressional grifters between 1998-2009.</p>
<p>Indeed, the &#8220;big four&#8221; firms caught-up in the warrantless wiretapping scandal have showered Congress with millions in payouts. According to OpenSecrets.org, AT&amp;T contributed some $8,191,618; Verizon Communications showered some $6,830,000; Qualcomm Inc. handed over $3,080,000; Qwest Communications $1,829,542 and Sprint/Nextel coughed-up some $1,306,000 to &#8220;our&#8221; representatives. By any standard, this is serious money by powerful constituencies not to be trifled with.</p>
<p>Like their Republican colleagues across the aisle, the Democrats have operated a revolving door between powerful corporations, financial institutions and secret state agencies, under the guise of bringing entrepreneurial expertise into government and &#8220;security&#8221; for our nation&#8217;s citizens.</p>
<p>They do neither.</p>
<p>Something as trivial as the rights of the American people to speak their minds, protest endless imperialist wars of aggression, the looting of the economy and the degradation of the environment for profit will however, continue to come under the lens of an out-of-control national security state committed to facilitating the greasing of various palms well into the future.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>FBI Data-Mining Programs Resurrect &#8220;Total Information Awareness&#8221;</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/10/fbi-data-mining-programs-resurrect-total-information-awareness/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/10/fbi-data-mining-programs-resurrect-total-information-awareness/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2009 16:00:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Anti-war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democrats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FBI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal/Constitutional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military/Militarism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIFA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Total Information Awareness]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=10907</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Like a vampire rising from it&#8217;s grave each night to feed on the privacy rights of Americans, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is moving forward with programs that drain the life blood from our constitutional liberties.
From the wholesale use of informants and provocateurs to stifle political dissent, to Wi-Fi hacking and viral computer spyware to [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Like a vampire rising from it&#8217;s grave each night to feed on the privacy rights of Americans, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is moving forward with programs that drain the life blood from our constitutional liberties.</p>
<p>From the wholesale use of <a href="http://www.brandondarby.com/">informants</a> and <a href="http://nigelparry.com/news/sentencing-david-mckay.shtml">provocateurs</a> to stifle political dissent, to <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/more-fbi-hackin/">Wi-Fi hacking</a> and viral computer <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/fbi-spyware-pro/">spyware</a> to follow our every move, the FBI has turned massive data-mining of personal information into a growth industry. In the process they are building the surveillance state long been dreamed of by American securocrats.</p>
<p>A chilling new <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/fbi-nsac/">report</a> by investigative journalist Ryan Singel provides startling details of how the FBI&#8217;s National Security Branch Analysis Center (NSAC) is quietly morphing into the Total Information Awareness (TIA) system of convicted Iran-Contra felon, Admiral John M. Poindexter. According to <a href="http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/09/nsac_funding_2008.pdf">documents</a> obtained by <em>Wired</em>:</p>
<blockquote><p>A fast-growing FBI data-mining system billed as a tool for hunting terrorists is being used in hacker and domestic criminal investigations, and now contains tens of thousands of records from private corporate databases, including car-rental companies, large hotel chains and at least one national department store. (Ryan Singel, &#8220;FBI&#8217;s Data-Mining System Sifts Airline, Hotel, Car-Rental Records,&#8221; <em>Wired</em>, September 23, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>Among the latest revelations of out-of-control secret state spookery, <em>Wired</em> disclosed that personal details on customers have been provided to the Bureau by the Wyndham Worldwide hotel chain &#8220;which includes Ramada Inn, Days Inn, Super 8, Howard Johnson and Hawthorn Suites.&#8221; Additional records were obtained from the Avis rental car company and Sears department stores.</p>
<p>Singel reports that the Bureau is planning a massive expansion of NSAC, one that would enlarge the scope, and mission, of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) and the file-crunching, privacy-killing Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW).</p>
<p>&#8220;Among the items on its wish list,&#8221; Singel writes, &#8220;is the database of the Airlines Reporting Corporation&#8211;a company that runs a backend system for travel agencies and airlines.&#8221; If federal snoops should obtain ARC&#8217;s data-sets, the FBI would have unlimited access to &#8220;billions of American&#8217;s itineraries, as well as the information they give to travel agencies, such as date of birth, credit card numbers, names of friends and family, e-mail addresses, meal preferences and health information.&#8221;</p>
<p>The publication reports that the system &#8220;is both a meta-search engine&#8211;querying many data sources at once&#8211;and a tool that performs pattern and link analysis.&#8221; Internal FBI documents reveal that despite growing criticism of the alleged &#8220;science&#8221; of data-mining, including a stinging 2008 <a href="http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22285/Protecting_Individual_Privacy.pdf">report</a> by the prestigious National Research Council, for all intents and purposes the Bureau will transform NSAC into a low-key version of Adm. Poindexter&#8217;s Information Awareness Office. An internal FBI document provides a preview of the direction NSAC will take.</p>
<blockquote><p>According to the General Accounting Office (GAO) May 2004 report on federal data mining efforts, the GAO defined data mining as &#8220;the application of database technology&#8211;to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future results&#8221; (GAO-05-866, Data Mining p. 4). There are a number of security and privacy issues that government and private industry must address when contemplating the use of technology and data in these ways. While the current activities and efforts of the IDW and FTTTF programs do not provide NSB [National Security Branch] users with the full level of data mining services as defined above <em>it is the intention of the NSAC to pursue and refine these capabilities</em> where permitted by statute and policy. The implementation and responsible utilization of these services will advance the FBI&#8217;s ability to address national security threats in a timely fashion, uncover previously unknown patterns and trends and empower agents and analysts to better &#8220;hunt between the cases&#8221; to find those persons, places or things of investigative and intelligence interest. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, &#8220;Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Internal Planning &amp; Budget Review, Program Narrative for Enhancements/Increases,&#8221; p. 5, emphasis added)</p></blockquote>
<p>Unsurprisingly, in their quest for increased funding FBI officials failed to mention that the 2004 GAO <a href="http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/gao_dm_rpt.pdf">report</a> raised significant and troubling questions glossed over by securocrats. To wit, GAO investigators averred:</p>
<blockquote><p>Privacy concerns about mined or analyzed personal data also include concerns about the quality and accuracy of the mined data; the use of the data for other than the original purpose for which the data were collected without the consent of the individual; the protection of the data against unauthorized access, modification, or disclosure; and the right of individuals to know about the collection of personal information, how to access that information, and how to request a correction of inaccurate information. (General Accounting Office, Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a Wide Range of Uses, GAO-04-548, May 2004)</p></blockquote>
<p>Despite these concerns, an FBI budget <a href="http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/09/nsac_misc.pdf">document</a> released to <em>Wired</em> baldly states:</p>
<blockquote><p>The NSAC will provide subject-based &#8220;link analysis&#8221; through utilization of the FBI&#8217;s collection data sets, combined with public records on predicated subjects. Link analysis uses these data sets to find links between subjects, suspects, and addresses or other pieces of relevant information, and other persons, places, and things. This technique is currently being used on a limited basis by the FBI; the NSAC will provide improved processes and greater access to this technique to all NSB components. The NSAC will also pursue &#8220;pattern analysis&#8221; as part of its service to the NSB. &#8220;Pattern analysis&#8221; queries take a predictive model or pattern of behavior and search for that pattern in data sets. The FBI&#8217;s efforts to define predictive models and patterns of behavior should improve efforts to identify &#8220;sleeper cells.&#8221; Information produced through data exploitation will be processed by analysts who are experts in the use of this information and used to produce products that comply with requirements for the proper handling of the information. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, &#8220;National Security Branch Analytical Capabilities,&#8221; November 12, 2008)</p></blockquote>
<p>Four years after the GAO report cited the potential for abuse inherent in such techniques, The National Research Council&#8217;s exhaustive study criticized the alleged ability of data-miners to discover hidden &#8220;patterns&#8221; and &#8220;trends&#8221; among disparate data-sets &#8220;precisely because so little is known about what patterns indicate terrorist activity; as a result, they are likely to generate huge numbers of false leads.&#8221;</p>
<p>False leads that may very well land an innocent person on a terrorist watch-list or as a subject of a wide-ranging and unwarranted national security investigation. But as with all things relating to &#8220;counterterrorism,&#8221; the guilt or innocence of the average citizen is a trifling matter while moves to &#8220;empower agents&#8221; to &#8220;find those persons, places or things of investigative and intelligence interest,&#8221; is the paramount goal. &#8220;Justice&#8221; under such a system becomes another preemptive &#8220;tool&#8221; subject to the whims of our political masters.</p>
<p>The use of federal dollars for such a dubious and questionable enterprise has already had real-world consequences for political activists. Just ask RNC Welcoming Committee activists currently under indictment in Minnesota for their role in organizing legal protests against the far-right Republican National Convention last year in St. Paul.</p>
<p>As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/02/targeting-rnc-welcoming-committee-case.html">revealed</a> earlier this year, one private security outfit, the now-defunct Highway Watch which worked closely with the FBI, used &#8220;social network theory&#8221; and &#8220;link analysis,&#8221; and cited the group&#8217;s legal political organizing, including &#8220;increased membership via the internet&#8221; and &#8220;public appearances at various locations across the US,&#8221; as a significant factor that rendered the group a &#8220;legitimate&#8221; target for heightened surveillance and COINTELPRO-style disruption.</p>
<p>Singel also disclosed that NSAC shared data &#8220;with the Pentagon&#8217;s controversial Counter-Intelligence Field Activity office, a secretive domestic-spying unit which collected data on peace groups, including the Quakers, until it was shut down in 2008. But the FBI told lawmakers it would be careful in its interactions with that group.&#8221;</p>
<p>As journalists and congressional investigators subsequently revealed however, CIFA&#8217;s dark heart&#8211;the office&#8217;s mammoth databases&#8211;were off-loaded to other secret state security agencies, including the FBI.</p>
<p><strong>CIFA: Closed Down or Farmed Out?</strong></p>
<p>When CIFA ran aground after a series of media disclosures beginning in 2004, some critics believed that was the end of that. &#8220;From the beginning of its existence,&#8221; investigative journalist Tim Shorrock revealed in <em><a href="http://books.simonandschuster.com/9780743282246">Spies For Hire</a></em>, &#8220;CIFA had extensive authority to conduct domestic counterintelligence.&#8221;</p>
<p>Indeed, one CIFA official &#8220;was the deputy director of the FBI&#8217;s multiagency Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force,&#8221; Shorrock wrote, &#8220;and other CIFA officials were assigned to more than one hundred regional Joint Terrorism Task Forces where they served with other personnel from the Pentagon, as well as the FBI, state and local police, and the Department of Homeland Security.&#8221;</p>
<p>Several investigative reports in <em>Antifascist Calling</em> have documented the close interconnections among Pentagon spy agencies, the FBI, DHS, private contractors, local and state police in what have come to be known as fusion centers, which rely heavily on extensive data-mining operations.</p>
<p>Their role as clearinghouses for domestic intelligence will expand even further under President Obama&#8217;s purported &#8220;change&#8221; administration.</p>
<p><em>Federal Computer Week</em> <a href="http://fcw.com/articles/2009/09/30/web-new-dhs-fusion-center-office.aspx">revealed</a> September 30, that DHS &#8220;is establishing a new office to coordinate its intelligence-sharing efforts in state and local intelligence fusion centers.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to the publication, a &#8220;new Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office will be part of DHS&#8217; Office of Intelligence and Analysis, [DHS Secretary Janet] Napolitano told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Napolitano said she strongly supports the centers.&#8221;</p>
<p>Though little reported by the corporate media, domestic spying had become big business with some very powerful constituencies.</p>
<p>Take CIFA, for example. Ostensibly a Defense Department agency, the secretive office which once had a multi-billion dollar budget at its disposal, was a veritable cash cow for enterprising security grifters. Much has been made of the corrupt contracts forged by disgraced Pentagon contractor Mitchell Wade and his MZM corporation, caught up in the &#8220;Duke&#8221; Cunningham scandal that landed the San Diego Republican congressman an eight-year federal prison term in 2006. Untouched however, by the outcry over domestic Pentagon spying were top-flight defense and security firms who lent their considerable resources&#8211;at a steep price&#8211;to the office.</p>
<p>Among the corporations who contracted out analysts and operatives to CIFA were heavy hitters such as Lockheed Martin, Carlyle Group subsidiary U.S. Investigations Services, Analex, Inc., an intelligence contractor owned by the U.K.&#8217;s QinetiQ, ManTech International, the Harris Corporation, SRA International, as well as General Dynamics, CACI International and the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). All told, these corporations reap tens of billions of dollars annually in federal largesse.</p>
<p>As Shorrock revealed, by 2006 CIFA &#8220;had four hundred full-time employees and eight hundred to nine hundred contractors working for it.&#8221; Many were military intelligence and security analysts who jumped ship to land lucrative six-figure contracts in the burgeoning homeland security market, as the whistleblowing web site <a href="http://www.wikileaks.org/">Wikileaks</a> revealed in July when they <a href="http://88.80.16.63/leak/wajac-outsourcing-2008.pdf">published</a> a massive 1525-page file on just <em>one</em> fusion center.</p>
<p>Information illegally obtained on American citizens by CIFA came to reside in the office&#8217;s Threat And Local Observation Notice (TALON) system and a related database known as CORNERSTONE.</p>
<p>In 2007, the National Security Archive published Pentagon <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB230/index.htm">documents</a> outlining U.S. Northern Command&#8217;s (USNORTHCOM) extensive surveillance activities that targeted legal political protests organized by antiwar activists. In April 2007, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Lt. General James Clapper, &#8220;reviewed the results of the TALON program&#8221; and concluded &#8220;he did not believe they merit continuing the program as currently constituted.&#8221;</p>
<p>Despite revelations that CIFA and USNORTHCOM had illegally conducted prohibited activities in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, which restricts the military from carrying out domestic law enforcement, not a <em>single</em> operative or program manager was brought to book. According to The National Security Archive:</p>
<blockquote><p>In June 2007, the Department of Defense Inspector General released the results of his review of the TALON reporting program. Its findings included the observation that CIFA and the Northern Command &#8220;legally gathered and maintained U.S. person information on individuals or organizations involved in domestic protests and demonstrations against DOD&#8221;&#8211;information gathered for law enforcement and force protection purposes as permitted by Defense Department directive (5200.27) on the &#8220;Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.&#8221; However, CIFA did not comply with the 90-day retention review policy specified by that directive and the CORNERSTONE database did not have the capability to identify TALON reports with U.S. person information, to identify reports requiring a 90-day retention review, or allow analysts to edit or delete the TALON reports.</p>
<p>In August the Defense Department announced that it would shut down the CORNERSTONE database on September 17, with information subsequently collected on potential terror or security threats to Defense Department facilities or personnel being sent to an FBI data base known as GUARDIAN. A department spokesman said the database was being terminated because &#8220;the analytical value had declined,&#8221; not due to public criticism, and that the Pentagon was hoping to establish a new system&#8211;not necessarily a database&#8211;to &#8220;streamline&#8221; threat reporting, according to a statement released by the Department&#8217;s public affairs office. (Jeffrey Richelson, &#8220;The Pentagon&#8217;s Counterspies: The Counterintelligence Field Activity,&#8221; The National Security Archive, September 17, 2007)</p></blockquote>
<p>Last year <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2008/08/cifa-closes-pentagon-opens-new-spy-shop.html">reported</a> that when CIFA was shut down, that organization&#8217;s TALON database was off-loaded to the Defense Intelligence Agency&#8217;s Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center and the FBI&#8217;s GUARDIAN database that resides in the Bureau&#8217;s Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW).</p>
<p>The IDW is a massive repository for data-mining. As I <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/05/fbis-department-of-precrime.html">reported</a> in May, citing the Electronic Frontier Foundation&#8217;s <a href="http://www.eff.org/issues/foia/investigative-data-warehouse-report">revelations</a>, the IDW possesses something on the order of 1.5 billion searchable files. In comparison, the entire Library of Congress contains 138 million unique documents.</p>
<p>EFF has called the IDW &#8220;the FBI&#8217;s single largest repository of operational and intelligence information.&#8221;</p>
<p>In 2005, FBI Section Chief Michael Morehart said that &#8220;IDW is a centralized, web-enabled, closed system repository for intelligence and investigative data.&#8221; Unidentified FBI agents have described it as &#8220;one-stop shopping&#8221; for FBI agents and an &#8220;uber-Google.&#8221; According to the Bureau, &#8220;[t]he IDW system provides data storage, database management, search, information presentation, and security services.&#8221;</p>
<p>As the <em>Wired</em> investigation reveals, NSAC intends to expand these data-mining capabilities. Currently, NSAC employs &#8220;103 full-time employees and contractors, and the FBI was seeking budget approval for another 71 employees, plus more than $8 million for outside contractors to help analyze its growing pool of private and public data.&#8221; Long-term, according to a planning document, the FBI &#8220;wants to expand the center to 439 people.&#8221;</p>
<p>While John Poindexter&#8217;s Total Information Awareness program may have disappeared along with the Bush administration, it&#8217;s toxic heart lives on in the National Security Branch Analysis Center.</p>
<p><strong>TIA, IDW, NSAC: What&#8217;s in an Acronym? Plenty!</strong></p>
<p>When the Pentagon&#8217;s Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (<a href="http://www.darpa.mil/">DARPA</a>) stood up the Information Awareness Office in 2002, the office&#8217;s stated mission was to gather as much information on American citizens as possible and store it in a centralized, meta-database for perusal by secret state agencies.</p>
<p>Information included in the massive data-sets by IAO included internet activity, credit card purchase histories, airline ticket purchases and travel itineraries, rental car records, medical histories, educational transcripts, driver&#8217;s licenses, social security numbers, utility bills, tax returns, indeed any searchable record imaginable.</p>
<p>As <em>Wired</em> reported, these are the data-sets that NSAC plans to exploit.</p>
<p>When Congress killed the DARPA program in 2004, most critics believed that was the end of the Pentagon&#8217;s leap back into domestic intelligence. However, as we have since learned, the data-mining portion of the program was farmed out to a host of state agencies, including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI.</p>
<p>Needless to say, private sector involvement&#8211;and lucrative contracts&#8211;for TIA projects included usual suspects such as Booz Allen Hamilton, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, The Analysis Group and SAIC, as well as a number of low-key firms such as 21st Century Technologies, Inc., Evolving Logic, Global InfoTech, Inc., and the Orwellian-sounding Fund For Peace.</p>
<p>These firms, and many more, are current NSAC contractors; to all intents and purposes TIA now resides deep inside the Bureau&#8217;s Investigative Data Warehouse and NSAC&#8217;s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.</p>
<p>While the FBI claims that unlike TIA, NSAC is not &#8220;open-ended&#8221; and that a &#8220;mission is usually begun with a list of names or personal identifiers that have arisen during a threat assessment, preliminary or full investigation,&#8221; <em>Wired</em> reports that &#8220;the FBI&#8217;s pre-crime intentions are much wider that the bureau acknowledged.&#8221;</p>
<p>This will inevitably change&#8211;and not for the better&#8211;as NSAC expands its brief and secures an ever-growing mountain of data at an exponential rate. In this endeavor, they will be aided by the U.S. Senate.</p>
<p>With three provisions of the draconian Patriot Act set to expire at years&#8217; end, the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VI) and Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), a member of the committee and chairwoman of the powerful Senate Intelligence Committee, stripped-away privacy protections to proposed legislation that would extend the provisions.</p>
<p>Caving-in to pressure from the FBI which claims that protecting Americans&#8217; privacy rights from out-of-control spooks would jeopardize &#8220;ongoing&#8221; terror investigations, Leahy gutted the safeguards he had espoused just last week!</p>
<p>Claiming that his own proposal might hinder open-ended &#8220;terror&#8221; investigations Leahy said at the hearing, &#8220;I&#8217;m trying to introduce balances on both sides.&#8221; The original amendment would have curtailed Bureau fishing expeditions and would have required an actual connection of investigated parties to terrorism or foreign espionage.</p>
<p>Leahy was referring to Section 215 of the Patriot Act that allows the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to authorize broad warrants for nearly any type of record, including those held by banks, libraries, internet service providers, credit card companies, even doctors of &#8220;persons of interest.&#8221;</p>
<p>An amendment offered by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL) to repeal the Leahy-Feinstein amendment was defeated in committee by a 4-15 vote. As the Senator from the FBI, Feinstein said that the Bureau did not support Durbin&#8217;s amendment. &#8220;It would end several classified and critical investigations,&#8221; she said. Or perhaps Durbin&#8217;s amendment would have lowered the boom on a host of illegal programs across the 16-agency U.S. &#8220;Intelligence Community.&#8221;</p>
<p>As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/07/was-dr-david-kelly-target-of-dick.html">reported</a> in July, a 38-page <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/IGTSPReport090710.pdf">declassified report</a> by inspectors general of the CIA, NSA, Department of Justice, Department of Defense and the Office of National Intelligence collectively called the acknowledged &#8220;Terrorist Surveillance Program&#8221; and cross-agency top secret &#8220;Other Intelligence Activities&#8221; the &#8220;President&#8217;s Surveillance Program,&#8221; PSP.</p>
<p>The IG&#8217;s report failed to disclose what these programs actually did, and probably still do today under the Obama administration. Shrouded beneath impenetrable layers of secrecy and deceit, these undisclosed programs lie at the dark heart of the state&#8217;s war against the American people.</p>
<p>The Department of Justice&#8217;s Office of Inspector General (OIG) described FBI participation in the PSP as that of a passive &#8220;recipient of intelligence collected under the program&#8221; and efforts by the Bureau &#8220;to improve cooperation with the NSA to enhance the usefulness of PSP-derived information to FBI agents.&#8221;</p>
<p>The OIG goes on to state that &#8220;further details about these topics are classified and therefore cannot be discussed here.&#8221; As <em>The New York Times</em> revealed earlier this year in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html">April</a> and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/us/17nsa.html">June</a>, the NSA&#8217;s STELLAR WIND and PINWALE internet and email text intercept programs are giant data-mining meta-databases that sift emails, faxes, and text messages of millions of people in the United States.</p>
<p>Far from being mere passive spectators, the FBI&#8217;s Investigative Data Warehouse continues to be a major recipient of NSA&#8217;s STELLAR WIND and PINWALE programs. As Marc Ambinder reported in <em><a href="http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/06/pinwale_and_the_new_nsa_revelations.php">The Atlantic</a></em> PINWALE is &#8220;an unclassified proprietary term used to refer to advanced data-mining software that the government uses. Contractors who do SIGINT mining work often include a familiarity with Pinwale as a prerequisite for certain jobs.&#8221;</p>
<p>As the Electronic Frontier Foundation&#8217;s report on the IDW revealed, the FBI closely worked with SAIC, Convera and Chiliad to develop the project. Indeed, as EFF discovered &#8220;The FBI set up an Information Sharing Policy Group (ISPG), chaired by the Executive Assistant Directors of Administration and Intelligence, to review requests to ingest additional datasets into the IDW, in response to Congressional &#8216;privacy concerns that may arise from FBI engaging in &#8216;data mining.&#8217; In February 2005, the Counterterrorism Division asked for <a href="http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/foia_idw/20080408_idw02-datasetsapproved.pdf">8 more data sources</a>.&#8221; The names of the data sources were redacted in three of the eight datasets reviewed by EFF while three came from the Department of Homeland Security.</p>
<p>All of which begs the question: what is the FBI hiding behind it&#8217;s reorganization of the FTTTF and IDW into the National Security Branch Analysis Center? What role does the National Security Agency and private contractors play in standing-up NSAC? And why, as EFF disclosed, is the Bureau fearful of including Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) that might raise &#8220;congressional consciousness levels and expectations&#8221; in the context of Bureau &#8220;national security systems&#8221;?</p>
<p>Indeed, as the American Civil Liberties Union <a href="http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/41144prs20090924.html">stated</a>, &#8220;once again, the FBI has been found to be using invasive &#8216;counterterrorism&#8217; tools to collect personal information about innocent Americans,&#8221; and it &#8220;appears that the FBI has continued its habit of gathering bulk amounts of personal information with little or no oversight.&#8221;</p>
<p>Not that congressional grifters and their corporate cronies, who have much to gain from billions of federal dollars pumped into these intrusive programs, actually care to explore what becomes of data illegally collected on innocent Americans by NSAC.</p>
<p>The civil liberties watchdog concludes they have &#8220;long suspected that the congressional dissent over and public demise of the Pentagon&#8217;s TIA program would result in a concealed and more invasive version of the program.&#8221;</p>
<p><em>Plus ça change, plus c&#8217;est la même chose</em>. Somewhere near Washington Admiral Poindexter is leaning back in his chair, filling his pipe and smiling&#8230;</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Obama Administration Moves to Keep Terror Watch-List Data Strictly Hush-Hush</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/09/obama-administration-moves-to-keep-terror-watch-list-data-strictly-hush-hush/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/09/obama-administration-moves-to-keep-terror-watch-list-data-strictly-hush-hush/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2009 16:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal/Constitutional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=10410</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[During his 2008 run for the presidency, Senator Barack Obama promised to reverse the Bush regime&#8217;s pathological penchant for secrecy and the illegal programs that flourished in darkness like so many poisonous mushrooms.
Administration backpedaling on promises to end the more onerous features of the Bush years betray, not so much Obama&#8217;s duplicity but rather, the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>During his 2008 run for the presidency, Senator Barack Obama promised to reverse the Bush regime&#8217;s pathological penchant for secrecy and the illegal programs that flourished in darkness like so many poisonous mushrooms.</p>
<p>Administration backpedaling on promises to end the more onerous features of the Bush years betray, not so much Obama&#8217;s duplicity but rather, the naïve and misplaced hope by his supporters that a <em>centrist Democrat</em> beholden to the corporate pirates and militarists who rule the roost, would actually do things any differently.</p>
<p>In areas of critical importance to civil libertarians, the Democratic regime continues to beef up Bushist programs and heighten government secrecy while limiting public accountability, particularly where the intelligence and security apparatus is concerned.</p>
<p>How else explain Obama&#8217;s plan, buried within the 2010 budget, to provide the <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fy2010_department_homeland/">Department of Homeland Security</a> an additional $260 million to hire thousands more state and regional intelligence analysts to staff already bloated and controversial fusion centers?</p>
<p>In this context, <em>The Washington Post</em> <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/05/AR2009090502240.html">reported</a> September 6 that the administration &#8220;wants to maintain the secrecy of terrorist watch-list information it routinely shares with federal, state and local agencies, a move that rights groups say would make it difficult for people who have been improperly included on such lists to challenge the government.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to the ACLU&#8217;s &#8220;<a href="http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/watchlistcounter.html">Watch List Counter</a>,&#8221; as of September 8 some 1.27 million names appear on the U.S. government&#8217;s terror list!</p>
<p><em>Post</em> reporter Ellen Nakashima writes that &#8220;intelligence officials are pressing for legislation that would exempt &#8216;terrorist identity information&#8217; from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.&#8221;</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the right-wing <em>Washington Times</em> <a href="http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/09/anti-secrecy-groups-disappointed-with-obama/">reported</a> September 9 that the anti-secrecy group, <a href="http://www.openthegovernment.org/">OpenThe Government.org</a> issued a new <a href="http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SecrecyRC_2009.pdf">report</a> challenging the administration to end the abusive practices of the Bush regime.</p>
<p>Patrice McDermott, the executive director of the group told the <em>Washington Times</em>, &#8220;This administration is continuing to use the enlarged executive powers of the Bush-Cheney administration.&#8221; In all areas where government transparency is essential for restoring democratic processes and the rule of law, the Obama administration has failed to deliver.</p>
<p>In essence the new Executive Branch initiative, spearheaded by the Democratic-controlled House and Senate Intelligence Committees would absolve &#8220;law enforcement agencies and intelligence &#8216;fusion centers,&#8217; which combine state and federal counterterrorism resources&#8221; from even minimal levels of accountability for individuals damaged by an improper listing on the government&#8217;s national security index.</p>
<p>Claiming that disclosure would risk &#8220;alerting terrorism suspects&#8221; that they&#8217;re on the secret state&#8217;s radar and &#8220;may help them evade surveillance,&#8221; Michael G. Birmingham, a spokesman for the spooky Office of the Director of National Intelligence (<a href="http://www.dni.gov/">ODNI</a>), told the <em>Post</em> that the &#8220;intelligence community&#8221; is seeking &#8220;adequate protection from disclosing terrorist identity information&#8221; to the public because &#8220;no [such] exemption currently exists under FOIA.&#8221;</p>
<p>Circular logic such as this of course, means in practice that intelligence operatives&#8211;both federal and private&#8211;are aiming to increase their reach into our lives by exempting their agents, or well-paid private contractors manning a growth-rich &#8220;terrorism industry,&#8221; from minimal standards of disclosure.</p>
<p>&#8220;The goal,&#8221; according to Birmingham, is to &#8220;keep sensitive unclassified information from unintended recipients, including terrorism suspects.&#8221; And if someone has been improperly classified a &#8220;terrorism suspect&#8221; and prevented from boarding a plane or obtaining employment? Well, tough luck!</p>
<p>And with criteria for watch-listing that is vague at best, the prospects of ever having yourself removed from one is an exercise in Kafkaesque futility. According to the FBI&#8217;s Terrorist Screening Center (<a href="http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterrorism/tsc.htm">TSC</a>), an individual lands on a watch-list if he or she is &#8220;known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.&#8221;</p>
<p>Ponder the phrase &#8220;in aid of, or related to terrorism.&#8221; What does <em>that</em> mean?</p>
<p>As I <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2008/10/are-you-violent-extremist-fbis.html">reported</a> in October, citing a document published by the intelligence web site <a href="http://cryptome.org/">Cryptome</a>, the FBI&#8217;s <a href="http://cryptome.org/fbi-ct-lexicon.pdf">Counterterrorism Analytical Lexicon</a> reveals the following:</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>US-Radicalized:</strong> A &#8220;US-radicalized&#8221; individual&#8217;s primary social influence has been the cultural values and beliefs of the United States and whose radicalization and indoctrination began or occurred primarily in the United States.</p>
<p><strong>Ideologue or propagandist:</strong> An &#8220;ideologue&#8221; or &#8220;propagandist&#8221; establishes, promotes, or disseminates justifications for violent extremism, often through manipulation of primary text materials such as religious texts or historical accounts that establish grievances. He or she may not have strong links to any terrorist organization or be integrated into an organization&#8217;s command structure. Unless he or she directly advocates specific acts of violence, much of such an individual&#8217;s activity might be constitutionally protected. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Analytical Lexicon,&#8221; Washington, D.C., no date, pp. 4-5)</p></blockquote>
<p>This covers a lot of ground. Would an anarchist, socialist or environmental critic of current U.S. policies, such as the escalation of America&#8217;s imperialist intervention in Afghanistan or West Virginia mountaintop removal for quick extraction of coal for example, fall into the category of an &#8220;ideologue&#8221; since his or her &#8220;activity might be constitutionally protected&#8221;?</p>
<p>And what about the equally suspect term &#8220;propagandist&#8221;? Would an historian or journalist for example, who cites primary source materials published by the CIA or the oxymoronic National Endowment for Democracy, and then builds a case that the United States attempted the 2002 overthrow of the Chávez government in Venezuela, thereby stand accused of &#8220;manipulating historical accounts&#8221; and fall under the FBI&#8217;s spotlight? And what if that person were subsequently watch-listed? What recourse would he or she have at discovering who their accusers were?</p>
<p>If the Executive Branch&#8217;s legislative proposal passes muster in the House and Senate, they&#8217;ll probably never know.</p>
<p><strong>An Insatiable Surveillance Beast: Fusion Centers</strong></p>
<p>Feeding the monstrosity known as the Terrorist Screening Center is the National Counterterrorism Center&#8217;s (<a href="http://www.nctc.gov/">NCTC</a>) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (<a href="http://www.nctc.gov/docs/Tide_Fact_Sheet.pdf">TIDE</a>), a vast database of names powering the surveillance state.</p>
<p>&#8220;Every evening&#8221; according to an NCTC Fact Sheet, &#8220;TIDE analysts export a sensitive but unclassified subset of the data containing the terrorist identifiers to the FBI&#8217;s Terrorist Screening Center&#8221; as well as to the Transportation Security Administration for inclusion on TSA&#8217;s &#8220;No Fly&#8221; list and the Department of State&#8217;s visa database of individuals to be denied entry into the U.S.</p>
<p>Information on &#8220;domestic terrorists&#8221; and &#8220;violent extremists&#8221; are provided to TSC and TIDE by the FBI, CIA, NSA, U.S. Northern Command and some 70 fusion centers scattered across the country. The <em>Post</em> article specifically states that state and local police agencies and fusion centers would be exempt from reporting &#8220;terrorist identity information&#8221; currently available under the Freedom of Information Act.</p>
<p>As the American Civil Liberties Union revealed in a series of troubling <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf">reports</a>, fusion centers are &#8220;state, local and regional institutions [that] were originally created to improve the sharing of anti-terrorism intelligence among different state, local and federal law enforcement agencies.&#8221;</p>
<p>However, ACLU researchers Michael German and Jay Stanley revealed &#8220;the scope of their mission quickly expanded&#8211;with the support and encouragement of the federal government&#8211;to cover &#8216;all crimes and all hazards.&#8217;&#8221;</p>
<p>Ominously for privacy and individual rights, &#8220;the types of information they seek for analysis has also broadened over time to include not just criminal intelligence, but public and private sector data, and participation in these centers has grown to include not just law enforcement, but other government entities, the military and even select members of the private sector.&#8221;</p>
<p>German and Stanley identified serious problems with these largely unaccountable intelligence-gathering bureaucracies:</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>• Ambiguous Lines of Authority.</strong> The participation of agencies from multiple jurisdictions in fusion centers allows the authorities to manipulate differences in federal, state and local laws to maximize information collection while evading accountability and oversight through the practice of &#8220;policy shopping.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>• Private Sector Participation.</strong> Fusion centers are incorporating private-sector corporations into the intelligence process, breaking down the arm&#8217;s length relationship that protects the privacy of innocent Americans who are employees or customers of these companies, and increasing the risk of a data breach.</p>
<p><strong>• Military Participation.</strong> Fusion centers are involving military personnel in law enforcement activities in troubling ways.</p>
<p><strong>• Data Fusion = Data Mining.</strong> Federal fusion center guidelines encourage wholesale data collection and manipulation processes that threaten privacy.</p>
<p><strong>• Excessive Secrecy.</strong> Fusion centers are hobbled by excessive secrecy, which limits public oversight, impairs their ability to acquire essential information and impedes their ability to fulfill their stated mission, bringing their ultimate value into doubt. (Michael German and Jay Stanley, <em>What&#8217;s Wrong With Fusion Centers?</em>, American Civil Liberties Union, December 2007)</p></blockquote>
<p>In their 2008 follow-up <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusion_update_20080729.pdf">report</a>, German and Stanley wrote that &#8220;it is becoming increasingly clear that fusion centers are part of a new domestic intelligence apparatus.&#8221; They revealed that &#8220;elements of this nascent domestic surveillance system&#8221; include:</p>
<blockquote><p>• Watching and recording the everyday activities of an ever-growing list of individuals<br />
• Channeling the flow of the resulting reports into a centralized security agency<br />
• Sifting through (&#8221;data mining&#8221;) these reports and databases with computers to identify individuals for closer scrutiny</p>
<p>Such a system, if allowed to permeate our society, would be nothing less than the creation of a total surveillance society. (Michael German and Jay Stanley, <em>Fusion Center Update</em>, American Civil Liberties Union, July 2008)</p></blockquote>
<p>Driving home the point that pervasive surveillance has real-world consequences, not least of all in terms of limiting public accountability, the Center for Investigative Reporting (<a href="http://www.centerforinvestigativereporting.org/">CIR</a>) disclosed during their investigation into police state tactics during last year&#8217;s Democratic and Republican National Conventions in Denver and St. Paul, that local authorities, federal agencies and private corporations, sought to suppress information on their activities.</p>
<p>Investigative journalist G.W. Schulz revealed that Denver officials &#8220;refused a public-records request sent by CIR.&#8221; The close proximity of USNORTHCOM&#8217;s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in nearby Colorado Springs, and their alleged participation in illegal intelligence gathering, may be one reason why Denver officials were less than forthcoming. In an echo of the current debate in Washington, Schulz <a href="http://centerforinvestigativereporting.org/articles/arethingsanydifferentindenver">reported</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>The Colorado Information Analysis Center is run by the state&#8217;s Department of Public Safety. In a response letter, Spokesman Lance Clem said that releasing the records would be contrary to the public interest and &#8220;not only would compromise [the] security and investigative practices of numerous law enforcement agencies but would also violate confidentiality agreements that have been made with private partner organizations and federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.&#8221; (G.W. Schulz, &#8220;Are Things Any Different in Denver?,&#8221; Center for Investigative Reporting, September 1, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>With a long-standing and well-documented history of illegal spying and infiltration of antiwar and other dissident groups by Denver police, it is clear that law enforcement repressors have much to hide.</p>
<p>CIR also <a href="http://www.centerforinvestigativereporting.org/articles/fightingcrimewithcomputersinminnesota">revealed</a> that Minnesota&#8217;s Joint Analysis Center (MJAC) and that state&#8217;s &#8220;ICEFISHX communications network, which collects reports about suspicious activity,&#8221; closely coordinated activist surveillance with both the FBI and &#8220;authorities in the neighboring states of North Dakota and South Dakota.&#8221; An additional layer of unaccountability and secrecy was added to the mix when CIR disclosed that corporate spies also contribute information to fusion centers.</p>
<blockquote><p>Private corporations even contribute &#8220;intelligence&#8221; to ICEFISHX. Douglas Reynolds, security director for the Mall of America, the largest retail complex in the United States based in Bloomington, described his office to Congress in July of 2008 as the &#8220;number one source of actionable intelligence in the state,&#8221; having handed more information regarding suspicious activities to the fusion center than anyone else. Several attempts to reach Reynolds for elaboration failed. (G.W. Schulz, &#8220;Fighting Crime with Computers in Minnesota,&#8221; Center for Investigative Reporting, September 1, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>The nexus among state spies and capitalist grifters point to an ongoing process whereby public, democratic institutions are systematically hollowed-out in favor of a perverse subversion of the public&#8217;s <em>right to know</em> into yet another <em>proprietary commercial secret</em>.</p>
<p>Encompassing all relationships in a social order mediated by a zero sum game where profit is king and the devil take the hindmost, the only meaningful exchange recognized by the system is the sterile transfer of cash from one palm to another.</p>
<p>Is it any wonder then that the Obama administration, like their Bushist predecessors seek to conceal these illegal surveillance programs from the American people by exempting their most egregious features, the neo-McCarthyite watch-list, from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act?</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Obama Administration Seeks &#8220;Emergency Control&#8221; of the Internet</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/08/obama-administration-seeks-emergency-control-of-the-internet/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/08/obama-administration-seeks-emergency-control-of-the-internet/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 29 Aug 2009 16:00:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democrats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal/Constitutional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military/Militarism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=10172</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[You have to hand it to congressional Democrats. Mendacious grifters whose national security agenda is virtually indistinguishable from Bushist Republicans, when it comes to rearranging proverbial deck chairs on the Titanic, the party of &#8220;change&#8221; is second to none in the &#8220;all terrorism all the time&#8221; department.
While promising to restore the &#8220;rule of law,&#8221; &#8220;protect [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You have to hand it to congressional Democrats. Mendacious grifters whose national security agenda is virtually indistinguishable from Bushist Republicans, when it comes to rearranging proverbial deck chairs on the Titanic, the party of &#8220;change&#8221; is second to none in the &#8220;all terrorism all the time&#8221; department.</p>
<p>While promising to restore the &#8220;rule of law,&#8221; &#8220;protect civil liberties&#8221; while &#8220;keeping America safe,&#8221; in practice, congressional Democrats like well-coiffed Republican clones across the aisle, are crafting legislation that would do Dick Cheney proud!</p>
<p>As the Cybersecurity Act of 2009 (<a href="http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s773/text">S.773</a>) wends its way through Congress, civil liberties&#8217; advocates are decrying provisions that would hand the President unlimited power to disconnect private-sector computers from the internet.</p>
<p>CNET <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10320096-38.html">reported</a> August 28, that the latest iteration of the bill &#8220;would allow the president to &#8216;declare a cybersecurity emergency&#8217; relating to &#8216;non-governmental&#8217; computer networks and do what&#8217;s necessary to respond to the threat.&#8221;</p>
<p>Drafted by Senators Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and Olympia Snowe (R-ME), &#8220;best friends forever&#8221; of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the telecommunications industry, they were key enablers of Bush-era warrantless wiretapping and privacy-killing data mining programs that continue apace under Obama.</p>
<p>As <em>The New York Times</em> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/us/17nsa.html">revealed</a> in June, a former NSA analyst described a secret database &#8220;code-named Pinwale, that archived foreign and domestic e-mail messages.&#8221; The former analyst &#8220;described being trained in 2005 for a program in which the agency routinely examined large volumes of Americans&#8217; e-mail messages without court warrants. Two intelligence officials confirmed that the program was still in operation.&#8221;</p>
<p><em>Antifascist Calling</em> has noted on more than one occasion, that with &#8220;cyberterrorism&#8221; morphing into al-Qaeda 2.0, administration policies designed to increase the scope of national security state surveillance of private communications will soon eclipse the intrusiveness of Bushist programs.</p>
<p>As Cindy Cohn, the Legal Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (<a href="http://www.eff.org/">EFF</a>) <a href="http://www.acslaw.org/node/13922">wrote</a> earlier this month, commenting on this summer&#8217;s public relations blitz by former NSA boss Michael Hayden and Office of Legal Counsel torture-enabler John Yoo&#8217;s defense of the so-called Presidential Surveillance Program,</p>
<blockquote><p>While the details are unknown, credible evidence indicates that billions of everyday communications of ordinary Americans are swept up by government computers and run through a process that includes both data-mining and review of content, to try to figure out whether any of us were involved in illegal or terrorist-related activity. That means that even the most personal and private of our electronic communications&#8211;between doctors and patients, between husbands and wives, or between children and parents&#8211;are subject to review by computer algorithms programmed by government bureaucrats or by the bureaucrats themselves. (Cindy Cohn, &#8220;Lawless Surveillance, Warrantless Rationales,&#8221; American Constitution Society, August 17, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>Both Rockefeller and Snowe are representative of the state&#8217;s &#8220;bipartisan consensus&#8221; when it comes to increasing the power of the intelligence and security apparatus and were instrumental in ramming through retroactive immunity for telecoms who illegally spy on the American people. If last year&#8217;s &#8220;debate&#8221; over the grotesque FISA Amendments Act (FAA) is an indication of how things will go after Congress&#8217; summer recess, despite hand-wringing by congressional &#8220;liberals,&#8221; S.773 seems destined for passage. CNET revealed:</p>
<blockquote><p>When Rockefeller, the chairman of the Senate Commerce committee, and Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) introduced the original bill in April, they claimed it was vital to protect national cybersecurity. &#8220;We must protect our critical infrastructure at all costs&#8211;from our water to our electricity, to banking, traffic lights and electronic health records,&#8221; Rockefeller said. (Declan McCullagh, &#8220;Bill Would Give President Emergency Control of Internet,&#8221; CNET News, August 28, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>But as we witness practically on a daily basis, hysterical demands for &#8220;protection&#8221; from various &#8220;dark actors&#8221; inevitably invokes an aggressive response from militarized state security apparatchiks and their private partners.</p>
<p>As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/07/behind-cyberattacks-on-america-and.html">reported</a> in July (see: &#8220;Behind the Cyberattacks on America and South Korea. &#8216;Rogue&#8217; Hacker, Black Op or Both?&#8221;), when North Korea was accused of launching a widespread computer attack on U.S. government, South Korean and financial web sites, right-wing terrorism and security specialists perched at <a href="http://www.stratfor.com/">Stratfor</a> and the American Enterprise Institute (<a href="http://www.aei.org/">AEI</a>)&#8211;without a shred of evidence&#8211;linked the cyber blitz to a flurry of missile tests and the underground detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea.</p>
<p>Adding to the noise, Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-MI), the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee went so far as to urge President Obama to respond&#8211;by launching a cyberattack against the bankrupt Stalinist regime.</p>
<p>Despite provocative rhetoric and false charges that might have led to war with disastrous consequences for the people of East Asia, as it turned out an unknown sociopath used an updated version of the MyDoom e-mail worm to deploy a botnet in the attack. As <em>Computerworld</em> <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9135369/Korea_DDOS_virus_mission_shifts_to_destroying_erasing_data?taxonomyId=17">reported</a>, the botnet &#8220;does not use typical antivirus evasion techniques and does not appear to have been written by a professional malware writer.&#8221; Hardly a clarion call for bombing Dear Leader and countless thousands of Koreans to smithereens!</p>
<p>In this context, the Cybersecurity Act of 2009 goes much further than protecting &#8220;critical infrastructure&#8221; from over-hyped cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Among other measures, Section 18, &#8220;Cybersecurity Responsibilities and Authority,&#8221; hands the Executive Branch, specifically The President, the power to &#8220;declare a cybersecurity emergency and order the limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any compromised Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure information system or network.&#8221; This does not simply apply to federal networks, but may very well extend to the private communications (&#8221;critical infrastructure information system or network&#8221;) of citizens who might organize against some egregious act by the state, say a nuclear strike against a nation deemed responsible for launching a cyberattack against the United States, as <a href="http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090512_4977.php">suggested</a> in May by the head of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) General Kevin Chilton.</p>
<p>As I <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/06/cyber-command-launched-us-strategic.html">reported</a> in June (see: &#8220;Cyber Command Launched. U.S. Strategic Command to Oversee Offensive Military Operations&#8221;), the military&#8217;s newly-launched U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is a &#8220;subordinate unified command&#8221; overseen by STRATCOM. Would &#8220;message force multipliers&#8221; embedded in the media or Pentagon public diplomacy specialists carrying out psychological operations (PSYOPS) here in the heimat, become the sole conduit for critical news and information during said &#8220;national emergency&#8221;?</p>
<p>Additionally, under Section 18&#8217;s authority The President &#8220;shall designate an agency to be responsible for coordinating the response and restoration of any Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure information system or network affected by a cybersecurity emergency declaration under paragraph (2).&#8221; What agency might Senator Rockefeller have in mind for &#8220;coordinating the response&#8221;? As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/04/pentagons-cyber-command-to-be-based-at.html">revealed</a> in April (see: &#8220;Pentagon&#8217;s Cyber Command to Be Based at NSA&#8217;s Fort Meade&#8221;), CYBERCOM will be based at NSA headquarters and led by Lt. General Keith Alexander, the current NSA director who will oversee Pentagon efforts to coordinate both defensive and offensive cyber operations.</p>
<p>How might an out-of-control Executive Branch seize the initiative during an alleged &#8220;national emergency&#8221;? Paragraph 6 spells this out in no uncertain terms: &#8220;The President may order the disconnection of any Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure information systems or networks in the interest of national security.&#8221;</p>
<p>The draconian bill has drawn a sharp rebuke from both civil libertarians and the telecommunications industry. Larry Clinton, the president of the Internet Security Alliance (<a href="http://www.isalliance.org/">ISA</a>) told CNET: &#8220;It is unclear what authority Sen. Rockefeller thinks is necessary over the private sector. Unless this is clarified, we cannot properly analyze, let alone support the bill.&#8221;</p>
<p>And Wayne Crews, the director of technology studies at the rightist Competitive Enterprise Institute (<a href="http://cei.org/">CEI</a>) told <em><a href="http://fcw.com/articles/2009/08/28/cybersecurity-bill-presidential-power.aspx">Federal Computer Week</a></em>: &#8220;From American telecommunications to the power grid, virtually anything networked to some other computer is potentially fair game to [President Barack] Obama to exercise &#8216;emergency powers&#8217;.&#8221;</p>
<p>True enough as far as it goes, these &#8220;free market&#8221; cheerleaders are extremely solicitous however, when it comes to government defense and security contracts that benefit their clients; so long as the public is spared the burden of exercising effective control as cold cash greases the sweaty palm of the market&#8217;s &#8220;invisible hand&#8221;!</p>
<p>As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/06/obamas-cybersecurity-plan-bring-in.html">revealed</a> in June (see: &#8220;Obama&#8217;s Cybersecurity Plan: Bring on the Contractors!&#8221;), the ISA is no ordinary lobby shop. According to a self-promotional blurb on their web site, ISA &#8220;was created to provide a forum for information sharing&#8221; and &#8220;represents corporate security interests before legislators and regulators.&#8221;</p>
<p>Amongst ISA sponsors one finds AIG (yes, <em>that</em> AIG!) Verizon, Raytheon, VeriSign, the National Association of Manufacturers, Nortel, Northrop Grumman, Tata, and Mellon. State partners include the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Congress, and the Department of Commerce.</p>
<p>Indeed ISA and CEI, are firm believers in the mantra that &#8220;the diversity of the internet places its security inescapably in the hands of the private sector,&#8221; and that &#8220;regulation for consumer protection&#8221; that rely on &#8220;government mandates&#8221; to &#8220;address cyber infrastructure issues&#8221; will be &#8220;ineffective and counter-productive both from a national security and economic perspective.&#8221; CEI and ISA&#8217;s solution? Let&#8217;s have another gulp of that tasty &#8220;market incentives&#8221; kool-aid!</p>
<p>In other words, hand over the cash in the form of taxpayer largess and we&#8217;ll happily (and profitably!) continue to violate the rights of the American people by monitoring their Internet communications and surveilling their every move through nifty apps hardwired into wireless devices as the Electronic Frontier Foundation revealed in a new <a href="http://www.eff.org/wp/locational-privacy">report</a> on locational privacy.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, Clinton, Crews and their well-heeled partners seem to have forgotten an elementary lesson of history: a national security state such as ours will invariably unwind its tentacles into every corner of life unless challenged by a countervailing force&#8211;a pissed-off, mobilized citizenry.</p>
<p>Now that national security &#8220;change&#8221; chickens are coming home to roost, both CEI and ISA seem incredulous: you mean <em>us</em>? How&#8217;s that for irony!</p>
<p>Lee Tien, a senior staff attorney with EFF told CNET that changes to the original version of the bill do not address pressing privacy concerns.</p>
<p>Tien told the publication: &#8220;The language has changed but it doesn&#8217;t contain any real additional limits. It simply switches the more direct and obvious language they had originally to the more ambiguous (version)&#8230;The designation of what is a critical infrastructure system or network as far as I can tell has no specific process. There&#8217;s no provision for any administrative process or review. That&#8217;s where the problems seem to start. And then you have the amorphous powers that go along with it.&#8221;</p>
<p>McCullagh avers: &#8220;Translation: If your company is deemed &#8216;critical,&#8217; a new set of regulations kick in involving who you can hire, what information you must disclose, and when the government would exercise control over your computers or network.&#8221;</p>
<p>And there you have it, a &#8220;cybersecurity&#8221; blacklist to accompany a potential state takeover of the Internet during a &#8220;national emergency.&#8221; What will they think of next!</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Pervasive Surveillance Continuing Under Obama</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/pervasive-surveillance-continuing-under-obama-new-dhs-nsa-att-cybersecurity-partnership/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/pervasive-surveillance-continuing-under-obama-new-dhs-nsa-att-cybersecurity-partnership/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2009 16:02:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military/Militarism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Under the rubric of cybersecurity, the Obama administration is moving forward with a Bush regime program to screen state computer traffic on private-sector networks, including those connecting people to the Internet, The Washington Post revealed July 3.
That project, code-named &#8220;Einstein,&#8221; may very well be related to the much-larger, ongoing and highly illegal National Security Agency [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Under the rubric of cybersecurity, the Obama administration is moving forward with a Bush regime program to screen state computer traffic on private-sector networks, including those connecting people to the Internet, <em>The Washington Post</em> <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/02/AR2009070202771.html">revealed</a> July 3.</p>
<p>That project, code-named &#8220;Einstein,&#8221; may very well be related to the much-larger, ongoing and highly illegal National Security Agency (NSA) communications intercept program known as &#8220;Stellar Wind,&#8221; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html">disclosed</a> in 2005 by <em>The New York Times</em>.</p>
<p>There are several components to Stellar Wind, one of which is a massive data-mining project run by the agency. As <em>USA Today</em> <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm">revealed</a> in 2006, the &#8220;National Security Agency has been secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&amp;T, Verizon and BellSouth.&#8221;</p>
<p>Under the current program, Einstein will be tied directly into giant NSA data bases that contain the trace signatures left behind by cyberattacks; these immense electronic warehouses will be be fed by information streamed to the agency by the nation&#8217;s telecommunications providers.</p>
<p>AT&amp;T, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the NSA will spearhead the aggressive new initiative to detect malicious attacks launched against government web sites&#8211;by continuing to monitor the electronic communications of Americans.</p>
<p>This contradicts President Obama&#8217;s <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Securing-Our-Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure/">pledge</a> announcing his administration&#8217;s cybersecurity program on May 29. During White House remarks Obama said that the government will not continue Bush-era surveillance practices or include &#8220;monitoring private sector networks or Internet traffic.&#8221;</p>
<p>Called the &#8220;flagship system&#8221; in the national security state&#8217;s cyber defense arsenal, <em>The Wall Street Journal</em> <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124657680388089139.html">reports</a> that Einstein is &#8220;designed to protect the U.S. government&#8217;s computer networks from cyberspies.&#8221; In addition to cost overruns and mismanagement by outsourced contractors, the system &#8220;is being stymied by technical limitations and privacy concerns.&#8221; According to the <em>Journal</em>, Einstein is being developed in three stages:</p>
<blockquote><p>
Einstein 1: Monitors Internet traffic flowing in and out of federal civilian networks. Detects abnormalities that might be cyber attacks. Is unable to block attacks.</p>
<p>Einstein 2: In addition to looking for abnormalities, detects viruses and other indicators of attacks based on signatures of known incidents, and alerts analysts immediately. Also can&#8217;t block attacks.</p>
<p>Einstein 3: Under development. Based on technology developed for a National Security Agency program called Tutelage, it detects and deflects security breaches. Its filtering technology can read the content of email and other communications. (Siobhan Gorman, &#8220;Troubles Plague Cyberspy Defense,&#8221; <em>The Wall Street Journal</em>, July 3, 2009)
</p></blockquote>
<p>As readers of <em>Antifascist Calling</em> are well aware, like other telecom grifters</a>, AT&amp;T is a private-sector partner of NSA and continues to be a key player in the agency&#8217;s driftnet spying on Americans&#8217; electronic communications. In 2006, AT&amp;T whistleblower Mark Klein revealed in a sworn <a href="http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/SER_klein_decl.pdf">affidavit</a>, that the firm&#8217;s Internet traffic that runs through fiber-optic cables at the company&#8217;s Folsom Street facility in San Francisco was routinely provided to the National Security Agency</p>
<p>Using a device known as a splitter, a complete copy of Internet traffic that AT&amp;T receives&#8211;email, web browsing requests and other electronic communications sent by AT&amp;T customers, was diverted onto a separate fiber-optic cable connected to the company&#8217;s SG-3 room, controlled by the agency. Only personnel with NSA clearances&#8211;either working for, or on behalf of the agency&#8211;have access to this room.</p>
<p>Klein and other critics of the program, including investigative journalist James Bamford who reported in his book, <a href="http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl/9780385521321.html"> <em>The Shadow Factory</em> </a>, believe that some 15-30 identical NSA-controlled rooms exist at AT&amp;T facilities scattered across the country.</p>
<p><strong>Einstein: You Don&#8217;t Have to Be a Genius to Know They&#8217;re Lying</strong> </p>
<p>But what happens next, <em>after</em> the data is processed and catalogued by the agency is little understood. Programs such as Einstein will provide NSA with the ability to read and decipher the content of email messages, <em>any and all</em> messages in real-time.</p>
<p>While DHS claims that &#8220;the new program will scrutinize only data going to or from government systems,&#8221; the <em>Post</em> reports that a debate has been sparked within the agency over &#8220;uncertainty about whether private data can be shielded from unauthorized scrutiny, how much of a role NSA should play and whether the agency&#8217;s involvement in warrantless wiretapping during George W. Bush&#8217;s presidency would draw controversy.&#8221; </p>
<p>A &#8220;Privacy Impact Assessment (<a href="http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_einstein2.pdf">PIA</a>) for EINSTEIN 2&#8243; issued by DHS in May 2008, claims the system is interested in &#8220;malicious activity&#8221; and not personally identifiable information flowing into federal networks. </p>
<p>While DHS claims that &#8220;the risk associated with the use of this computer network security intrusion detection system is actually lower than the risk generated by using a commercially available intrusion detection system,&#8221; this assertion is undercut when the agency states, &#8220;Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from address of their messages or the IP addresses of the sites they visit.&#8221; </p>
<p>When Einstein 3 is eventually rolled-out, Internet users similarly will &#8220;have no expectation of privacy&#8221; when it comes to the <em>content</em> of their communications.</p>
<p>DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano told reporters, &#8220;we absolutely intend to use the technical resources, the substantial ones, that NSA has.&#8221; Seeking to deflect criticism from civil libertarians, Napolitano claims &#8220;they will be guided, led and in a sense directed by the people we have at the Department of Homeland Security.&#8221;</p>
<p>Despite protests to the contrary by securocrats, like other Bush and Obama &#8220;cybersecurity&#8221; initiatives the Einstein program is a backdoor for pervasive state surveillance. <em>Government Computer News</em> <a href="http://gcn.com/articles/2008/12/04/better-privacy-for-better-security.aspx">reported</a> in December 2008 that Marc Rotenberg, the executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (<a href="http://epic.org/">EPIC</a>) said that &#8220;the misuse or exposure of sensitive data from such a program [Einstein] could undermine the security arguments for surveillance.&#8221;</p>
<p>And with Internet Service Providers routinely deploying deep packet inspection tools to &#8220;siphon off requested traffic for law enforcement,&#8221; tools with the ability to &#8220;inspect and shape every single packet&#8211;in real time&#8211;for nearly a million simultaneous connections&#8221; as <em>Ars Technica</em> <a href="http://arstechnica.com/hardware/news/2007/07/Deep-packet-inspection-meets-net-neutrality.ars">reported</a>, to assume that ISPs will protect Americans&#8217; privacy rights from out-of-control state agencies is a foolhardy supposition at best.</p>
<p>The latest version of the system will not be rolled-out for at least 18 months. But like the Stellar Wind driftnet surveillance program, communications intercepted by Einstein 3 will be routed through a &#8220;monitoring box&#8221; controlled by NSA and their civilian contractors.</p>
<blockquote><p>
Under a classified pilot program approved during the Bush administration, NSA data and hardware would be used to protect the networks of some civilian government agencies. Part of an initiative known as Einstein 3, the plan called for telecommunications companies to route the Internet traffic of civilian agencies through a monitoring box that would search for and block computer codes designed to penetrate or otherwise compromise networks. (Ellen Nakashima, &#8220;Cybersecurity Plan to Involve NSA, Telecoms,&#8221; <em>The Washington Post</em>, July 3, 2009)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, investigative journalist Wayne Madsen <a href="http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_3766.shtml">reported</a> last September &#8220;that the Bush administration has authorized massive surveillance of the Internet using as cover a cyber-security multi-billion dollar project called the &#8216;Einstein&#8217; program.&#8221;</p>
<p>While some researchers (including this one) question Madsen&#8217;s overreliance on anonymous sources and undisclosed documents, in fairness it should be pointed out that <em>nine months</em> before <em>The New York Times</em> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/us/17nsa.html"> </a> the NSA&#8217;s secret e-mail collection database known as Pinwale, Madsen had already identified and broken the story. According to Madsen,</p>
<blockquote><p>
The classified technology being used for Einstein was developed for the NSA in conducting signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations on email networks in Russia. Code-named PINWHEEL, the NSA email surveillance system targets Russian government, military, diplomatic, and commercial email traffic and burrows into the text portions of the email to search for particular words and phrases of interest to NSA eavesdroppers. According to NSA documents obtained by WMR, there is an NSA system code-named &#8221;PINWALE.&#8221;</p>
<p>The DNI and NSA also plan to move Einstein into the private sector by claiming the nation&#8217;s critical infrastructure, by nature, overlaps into the commercial sector. There are classified plans, already budgeted in so-called &#8220;black&#8221; projects, to extend Einstein surveillance into the dot (.) com, dot (.) edu, dot (.) int, and dot (.) org, as well as other Internet domains. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has budgeted $5.4 billion for Einstein in his department&#8217;s FY2009 information technology budget. However, this amount does not take into account the &#8220;black&#8221; budgets for Einstein proliferation throughout the U.S. telecommunications network contained in the budgets for NSA and DNI. (Wayne Madsen, &#8220;&#8216;Einstein&#8217; replaces &#8216;Big Brother&#8217; in Internet Surveillance,&#8221; <em>Online Journal</em>, September 19, 2008)
</p></blockquote>
<p>A follow-up article <a href="http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_4347.shtml">published</a> in February, identified the ultra-spooky Booz Allen Hamilton firm as the developer of Pinwale, an illegal program for the interception of text communications. According to Madsen, &#8220;the system is linked to a number of meta-databases that contain e-mail, faxes, and text messages of hundreds of millions of people around the world and in the United States.&#8221;</p>
<p>In other words both classified programs, Pinwale and Einstein, are sophisticated electronic communications surveillance projects that most certainly will train the agency&#8217;s formidable intelligence assets on the American people &#8220;using as cover a cyber-security multi-billion dollar project called the &#8216;Einstein&#8217; program,&#8221; as Madsen reported.</p>
<p><strong>AT&amp;T: &#8220;No Comment&#8221;</strong></p>
<p>An AT&amp;T spokesman refused to comment on the proposals and is seeking legal protection from the state that it will not be sued for privacy breaches as a result of its participation in the new program. &#8220;Legal certification&#8221; the <em>Post</em> reports, &#8220;has been held up for several months as DHS prepares a contract.&#8221;</p>
<p>NSA&#8217;s involvement is critical proponents claim, because the agency has a readily-accessible database of computer codes, or signatures &#8220;that have been linked to cyberattacks or known adversaries. The NSA has compiled the cache by, for example, electronically observing hackers trying to gain access to U.S. military systems,&#8221; the <em>Post</em> averred.</p>
<p>Calling NSA&#8217;s cache &#8220;the secret sauce&#8230;it&#8217;s the stuff they have that the private sector doesn&#8217;t,&#8221; is what raises alarms for privacy and civil liberties&#8217; advocates. Known as Tutelage, NSA&#8217;s classified program can detect and automatically decide how to deal with malicious intrusions, &#8220;to block them or watch them closely to better assess the threat,&#8221; according to the <em>Post</em>. &#8220;The database for the program would also contain feeds from commercial firms and DHS&#8217;s U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, administration officials said.&#8221;</p>
<p>Jeff Mohan, AT&amp;T&#8217;s executive director for Einstein, was more forthcoming earlier this year. He told <a href="http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?sid=1577900&amp;nid=35">Federal News Radio</em></a>: &#8220;With these services, we will provide a secure portal from the agency&#8217;s infrastructure, or Intranet to the public internet. There is a technical aspect, which is routers, firewalls and that sort of thing that applies these security capabilities across that portal and looks a Internet traffic that comes from public Internet to Intranet and vice versa.&#8221;</p>
<p>The &#8220;technical aspect&#8221; will also provide federal agencies the ability to capture, sort, read and then store Americans&#8217; private communications in huge data bases run by NSA.</p>
<p>Mohan said that AT&amp;T will provide the state with &#8220;optional services such as scanning e-mail and placing filters on agency networks to keep malicious e-mail off the network as well as forensic and storage capabilities also are available through MTIPS [Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Services].&#8221;</p>
<p>In addition to AT&amp;T, other private partners awarded contracts under the General Services Administration&#8217;s MTIPS which has a built-in &#8220;Einstein enclave&#8221; include: Sprint, L3 Communications, Qwest, MCI, General Dynamics and Verizon, according to multiple reports published by <em>Federal Computer Week</em>.</p>
<p>Claiming that the state is &#8220;looking for malicious content, not a love note to someone with a dot-gov e-mail address,&#8221; a former unnamed &#8220;senior Bush administration official&#8221; told the <em>Post</em> &#8220;what we&#8217;re interested in is finding the code, the thing that will do the network harm, not reading the e-mail itself.&#8221;</p>
<p>Try selling <em>that</em> to the tens of millions of Americans whose private communications have been illegally spied upon by the Bush and Obama administrations or leftist dissidents singled-out for &#8220;special handling&#8221; by the national security state&#8217;s public-private surveillance partnership!</p>
<p>As the &#8220;global war on terror&#8221; morphs into an endless war on our democratic rights, the NSA is expanding domestic operations by &#8220;decentralizing its massive computer hubs,&#8221; <em>The Salt Lake Tribune</em> <a href="http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_12735293">revealed</a>.</p>
<p>The agency &#8220;will build a 1-million-square-foot data center at Utah&#8217;s Camp Williams,&#8221; the newspaper disclosed July 1. The new facility would be NSA&#8217;s third major data center. In 2007, the agency announced plans to build a second data center in San Antonio, Texas after the <em>Baltimore Sun</em> reported that NSA had &#8220;maxed out&#8221; the electric capacity of the Baltimore area&#8217;s power grid.</p>
<p>The <em>San Antonio Current</em> <a href="http://www.sacurrent.com/news/story.asp?id=69607">reported</a> in December, that the NSA&#8217;s Texas Cryptology Center will cost &#8220;upwards of $130 million.&#8221; The 470,000 square-foot-facility is adjacent to a similar center constructed by software giant Microsoft. Investigative journalist James Bamford told the <em>Current</em> that under current law &#8220;NSA could gain access to Microsoft&#8217;s stored data without even a warrant, but merely a fiber-optic cable.&#8221;</p>
<p>A follow-up article by <em>The Salt Lake Tribune</em> <a href="http://www.sltrib.com/ci_12744661"></a> that the facility will cost upwards of $2 billion dollars and that funds have already been appropriated by the Obama administration for NSA&#8217;s new data center and listening post.</p>
<blockquote><p>
The secretive agency released a statement Thursday acknowledging the selection of Camp Williams as a site for the new center and describing it as &#8220;a specialized facility that houses computer systems and supporting equipment.&#8221;</p>
<p>Budget documents provide a more detailed picture of the facility and its mission. The supercomputers in the center will be part of the NSA&#8217;s signal intelligence program, which seeks to &#8220;gain a decisive information advantage for the nation and our allies under all circumstances&#8221; according to the documents. (Matthew D. LaPlante, &#8220;New NSA Center Unveiled in Budget Documents,&#8221; <em>The Salt Lake Tribune</em>, July 2, 2009)
</p></blockquote>
<p>Not everyone is pleased with the announcement. Steve Erickson, the director of the antiwar Citizens Education Project told the <em>Tribune</em>, &#8220;Finally, the Patriot Act has a home.&#8221;</p>
<p>While the total cost of rolling-out the Einstein 3 system is classified, <em>The Wall Street Journal</em> reports that &#8220;the price tag was expected to exceed $2 billion.&#8221; And as with other national security state initiatives, it is the American people who are footing the bill for the destruction of our democratic rights.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Cyber Command Launched. U.S. Strategic Command to Oversee Offensive Military Operations</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/cyber-command-launched-us-strategic-command-to-oversee-offensive-military-operations/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/cyber-command-launched-us-strategic-command-to-oversee-offensive-military-operations/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2009 14:00:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates signed a memorandum June 23 that announced the launch of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). A scheme by securocrats in the works for several years, the order specifies that the new office will be a &#8220;subordinate unified command&#8221; under U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
According to the memorandum, CYBERCOM &#8220;will reach initial operating capability [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates signed a <a href="http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/OSD05914.pdf">memorandum</a> June 23 that announced the launch of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). A scheme by securocrats in the works for several years, the order specifies that the new office will be a &#8220;subordinate unified command&#8221; under U.S. Strategic Command (<a href="http://www.stratcom.mil/">STRATCOM</a>).</p>
<p>According to the memorandum, CYBERCOM &#8220;will reach initial operating capability (IOC) not later than October 2009 and full operating capability (FOC) not later than October 2010.&#8221;</p>
<p>Gates has recommended that this new Pentagon domain be led by Lt. General Keith Alexander, the current Director of the ultra-spooky National Security Agency (<a href="http://www.nsa.gov/">NSA</a>). Under the proposal, Alexander would receive a fourth star and the new agency would be based at Ft. Meade, Maryland, NSA&#8217;s headquarters.</p>
<p>Gates&#8217; memorandum specifies that CYBERCOM &#8220;must be capable of synchronizing warfighting effects across the global security environment as well as providing support to civil authorities and international partners.&#8221;</p>
<p>Ostensibly launched to protect military networks against malicious cyberattacks, the command&#8217;s offensive nature is underlined by its role as STRATCOM&#8217;s operational cyber wing. In addition to a defensive brief to &#8220;harden&#8221; the &#8220;dot-mil&#8221; domain, the Pentagon plan calls for an offensive capacity, one that will deploy cyber weapons against imperialism&#8217;s adversaries.</p>
<p>One of ten Unified Combatant Commands, STRATCOM is the successor organization to Strategic Air Command (SAC). Charged with space operations (military satellites), information warfare, missile defense, global command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as global strike and strategic deterrence (America&#8217;s first-strike nuclear arsenal), it should be apparent that designating CYBERCOM a STRATCOM branch all but guarantees an aggressive posture.</p>
<p>As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/05/national-cyber-range-building-attack.html">reported</a> in May, the Pentagon&#8217;s geek squad, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is currently building a National Cyber Range (<a href="http://www.darpa.mil/sto/ia/ncr.html">NCR</a>), a test bed for developing, testing and fielding cyber weapons.</p>
<p>In conjunction with &#8220;private-sector partners,&#8221; the agency averred in a January 2009 <a href="http://www.darpa.mil/news/2009/NCRPhI.pdf">press release</a> that NCR promises to deliver &#8220;&#8216;leap ahead&#8217; concepts and capabilities.&#8221;</p>
<p>The <em>Armed Forces Press Service</em> <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54890">reported</a> June 24, that Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell told journalists that CYBERCOM is &#8220;not some sort of new and necessarily different authorities that have been granted.&#8221; Obfuscating the offensive role envisaged for the command, Morrell told reporters: &#8220;This is about trying to figure out how we, within this department, within the United States military, can better coordinate the day-to-day defense, protection and operation of the department&#8217;s computer networks.&#8221;</p>
<p>Others within the defense bureaucracy are far more enthusiastic, and forthright, when it comes to recommending that cyber armaments be fielded as offensive weapons of war. Indeed, <a href="http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/05/3375884"><em>Armed Forces Journal</em></a> featured a lengthy analysis advocating precisely that.</p>
<blockquote><p>The world has abandoned a fortress mentality in the real world, and we need to move beyond it in cyberspace. America needs a network that can project power by building an af.mil robot network (botnet) that can direct such massive amounts of traffic to target computers that they can no longer communicate and become no more useful to our adversaries than hunks of metal and plastic. America needs the ability to carpet bomb in cyberspace to create the deterrent we lack. (Col. Charles W. Williamson III, &#8220;Carpet Bombing in Cyberspace,&#8221; <em>Armed Forces Journal</em>, May 2008)</p></blockquote>
<p>We have heard these Orwellian arguments before; one can take it for granted that when militarists pontificate on the need for a &#8220;deterrent,&#8221; the bombers are preparing for take off.</p>
<p>As with other Pentagon schemes, the technological quick fix may prove as deadly as the alleged threat, particularly where botnets are concerned.</p>
<p>A botnet is a collection of widely dispersed computers controlled from one or more central nodes. Often built by cyber criminals to implant malicious programs or code, steal passwords and other encrypted data from targeted systems, botnets are the bane of the Internet.</p>
<p>In these endeavors, sophisticated hackers are aided and abetted by the miserable security code or lax practices of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) more concerned with facilitating commerce&#8211;and the bottom line&#8211;than in providing adequate protection against criminals.</p>
<p>Indeed in March, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (<a href="http://epic.org/"><span><strong>EPIC</strong></span></a>) urged the Federal Trade Commission &#8220;to shut down Google&#8217;s so-called cloud computing services, including Gmail and Google Docs, if the web giant can&#8217;t ensure the safety of user data stored by these online apps,&#8221; <em>The Register</em> <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/03/18/epic_google_ftc_petition/">reported</a>.</p>
<p>EPIC&#8217;s <a href="http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf">petition</a> in part, was sparked &#8220;by a Google snafu that saw the company inadvertently share certain Google Docs files with users unauthorized to view them. Google estimates that the breach hit about 0.05 per cent of the documents stored by the service,&#8221; according to <em>The Register</em>.</p>
<p>Infected computers are referred to as &#8220;zombies&#8221; that can be controlled remotely from any point on the planet by &#8220;master&#8221; machines. Unwary users are often &#8220;spoofed&#8221; by hackers through counterfeit e-mails replete with embedded hyperlinks into &#8220;cooperating&#8221; with the installation of malicious code.</p>
<p>While criminals employ botnets to generate spam or commit fraudulent transactions, draining a savings account or running-up credit card debt through multiple purchases for example, botnets also have the capacity to launch devastating distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks against inadequately defended computers or indeed, entire networks.</p>
<p>As many commentators have warned, the best defense is to write better security programs and exercise a modicum of common sense when using the Internet. The Pentagon however, has something else in mind.</p>
<p>Col. Williamson proposes to transform the Air Force&#8217;s high-speed intrusion-detection systems into an offensive botnet by enabling &#8220;the thousands of computers the Air Force would normally discard every year for technology refresh, removing the power-hungry and heat-inducing hard drives, replacing them with low-power flash drives, then installing them in any available space every Air Force base can find.&#8221; In other words, creating thousands of zombie machines.</p>
<p>&#8220;After that,&#8221; Col. Williamson avers, &#8220;the Air Force could add botnet code to all its desktop computers attached to the Nonsecret Internet Protocol Network (NIPRNet). Once the system reaches a level of maturity, it can add other .mil computers, then .gov machines.&#8221;</p>
<p>Underscoring the risks posed by out-of-control military hackers to hold America&#8217;s, or any other nations&#8217; communications infrastructure hostage to a militarized state, Williamson suggests that in order to &#8220;generate the right amount of power for offense, all the available computers must be under the control of a <em>single commander</em>, even if he provides the capability for multiple theaters. While it cannot be segmented like an orange for individual theater commanders, it can certainly be placed under their tactical control.&#8221; (emphasis added)</p>
<p>In other words, should an &#8220;individual theatre commander&#8221; desire to suddenly darken a city or wreck havoc on a nation&#8217;s electrical infrastructure at the behest of his political masters then by all means, go right ahead! A proposal such as this, should it ever be implemented, would in essence, be a <em>first-strike weapon</em>.</p>
<p>Other plans for &#8220;defending&#8221; Pentagon computer networks are even more extreme.</p>
<p>STRATCOM commander Gen. Kevin Chilton has even suggested that &#8220;the White House retains the option to respond with physical force&#8211;potentially even using nuclear weapons&#8211;if a foreign entity conducts a disabling cyber attack against U.S. computer networks,&#8221; according to a disturbing <a href="http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090512_4977.php">report</a> published by <em>Global Security Newswire</em>. During a Defense Writers Group breakfast in May, Chilton told journalists:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;I think you don&#8217;t take any response options off the table from an attack on the United States of America. Why would we constrain ourselves on how we respond?&#8221; &#8230;</p>
<p>Should the breaches evolve into more serious computer attacks against the United States, Chilton said he could not rule out the possibility of a military salvo against a nation like China, even though Beijing has nuclear arms. He rejected the idea that such a conflict would necessarily risk going nuclear.</p>
<p>&#8220;I don&#8217;t think that&#8217;s true,&#8221; Chilton said.</p>
<p>At the same time, the general insisted that all strike options, including nuclear, would remain available to the commander in chief in defending the nation from cyber strikes.</p>
<p>&#8220;I think that&#8217;s been our policy on any attack on the United States of America,&#8221; Chilton said. &#8220;And I don&#8217;t see any reason to treat cyber any differently. I mean, why would we tie the president&#8217;s hands? I can&#8217;t. It&#8217;s up to the president to decide.&#8221; (Elaine M. Grossman, &#8220;U.S. General Reserves Right to Use Force, Even Nuclear, in Response to Cyber Attack,&#8221; <em>Global Security Newswire</em>, May 12, 2009)  blockquote><br />
While Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/technology/24cyber.html"><em>The New York Times</em></a> that CYBERCOM&#8217;s launch &#8220;is not about the militarization of cyber,&#8221; how else can it be characterized?</p>
<p>Indeed, Whitman went on to say that CYBERCOM &#8220;is focused only on military networks to better consolidate and streamline Department of Defense capabilities into a single command.&#8221;</p>
<p>How then, should one interpret moves by the Pentagon to &#8220;consolidate and streamline&#8221; DoD &#8220;capabilities&#8221; under the purview of STRATCOM? Obviously, an entity defined as a &#8220;Unified Combatant Command&#8221; as clearly stated by General Chilton&#8217;s avowal to &#8220;leave all options on the table,&#8221; would combine cyber &#8220;defense&#8221; with STRATCOM&#8217;s global strike mission.</p>
<p><em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2008/07/air-force-cyber-command-building.html">revealed</a> last year, citing a U.S. Air Force <a href="http://www.afcyber.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080303-054.pdf">planning document</a>, that preparations are already underway to transform cyberspace into an offensive military domain. Indeed, Air Force theorists averred:</p>
<blockquote><p>Cyberspace favors offensive operations. These operations will deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, or deceive an adversary. Cyberspace offensive operations ensure friendly freedom of action in cyberspace while denying that same freedom to our adversaries. We will enhance our capabilities to conduct electronic systems attack, electromagnetic systems interdiction and attack, network attack, and infrastructure attack operations. Targets include the adversary&#8217;s terrestrial, airborne, and space networks, electronic attack and network attack systems, and the <em>adversary itself</em>. As an adversary becomes more dependent on cyberspace, cyberspace offensive operations have the potential to produce greater effects. (Air Force Cyber Command, &#8220;Strategic Vision,&#8221; no date, emphasis added)</p></blockquote>
<p>Echoing Air Force strategy, SecDef Gates memo clearly states, since &#8220;cyberspace and its associated technologies &#8230; are vital to our nation&#8217;s security,&#8221; the United States will &#8220;secure freedom of action in cyberspace&#8221; by standing-up a unified command &#8220;that possesses the required technical capability and remains focused on the integration of cyberspace operations.&#8221;</p>
<p>Simply put, the Pentagon intends to build an infrastructure fully-capable of committing high-tech war crimes.</p>
<p><strong>Under NSA&#8217;s Operational Control</strong></p>
<p>Meanwhile in the <em>heimat</em>, CYBERCOM will effectively be under the day-to-day control of the National Security Agency. This is hardly good news when it comes to civil liberties.</p>
<p>Leaving aside considerations of bureaucratic trench warfare with the Department of Homeland Security, charged with defending the state&#8217;s .gov and .com domains, the unprecedented power of CYBERCOM to conduct offensive military and surveillance operations within the United States itself is underlined by the preeminent role NSA will assume.</p>
<p>Authorized by the criminal Bush regime to carry out massive electronic surveillance of Americans&#8217; private communications in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, various driftnet spying operations continue under Obama&#8217;s purported &#8220;change&#8221; administration. As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> has averred many times, the only &#8220;change&#8221; that&#8217;s come to the White House has been the color of the drapes hanging in the Oval Office.</p>
<p><em>The New York Times</em> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/us/17nsa.html"><span></a> June 17, that the &#8220;National Security Agency is facing renewed scrutiny over the extent of its domestic surveillance program, with critics in Congress saying its recent intercepts of the private telephone calls and e-mail messages of Americans are broader than previously acknowledged.&#8221; According to the <em>Times</em>, &#8220;The agency&#8217;s monitoring of domestic e-mail messages, in particular, has posed longstanding legal and logistical difficulties, the officials said.&#8221;</p>
<p>I take issue with the <em>Times&#8217;</em> characterization that such a breach of constitutional norms merely represent &#8220;logistical difficulties.&#8221; As with a <em>Times&#8217;</em> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html">report</a> in April which alleged that NSA&#8217;s driftnet spying under Obama was simply a problem of &#8220;overcollection,&#8221; far from being mere technical issues, first and foremost, these violations represent <em>political decisions</em> made at the highest levels of the national security state itself.</p>
<blockquote><p>Since April, when it was disclosed that the intercepts of some private communications of Americans went beyond legal limits in late 2008 and early 2009, several Congressional committees have been investigating. Those inquiries have led to concerns in Congress about the agency&#8217;s ability to collect and read domestic e-mail messages of Americans on a widespread basis, officials said. Supporting that conclusion is the account of a former N.S.A. analyst who, in a series of interviews, described being trained in 2005 for a program in which the agency routinely examined large volumes of Americans&#8217; e-mail messages without court warrants. Two intelligence officials confirmed that the program was still in operation. (James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, &#8220;E-Mail Surveillance Renews Concerns in Congress,&#8221; <em>The New York Times</em>, June 17, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>Last year, congressional Democrats, including Senator now President, Obama, handed the NSA virtually unchecked power to spy on the private communications of Americans. In addition to granting retroactive immunity to telecom grifters who profited from their conspiracy to illegally spy on citizens for the state, the despicable FISA Amendments Act (FIA) gave NSA the legal cover to intercept Americans&#8217; communications &#8220;so long as it was done only as the incidental byproduct of investigating individuals &#8216;reasonably believed&#8217; to be overseas,&#8221; as the <em>Times</em> delicately put it.</p>
<p>CYBERCOM&#8217;s brief, and its deployment inside NSA with full access to the agency&#8217;s powerful computing assets, and with a mission to conduct global Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) at the behest of their STRATCOM masters, mean that despite bromides about &#8220;privacy concerns,&#8221; the Pentagon will most assuredly be interested in developing an attack matrix that can just as easily be turned <em>inward</em>. After all as General Chilton asserts, &#8220;it&#8217;s up to the president to decide.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;One thing that is pretty clear,&#8221; <em>Wired</em> <a href="http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/06/foggy-future-for-militarys-new-cyber-command/">reports</a>, &#8220;NSA will be leading this emerging command.&#8221; Indeed, NSA &#8220;may also come to dominate the wider government cyber defense effort, as well.&#8221; As <em>The Wall Street Journal</em> <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124579956278644449.html">revealed</a>, the Defense Department&#8217;s 2010 budget &#8220;envisions training and graduating more than 200 cyber-security officers annually.&#8221; In contradistinction to DoD, &#8220;the Department of Homeland Security has 100 employees dedicated to civilian cyber security, with plans to reach 260 next year,&#8221; the <em>Journal</em> reports.</p>
<p>In other words, right from the get-go NSA will be assuming operational control of CYBERCOM. This is driven home by the fact that the Pentagon is already receiving the vast majority of appropriations for state cybersecurity initiatives and have thousands of cyberwarriors across all branches of the military, including outsourced private contractors who labor for DoD, ready, willing and able to staff the new command.</p>
<p>As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2009/04/pentagons-cyber-command-to-be-based-at.html">revealed</a> in April, with billions of dollars already spent on a score of top secret cyber initiatives, including those hidden within Pentagon Special Access or black programs, the issue of oversight is already a moot point.</p>
<p>Defense analyst William M. Arkin in his essential book, <a href="http://www.steerforth.com/books/display.pperl?isbn=9781586420833"><em>Code Names</em></a>, described some three dozen cyberwar programs and/or exercises, currently being pursued by the Pentagon. Since the book&#8217;s 2005 publication, many others undoubtedly have come on-line.</p>
<p>While NSA Director Alexander has explicitly stated that he does &#8220;not want [NSA] to run cybersecurity for the United States government,&#8221; CYBERCOM&#8217;s stand-up, and Alexander&#8217;s near certain appointment as commander, all but guarantees that the agency will be a ubiquitous and silent gatekeeper answerable to no one.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Look! Up in the Sky! It&#8217;s a Bird&#8230; It&#8217;s a Plane&#8230; It&#8217;s a Raytheon Spy Blimp!</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/06/look-up-in-the-sky-its-a-bird-its-a-plane-its-a-raytheon-spy-blimp/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/06/look-up-in-the-sky-its-a-bird-its-a-plane-its-a-raytheon-spy-blimp/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 17:33:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Capitalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal/Constitutional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military/Militarism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Science/Tech]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=8777</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As the American republic&#8217;s long death-spiral continues apace, newer and ever more insidious technologies usher us towards an age of high-tech barbarism.
&#8220;At first glance&#8221; Newsweek reveals, &#8220;there was nothing special about the blimp floating high above the cars and crowd at this year&#8217;s Indy 500 on Memorial Day weekend.&#8221;
&#8220;Nothing special&#8221; that is, until you took [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the American republic&#8217;s long death-spiral continues apace, newer and ever more insidious technologies usher us towards an age of high-tech barbarism.</p>
<p>&#8220;At first glance&#8221; <em>Newsweek</em> <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/201697"><span><strong>reveals</strong></span></a>, &#8220;there was nothing special about the blimp floating high above the cars and crowd at this year&#8217;s Indy 500 on Memorial Day weekend.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;Nothing special&#8221; that is, until you took a closer look. What you then discovered was another quintessentially American innovation, all the more chilling for its bland ubiquity. A silent, hovering sentinel linking commerce and repression; a perfect trope for our ersatz democracy. &#8220;Like most airships&#8221; <em>Newsweek</em> continued, &#8220;it acted as an advertising vehicle.&#8221;</p>
<blockquote><p>But the real promo should have been for the blimp&#8217;s creator, Raytheon, the security company best known for its weapons systems. Hidden inside the 55-foot-long white balloon was a powerful surveillance camera adapted from the technology Raytheon provides the U.S. military.</p>
<p>Essentially an unmanned drone, the blimp transmitted detailed images to the race&#8217;s security officers and to Indiana police. &#8220;The airship is great because it doesn&#8217;t have that Big Brother feel, or create feelings of invasiveness,&#8221; says Lee Silvestre, vice president of mission innovation in Raytheon&#8217;s Integrated Defense division. &#8220;But it&#8217;s still a really powerful security tool.&#8221; (Kurt Soller, &#8220;Are You Being Watched? The blimp flying above your head may be watching your every move,&#8221; <em>Newsweek</em>, June 11, 2009)  <em></em></p></blockquote>
<p>&#8220;It doesn&#8217;t have that Big Brother feel&#8221; and yet here, as elsewhere, the &#8220;feelings of invasiveness&#8221; are implicit, unseen, invisible, the securitized DNA giving form and structure to the Empire&#8217;s &#8220;new normal.&#8221;</p>
<p>Imported from America&#8217;s aggressive wars of conquest in Iraq and Afghanistan and now deployed in the <em>heimat</em>, sprawling intelligence and security bureaucracies have teamed-up with corporate <a href="http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=46&amp;ranking=5"><span><strong>scofflaws</strong></span></a> to fill a market niche, inflating the bottom-line at the expense of a cherished freedom: the right to be <em>left alone</em>.</p>
<p>But as <em>Antifascist Calling</em> has noted many times, &#8220;what happens in Vegas&#8221; certainly doesn&#8217;t stay there, a point driven home by Raytheon.</p>
<p>&#8220;Anticipating requirements for innovative and affordable ways to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),&#8221; according to a company <a href="http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/technology/pas09/newsroom/news16/"><span><strong>press release</strong></span></a>, &#8220;Raytheon is using aerostats&#8211;modern blimps or balloons&#8211;carrying high-tech sensors to detect threats on the ground and in the air at distances that enable appropriate countermeasures.&#8221;</p>
<p>Known as RAID (Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment) the system is kitted-out with &#8220;electro-optic infrared, radar, flash and acoustic detectors.&#8221; According to the firm, some 300 have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The same military version, as <em>Newsweek</em> reported and Raytheon confirmed, &#8220;demonstrated to officials concerned with security and spectator safety its value by providing situational awareness in what is billed as one of the largest sporting events of the year.&#8221;</p>
<p>Indeed Charles Burns, the director of Corporate Security for the Indy Racing League said in the company&#8217;s press release: &#8220;Conducting this demo with Raytheon gives us the opportunity to evaluate new and innovative technology that keeps our venues safe and optimizes the racing experience for our fans.&#8221;</p>
<p>Along with a suite of sensors and high resolution video cameras, RAID&#8217;s digitized mapping tools are similar to those developed for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (<a href="https://www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx"><span><strong>NGA</strong></span></a>). In tandem with a preprogrammed mapping grid of the target location, the system can scan a wide area and relay video clips to a centralized command center.</p>
<p>Captured data known as GEOINT, or geospatial intelligence, is &#8220;tailored for customer-specific solutions&#8221; according to NGA. That agency along with its &#8220;sister&#8221; organization, the National Reconnaissance Office (<a href="http://www.nro.gov/"><span><strong>NRO</strong></span></a>), the super-secret agency that develops and flies America&#8217;s fleet of spy satellites are also among the most heavily-outsourced departments in the so-called Intelligence Community.</p>
<p>As investigative journalist Tim Shorrock points out in his essential book, <a href="http://books.simonandschuster.com/9780743282246"><span><strong><em>Spies For Hire</em></strong></span></a>, giant defense firms such as Raytheon and Northrop Grumman &#8220;with assistance from Republican lawmakers from the House Intelligence Committee,&#8221; helped launch a lobby shop for the industry in 2004, the United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation (<a href="http://www.usgif.org/"><span><strong>USGIF</strong></span></a>).</p>
<p>Self-described as a &#8220;not-for-profit educational foundation,&#8221; USGIF &#8220;is the only organization dedicated to promoting the geospatial intelligence tradecraft and building a stronger community of interest across industry, academia, government, professional organizations and individual stakeholders.&#8221; Since its formation, USGIF has expanded to some 154 companies and state agencies and has an annual budget that exceeds $1 million.</p>
<p>&#8220;<a href="http://www.usgif.org/Membership_OurMembership.aspx"><span><strong>Strategic partners</strong></span></a>&#8221; include the usual suspects, corporate heavy-hitters such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Science Applications International Corporation, Boeing, Booz Allen Hamilton, Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, IBM, Google, AT&amp;T, Microsoft, The MITRE Corporation, and L3 Communications. Additionally, niche companies such as Analytical Graphics, Inc., DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Intergraph, PCI Geomatics, TechniGraphics, Inc., flesh-out USGIF&#8217;s roster.</p>
<p>In this context, the public roll-out of RAID is all the more pressing for securocrats and the companies they serve since Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano &#8220;plans to kill a program begun by the Bush administration that would use U.S. spy satellites for domestic security and law enforcement,&#8221; the <em>Associated Press</em> <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/06/22/ap_source_dhs_to_kill_domestic_satellite_spying/?rss_id=Boston.com+--+Top+political+stories"><span><strong>reported</strong></span></a> June 22.</p>
<p>That program, the National Applications Office (NAO) was first announced by the Bush regime in 2007 and was mired in controversy from the get-go. As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2008/06/homeland-securitys-space-based-spies.html"><span><strong>reported</strong></span></a> last year, NAO would coordinate how domestic law enforcement and &#8220;disaster relief&#8221; agencies such as FEMA utilize GEOINT and imagery intelligence (IMINT) generated by U.S. spy satellites. But as with other <em>heimat</em> security schemes there was little in the way of oversight and zero concern for the rights of the American people.</p>
<p>The intrusiveness of the program was so severe that even Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA), the author of the despicable &#8220;Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007&#8243; (H.R. 1955) vowed to pull the plug. Chairwoman of the Homeland Security Committee&#8217;s Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment subcommittee, Harman introduced legislation earlier this month that would have shut down NAO immediately while prohibiting the agency from spending money on NAO or similar programs.</p>
<p>When the bill was introduced, Harman told <a href="http://fcw.com/articles/2009/06/05/web-nao-harman-legislation.aspx"><span><strong><em>Federal Computer Week</em></strong></span></a>: &#8220;Imagine, for a moment, what it would be like if one of these satellites were directed on your neighborhood or home, a school or place of worship&#8211;and without an adequate legal framework or operating procedures in place for regulating their use. I daresay the reaction might be that Big Brother has finally arrived and the black helicopters can&#8217;t be far behind. Yet this is precisely what the Department of Homeland Security has done in standing up the benign-sounding National Applications Office, or NAO.&#8221;</p>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-spy23-2009jun23,0,6115663.story"><span><strong><em>Los Angeles Times</em></strong></span></a>, Napolitano reached a decision to cut NAO off at the knees &#8220;after consulting with state and local law enforcement officials and learning that they had far more pressing priorities than using satellites to collect information and eavesdrop on people.&#8221;</p>
<p>Perhaps those &#8220;pressing priorities&#8221; could be better served by a low-key approach, say the deployment of a system such as RAID? After all, what&#8217;s so threatening about a blimp?</p>
<p>It comes as no surprise then, that the next target for Raytheon marketeers are <em>precisely</em> local police departments and sports facilities &#8220;that want to keep an eye on crowds that might easily morph into an unruly mob,&#8221; as <em>Newsweek</em> delicately put it.</p>
<p>Nathan Kennedy, Raytheon&#8217;s project manager for the spy blimp told the publication, &#8220;large municipalities could find many uses for this [technology] once we figure out how to get it in their hands.&#8221;</p>
<p>While the company refuses to divulge what this intrusive system might actually cost cash-strapped localities drastically cutting social services for their citizens as America morphs into a failed state, municipalities &#8220;without a Pentagon-size police budget&#8221; could look at the airship&#8217;s &#8220;potential to display ads [that] may assist with financing.&#8221;</p>
<p>Raytheon claims that local authorities fearful of succumbing to what I&#8217;d call a dreaded &#8220;surveillance airship gap,&#8221; could install &#8220;a built-in LED screen to attract sponsors, generate revenue and defer operating costs.&#8221;</p>
<p>How convenient!</p>
<p>However, Raytheon&#8217;s slimmed-down surveillance airship is a spin-off from a larger Pentagon project.</p>
<p>Among other high-tech, privacy-killing tools currently under development is the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency&#8217;s (<a href="http://www.darpa.mil/"><span><strong>DARPA</strong></span></a>) Integrated Sensor Is Structure (<a href="http://www.darpa.mil/sto/space/isis.html"><span><strong>ISIS</strong></span></a>) program. As conceived by the agency, ISIS will be a high-altitude autonomous airship built for the U.S. Air Force that can operate at 70,000 feet and stay aloft for a decade.</p>
<p><em>Washington Technology</em> <a href="http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/04/29/lockheed-team-to-develop-surveillance-radar.aspx"><span><strong>reported</strong></span></a> April 29, that Lockheed Martin won a $400 million deal to design the system. &#8220;Under the contract&#8221; the publication revealed, &#8220;Lockheed Martin will provide systems integration services, and Raytheon Co. will furnish a high-energy, low-power density radar, Lockheed Martin officials said.&#8221;</p>
<p>Operating six miles above the earth&#8217;s surface, well out of range of surface-to-air missiles, the airship will be some 450 feet long, powered by hydrogen fuel cells and packed with electronic surveillance gear and radar currently being field-tested by Raytheon.</p>
<p>Projects such as ISIS reflect a shift in Pentagon planning and spending priorities. Under Bush regime holdover, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the military plans to leverage America&#8217;s technological advantage to improve intelligence and surveillance capabilities at the expense of over-inflated big ticket items such as the F-22 Raptor or new Navy destroyers.</p>
<p>Gates and others in the Pentagon believe a shift towards &#8220;robust ISR platforms&#8221; will better facilitate the Pentagon&#8217;s new paradigm: waging multiple, counterinsurgency wars of conquest to secure natural resources and strategic advantage vis-à-vis imperialism&#8217;s geopolitical rivals.</p>
<p>But military might and technological preeminence, however formidable, represented by the Pentagon&#8217;s quixotic quest for total &#8220;situational awareness&#8221; promised by platforms such as ISIS and RAID, will no more ameliorate the Empire&#8217;s extreme political weakness than putting a band-aid over a gangrenous lesion changes the outcome for a dying patient.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>FBI &#8220;Going Dark.&#8221; Budget Request for High-Tech Surveillance Capabilities Soar</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/05/fbi-going-dark-budget-request-for-high-tech-surveillance-capabilities-soar/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/05/fbi-going-dark-budget-request-for-high-tech-surveillance-capabilities-soar/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2009 16:59:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=8253</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Federal Bureau of Investigation&#8217;s budget request for Fiscal Year 2010 reveals that America&#8217;s political police intend to greatly expand their high-tech surveillance capabilities.
According to ABC News, the FBI is seeking additional funds for the development of &#8220;a new &#8216;Advanced Electronic Surveillance&#8217; program which is being funded at $233.9 million for 2010. The program has [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Federal Bureau of Investigation&#8217;s <a href="http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/05/fbi-bud-summary.pdf">budget request</a> for Fiscal Year 2010 reveals that America&#8217;s political police intend to greatly expand their high-tech surveillance capabilities.</p>
<p>According to <a href="http://www.abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Story?id=7532199&amp;page=1"><em>ABC News</em></a>, the FBI is seeking additional funds for the development of &#8220;a new &#8216;Advanced Electronic Surveillance&#8217; program which is being funded at $233.9 million for 2010. The program has 133 employees, 15 of whom are agents.&#8221;</p>
<p>Known as &#8220;Going Dark,&#8221; the program is designed to beef up the Bureau&#8217;s already formidable electronic surveillance, intelligence collection and evidence gathering capabilities &#8220;as well as those of the greater Intelligence Community,&#8221; <em>ABC</em> reports. An FBI spokesperson told the network:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;The term &#8216;Going Dark&#8217; does not refer to a specific capability, but is a program name for the part of the FBI, Operational Technology Division&#8217;s (OTD) lawful interception program which is shared with other law enforcement agencies.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;The term applies to the research and development of new tools, technical support and training initiatives.&#8221; (Jason Ryan, &#8220;DOJ Budget Details High-Tech Crime Fighting Tools,&#8221; <em>ABC News</em>, May 9, 2009)  </p></blockquote>
<p>Led by Assistant Director Marcus C. Thomas, OTD <a href="http://www.fbi.gov/hq/otd/otd.htm">describes</a> the office as supporting &#8220;the FBI’s investigative and intelligence-gathering efforts&#8211;and those of our federal, state, and local law enforcement/intelligence partners&#8211;with a wide range of sophisticated technological equipment, examination tools and capabilities, training, and specialized experience. You won’t hear about our work on the evening news because of its highly sensitive nature, but you will continue to hear about the fruits of our labor&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>According to OTD&#8217;s <a href="http://www.fbi.gov/hq/otd/capabilities.htm">website</a>, the Division possesses &#8220;seven core capabilities&#8221;: Digital Forensics; Electronic Surveillance; Physical Surveillance; Special Technology and Applications; Tactical Communications; Tactical Operations and finally, Technical Support/Coordination.</p>
<p>Under the heading &#8220;Electronic Surveillance,&#8221; OTD deploys &#8220;tools and techniques for performing lawfully-authorized intercepts of wired and wireless telecommunications and data network communications technologies; enhancing unintelligible audio; and working with the communications industry as well as regulatory and legislative bodies to ensure that our continuing ability to conduct electronic surveillance will not be impaired as technology evolves.&#8221;</p>
<p>But as we have seen throughout the entire course of the so-called &#8220;war on terror,&#8221; systemic constitutional breeches by the FBI&#8211;from their abuse of <a href="http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nationalsecurityletters/34972leg20080423.html">National Security Letters</a>, the proliferation of corporate-dominated <a href="http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusion_update_20080729.pdf">Fusion Centers</a> to the infiltration of <a href="http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spyfiles/24011res20060131.html">provocateurs</a> into antiwar and other dissident groups&#8211;the only thing &#8220;impaired&#8221; by an out-of-control domestic spy agency have been the civil liberties of Americans.</p>
<p><strong>Communications Backdoor Provided by Telecom Grifters</strong></p>
<p>While the Bureau claims that it performs &#8220;lawfully-authorized intercepts&#8221; in partnership with the &#8220;communications industry,&#8221; also known as telecommunications&#8217; <a href="http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=172&amp;ranking=95">grifters</a>, the available evidence suggests otherwise.</p>
<p>As <em>Antifascist Calling</em> <a href="http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/04/fbis-quantico-circuit-still-spying-still-lying/">reported</a> last year, security consultant and whistleblower Babak Pasdar, in a sworn <a href="http://www.themediaconsortium.com/reporting/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/affidavit-bp-final.pdf">affidavit</a> to the Government Accountability Project (<a href="http://www.whistleblower.org/template/index.cfm">GAP</a>), provided startling details about the collusive&#8211;and <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/01/fbi-wiretap-cut/">profitable</a> alliance&#8211;between the FBI and America&#8217;s wireless carriers.</p>
<p>Pasdar furnished evidence that FBI agents have instantly transferred data along a high-speed computer circuit to a Bureau technology office in Quantico, Virginia. The so-called Quantico Circuit was provided to the FBI by Verizon, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/07/AR2008040702364.html"><em>The Washington Post</em></a> revealed.</p>
<p>According to published reports, the company maintains a 45 megabit/second DS-3 digital line that allowed the FBI and other security agencies virtually &#8220;unfettered access&#8221; to the carrier&#8217;s wireless network, including billing records and customer data &#8220;transferred wirelessly.&#8221; Verizon and other telecom giants have supplied FBI technical specialists with real-time access to customer data.</p>
<p>&#8220;The circuit was tied to the organization&#8217;s core network,&#8221; Pasdar wrote. Such access would expose customers&#8217; voice calls, data packets, even their physical movements and geolocation to uncontrolled&#8211;and illegal&#8211;surveillance.</p>
<p>In April, <em>Wired</em> obtained <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/04/get-your-fbi-sp.html">documents</a> from the FBI under a Freedom of Information Act request. Those files demonstrate how the Bureau&#8217;s &#8220;geek squad&#8221; routinely hack into wireless, cellular and computer networks.</p>
<p>Although the FBI released 152 heavily-redacted pages, they withheld another 623, claiming a full release would reveal a &#8220;sensitive investigative technique.&#8221; Nevertheless, <em>Wired</em> discovered that the FBI is deploying spyware called a &#8220;computer internet protocol address verifier,&#8221; or CIPAV, designed to infiltrate a target&#8217;s computer and gather a wide range of information, &#8220;which it sends to an FBI server in eastern Virginia.&#8221; While the documents do not detail CIPAV&#8217;s capabilities, an FBI affidavit from a 2007 case indicate it gathers and reports,</p>
<blockquote><p>a computer&#8217;s IP address; MAC address; open ports; a list of running programs; the operating system type, version and serial number; preferred internet browser and version; the computer&#8217;s registered owner and registered company name; the current logged-in user name and the last-visited URL.</p>
<p>After sending the information to the FBI, the CIPAV settles into a silent &#8220;pen register&#8221; mode, in which it lurks on the target computer and monitors its internet use, logging the IP address of every server to which the machine connects. (Kevin Poulsen, &#8220;FBI Spyware Has Been Snaring Extortionists, Hackers for Years,&#8221; <em>Wired</em>, April 16, 2009)  <em></em></p></blockquote>
<p>&#8220;Going Dark&#8221; is ostensibly designed to help the Bureau deal with technological changes and methods to intercept Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phone calls facilitated by programs such as Skype. But a tool that can seamlessly target hackers and cyber-criminals can just as easily be deployed against political opponents.</p>
<p>The FBI also intends to continue their use of automated link- and behavioral analysis derived from data mining as investigative tools. As a subset of applied mathematics, social network theory and its derivatives, link- and behavioral analysis, purport to uncover hidden relationships amongst social groups and networks. Over time, it has become an invasive tool deployed by private- and state intelligence agencies against political activists, most recently, as <em>Antifascist Calling</em> reported in February, against protest groups organizing against the<a href="http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/02/targeting-the-rnc-welcoming-committee-a-case-study-in-political-paranoia/">Republican National Convention</a>.</p>
<p>These methods raise very troubling civil liberties&#8217; and privacy concerns. The Electronic Privacy Information Coalition (<a href="http://epic.org/">EPIC</a>) filed a Freedom of Information Act <a href="http://epic.org/privacy/socialnet/gsa_foia_4-30-09.pdf">request</a>, demanding that the General Services Administration (<a href="http://gsa.gov/">GSA</a>) turn over agency records &#8220;concerning agreements the GSA negotiated between federal agencies and social networking services, including Flickr, YouTube, Vimeo, Blip.tv, and Facebook.&#8221;</p>
<p>With the proliferation of social networking sites, applications allow users to easily share information about themselves with others. But as EPIC points out, &#8220;Many online services relay information about online associations as users create new relationships. While government agencies may use social networking, cloud computing, and Internet services to create greater transparency on their activities, it remains unclear if there are data collection, use, and sharing limitations.&#8221;</p>
<p>And with &#8220;information discoverability&#8221; all the rage amongst spooky security agencies ranging from the FBI to the NSA, &#8220;connecting the dots,&#8221; particularly when it comes to dissident Americans, &#8220;is gaining increasing attention from homeland security officials and experts in their ongoing attempt to corral anti-terrorism information that resides across federal, state and local jurisdictions,&#8221; <em>Federal Computer Week</em> <a href="http://fcw.com/articles/2009/05/18/data-sharings-new-mandate.aspx">reports</a>.</p>
<p>Will an agreement between Facebook and the FBI facilitate &#8220;dot connecting&#8221; or will it serve as a new, insidious means to widen the surveillance net, building ever-more intrusive electronic case files on dissident Americans?</p>
<p><strong>The Electronic Police State</strong></p>
<p>As <a href="http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/05/the-fbis-department-of-precrime/">reported</a> earlier this month, citing the Electronic Frontier Foundation&#8217;s (<a href="http://www.eff.org/">EFF</a>) <a href="http://www.eff.org/issues/foia/investigative-data-warehouse-report">dossier</a> on the FBI&#8217;s Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW), the office had &#8220;transitioned to the operations and maintenance phase during FY 2008&#8243; and now possesses some &#8220;997,368,450 unique searchable documents,&#8221; ready for data mining.</p>
<p>But as study after study has revealed, most recently the comprehensive <a href="http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22285/Protecting_Individual_Privacy.pdf">examination</a> of various programs by the National Research Council, automated data mining is &#8220;likely to generate huge numbers of false leads.&#8221;</p>
<p>Because the mountainous volumes of data &#8220;mined&#8221; for &#8220;actionable intelligence&#8221; are drawn from dozens of disparate sources on terrorism or criminal suspects, &#8220;they have an enormous potential for privacy violations because they will inevitably force targeted individuals to explain and justify their mental and emotional states.&#8221;</p>
<p>EFF documented that the Bureau&#8217;s Telephone Application (TA) &#8220;provides a central repository for telephone data obtained from investigations.&#8221; TA allegedly functions as an &#8220;investigative tool &#8230; for all telephone data collected during the course of FBI investigations. Included are pen register data, toll records, trap/trace, tape-edits, dialed digits, airnet (pager intercepts), cellular activity, push-to-talk, and corresponding subscriber information.&#8221;</p>
<p>Additionally, the civil liberties&#8217; group revealed that &#8220;records obtained through National Security Letters are placed in the Telephone Application, as well as the IDW by way of the ACS [Automated Case] system.&#8221; It would appear that &#8220;Going Dark&#8221; will serve as a research subsystem feeding the insatiable appetite of the Investigative Data Warehouse.</p>
<p>In fact, these programs are part and parcel of what the security <a href="https://secure.cryptohippie.com/">website</a> <em>Cryptohippie</em> refers to as the <a href="https://secure.cryptohippie.com/pubs/EPS-2008.pdf">Electronic Police State</a>. Far from keeping us safe from all manner of dastardly plots hatched by criminals and/or terrorists, <em>Cryptohippie</em> avers:</p>
<blockquote><p>An electronic police state is quiet, even unseen. All of its legal actions are supported by abundant evidence. It looks pristine.</p>
<p>An electronic police state is characterized by this:</p>
<p><strong>State use of electronic technologies to record, organize, search and distribute forensic evidence against its citizens.</strong></p>
<p>The two crucial facts about the information gathered under an electronic police state are these:</p>
<p>1. It is criminal evidence, ready for use in a trial.</p>
<p>2. It is gathered universally and silently, and only later organized for use in prosecutions.</p>
<p>In an Electronic Police State, every surveillance camera recording, every email you send, every Internet site you surf, every post you make, every check you write, every credit card swipe, every cell phone ping&#8230; are all criminal evidence, and they are held in searchable databases, for a long, long time. Whoever holds this evidence can make you look very, very bad whenever they care enough to do so. You can be prosecuted whenever they feel like it&#8211;the evidence is already in their database. (&#8221;The Electronic Police State, 2008 National Rankings,&#8221; <em>Cryptohippie</em>, no date)  <em></em></p></blockquote>
<p>Unfortunately, this is not the stuff of paranoid fantasies, but American reality in the year 2009; one unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>In addition to &#8220;Going Dark,&#8221; the FBI is busily constructing what <em>ABC News</em> refers to as the &#8220;development of the Biometric Technology Center, a Joint Justice, FBI and DoD program.&#8221; At a cost of $97.6 million, the center will function as a research and development arm of the Bureau&#8217;s Biometric Center of Excellence (<a href="http://www.fbibiospecs.org/fbibiometric/background.html">BCOE</a>), one which will eventually &#8220;be a vast database of personal data including fingerprints, iris scans and DNA which the FBI calls the Next Generation Identification (NGI).&#8221;</p>
<p>The program is closely tied with technology under development by West Virginia University&#8217;s Center for Identification Technology Research (<a href="http://www.citer.wvu.edu/">CITeR</a>). As the FBI&#8217;s &#8220;lead academic partner in biometrics research&#8221; according to a Bureau <a href="http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel08/wvu_fbi_020608.htm">press release</a>, CITeR provides &#8220;biometrics research support to the FBI and its law enforcement and national security partners and serve as the FBI liaison to the academic community of biometric researchers nationwide.&#8221;</p>
<p>Indeed, CITeR director Lawrence A. Hornak, &#8220;a visionary of the Big Brother school of technology&#8221; told <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/12/24/fbi_database_biometrics/"><em>The Register</em></a>, he awaits the day &#8220;when devices will be able to &#8216;recognize us and adapt to us&#8217;.&#8221; The &#8220;long-term goal,&#8221; Hornak declared, is the &#8220;ubiquitous use of biometrics.&#8221;</p>
<p>But as <em>The Register</em> pointed out when the program was publicly rolled-out, &#8220;civil libertarians and privacy advocates are not amused.&#8221;</p>
<blockquote><p>They claim that the project presents nightmare scenarios of stolen biometric information being used for ever-more outlandish forms of identity theft, which would be nearly impossible to correct. Correcting an inaccurate credit report is already an insulting and hair-raising experience in America, and critics contend that the use of biometrics would make correcting inaccurate credit reports or criminal histories nearly impossible. Besides, they argue, the US government does not exactly have a sterling record when it comes to database security&#8211;what happens when, as seems inevitable, the database is hacked and this intimate and allegedly indisputable data is compromised? &#8230;</p>
<p>Databases usually become less accurate, rather than more, the older and bigger they get, because there&#8217;s very little incentive for the humans that maintain them to go back and correct old, inaccurate information rather than simply piling on new information. Data entry typically trumps data accuracy. Furthermore, the facial recognition technology in its current iteration is woefully inaccurate, with recognition rates as low as 10 per cent at night. All in all, there is ample reason for skepticism&#8211;not that it will make much of a difference. (Burke Hansen, &#8220;FBI preps $1bn biometric database,&#8221; <em>The Register</em>, December 24, 2007) </p></blockquote>
<p>But WVU&#8217;s CITeR isn&#8217;t the only partner lining-up to feed at the FBI&#8217;s trough. <em>ABC</em> reports that the Bureau &#8220;has awarded the NGI contract to Lockheed Martin to update and maintain the database which is expected to come online in 2010. After being fully deployed the NGI contract could cost up to $1 billion.&#8221;</p>
<p>However, <em>Federal Computer Week</em> <a href="http://fcw.com/articles/2008/02/12/fbi-awards-ngi-contract-to-lockheed-martin.aspx">reported</a> in 2008 that although the initial contract will &#8220;consist of a base year,&#8221; the potential for &#8220;nine option years&#8221; means that &#8220;the value of the multiyear contract &#8230; could be higher.&#8221; You can bet it will!</p>
<p>Additional firms on Lockheed Martin&#8217;s &#8220;team&#8221; as subcontractors include IBM, Accenture, BAE Systems, Global Science &amp; Technology, Innovative Management &amp; Technology Services and Platinum Solutions. In other words, NGI is yet another in a gigantic herd of cash cows enriching the Military-Industrial-Security Complex.</p>
<p><strong>Democracy &#8220;Going Dark&#8221;</strong></p>
<p>The &#8220;vast apparatus of domestic spying&#8221; described by the <a href="http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/may2009/pers-m13.shtml"><em>World Socialist Web Site</em></a>, greatly expanded under the criminal Bush regime is a permanent feature of the capitalist state; one that will continue to target political dissent during a period of profound economic crisis.</p>
<p>That the Obama administration, purportedly representing fundamental change from the previous government, has embraced the felonious methods of the Bush crime family and its <em>capo tutti capo</em>, Richard Cheney, should surprise no one. Like their Republican colleagues, the Democrats are equally complicit in the antidemocratic programs of repression assembled under the mendacious banner of the &#8220;global war on terror.&#8221;</p>
<p>From warrantless wiretapping to the suppression of information under cover of state secrets, and from the waging of imperialist wars of conquest to torture, the militarist mind-set driving capitalist elites at warp speed towards an abyss of their own creation, are signs that new political provocations are being prepared by America&#8217;s permanent &#8220;shadow government&#8221;&#8211;the military-intelligence-corporate apparatus.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Obama&#8217;s Justice Department Moves to Squash NSA Spying Suits</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/04/obamas-justice-department-moves-to-squash-nsa-spying-suits/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/04/obamas-justice-department-moves-to-squash-nsa-spying-suits/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2009 16:59:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal/Constitutional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=7690</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Since fatuously declaring his to be a &#8220;change&#8221; administration, President Barack Obama has quickly donned the blood-spattered mantle of state secrecy and executive privilege worn by the Bush regime.
On Friday April 3, the Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss one of the Electronic Frontier Foundation&#8217;s (EFF) landmark lawsuits against illegal spying by the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since fatuously declaring his to be a &#8220;change&#8221; administration, President Barack Obama has quickly donned the blood-spattered mantle of state secrecy and executive privilege worn by the Bush regime.</p>
<p>On Friday April 3, the Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss one of the Electronic Frontier Foundation&#8217;s (<a href="http://www.eff.org/">EFF</a>) landmark lawsuits against illegal spying by the National Security Agency (NSA).</p>
<p>That suit, <a href="http://www.eff.org/cases/jewel"><em>Jewell v. NSA</em></a>, was filed last September against the NSA, NSA Director Keith B. Alexander, President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey and Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence. But with the departure of the Bush gang, the defendants now include President Barack Obama, NSA Director Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence.</p>
<p>When the suit was filed against the government, EFF <a href="http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/09/17-0">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>The lawsuit, <em>Jewel v. NSA</em>, is aimed at ending the NSA&#8217;s dragnet surveillance of millions of ordinary Americans and holding accountable the government officials who illegally authorized it. Evidence in the case includes undisputed documents provided by former AT&amp;T telecommunications technician Mark Klein showing AT&amp;T has routed copies of Internet traffic to a secret room in San Francisco controlled by the NSA. (&#8221;EFF Sues NSA, President Bush and Vice President Cheney to Stop Illegal Surveillance,&#8221; Electronic Frontier Foundation, Press Release, September 18, 2008)</p></blockquote>
<p>Though the drapery in the Oval Office may have changed, the criminal acts against American citizens and legal residents by unaccountable intelligence agencies and privateers in the corporate security industry continue apace.</p>
<p>Based on information disclosed by AT&amp;T whistleblower Klein and other sources, including <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html"><em>The New York Times</em></a>, the suit seeks to &#8220;halt illegal, unconstitutional, and ongoing dragnet surveillance&#8221; by AT&amp;T and other grifting telecoms of the &#8220;communications and communications records&#8221; of their customers.</p>
<p>Klein told the Court in a sworn <a href="http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/SER_klein_decl.pdf">affidavit</a> that AT&amp;T&#8217;s internet traffic in San Francisco runs through fiber-optic cables at the company&#8217;s Folsom Street facility. Using a device known as a splitter, a complete copy of internet traffic that AT&amp;T receives&#8211;email, web browsing requests and other electronic communications sent by AT&amp;T customers, or received from people who use another internet service provider&#8211;was diverted onto a separate fiber-optic cable connected to the company&#8217;s SG-3 room, controlled by NSA. Only personnel with NSA clearances&#8211;either working for, or on behalf of the agency&#8211;have access to this room.</p>
<p>The evidence of corporate malfeasance presented by Klein and other whistleblowers, led the civil liberties&#8217; watchdog group to assert that AT&amp;T&#8217;s &#8220;deployment of NSA-controlled surveillance capability&#8221; is not limited to the corporation&#8217;s San Francisco facility &#8220;and is consistent with an overall national AT&amp;T deployment to from 15 to 20 similar sites, possibly more. This implies that a substantial fraction, probably well over half, of AT&amp;T&#8217;s purely domestic traffic was diverted to the NSA. At the same time, the equipment in the room is well suited to the capture and analysis of large volumes of data for purposes of surveillance.&#8221;</p>
<p>As I <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2008/11/thick-as-thieves-private-and-very.html">reported</a> in November, among the firms supplying the surveillance products hardwired into America&#8217;s telecommunications infrastructure is <a href="http://verint.com/corporate/">Verint Systems Inc.</a> (formerly Comverse InfoSys). The firm was founded by former Israeli intelligence officer, Jacob &#8220;Kobi&#8221; Alexander, a corporate grifter who fled the United States for Namibia after being indicted in 2006 on thirty-two counts of fraud. Alexander hatched a backdated stock options scheme that netted him $138 million in profits looted from company shareholders.</p>
<p>While Alexander and his family may be safely ensconced in the dry but relatively safe harbor of Windhoek, Verint&#8217;s security products live on, providing &#8220;actionable intelligence solutions&#8221; to repressors world wide. According to a <em>Business Week</em> <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/snapshot/snapshot_article.asp?symbol=VRNT.PK">company profile</a>,</p>
<blockquote><p>Verint Systems, Inc. provides analytic software-based solutions for the security and business intelligence markets. Its analytic solutions collect, retain, and analyze voice, fax, video, email, Internet, and data transmissions from voice, video and IP networks for the purpose of generating actionable intelligence for decision makers. The company primarily offers communications interception solutions, such as STAR-GATE, RELIANT, and VANTAGE; networked video solutions that include NEXTIVA; and contact center actionable intelligence solutions, which include ULTRA. Verint Systems serves government entities, global corporations, law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, transportation agencies, retail stores, utilities, and communications service providers.<em> </em>(Verint Systems, Inc. <em>Business Week</em>, Information Technology Sector, accessed April 11, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>Other corporate outfits providing similar intelligence &#8220;solutions&#8221; to America&#8217;s telecommunications firms and agencies such as the CIA, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency include Verint&#8217;s rival <a href="http://www.narus.com/">Narus</a> (another spooky Israeli security firm), <a href="http://www.quintessenz.at/doqs/000100004315/2007_02_01,siemens_intelligence_platform.pdf"><span><strong>Siemans</strong></span></a> and <a href="http://www.quintessenz.at/doqs/000100003497/IMS_USER_MANUAL.pdf">Ericsson</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the economic meltdown, <em>Washington Technology</em> <a href="http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/03/30/strategy-stimulus-opportunities.aspx">reported</a> March 27 that &#8220;technology companies are poised to tap into the billions of dollars that will flow from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act into new federal, state and local initiatives.&#8221; Many of the initiatives include new corporate welfare projects devised by the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI to &#8220;keep America safe.&#8221;</p>
<p>In this context, the Obama administration&#8217;s drive to preserve the NSA&#8217;s ability to illegally spy on Americans is intimately connected to the corporatist bottom line. After all, Democrat or Republican, <em>the business of government is business</em>.</p>
<p>Arguments in San Francisco federal district court by U.S. Attorneys have been described by constitutional law experts as being &#8220;worse than Bush.&#8221; In their motion to dismiss <em>Jewell</em>, the Obama administration cited the same perverse logic of the previous regime: that the state secrets privilege requires the court to dismiss the issue &#8220;out of hand.&#8221;</p>
<p>Douglas Letter, U.S. Terrorism Litigation Counsel for Obama&#8217;s Department of Justice, argued that simply allowing the case to proceed &#8220;would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.&#8221;</p>
<p>Yet more pernicious&#8211;and unprecedented&#8211;arguments followed. &#8220;The DoJ,&#8221; <a href="http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/obama-doj-worse-than-bush">according</a> to EFF, now claim &#8220;that the U.S. Government is completely immune from litigation for illegal spying&#8211;that the Government can never be sued for surveillance that violates federal privacy statutes.&#8221;</p>
<p>Arguing that the state possesses &#8220;sovereign immunity,&#8221; the &#8220;change&#8221; administration now claims that under provisions of the disgraceful USA PATRIOT Act&#8211;a draconian law rammed through Congress in the wake of the 9/11 attacks&#8211;the state is &#8220;immune from suit under the two remaining key federal surveillance laws: the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act.&#8221;</p>
<p>In practice, this means that under a new, ludicrous interpretation of the Orwellian PATRIOT Act, the government can <em>never</em> be held accountable for illegal surveillance under any federal statute. As Glenn Greenwald points out in <a href="http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/04/06/obama/index.html"><em>Salon</em></a>,</p>
<blockquote><p>In other words, beyond even the outrageously broad &#8220;state secrets&#8221; privilege invented by the Bush administration and now embraced fully by the Obama administration, the Obama DOJ has now invented a brand new claim of government immunity, one which literally asserts that the U.S. Government is free to intercept all of your communications (calls, emails and the like) and&#8211;even if what they&#8217;re doing is blatantly illegal and they know it&#8217;s illegal&#8211;you are barred from suing them unless they &#8220;willfully disclose&#8221; to the public what they have learned. (&#8221;New and worse secrecy and immunity claims from the Obama DOJ,&#8221; <em>Salon</em>, April 6, 2009)</p></blockquote>
<p>EFF attorney Kevin Bankston told <em>Salon</em>: &#8220;This is the first time [the DOJ] claimed sovereign immunity against Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act claims. In other words, the administration is arguing that the U.S. can <em>never</em> be sued for spying that violates federal surveillance statutes, whether FISA, the Wiretap Act or the SCA.&#8221;</p>
<p>In their motion to dismiss, DoJ attorneys&#8211;like their predecessors&#8211;argue on Page 13 of the Government&#8217;s brief that &#8220;An assertion of the state secretes privilege &#8220;must be accorded the &#8216;utmost deference&#8217; and the court&#8217;s review of the claim of privilege is narrow.&#8221; <em>Kasza</em>, 133 F.3d at 1166; see also <em>Al-Haramain</em>, 507 F3d at 1203 (&#8217;[W]e acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena&#8217;).&#8221;</p>
<p>On Page 16, the state contends that, &#8220;Finally, all of the plaintiffs&#8217; claims require the disclosure of whether or not AT&amp;T assisted the Government in alleged intelligence activities, and the DNI again has demonstrated that disclosure of whether the NSA has an intelligence relationship with a particular private company would also cause exceptional harm to national security&#8211;among other reasons by revealing to foreign adversaries which channels of communication may or may not be secure.&#8221;</p>
<p>If U.S. District Judge Judge Vaughn Walker rules in the state&#8217;s favor and dismisses <em>Jewell</em>, constitutional protections under the fourth amendment guaranteeing &#8220;the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,&#8221; would be a meaningless charade.</p>
<p>There is however, a precedent for the Obama administration&#8217;s blatant violation of our rights: that of their predecessors in the Bush regime&#8217;s Office of Legal Counsel.</p>
<p>According to an October 23, 2001 Department of Justice <a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memomilitaryforcecombatus10232001.pdf">memorandum</a> titled <em>Authority for Use of Military Force To Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States</em>, authored by torture-enabler and OLC head, John C. Yoo, the military could be deployed domestically to interrogate, detain, raid and spy on Americans, without having to comply with constitutional guarantees under the Bill of Rights. Yoo advised the Oval Office:</p>
<blockquote><p>Fourth, we turn to the question whether the Fourth Amendment would apply to the use of the military domestically against foreign terrorists. Although the situation is novel (at least in the nation&#8217;s recent experience), we think that the better view is that the Fourth Amendment would <em>not</em> apply in these circumstances. Thus, for example, we do not think that a military commander carrying out a raid on a terrorist cell would be required to demonstrate probable cause or to obtain a warrant. (Page 2)</p></blockquote>
<p>Additionally, having decided that the President enjoys plenary, that is, unlimited power to carry out the &#8220;war on terror&#8221; Yoo concludes, after dispensing with Fourth Amendment protections that,</p>
<blockquote><p>First Amendment speech and press rights may also be subordinated to the overriding need to wage war successfully. &#8230;</p>
<p>The current campaign against terrorism may require even broader exercises of federal power domestically. Terrorists operate within the continental United States itself, and escape detection by concealing themselves within the domestic society and economy. While, no doubt these terrorists pose a direct military threat to the national security, their methods of infiltration and their surprise attacks on civilian and governmental facilities make it difficult to identify any front line. Unfortunately, the terrorist attacks of September 11 have created a situation in which the battlefield has occurred, and may occur, at dispersed locations and intervals within the American homeland itself. As a result, efforts to fight terrorism may require not only the usual wartime regulations of domestic affairs, but also military actions that have normally occurred abroad. (Pages 24, 25)  <em></em></p></blockquote>
<p>Indeed, the Bush administration&#8217;s so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) transformed the United States into a limitless battlespace where anything goes. From warrantless wiretapping of telephone and internet communications, the seizure of business and medical records, as well as the illegal&#8211;and indefinite&#8211;detention of citizens and legal residents as &#8220;unlawful enemy combatants,&#8221; Yoo&#8217;s memorandum provided the steel and concrete that gave form to the architectural blueprints for a presidential dictatorship.</p>
<p>Instructively, these memos were not withdrawn until 2008. However, in moving to suppress <em>Jewell</em>, Obama&#8217;s Justice Department and their private partners in the telecommunications industry in practice, are continuing the same repressive policies.</p>
<p>As <em>Wired</em> <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/01/nsa-whistlebl-1.html">reported</a> back in January, &#8220;NSA whistleblower Russell Tice&#8221; revealed &#8220;that the National Security Agency spied on individual U.S. journalists, entire U.S. news agencies as well as &#8216;tens of thousands&#8217; of other Americans.&#8221;</p>
<blockquote><p>Tice said on Wednesday that the NSA had vacuumed in all domestic communications of Americans, including, faxes, phone calls and network traffic.</p>
<p>Today Tice said that the spy agency also combined information from phone wiretaps with data that was mined from credit card and other financial records. He said information of tens of thousands of U.S. citizens is now in digital databases warehoused at the NSA.</p>
<p>&#8220;This [information] could sit there for ten years and then potentially it marries up with something else and ten years from now they get put on a no-fly list and they, of course, won&#8217;t have a clue why,&#8221; Tice said.</p>
<p>In most cases, the person would have no discernible link to terrorist organizations that would justify the initial data mining or their inclusion in the database. (Kim Zetter, &#8220;NSA Whistleblower: Wiretaps Were Combined with Credit Card Records of U.S. Citizens,&#8221; <em>Wired</em>, January 23, 2009)  <em></em></p></blockquote>
<p>As George Washington University Law Professor and constitutional scholar, Jonathan Turley, <a href="http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/keith-olbermann-obama-and-wiretapping">told</a> MSNBC&#8217;s Keith Olbermann on &#8220;Countdown&#8221; April 7,</p>
<blockquote><p>I think right now, the Bush people are bringing out their mission-accomplished sign, because they&#8217;ve not only gotten Obama to protect Bush and Cheney and others from any criminal investigation on torture, but he&#8217;s now gone even further than they did in the protection of unlawful surveillance. This is the ultimate victory for the Bush officials. They have Barack Obama adopting the same extremist arguments, and in fact exceeding the extremist arguments made by President Bush&#8230;</p>
<p>You cannot any longer suggest that President Obama is advancing the civil liberties and the privacy interests that he promised to advance. This is a terrible roll-back. It&#8217;s a terrible decision. (&#8221;Countdown&#8221; with Keith Olbermann, MSNBC, Tuesday, April 7, 2009)  <em></em></p></blockquote>
<p>And with Congress&#8217; passage of the abominable FISA Amendments Act (FAA) last July, handing the NSA carte blanche to continue warrantless spying and driftnet surveillance of Americans, granting grifting telecom giants such as AT&amp;T, Sprint and Verizon get-out-of-jail-free-cards in the form of retroactive immunity for their collusive and wholly illegal activity with NSA and other state agencies, America&#8217;s post-constitutional new order continues apace. As I <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2008/09/democracy-or-police-state-new-lawsuit.html">reported</a> last September, &#8220;the extent of these illegal programs have revealed, the &#8216;enemy&#8217; is none other than the American people themselves!&#8221;</p>
<p>Three months into the Obama administration, the contours of a new and improved &#8220;liberal&#8221; police state reveal the same rotten, nidorous core as that of their predecessors. This time around however, the mailed fist of the capitalist state is gussied up with Smiley Face emblems and Hello Kitty stickers.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Thick as Thieves: The Private (and very profitable) World of Corporate Spying</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/12/thick-as-thieves-the-private-and-very-profitable-world-of-corporate-spying/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/12/thick-as-thieves-the-private-and-very-profitable-world-of-corporate-spying/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2008 16:00:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Tom Burghardt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Capitalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Globalization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Espionage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dissidentvoice.org/?p=5029</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[When Comverse Infosys founder and CEO Jacob &#8220;Kobi&#8221; Alexander fled to Israel and later Namibia in 2006, the former Israeli intelligence officer and entrepreneur took along a little extra cash for his extended &#8220;vacation&#8221;&#8211;$57 million to be precise.
According to investigative journalist James Bamford&#8217;s exposé of the National Security Agency, The Shadow Factory, Alexander was facing [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Comverse Infosys founder and CEO Jacob &#8220;Kobi&#8221; Alexander fled to Israel and later Namibia in 2006, the former Israeli intelligence officer and entrepreneur took along a little extra cash for his extended &#8220;vacation&#8221;&#8211;$57 million to be precise.</p>
<p>According to investigative journalist James Bamford&#8217;s exposé of the National Security Agency, <a href="http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl/9780385521321.html"><em>The Shadow Factory</em></a>, Alexander was facing a thirty-two-count indictment by the Justice Department &#8220;charging him with masterminding a scheme to backdate millions of Comverse stock options &#8230; that allowed Alexander to realize $138 million in profits&#8211;profits stolen from the pockets of the company&#8217;s shareholders.&#8221;</p>
<p>When the scandal broke, one former colleague told the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/21/technology/21options.html"><em>New York Times</em></a>, &#8220;The one thing about Kobi is that he did have a sense of entitlement,&#8221; said Stephen R. Kowarsky, who was an executive at Comverse from 1985-97. &#8220;Most people are a little bit shy or self-effacing about asking for something, but not Kobi. It was easy for him to say, &#8216;I want that. I deserve that.&#8217;&#8221;</p>
<p>Sounds like business as usual to me!</p>
<p>But there is a darker side to Verint. As investigative journalist Christopher Ketcham revealed on the muckraking website <a href="http://www.counterpunch.org/ketcham09272008.html"><em>CounterPunch</em></a>, U.S. intelligence agencies are wary of Israeli penetration and interception of U.S. military systems and advanced computing applications through a backdoor, called a &#8220;trojan,&#8221; secretly built into enterprise architecture. Ketcham wrote,</p>
<blockquote><p>According to former CIA officer [Philip] Giraldi and other US intelligence sources, software manufactured and maintained by Verint, Inc. handles most of American law enforcement&#8217;s wiretaps. Says Giraldi: &#8220;Phone calls are intercepted, recorded, and transmitted to US investigators by Verint, which claims that it has to be &#8216;hands on&#8217; with its equipment to maintain the system.&#8221; Giraldi also notes Verint is reimbursed for up to 50 percent of its R&amp;D costs by the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade. According to Giraldi, the extent of the use of Verint technology &#8220;is considered classified,&#8221; but sources have spoken out and told Giraldi they are worried about the security of Verint wiretap systems. The key concern, says Giraldi, is the issue of a &#8220;trojan&#8221; embedded in the software. (Christopher Ketcham, &#8220;An Israeli Trojan Horse,&#8221; <em>CounterPunch</em>, Weekend Edition, September 27-28, 2008)</p></blockquote>
<p>Yet despite alarms raised by a score of federal law enforcement agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), fearful that sensitive wiretap information was finding its way into the hands of international narcotrafficking cartels, virtually nothing has been done to halt the outsourcing of America&#8217;s surveillance apparatus to firms with intimate ties to foreign intelligence entities. Indeed, as America&#8217;s spy system is turned inward against the American people, corporations such as Verint work hand-in-glove with a spooky network of security agencies and their corporatist pals in the telecommunications industry.</p>
<p>Kobi Alexander would&#8217;ve certainly known the drill, exploiting family connections for advantage over competitors with movers and shakers in Washington. As they say, the fruit doesn&#8217;t fall far from the tree. Kobi&#8217;s father Zvi was a fabulously wealthy oil baron who wound up running Israel&#8217;s state oil company. Bamford recounts how Zvi won drilling franchises: he&#8217;d bribe African cabinet ministers, &#8220;often in partnership with the U.S. tax cheat Marc Rich, who became a fugitive and was given sanctuary in Israel.&#8221;</p>
<p>That is, until Rich was handed a pardon during the waning days of the Clinton administration. In the aftermath of Clinton&#8217;s &#8220;gifting&#8221; the tax scofflaw with a &#8220;get-out-of-jail-free&#8221; card, Rich&#8217;s close confidant, attorney and convicted felon, I. Lewis &#8220;Scooter&#8221; Libby, denied that Rich had conspired to hide illegal profits or violate U.S. laws.</p>
<p>Yet despite a documentary record of shady dealings that spanned continents&#8211;and decades&#8211;a &#8220;neutral, leaning towards favorable&#8221; opinion on Rich&#8217;s petition for pardon was signed-off by none other than former U.S. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Barack Obama&#8217;s apparent pick for U.S. Attorney General.</p>
<p>Like Kobi Alexander and his pals at Comverse, Rich too, had a dirty little secret as CNN <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0102/18/sm.01.html">reported</a> back in 2001: &#8220;Marc Rich did help the Israeli security services in some way.&#8221; CNN doesn&#8217;t specify <em>how</em> Rich curried favor with Mossad, only that he <em>did</em>. Which just goes to show its a small world&#8211;of one hand washing the other.</p>
<p>(Memo to Obama supporters: you can forget about future Justice Department investigations of Bush cronies and war criminals. Why? Shortly before entering private practice at the tony law firm Covington &amp; Burling, Holder was <em>Bush&#8217;s</em> Acting Attorney General until John Ashcroft&#8217;s nomination was confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Out of government, Holder made a killing defending <a href="http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia253.htm">Chiquita Brands International</a> against charges that the firm paid the far-right Colombian, <a href="http://www.narconews.com/Issue40/article1543.html">narcotrafficking</a> AUC death squad millions in &#8220;protection money&#8221; to murder labor activists. But I digress.)</p>
<p>Meanwhile in the <em>heimat</em>, enterprising innovators such as Verint are inside&#8211;<em>deep inside</em>&#8211;America&#8217;s telephone and internet infrastructure. Keeping &#8220;America safe&#8221;&#8211;from its citizens&#8211;has become a veritable cash cow for dozens of corporate embeds busy as proverbial bees inventing new products for an alphabet-soup mix of intelligence agencies such as the FBI, CIA, DHS, DIA, NGA, NRO and NSA.</p>
<p>Five months after the 9/11 attacks, the security bubble was rapidly expanding and the &#8220;homeland security&#8221; market was touted by Wall Street gurus as &#8220;the next big thing&#8221; on the corporate grifting horizon.</p>
<p>Alexander (before fleeing to the dry, but relatively safe harbor in Windhoek) rebranded Comverse Infosys, <a href="http://verint.com/corporate/">Verint Systems, Inc.</a>, an acronym for &#8220;verified intelligence.&#8221; The company, which made a fortune on a digital suite of wiretapping tools, AudioDisk, describes itself as a &#8220;a leading provider of actionable intelligence solutions for workforce optimization, IP video, communications interception, and public safety.&#8221;</p>
<p>Soon thereafter according to Bamford, Verint was selling its &#8220;actionable intelligence solutions&#8221; to &#8220;more than 5,000 organizations in over 100 countries&#8221; world-wide, including the worst human rights abusers on the planet. And why wouldn&#8217;t they? Verint&#8217;s already brisk business took off like a bat out of hell after 9/11.</p>
<p>As <em>USA Today</em> <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/2006-09-10-security-industry_x.htm">reported</a> in 2006, &#8220;Most of the growth this decade will come from building what Homeland Security Research calls &#8216;a homeland defense infrastructure.&#8217; Growth areas are likely to include technology for surveillance and for detection of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.&#8221; Or illegal spying by unaccountable state agencies and their private partners.</p>
<p>According to a <em>Business Week</em> company <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/snapshot/snapshot_article.asp?symbol=VRNT.PK">profile</a>,</p>
<blockquote><p>Verint Systems, Inc. provides analytic software-based solutions for the security and business intelligence markets. Its analytic solutions collect, retain, and analyze voice, fax, video, email, Internet, and data transmissions from voice, video and IP networks for the purpose of generating actionable intelligence for decision makers. The company primarily offers communications interception solutions, such as STAR-GATE, RELIANT, and VANTAGE; networked video solutions that include NEXTIVA; and contact center actionable intelligence solutions, which include ULTRA. Verint Systems serves government entities, global corporations, law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, transportation agencies, retail stores, utilities, and communications service providers. (Verint Systems, Inc. <em>Business Week</em>, Information Technology Sector, accessed November 26, 2008)</p></blockquote>
<p>With total revenues of $249.8 million and gross profits in 2005 of $137.1 million, Verint, while not the largest firm in the security and intelligence &#8220;marketplace&#8221; nonetheless is connected to a host of spooky clients, including the National Security Agency and their &#8220;partners&#8221; at Verizon Communications.</p>
<p>As I <a href="http://antifascist-calling.blogspot.com/2008/03/nsa-data-driftnets-domestic.html">wrote</a> back in March, whistleblower and security consultant Babak Pasdar revealed how Verizon handed the FBI and one assumes the NSA, unrestricted access to their customers&#8217; voice communications and electronic data via the Bureau&#8217;s &#8220;Quantico circuit.&#8221;</p>
<p>In a signed <a href="http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/2008/BPAffidavit1.pdf">affidavit</a> to the whistleblowing protection group, the Government Accountability Project (<a href="http://www.whistleblower.org/template/index.cfm">GAP</a>), Pasdar described how his unnamed client (<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/07/AR2008040702364.html">revealed</a> by <em>The Washington Post</em> as Verizon Communications), listened in and recorded all conversations en-masse; collected and recorded mobile phone data use en-masse; obtained data that the company accessed from mobile phone usage, including internet access, e-mail and web browsing; trended calling patterns and call behavior; identified inbound and outbound callers; tracked all inbound and outbound calls; and traced a user&#8217;s physical location.</p>
<p>While Verizon and fellow telecom spy AT&amp;T may have handed the FBI and NSA a treasure trove of their customer&#8217;s personal details, niche telecom companies such as Verint, rival <a href="http://www.narus.com/">Narus</a> (another spooky Israeli security firm), <a href="http://www.quintessenz.at/doqs/000100004315/2007_02_01,siemens_intelligence_platform.pdf">Siemans</a> and <a href="http://www.quintessenz.at/doqs/000100003497/IMS_USER_MANUAL.pdf">Ericsson</a> to name but a few of the multinationals that build the surveillance tools hard-wired into America&#8217;s telecommunications infrastructure, have made a killing destroying our privacy.</p>
<p><strong>The Ties that Bind: Verint&#8217;s Spooky Board of Directors</strong></p>
<p>The close interconnections amongst firms such as Verint and the U.S. and Israeli National Security States are revealed by a glance at the firm&#8217;s <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/people/board.asp?symbol=VRNT.PK">Board of Directors</a>.</p>
<p>When Kobi Alexander fled the country in 2006, Dan Bodner became the company&#8217;s CEO. According to <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=263013&amp;symbol=VRNT.PK"><em>Business Week</em></a>, Bodner, a Comverse Infosys insider, &#8220;served in the Israeli Defense Forces in an engineering capacity.&#8221; A graduate of Technion, Israel&#8217;s Institute of Technology, Bodner was previously the President and CEO of Comverse Government Systems Corporation.</p>
<p>David T. Ledwell, Verint&#8217;s Chief Strategic Officer since 2003, was formerly the President and CEO of Verint subsidiary Loronix Information Systems, according to <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=1111118&amp;symbol=VRNT.PK"><em>Business Week</em></a>. Apparently Loronix has been folded into its parent company Verint, and no longer exists as a separate corporate entity. However, the firm&#8217;s products made the transition. According to <a href="http://verint.com/video_solutions/index.cfm">Verint</a>, the former Loronix division was responsible for its Nextiva IP Video Surveillance System. The &#8220;Nextiva portfolio&#8221; is loaded with &#8220;a broad array of solutions&#8221; for video recording and analysis in the banking, critical infrastructure, retail and mass transit &#8220;markets.&#8221;</p>
<p>Andre Dahan, CEO, President and Executive Director of Verint&#8217;s parent company Comverse Technology Inc., was a former CEO and President of AT&amp;T Wireless Services Inc., <em>Business Week</em> <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=1466006&amp;capId=263003&amp;previousCapId=1717518&amp;previousTitle=Verint%20Systems%20Inc.">reveals</a>. Dahan, a graduate of the Jerusalem Institute of Technology, is described as having &#8220;more than 30 years of leadership experience in the information technology industry.&#8221;</p>
<p>Victor DeMarines, a Verint <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=2201309&amp;privcapId=42368917&amp;previousCapId=1717518&amp;previousTitle=Verint%20Systems%20Inc.">board member</a> since 2002 and Advisor to <a href="http://www.g2-inc.com/national.html">National Security Solutions, Inc.</a>, a &#8220;private equity firm&#8221; that focuses on &#8220;services and software&#8221; in the security and homeland defense industries, served as President and CEO of the spooky <a href="http://www.mitre.org/">MITRE Corporation</a>, where he worked in the &#8220;command and control&#8221; field as general manager of MITRE&#8217;s Center for Integrated Intelligence Systems and oversaw the non-profit&#8217;s Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Systems. Interestingly enough, from 1967-1969 DeMarines &#8220;managed MITRE&#8217;s Bangkok, Thailand, site, where he helped coordinate MITRE&#8217;s support for Air Force systems &#8230; on support operations issues,&#8221; according to <em>Business Week</em>. In addition to his duties at Verint and MITRE, DeMarines is a member of the advisory group for the National Reconnaissance Office (<a href="http://www.nro.gov/">NRO</a>) that oversees operations of America&#8217;s fleet of military spy satellites.</p>
<p>Howard Safir, formerly New York City Police Commissioner under &#8220;Mr. 9/11&#8243; himself, Mayor Rudy Giuliani, has been a Verint board member since 2002 according to his <em>Business Week</em> <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=2201371&amp;capId=3426505&amp;previousCapId=1717518&amp;previousTitle=Verint%20Systems%20Inc.">profile</a>. After his tenure as Police Commissioner, Safir became the CEO of <a href="http://www.safirrosetti.com/">SafirRosetti</a>, the intelligence and security division of <a href="http://www.globaloptions.com/">GlobalOptions Group, Inc.</a>, described as a firm that provides &#8220;crisis management and emergency response plans for disaster mitigation, continuity of operations, and other emergency management issues.&#8221;</p>
<p>Larry Myers, another MITRE alumni was MITRE&#8217;s Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer. At MITRE, Myers&#8217; brief included work on that firms&#8217; wide-ranging contracts for computer systems for the Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Internal Revenue Service and &#8220;several organizations&#8221; in the &#8220;U.S. intelligence community,&#8221; according to <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=8113535&amp;capId=1717518&amp;previousCapId=1717518&amp;previousTitle=Verint%20Systems%20Inc."><em>Business Week</em></a>. He joined Verint&#8217;s board in 2003.</p>
<p>Paul D. Baker, Vice President of Corporate Marketing and Corporate Communications of Comverse Technology, joined Verint&#8217;s board in 2002 according to his <em>Business Week</em> <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=541034&amp;capId=411448&amp;previousCapId=1717518&amp;previousTitle=Verint%20Systems%20Inc.">profile</a>. Additionally, Baker is a director with <a href="http://www.ulticom.com/">Ulticom, Inc.</a>, a firm that provides the telecommunications industry with &#8220;Mobility, Location, Payment, Switching and Messaging services within wireless, IP and wireline networks,&#8221; according to Ulticom&#8217;s website.</p>
<p>Lt. General (retired) Kenneth Minihan, joined Verint&#8217;s board in 2002, according to <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=1908593&amp;privcapId=1446400&amp;previousCapId=1717518&amp;previousTitle=Verint%20Systems%20Inc."><em>Business Week</em></a>. Described by the business publication as the &#8220;most connected&#8221; member on Verint&#8217;s board of directors, after leaving his post as the Director of the National Security Agency, NSA&#8217;s Central Security Service and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Minihan became managing director of the <a href="http://www.paladincapgroup.com/portal/index.php">Paladin Capital Group</a>. A private equity firm based (where else!) in Washington, D.C. Paladin&#8217;s management team is loaded with heavy-hitting embeds from the security-intelligence complex, including among others, Dr. Alf Andreassen, described by his Paladin profile as having &#8220;promoted technological innovation in the area of national security &#8230; for AT&amp;T&#8217;s support of classified national programs in the areas of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence&#8221; (C3I). Minihan is well placed on some 17 boards of directors to implement the Pentagon&#8217;s vision of creating a panoptic police state. Indeed, while at NSA Minihan oversaw that agency&#8217;s transition into the digital age of surveillance.</p>
<p>Shortly after Minihan&#8217;s appointment to Verint&#8217;s board, Verizon Communications installed STAR-GATE, an intrusive communications interception system. According to a blurb on the firm&#8217;s <a href="http://verint.com/communications_interception/section2a.cfm?article_level2_category_id=7&amp;article_level2a_id=220">website</a>,</p>
<blockquote><p>STAR-GATE &#8230; [is] designed to manage vast numbers of targets, concurrent sessions, call data records, and communications, STAR-GATE transparently accesses targeted communications without alerting subscribers or disrupting service. Verint partners with leading switch and network equipment vendors across the globe to deliver passive, active, and hybrid solutions for a wide range of communication technologies and communication services. &#8230; STAR-GATE can manage network topologies from small, single-switch implementations to country-wide deployments. (Verint, &#8220;STAR-GATE Lawful Interception and Data Retention Compliance Solutions for Communication Service Providers,&#8221; accessed November 28, 2008)</p></blockquote>
<p>Another product marketed by Verint for security and intelligence agencies world-wide is RELIANT, <a href="http://verint.com/communications_interception/section2a.cfm?article_level2_category_id=7&amp;article_level2a_id=196">described</a> by the firm as a monitoring center for &#8220;interception compliance, evidence gathering and historical data analysis by law enforcement agencies.&#8221; The Verint brochure touts RELIANT&#8217;s ability &#8220;to collect, retain, analyze, investigate and distribute intercepted voice data and multimedia communications and historical data to facilitate more productive investigations and the gathering of evidence.&#8221;</p>
<p>VANTAGE, according to Verint&#8217;s product <a href="http://verint.com/communications_interception/section2a.cfm?article_level2_category_id=7&amp;article_level2a_id=197">description</a>, is specifically designed for &#8220;mass and target communications interception, investigation and analysis, including COMINT for intelligence and national security agencies.&#8221; Indeed the VANTAGE monitoring center promises to deliver a &#8220;mass and target interception system&#8221; that &#8220;intercepts, filters, and analyzes voice, data and multimedia for intelligence purposes, with sophisticated probing technology for passively collecting maximum communications, with Verint’s real-time filtering mechanisms to extract the most important information, and stored data analysis for generating intelligence from data collected over time.&#8221;</p>
<p>Amongst the &#8220;features&#8221; touted by Verint are: mass communications related to specific &#8220;areas of interest;&#8221; target interception of &#8220;known entities;&#8221; a &#8220;unified interception&#8221; and &#8220;investigation workflow&#8221; specifically designed for &#8220;intelligence generation;&#8221; the &#8220;historical data analysis of call records&#8221; conveniently &#8220;imported from service providers;&#8221; and &#8220;tools&#8221; that facilitate the &#8220;passive monitoring of virtually any type of network.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>The Failure of the National Security-Surveillance State</strong></p>
<p>While America turns its intelligence and security apparatus inward and targets its own citizens, especially leftist dissenters, labor organizers, environmentalists and antiglobalization activists, threats from well-trained far-right jihadis&#8211;many of whom were witting or unwitting Western intelligence assets deployed on countless battlefields from Afghanistan to Kosovo and beyond&#8211;or neo-Nazi hooligans training for the <em>next</em> Oklahoma City atrocity, go unaddressed.</p>
<p>&#8220;Reading the tea leaves&#8221; from petaflops (a quadrillion bits) of data vacuumed-up from the internet, cell phones, land lines, spy satellites, personal business transactions or CCTV cameras is not &#8220;intelligence&#8221; but the height of folly as the recently-concluded attacks in Mumbai starkly demonstrate. The Indian intelligence apparatus, particularly its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) are hardly slouches when its comes to tradecraft or high-tech security &#8220;solutions.&#8221;</p>
<p>The close relationship built-up over decades amongst RAW and Mossad for example, did not prevent commandos with alleged links to Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), a militant group aligned with al-Qaeda and Pakistan&#8217;s &#8220;state within a state,&#8221; the Inter-Sevices Intelligence agency (ISI) from striking at the heart of India&#8217;s financial center with devastating effect. While it appears unlikely that the Pakistani government was involved in the Mumbai massacre, pro-Taliban elements within ISI or the military may be seeking to enflame tensions between the two South Asian nuclear nations.</p>
<p>RAW, like their counterparts in the CIA, MI6 or Mossad, rely on an inexhaustible stream of signals intelligence (SIGINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT) and increasingly, imagery intelligence (IMINT) from India&#8217;s fleet of spy satellites to prevent attacks. Indeed, Verint and other high-tech firms have sold RAW the <em>same</em> equipment with the same promise of &#8220;security&#8221; that they sold their American and European counterparts. RAW&#8217;s headquarters in New Delhi may sport the latest in surveillance technologies, including high-speed supercomputers and yet, 195 people&#8217;s lives were snuffed-out by a determined gang of miscreants.</p>
<p>While high-tech &#8220;solutions&#8221; may give the cops the geolocation of young anarchists slated for preemptive arrest or which journalists may pose &#8220;problems,&#8221; all the data-mining on the planet will not prevent terrorism; indeed terrorism is the reactionary handmaid of a system at the end of its rope. As the global capitalist economic crisis deepens as industry after industry succumb to the hammer blows of an historic crisis of confidence, new social and political struggles inevitably, appear on the horizon.</p>
<p>Although the close&#8211;and well compensated&#8211;interconnections amongst securocrats and corporate grifters capitalizing on the homeland security investment bubble will continue well into the next administration, real security in any meaningful sense of the word will only come by creating a just society. Anything less is a fraudulent exercise in self-delusion fueled by the Gordon Gekko&#8217;s and Kobi Alexander&#8217;s of America&#8217;s (very profitable) &#8220;war on terror.&#8221;</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Driving Your Liberties Away: Biometrics and &#8220;Enhanced&#8221; Drivers Licenses</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/11/driving-your-liberties-away-biometrics-and-enhanced-drivers-licenses/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/11/driving-your-liberties-away-biometrics-and-enhanced-drivers-licenses/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Nov 2008 14:00:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Christopher Parsons</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Science/Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dissidentvoice.org/?p=4739</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Privacy advocates across Canada have been struggling to prevent the Ontario provincial government from passing legislation that will see radio identifiers and biometric data inserted into future Ontarian drivers licenses. In spite of their efforts to raise the government’s awareness of the privacy dangers accompanying the proposed licenses, it appears as though their work may [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Privacy advocates across Canada have been struggling to prevent the Ontario provincial government from passing legislation that will see radio identifiers and biometric data inserted into future Ontarian drivers licenses. In spite of their efforts to raise the government’s awareness of the privacy dangers accompanying the proposed licenses, it appears as though their work may been in vain: Bill 85 is now in its final reading, and is widely expected to be passed on November 17th, or shortly thereafter, when the reading continues.</p>
<p>Ontario, and the rest of Canada, is being forced into including radio and biometric features in future drivers licenses by the United States government. As a consequence of the U.S. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), all Canadians and Americans who cross into the U.S. at a land border with just a driver license will be required to present an Enhanced Drivers License (EDL) as of June 1, 2009. While the radio ‘feature’ is disturbing in its own right, insofar as it emits a unique identifier whenever brought into range of a reader, I want to focus on the biometric features of these cards, why they raise human rights and civil liberties concerns, and the risk of function creep associated with the biometric facets of EDLs.</p>
<p><strong>WHTI-Mandated Biometrics</strong></p>
<p>The EDLs that Canadians and Americans will need to enter the U.S. include a picture of a driver’s face that can be analyzed against an American-Canadian facial database. To enroll in the database, individuals must first have their images captured, after which the computer system converts the image to a biometric template that is stored in a shared American-Canadian database. Next, the biometric template is used to authenticate a person’s identity, ensuring that the biometric data that is provided recalls the precise template for the individual in question. Finally, and arguably the most concerning, the system performs an identification process, where the biometric data is compared to all of the records held in the database. This final stage allows for mass analysis of images in the database against incomplete facial templates, such as those derived from security cameras.</p>
<p>The WHTI-mandated biometrics are intended to guarantee the identity of individuals at the border while providing an extra level of difficulty in creating illegal identity documents. In theory, because these licenses crosscheck between the image provided, and the one entered into the government database, it is less likely that phony IDs can be used to cross the Canadian-American border. Beyond this security feature, the American and Canadian governments argue that placing these biometrics in identity documents will enable airports to process travelers more efficiently because of the redundancy in evaluating a person’s identity. The WHTI mandates are publicly stated as securing America while providing convenience to Americans and Canadians alike.</p>
<p><strong>Current Issues with the Proposed Biometrics</strong></p>
<p>Several issues arise when citizens provide their biometric information to central government agencies. To begin, there is the matter that biometric authentication relies on a statistical pattern recognition technology. We do not live in Jack Bauer’s nightmare world of <em>24</em>, where computers accurately and easily identify faces against government databases; in the real world there is a likelihood that images will be misidentified. Such misidentifications can lead to an inability to move internationally, and given the ‘ease’ of removing oneself from the American and Canadian ‘no-fly’ lists it is likely that any immobility imposed by mistaken biometric associations will be long-term conditions. Inviting the possibility of such immobility is an affront to Canada’s commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which mandates that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country” &#8212; the biometrics, as proposed, may deny Americans who have come to visit Canada from reentering their own nation, or prevent Canadians from enjoying their right of international movement. Regardless of America’s hesitance to sign the Declaration, Canada and her governments should attend to their obligations and resist the licensing changes on behalf of both Americans and Canadians.</p>
<p>In addition, there are concerns that the biometric proposals would fly in the face of privacy protections offered by Ontario’s Privacy and Information Commissioner, Dr. Ann Cavoukian. In her open letter to the Hon. D. Tsubouchi on April 5, 2001 she warned that, “…there must be no ability to compare biometric images from one data with biometric images from other databases or reproductions of the biometric not obtained from the individual.” Her caution was offered during a time that the Ontario government was considering issuing smart cards, and it still echoes today: people must be aware of all uses of their biometric data and consent to its use. In the case of Ontario, the government has been silent on the possibility of American authorities using the biometric information provided by the drivers license database for purposes beyond border screenings.</p>
<p>Finally, we live in a world where identity theft is becoming more sophisticated, more harmful, and more common. Were a person to successfully enroll in the biometric-program associated with the drivers license using another person’s identity, then the thief would have effectively stolen another person’s face for the purposes of computer-algorithm authentication. In a situation like this, how do we adjudicate when the correct person uses a license? The danger of ‘losing’ biometric information places innocent citizen at substantial risk of being accused of actions they are not responsible for. Research groups have demonstrated that there are substantial costs that follow from having one’s identity stolen, with costs reaching as high as thousands of dollars. How much will these costs skyrocket when biometric data is included in the information that thieves steal?</p>
<p><strong>Function Creep</strong></p>
<p>In the case of the American-mandated drivers licenses, there is a considerable worry of function creep that could ensue after they are distributed to the public. Interpol has recently announced that they want to begin using a facial recognition database to catch suspects by using a facial recognition system at borders, and various law enforcement agencies in Canada and the United States have similarly expressed an interest in this mode of discovering and identifying suspects. Imagine how much safer society might be; by using a massive government-sponsored facial database it would be far easier to identify dangerous elements in society!</p>
<p>While this might, initially, sound like a positive thing there are (at least) two associated dangers with this kind of function creep. First, any such use of the biometric data for these purposes would exceed the intent that the data was collected for &#8212; citizens should always be notified, and be required to give their consent, when their biometric data might be used for either private or public purposes. Second, and perhaps of even greater concern, biometric analyses are not wholly accurate. Accuracy rates plummet when less than ideal images are used in facial comparisons &#8212; the images taken from a security camera, for example, provide poor templates to search against the database. Searching the drivers license database with poor templates would risk implicating a great number of people as ‘suspects’ in a crime, based on poorly constructed computer-algorithms. The prospect of being a suspect on the basis of a computer foul-up is a less than heartening thought to the innocent.</p>
<p>Voltaire famously wrote, “It is better to risk saving a guilty man than condemn an innocent one.” We should heed his sound advice, and rethink the deployment of identity cards that will almost inevitably condemn the innocent to hardships in our governments’ incessant drives to ‘secure’ the societies that they govern from the guilty.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Britain’s Digital Surveillance: Hiding from Her Majesty’s &#8220;Black Boxes&#8221;</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/11/britain%e2%80%99s-digital-surveillance-hiding-from-her-majesty%e2%80%99s-black-boxes/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/11/britain%e2%80%99s-digital-surveillance-hiding-from-her-majesty%e2%80%99s-black-boxes/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 08 Nov 2008 14:00:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Christopher Parsons</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Science/Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dissidentvoice.org/?p=4623</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There are plans to deploy ‘black boxes’ in UK ISPs’ networking hubs so that the government can capture and record every website that UK citizens visit. A similar operation is in full swing in the United States, where the NSA has hooked up their own ‘black boxes’ to American Internet Service Providers’ (ISPs) networks to [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are plans to deploy ‘black boxes’ in UK ISPs’ networking hubs so that the government can capture and record every website that UK citizens visit. A similar operation is in full swing in the United States, where the NSA has hooked up their own ‘black boxes’ to American Internet Service Providers’ (ISPs) networks to capture ‘questionable content’ passing through these networks. Unlike the Americans, who only examine questionable content, the UK government is planning to develop a database to hold the contents of all messages passing along their nations’ telecommunications networks.</p>
<p>While this issue has recently been sensationalized in the media, I have yet to find a source addressing the actual technologies that will (likely) drive these ‘black boxes’. I want to address that deficiency, calling attention to the Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technologies that will presumably be responsible for examining, categorizing, and heuristically evaluating the data flowing across British ISPs’ networks. In this piece, I want to briefly explain how DPI technology works, its technical limitations, and modes of actively evading its surveillance powers. Evading DPI-enabled surveillance is essential to participate in free, unsurveyed discourse in the contemporary digital environments that Western citizens find themselves within.</p>
<p><strong>DPI Technologies</strong></p>
<p>ISPs are uniquely situated to survey all of the data traffic that their customers are involved in. ISPs, unlike Google, Yahoo!, or Microsoft, act as gateways that individuals must pass through to access the Internet-at-large. Thus, any attempt to comprehensively survey an individual’s online activities must occur at the ISP-level. While simultaneously monitoring millions of customers might seem a Herculean task, or one firmly situated in the realm of science fiction, networking hardware vendors such as Cisco, L-1, Ellacoya Networks, and Procera Networks have risen to the challenge, producing devices that can survey, filter, alter, and censor content in real time, as it passes through ISPs’ networks.</p>
<p>Packets of data traversing the Internet are composed of two parts: a header and a payload. The header holds the general addressing information – where the packet is going, what order it should arrive at its destination in, and so on. The payload holds information about the application that sent the packet, as well as the particular contents of the packet itself – in the case of email, each packet holds the address that it should be delivered to, a bit of information that notes that an email application sent the packet, and some of the email’s text. Metaphorically, a packet can be thought of in the terms of postal mail: the header corresponds with the address on the outside of the envelope, and the payload the letter itself.</p>
<p>DPI equipment lets ISPs examine the header information as well as the payload. This means that ISPs can examine the text of email, instant messages, cellular phone text messages, and unencrypted Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications, in real time, as these messages are transmitted. Given the present state of available networking equipment that the world’s networking vendors have made available to the market, I strongly expect that the UK government’s ‘Black Boxes’ are, in essence, DPI devices that capture data as it moves across UK ISPs’ networks, and will transmit the contents of those packets to government databases while analyzing packets’ contents to identify if they are carrying ‘questionable’ payloads.</p>
<p><strong>The Effectiveness of DPI</strong></p>
<p>The Internet Evolution actually tested DPI equipment provided by Ellacoya and Ipoque earlier this year. In their tests, they found that these vendors&#8217; devices could not filter ‘unwanted’ content 100% of the time – the applications targeted by the devices continued to function, although at reduced speeds, in spite of the censoring and filtering heuristics that the devices employ. This suggests that attempting to capture unencrypted Voice over Internet Protocol conversations, as an example, will never be fully successful because some packets associated with a conversation will not be correctly identified, captured, and saved in meaningful ways by the UK government’s ‘black boxes’. Moreover, and pertaining to the following section, the tests that the Internet Evolution performed suggest that data-encryption strategies can prevent the capture and filtering of data traffic.</p>
<p><strong>Evading DPI Surveillance</strong></p>
<p>It seems that every day we hear about a new data scandal in the UK; some new database is accidentally leaked, putting the information of hundreds, thousands, or millions of UK citizens at risk of being used for nefarious purposes. The suggestion that all citizens’ digitized conversations and online actions be captured and stored by the UK government only heightens worries: what will happen when (not if) this proposed database is breached? How much information will be accessible to criminals?</p>
<p>Fortunately, UK citizens can prevent their government’s DPI equipment from ever capturing conversations or online actions, and thus simultaneously limit exposure to the risks of identity theft and ubiquitous government surveillance. A core weakness of DPI equipment is that it cannot read the contents of fully encrypted communications. This means that when you send or receive encrypted data packets that the government’s devices will be unable to capture the contents of your email, your VoIP sessions, or your instant messages.</p>
<p>Encryption isn’t something that is terribly hard to set up; Voltage Security has a product that will let Windows users encrypt their sent email at a low annual cost. By default, Skype encrypts its data traffic to prevent surreptitious snooping of your private conversations, actually providing more privacy than talking on the phone. When it turns to instant messaging, there are several open source clients such as Trillian (for Windows) and Adium (for OS X and Linux) that have built-in encryption and compatibility with all major messaging services. Finally, when browsing websites, access the ‘https’ versions of the sites whenever possible to encrypt data traffic to and from the websites.</p>
<p><strong>Why Hide from Her Majesty?</strong></p>
<p>You may be asking: why should I bother with this encryption nonsense? I don’t have anything to hide – as a law-abiding citizen I find it offensive, but not necessary ‘dangerous’, that my government is snooping on me. Only criminals have something to hide!</p>
<p>The collection and centralization of large amounts of personal data gives criminals a single point that they can attack to access to vast swathes of information about law-abiding citizens. As the UK government persistently demonstrates, it cannot be trusted to secure the citizen data that it holds. By continuing to predominantly send unencrypted messages, you greatly enhance the chances that your personal information could be used to open lines of credit, create phony identification documents, and generally cause mischief in your good name. Encrypting your data, hiding your personal thoughts and communications from the proposed UK ‘black boxes’, is essential to prevent your identity being stolen, and ensures that you can continue to engage in free speech without worrying feeling the chilling effects of persistent government surveillance. Protecting your communications isn’t about hiding because you’re a criminal: it’s about limiting criminals from taking advantage of your good name while protecting your enshrined right of free speech.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Tracking Your Every Move: ‘Enhancing’ Driver’s Licenses at the Cost of Privacy</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/10/tracking-your-every-move-%e2%80%98enhancing%e2%80%99-driver%e2%80%99s-licenses-at-the-cost-of-privacy/</link>
		<comments>http://dissidentvoice.org/2008/10/tracking-your-every-move-%e2%80%98enhancing%e2%80%99-driver%e2%80%99s-licenses-at-the-cost-of-privacy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2008 14:01:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Christopher Parsons</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Civil Liberties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Science/Tech]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.dissidentvoice.org/?p=4268</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The potential for ubiquitous surveillance that emerges with Enhanced Drivers Licenses (EDLs) could only be imagined by the Stasi in Communist East Germany, but is a genuinely looming specter for contemporary North American democracies. Provincial and state governments in North America are proposing to &#8216;enhance&#8217; driver’s licenses in coming years by including a Radio Frequency [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The potential for ubiquitous surveillance that emerges with Enhanced Drivers Licenses (EDLs) could only be imagined by the Stasi in Communist East Germany, but is a genuinely looming specter for contemporary North American democracies. Provincial and state governments in North America are proposing to &#8216;enhance&#8217; driver’s licenses in coming years by including a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips in them. These &#8216;enhanced&#8217; licenses emit unique identifiers and will be optional when they are first available to the public, though they will be required to enter the United States using a driver&#8217;s license beginning in July 2009. The proposed Enhanced Driver’s Licenses (EDLs) are intended to be associated with border security, but are also accompanied with concerns linked to individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy.</p>
<p><strong>Radio Frequency Identifiers and Migratory Efficiency</strong></p>
<p>Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips are inserted into products every year. They emit unique identifiers, and increase supply chain efficiencies by enabling the discrete tracking of every item in the chain. RFIDs used in supply chains are usually ‘passive RFIDs’; they lack a battery or fuel cell to power the radio transceiver, instead emitting their respective identifier whenever in proximity to a reader. When restricted to supply chain systems there is little worry that passive RFIDs will infringe on people’s expectations of privacy; neither cattle, nor courier envelops, nor vehicle tires have any expectations of privacy.</p>
<p>The Canadian and American governments are inserting these passive RFID chips into EDLs. As it stands, RFID-enabled license will emit a random identifier whenever it comes into a reader device’s range. The number is unrelated to any other biometric information (e.g. birth date, color of eyes, height, first and last name, etc.) but is correlated with Canadian and American border-security databases. Whenever a person reaches a Canada/America land border crossing they will enter a ‘read’ zone. From this zone the EDL will emit its identifier, calling up the owner’s personal information on the border agent’s computer screen. This automatic data retrieval is intended to enhance border migration and security; migration by negating the need for the border agent to collect and scan identity documents, and security by establishing another measure to ensure that identity documents are state-issued.</p>
<p>Several advocacy groups disagree that the proposed EDLs will improve migratory efficiency or security. Border agents still must examine the individuals in any vehicle at a border; at most a few seconds will be shaved off individual crossings if border agents do not have to collect driver’s licenses. Any timesavings depend on passive readers functioning normally at border crossing. These readers are susceptible to covert ‘denial of service attacks’, which can disable the reader. In instances where a reader is disabled, an individual’s EDL is malfunctioning (i.e. not transmitting its identifier), or individuals are not using EDLs, there will be no timesavings benefit. Moreover, it is relatively easily to ‘clone’, or copy, an EDL’s RFID identifier using consumer products available electronics stores. The ease that this can be done with negates the suggestion that the RFID in EDLs can assist border agents in guaranteeing that EDLs are state-issued; the ease of mimicking identifiers will require border agents to inspect licenses manually and guarantee their legitimacy to maintain border security.</p>
<p><strong>Personally Identifiable Information and Your Privacy</strong></p>
<p>Canada’s provincial governments suggest that radio-shielding sleeves will limit the EDLs’ emissions – individual citizens will be required to be mindful to safeguard their own privacy, rather than government integrating privacy protections into the identity documents that they are providing to the public. In addition, they claim that because the unique identifier emitted from an ELD is randomly generated that it does not infringe on citizens’ privacy. In holding this position concerning EDL identifiers, the provincial governments are actively ignoring the recommendations and warnings from Canada’s provincial information and privacy commissioners, and their federal counterpart. Indeed, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has noted that if an RFID identifier could act as a proxy for an individual were it associated with a particular individual, then the identifier itself becomes classified as ‘personal information.’ Given that the identifier in each EDLs is intended to be associated with a particular individual it is clearly deserving of the same protection as other pieces of personal information. This mandates that some form of privacy enhancing technology, such as encryption, be implemented before making EDLs available to the public. Through encrypting, or otherwise securing, the RFID identifier Americans and Canadians can be assured that EDLs will not experience instances of ‘function creep’ that would violate their reasonable expectations of privacy.</p>
<p><strong>Encryption, Function Creep, and Tracking Individuals</strong></p>
<p>The particular RFID technical standard the American government has chosen for EDLs (EPC Gen-2) cannot be secured using encryption that would adequately limit the risks of third parties capturing the identifier. This should, but does not seem to, be slowing provinces and states from issuing driver’s licenses that emit personal information whenever the license holder is within range of a reader device. As a result, anyone with reader equipment can collect the identifier associated with a license holder and correlate it with whatever biometric, consumer, or other data they have access to. This surveillance can be performed without a license holder ever being made aware that the number was captured, or that it was associated with other personal information. Encryption would limit who could read the identifier, thus limiting the risks of function creep.</p>
<p>Driver’s licenses hold incredibly detailed personal information, and when that information is combined with an RFID identifier it is possible to monitor individuals’ movements. When currently entering a nightclub, as an example, it is commonplace for a bouncer to ‘swipe’ your license to ensure that it is valid. Few realize that nightclubs commonly sell the information they collect from licenses to third parties. When correlating the license information with an RFID identifier it is possible for those third parties to clearly identify people as they move in society. In addition, once individuals receive an EDL, retail facilities more generally can correlate the number with information they can associate with the individual associated with the number (e.g. What are their shopping habits? What stores do they visit? Do they travel a great deal? What identifiers/people are commonly near to them?), massively expanding the possibilities for private surveillance of citizens. Given present data sharing arrangements, this data can then be transferred to Canadian and American authorities, giving the state an excellent perception of where, exactly, their citizens are in their daily activities. The possibilities of surveillance combined with the inadequate government ‘protections’ mean that EDLs, as presently planned, infringe upon citizens’ reasonable expectations to move through society without private and public bodies being able to comprehensively track their every movement. Governments should attend to the warnings uttered by Canadian privacy and information commissioners, and involve the public in any deliberations to institute EDLs, to limit the possibilities of EDLs being used to expand increasingly ubiquitous private and state surveillance of citizens’ movements.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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