Venezuela is far from the “dictatorship which has a facade of democracy” described by General Raúl Baduel, who has been accused of corruption. What kind of tyranny oversees a 70% increase of participation in presidential elections, as Chávez has, or the government holding 13 free and fair elections in 10 years?

Of course, Venezuelan society and democracy is imperfect. One example is that corruption remains a very real problem. Opponents have tried to use this issue to disparage the government, though it pre-dates the Chávez era. It is therefore ironic that when measures are taken to tackle it, as is the case in legal prosecutions, these are cited as examples of a clampdown on political freedoms. Many Chávez-supporting politicians are under investigation and it paints a distorted picture to focus only on prosecutions against those opposed to Chávez.

Taking the two most prominent cases of those aligned with the opposition. With Baduel, the military prosecutors investigating the disappearance of more than $18.6m in 2006 and 2007 while he was minister of defence have decided to prosecute. He has had all the rights to a defence lawyer and transparent trial, yet so far his defence has not produced any evidence to counter the charges of corruption.

Manuel Rosales, infamously a signatory to the decree backing the 2002 military coup against Chávez, is one of the most notorious cases. He has allegedly been unable to show the source of millions of dollars in assets both in Venezuela and abroad. He fled to Peru and requested political asylum, but being given asylum by Peru is not proof of innocence. Recently Bolivia nearly broke diplomatic relations with Peru for granting asylum to three ministers from a previous government charged with responsibility for the October 2003 massacre in which 67 people were killed by the Bolivian army.

What cannot be said of Venezuela is that the right to protest is threatened. This year alone, the opposition have staged dozens of marches free from state harassment. On numerous occasions opponents and marchers have been invited to address the nation from the National Assembly.

In contrast, it was only 20 years ago that protests were met by brutal repression in Venezuela, with the Caracazo massacre by state security forces leaving 276 dead according to official figures and up to 3,000, according to claims, once mass graves were uncovered.

The opposition’s hostile views of the Chávez government dominate the Venezuelan media. But that is not the reason why some radio stations were recently closed. These were operating illegally without proper licences and continued to refuse to comply with the law. More than 200 radio stations, most of which identify with the opposition, that were also operating irregularly but did renew their franchises continue to operate freely.

Respect for democracy is intrinsic to the particular model being followed by the Chávez government. It does not resort to violence – it wins elections. In contrast, it is noteworthy that the notable elements of the Venezuelan opposition have broadly sympathised with the illegal de facto government of Micheletti in Honduras. Maybe in Honduras we have a serious glimpse of what “democracy” would have been like in Venezuela had its violent attempts to overthrow Chávez been successful?

The piece “Bolivia’s divisive president. The Permanent Campaign” does not even pretend to be ‘even-handed’ or ‘balanced.’ Some of the statements in it are simply unalloyed anti-Morales propaganda. Putting the blame squarely on Evo Morales, for example, for the diplomatic difficulties Bolivia has been having with the US (without informing the readers that Bush unilaterally had ended Bolivia’s export preferential treatment on some exports or that Bolivia expelled US ambassador Mr Phillip Goldberg because he had been actively supporting secessionist efforts in Santa Cruz), and with Peru (without telling readers that Peru gave asylum to Bolivian Cabinet minister indicted for civilian deaths resulting from military repression of protests six years ago during the government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada), but explaining them as a deliberate Morales drive to isolate Bolivia because, according to The Economist, “Many in the government dream of an economic autarky, powered by gas.” The article goes even further by quoting government’s opponents in Santa Cruz, who describe Morales as an “indigenous fascist” with The Economist accepting such a highly inflammatory label with no qualification whatsoever. And, if there was any doubt as to where The Economist stands on the Morales government, the piece ends by sympathetically paraphrasing one pundit who says “Bolivia is suffering a classic bout of Latin American populism: personalised politics, mild paranoia, bad economic policy and a weak opposition.” No journalistic objectivity or even the pretension of it.

Venezuelan Ambassador to the United Kingdom, HE Samuel Moncada, responded to the allegation regarding the participation of Venezuelan troops in the suppression of a rebellion in Santa Cruz in 2007, with letter to Michael Reid, The Economist’s Latin American editor, in which he stated that “Unfortunately, dangerous and negative consequences in the region may arise due to this blunder published in your magazine. I would therefore demand a correction of such fallacy”. (The Ambassador’s letter can be found in full here).

Subsequently Ambassador Moncada wrote again to Michael Reid who had responded to the first letter by saying that The Economist stood by their story. In his second letter Ambassador Moncada wrote: “As we believe that the videos in your possession are absolutely false, this matter can only be settled with evidence. Therefore, either you publish your data in order to prove your point, or our request in the first letter stands. Then, you will have no choice but to correct the statement in your article issued on the 18th of July.”

A campaign of letter writing to Michael Reid was initiated so that he published the video material in his possession and proved his story or correct the false statement made about Venezuelan troops having participated in quelling a rebellion in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

On its July 25, 2009, edition, The Economist did publish a ‘correction’ on its story “Clarification: Bolivia and Venezuela.”

See also the video footage on which the allegation was based.

The full text of the ‘correction’ is:

Clarification: Bolivia and Venezuela
Jul 30th 2009
From The Economist print edition
In our recent story on Bolivia (“The permanent campaign”, July 18th), we stated that “Venezuelan troops helped quell a rebellion centred on the airport at Santa Cruz in the east in 2007”. Both the Venezuelan and Bolivian governments deny this (see Letters), and Venezuela’s government has publicly asked us to retract this assertion. We based our statement on television footage aired at the time which shows a Venezuelan air force plane and uniformed Venezuelan personnel at Santa Cruz airport shortly after it had been seized by the Bolivian government from the local authorities. No official explanation has been given for their presence. However, we are happy to clarify that this footage does not prove Venezuelan troops played an active role in quelling the rebellion. We have placed the television footage on our website.

The explanation, “we are happy to clarify that this footage does not prove Venezuelan troops played an active role in quelling the rebellion”, not only TOTALLY contradicts the assertion made in the July 18 story — defended by Latin American editor, Michael Reid in correspondence with Venezuela’s ambassador — but also shows the type of bias The Economist tends engage in when it comes to covering developments in Venezuela in particular but also in Latin America in general.

The fact is that the assertion “Venezuelan troops helped quell a rebellion centred on the airport at Santa Cruz in the east in 2007” was based on the flimsiest of ‘evidences’ which no serious editor should use to make such a grave assertion. Furthermore, the facts themselves, as presented by The Economist ‘correction’ speak for themselves. The footage which Latin American editor Michael Reid was forced to made public NOWHERE shows anything of any kind whatsoever that could be construed as “Venezuelan troops [having] helped quell a rebellion” in Bolivia in 2007 as affirmed in the July 18 article.

The footage comes from a TV channel which is clearly opposed to President Evo Morales, at a time when the Bolivian government faced a serious destabilisation threat from a radical opposition to the Bolivian government whose epicentre was/is the Department of Santa Cruz and the capital city of the same name. The Half Moon ‘autonomist’ movement in Bolivia has strenuously tried to demonstrate in its propaganda that Morales is a puppet of Hugo Chavez and falsely claim that it is Venezuelan ‘domination’ they have been fighting against.

The Economist ‘explanation’ as to why it had asserted that there had been Venezuelan military participation in the quelling of an anti-government rebellion at the Santa Cruz airport is that the TV “footage aired at the time [...] shows a Venezuelan air force plane and uniformed Venezuelan personnel at Santa Cruz airport shortly after it had been seized by the Bolivian government from the local authorities,” adding, “No official explanation has been given for their presence.” None was asked. Mr Reid, as the Latin American editor, ought to have corroborated the story by requesting confirmation or otherwise from the Bolivian and Venezuelan authorities as to the alleged participation of Venezuelan troops in repressive activities against Bolivian citizens on Bolivian soil. It is just incredible that such grave assertion could have been made on the bases of the video footage published in The Economist and without this elementary safeguard of sound journalism.

Furthermore, of the original list of 386 individuals affected by the measure only 260 will actually be affected, due to the fact that the penalisation — i.e., the length of time which individuals found guilty will be barred from standing for public office — has already expired. The reason for this is that the length of the investigation carried out by the Comptroller Russián began back in 2005, showing the exhaustive nature of the investigations. Additionally, the Office of the Comptroller General issued a statement which shows that of the 428 individuals in the original list, 236 did not sign the petition back in 2004 to force a recall referendum on President Chavez, whereas 192 did;² and pro-government figures have come out to express their disagreement with the decision (such as Calixto Ortega MP3), thus showing that the decision was taken exclusively on legal grounds and was applied fairly.

THE FACTS

1. Comptroller General Clodosbaldo Russian, Venezuela’s top anti-corruption watchdog, submitted a list of 368 individuals (the ‘inhabilitados’) to the country’s National Electoral Council (CNE) asking it to implement a decision to prohibit them from running for public office in the upcoming regional elections in November, because they were being investigated for or had been found guilty of corruption and misuse of public funds.

2. The type of investigation conducted by the Comptroller General, is an obligation of its office, but it applies only to individuals who hold public office. The office of the Comptroller General has the legal authority to carry out administrative investigations into allegations of corruption and misuse of public funds against individuals holding public office.³

3. Although those affected have argued that the measure/decision is unconstitutional because it has not been taken by a court of law (penal or civil), the Comptroller General has argued that Art 65 of the Constitution makes it clear that “Persons who have been convicted of crimes committed while holding office or other offenses against public property, shall be ineligible to run for any office filled by popular vote, for such period as may be prescribed by law after serving their sentences, depending on the seriousness of the offense.” It continues: “Those who have been condemned for crimes committed during the exercise of their functions, which affect the public patrimony, cannot stand for office in any popular election for a period of time, fixed by the law, until the completion of the sentence, and in accordance with the gravity of the crime,” and establishes that sanctions can be applied as a result of civil, penal or administrative investigations.

4. After receiving the list from the Comptroller General (19 June 2008) on the grounds of the provisions in Art 105, the National Electoral Council (CNE) took the decision to approve the list, thus making those on it unable to hold or stand for public office for specified periods which could be up to 15 years. The CNE must be formally informed about this so that, should those individuals register as candidates, the CNE has the legal obligation to reject them. Furthermore, the CNE immediately requested Venezuela’s Supreme Court (TSJ) to pass judgment on those listed who had been put forward as candidates for governorships or mayoralties in the forthcoming elections on 23 November, 2008. Constitutionally, these individuals have the right to appeal to the TSJ against their disqualification to stand for or hold public office and it is on these grounds that the CNE requested the pronouncement of the TSJ. The CNE made it clear that the TSJ must rule on the issue before the period for the registration of candidacies, which is between 5-12 August. On 27 June the National Assembly (AN) discussed the matter and approved the decision by the Comptroller General to disqualify the individuals on the list. The decision by the AN was arrived at on the grounds of the legal and constitutional correctness of the process.

5. The Comptroller General’s Office instigated the investigations against the ‘inhabilitados’ on the list by virtue of Art 105 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General Office, which predates the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution up to 15 years (it was introduced in 1984 under the presidency of Jaime Lusinchi and was reviewed and confirmed under the administration of President Rafael Caldera in 1995). Therefore, the legal instrument to apply sanctions against individual whose probity as holders of public office was under question was already in existence, but was simply not being applied. The current form of Art 105 was adopted in 2002 by Venezuela’s National Assembly in an almost unanimous vote, with those infavour including the opposition parties that had, at that time, a substantial presence in the Assembly (COPEI, MAS, Socialdemocrats, MVR, Convergencia, AD, COPEI, Alianza Bravo Pueblo, Podemos and Primero Justicia — at the time the chavista alliance had 192 MPs and the opposition had 100 seats in parliament.⁴ The Organic Law in relation to the Comptroller General’s Office gives competence and authority to the Comptroller General to instigate investigations on holders of public office at all levels about any deviation from the performance of their duties according to existing rules, regulations and laws (Arts 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13), and Arts 91, 92 (see full text of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General Office). Additionally, the Office of the Comptroller General’s attributions is also stipulated in the 1999 Constitution in Arts 25, 274, 287, 288 and 289.⁵ Furthermore, Art 105 gives the Comptroller General Office the authority to bar individuals from holding office, once the investigation on their probity as holders of public office, regardless of political affiliation.

6. The final list of the individuals affected can be found here. The Comptroller General, Clodosbaldo Russian, formally handed in the list to the CNE on 25 February. At the time, Russian said that the names placed on the list had been based on decisions taken by the TSJ and the Sala Constitucional, through a sentence made in 2005. However, Russian explained that these people had the right to appeal to the TSJ to contest the decision and call for their case to be reviewed.

7. Therefore, in summary, the process of disqualification to hold or stand for office in the case of the 368 individuals on the list produced by Venezuela’s Comptroller General has been:

a) conducted strictly on legal and administrative grounds and taken on the basis of lack of probity or irregularities in the performance of public duties;
b) carried out as part of the constitutional and legal obligation of the duties of the Office of the Comptroller General;
c) taken following decisions of the TSJ back in 2005;
d) made under the authority of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General Office
and of the Constitution of Venezuela;
e) the individuals affected were fully informed throughout.
Furthermore:
e) Art 105, the main — although not the only — legal authority for the disqualifications, precedes the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999; and was in fact introduced in 1984, reviewed and approved in 1999, and again perfected in 2002 (this time) almost unanimously by Venezuela’s National Assembly including the political parties of the opposition COPEI, MAS, Socialdemocrats, Convergencia, AD, COPEI, Alianza Bravo Pueblo, Podemos (on the chavista camp at the time) and Primero Justicia;
f) the individuals on the list have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court (TSJ), they have not made use of this prerogative;
g) the CNE and the National Assembly (both within their specific legal and constitutional competencies) have approved it; the CNE has requested an official constitutional pronouncement by the TSJ;
e) the full implementation of the law in the fight against corruption where every elected public official is accountable is central to the democratic nature of the Bolivarian Revolution.

1. “Blacklisted-Candidates List,” International Herald Tribune, July 8, 2008.
2. “Mayoría de los inhabilitados son de tendencia chavista,” Ultimas Noticias, 13 July, 2008.
3. Usted lo vio: Calixto Ortega: “El Contralor no debería tener facultad para proclamar inhabilitaciones”
4. See CNE official results of 2000 parliamentary election.
5. Full text of the Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela,
   Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela