Venezuela’s last election was a referendum on the right of the President to stand again on 15 February 2009. This was endorsed by 54% of the electorate, against 46% opposing the measure. Sunday’s election is the first to take place against the backdrop of a recession in Venezuela, which has been hit hard by the world recession as have many other countries.

Media distortions, context and the truth about Venezuelan democracy

With these key elections approaching, there has already been a stepping up of media distortions about Venezuela internationally. In the run-up to previous election campaigns, the VSC has noted that the increases in false claims appear to be designed in order to de-legitimise the results and fairness of the elections internationally.

National Assembly elections take place every 5 years and the elected representatives will have power to pass legislation and also to block the president’s legislative initiatives (with the support of over a 1/3 of members). It also has other specific and important powers (outlined in Article 187 of the Constitution) including approving the budget, initiating impeachment proceedings against most government officials (including ministers but not the President, who can only be removed through a recall referendum of the population) and appointing the members of the government’s electoral, judicial, and prosecutorial branches.

However the last time these elections were held in 2005, the oppositions boycotted them in order to seek to delegitimize the result which was to give a majority to supporters of President Chávez. Therefore this year, the one thing that is clear is that the Venezuelan anti-Chávez right wing opposition will inevitably increase its number of seats in parliaments as it will actually contest the seats.

Some media coverage has already sought to portray the elections as representing a huge gain for anti-Chávez forces if the opposition can stop the pro-Chávez parties gaining two-thirds. However, this would be false. Whilst we can’t predict exactly what the opposition parties would have got in 2005 had they taken part in the democratic process, they did receive more than a third of the vote in elections in the 2006 Presidential elections, gaining 36.9% with 7,309,080 m votes. Furthermore, in the previous year, in the 2004 recall referendum, the opposition to Chávez got 40% (3,989,008 votes) – again this was more than one-third. The results – and claims made in the international media by the Venezuelan opposition and others – on September 26 must be analysed against this background and context if these are to be fully understood.

Rebutting opposition myths: How Venezuelan elections are free and fair

Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) officially announced the opening of the electoral campaign for the elections to renew the 165 seats for the country’s National Assembly in August. The CNE, as with every previous election since 1999, has conducted a national campaign of information to ensure that voters are aware of every detail of a key aspect of exerting their rights as citizens: voting. This year is no exception, and any Venezuelan can easily access the CNE’s website to find out about any aspect of the coming elections of 26 September, including individual voting districts, the list of all candidates in every single district in the country as a whole, officials and representatives to every electoral district, how to cast the electronic ballot/vote and so forth.¹

The effort goes, however, beyond informing the voter and ensuring their participation. Venezuela’s state institutions are constantly seeking to enfranchise people who had been traditionally excluded by the previous oligarchy-run system. Since 1999 and up to the 2009 referendum, an additional 7 million Venezuelans have been added to the electoral register, thus the 11 years of the Chavez government represent the largest expansion of voter participation in the history of the country. The CNE has furthermore, reported that for the 26 September elections, an additional 610,000 more voters have been registered in the country’s electoral rolls. Thus the number of officially registered voters who can cast their vote at the parliamentary elections is 17,772,768 — the highest ever. Voting is not compulsory in Venezuela, but pollsters predict a high level of participation of about 70%+ on 26 September.

Whilst in reality it is the opposition in Venezuela who have sought to undermine democracy, of all the elections since 1999 (for president, parliament, governors, municipalities, and referenda), the year when President Hugo Chávez became the President of Venezuela, the country’s opposition has thus far recognised the results of only ONE of them, the 2007 constitutional referendum which the government lost by the smallest of margins (1% — about 50,000 votes). And at every election since 1999, Venezuela’s opposition have nationally and internationally sowed doubts about the probity of the country’s National Electoral Council and of the electoral system.

And every single such campaign to discredit Venezuela’s elections as not free or fair has found a sympathetic ear in most of the international media, with many pretty much unambiguously echoing Venezuela’s oligarchy’s efforts to discredit the country’s electoral system. It was ostensibly these grounds – the alleged unreliability of Venezuela’s electoral system – that was used as an excuse by the opposition not to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections. This remained the case even though their request for the withdrawal of the planned use of electronic counting machines was granted by the government, as the opposition withdrew anyway. Yet, elections are invariably declared free and fair by international observers, including from the Organization of American States, the European Union and the Carter Center, amongst many others.

Despite the overwhelming evidence that Venezuela’s elections are probably the cleanest in the world -they are certainly the most observed- national opposition spokespeople, notably but not exclusively, Henry Ramos Allup (national leader of the Accion Democratica party) and Maria Corina Machado (candidate for the Primero Justicia party and head of Sumate, the NGO which famously organised the collection of signatures to oust president Chavez from office with the 2004 recall referendum) have made various TV and public appearances sowing doubts on the CNE’s probity. Both Ramos Allup and Machado signed the infamous ‘Carmona’ decree on April 12, 2002, during the short-lived coup d’etat against President Chávez; a decree which abolished all of Venezuela’s democratic institutions.

In contrast to the aforementioned claims of the opposition, the automated voting system is subject to 15 audits that are witnessed and verified by representatives from all the political parties. Routine checks are also carried out before, during and after the election. Seven such audits have taken place so far this year; audits which have included representatives from the opposition, from the PSUV and other parties that support the Chavez government, plus specialists and international observers. They audits have all been, as on previous occasions, to everyone’s satisfaction, and the rest of the audits will take place after the poll.

Nor is it true, as it is repeated ad nausea by much of the corporate media, that the Venezuelan government has majority control over the Venezuelan media. The opposition has overwhelming quantitative superiority over the government on TV, even greater control and ownership in the realm of radio stations and even greater still in newspapers. Furthermore, according to a study conducted by the CNE the opposition has had 75.4% of the TV electoral propaganda broadcasts so far in this campaign.

The real nature of the Venezuelan Opposition and its reliance on US Funding

When looking at the policies, claims and attitudes of Venezuela’s opposition it is particularly important to understand their relationship with the US and their reliance on US funding for their campaigns against the Chávez-led Government. It has, for example, been reported and evidenced that US agencies such as the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID, IRI and such like, have given Sumate massive amounts of money. Sumate is clearly part of the US destabilisation efforts against Venezuela, and the US has given it enormous importance.²

Today, opposition outfits, including many disguised as NGOs such as Sumate, continue to receive millions of dollars of US taxpayers’ money. In a recent article, Eva Gollinger outlines in depth the aims of this funding and the work of these groups, observing that “A report commissioned by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and published in May 2010 by the Spanish Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue (FRIDE) revealed that this year alone, international agencies are investing between $40-50 million in anti-Chavez groups in Venezuela. A large part of those funds have been channeled to the opposition coalition, Democratic Unity (MUD), and its campaign for the upcoming legislative elections on September 26.” She adds that “A majority of [such] funding comes from US agencies, particularly USAID, which has maintained a presence in Venezuela since 2002 with the sole intention of aiding in President Chavez’s removal from power,” before concluding that “There remains no doubt the Venezuelan opposition – in all its manifestations – is a product of the US government. US agencies fund and design their campaigns, train and build their parties, organize their NGOs, develop their messages, select their candidates and feed them with dollars to ensure survival.

With this in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that the opposition’s message for this election as with all previous ones, is intensely negative, exaggerated and strident, but has not been able to formulate a programme of government or a vision of Venezuela that might be inspirational. Worse, through the well rehearsed pronouncements of their spokespeople about ‘defending democracy in Venezuela’, they frequently let out some of their true views, such as that:

• they profoundly dislike Venezuela’s social missions (on winning several municipalities and governorships at the 2008 elections, they launched a spate of physical attacks against anything that resembled Chavista social missions in those constituencies which they won);
• they intensely oppose the presence of the thousands of Cuban doctors and other Cuban specialists who are improving the lives of millions of Venezuelans in these social programmes;
• they ferociously denounce Venezuela’s bilateral agreements with other Latin American countries – especially Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, the Caribbean and so forth – which they present as a robbery to Venezuelans rather than mutually beneficial examples of regional co-operation;
• many of their national leaders have absconded (mainly in Peru and Miami) avoiding trials for gross acts of corruption; and the opposition rallies unconditionally behind any member of the oligarchy who is caught engaged in corruption activities.³

Furthermore, during former Colombian President Uribe’s desperate effort to cause a serious confrontation, perhaps even a military confrontation, with Venezuela in the last weeks of his presidency, the opposition sided with Uribe against Venezuela.⁴ Chavez’s agility to positively respond to Colombia’s President Manuel Santos to hold a summit and take decisive steps to undo the cobweb of deceit and aggression woven by his predecessor, Alvaro Uribe, boosted Chavez’s standing in his own country, in Colombia and in the whole region (it did so for Santos as well) and left Venezuela’s opposition stuck in the uncomfortable position of pretending they had never supported Uribe and that were always for peace, ‘friendship with Colombia’ and so forth. In this sense, the whole saga was politically very damaging for them.

Conclusion

The key battles in the coming parliamentary elections on September 26, as in previous elections, will take place in the main cities, namely, Caracas (which elects 10 MPs), Carabobo (10 MPs), Lara (9 MPs), Miranda (12 MPs), Anzoategui, Aragua and Bolivar (8 MPs each), and Zulia (15 MPs), that is to say, the main and most populated urban centres. Polls on the whole – most pollsters in Venezuela broadly speaking share the opposition’s politics -have indicated that Chavismo is likely to win a majority of seats.⁵

But until Venezuelans cast their vote on 26 September nobody can know in advance the actual results. What we do know for sure is that the electoral process will be as clean and as transparent as it has been up to now. What we also know is that Venezuela’s opposition, despite repeated appeals by the CNE, President Chavez, and spokespeople of the PSUV, has not declared yet that it will recognise the results. Finally, we also know that, whatever the result, the Chavistas will recognise them.

1. All of which can be found here.
2. So much so that on 31 May 2005, President Bush received Maria Corina Machado at the Oval Office in the White House.
3. Such as the recent case of Francisco Mezerhane, head of the Banco Federal, in which the evidence (although the case is still pending) points to the robbing of Venezuelan depositors of hundreds of millions of dollars, the creation of hundreds of ghost companies, and the illegal use of thousands of ordinary Venezuelan’s names -including forging their signatures- with the purpose of carrying out fraud. Mezerhane is currently in Miami and the opposition have rallied to his defence presenting his case against him by the government as political persecution.
4. See Chavez-Santos Summit in Colombia: UNASUR-brokered peace breaks out.
5. See for example, the Miami Herald‘s Hugo Chávez looks to keep control of Venezuela’s parliamentary seats, 9 Sept, 2010.

Chavez reacted by breaking off relations with Colombia, leading to a further worsening of the relations between the two nations, but sent his foreign minister to attend Santos’ inauguration anyway. Uribe’s response was to announce that his government was lodging a formal accusation against Venezuela in the Inter-American Committee of Human Rights and another formal charge against President Chavez personally to the International Criminal Court, one day before Juan Manuel Santos inauguration. Furthermore, Uribe, reportedly, announced he would be prepared to testify to the ICC against Hugo Chavez.

However, after intense diplomatic activity undertaken by [Union of South American Nations] UNASUR, Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela’s Foreign Relations Minister, Nestor Kirchner, UNASUR’s President, and Brazils’ President, Lula, the latter two very publicly meeting with both Hugo Chavez and Juan Manuel Santos at various separate meetings, managed, in a matter of few days, to turn what looked like an inexorable slide to disaster, into one of the most extraordinary political turnarounds from the brink in recent Latin American history.

At his inauguration, Juan Manuel Santos stunned the world by announcing that his administration would be seeking to repair and normalise Colombia’s relations with Venezuela and Ecuador as a matter of priority. And in stark contrast to the prevailing attitude under Uribe, Santos declared “The word war is not in my dictionary when I think about Colombia’s relations with its neighbours” (a far cry from Uribe’s warmongering). Furthermore, Santos had previously indicated his willingness, under certain conditions, to even talk to the Colombian guerrillas. More surprises were to follow: Santos ordered the handing over of Raul Reyes’ ‘magical laptops’ to the government of Ecuador.

Some in the British media such as the Guardian, the Economist, the BBC and, of course, the ubiquitous Human Rights Watch, enthusiastically accepted the evidence publicised by the Colombian authorities at the time. The attitude of the US corporate media was significantly worse. As is well known, but not widely publicised by the corporate media, Ronald Coy, Head of Colombia’s technical police, admitted to an official investigation both that the data in the laptops had been manipulated before it was subjected to judicial review and that no emails had been found in them (this did not prevent the Guardian‘s Latin American correspondent, Rory Carroll, from reading several emails from the magical laptops, as he reported at the time).

We shall very soon see how much of Mr Hoyos’ “evidence” to the OAS is left standing after Ecuador’s expert analysis of the ‘magical laptops’ takes place. The Venezuelan government has consistently denied any such charges and to this day, apart from regular media repetition of Uribista “false positives,” no serious evidence of any kind has been produced to substantiate the allegations that Venezuela harbours guerrillas and guerrilla camps in its territory or that it gives them resources and weapons.

Venezuela and Colombia share 1,375 miles of very porous border. Colombia’s internal conflict has the unfortunate dynamic of spilling over into other countries in the form of guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug traffickers, refugees, and immigrants escaping from the conflict (about 5 million Colombians reside permanently in Venezuela). It is estimated that overall, Colombia’s military have over 300,000 soldiers — proportionately one of the largest in the region, and seven times larger than the armed forces of Venezuela — and have benefited from US$7 bn in military aid — the second largest in the world — which are nevertheless incapable to controlling their own domestic terrain in which there are about 8,000 armed guerrilla fighters, many thousands of active illegal paramilitary forces and a great deal of drug trafficking. Most of the cocaine in the world is produced in Colombia, and most of cocaine production takes place in Colombia, according to UNODOC about 50%. Furthermore, Venezuela finds itself geographically sandwiched between the largest producer and the largest consumer of cocaine in the world, Colombia and the United States respectively.

After Santos’ inauguration, events have developed at neck-breaking speed. Assisted by Nestor Kirchner, the Foreign Ministers of Colombia and Venezuela met last Sunday in Bogota, and they announced that Presidents Santos and Chavez would be meeting at a special summit on Tuesday 10 August in Colombia. Chavez immediately seized the opportunity offered by his Colombian counterpart and called upon the guerrillas to seek a political solution: “The Colombian guerrillas do not have a future by way of arms… moreover, they have become an excuse for the [US] empire to intervene in Colombia and threaten Venezuela from there,” he said on Sunday. He also called upon them to show their commitment to a peace accord through “decisive demonstrations, for example, that they liberate all those they have kidnapped.”

It is clear that Santos wanted to repair relations with Venezuela and Ecuador and that he was willing to accept UNASUR’s good offices to facilitate his meeting with President Chavez. However, the most significant aspects of this development is that Santos was determined to seek the improvement of Colombia’s relations with Venezuela and Ecuador, partly because it wanted to end Colombia’s regional isolation, but also because the almost complete cessation of trade with Venezuela was making Colombia’s economy scream (their mutual trade had declined by 73.7%). It is also clear that Uribe knew this and all his last-minute rabid attacks on Venezuela seemed to have been aimed more at Santos than Chavez. Uribe desperately tried to torpedo the Colombo-Venezuelan rapprochement because he knew it was in the offing.

Uribe’s desperate efforts mirror the actions of powerful forces in Washington which have been vigorously lobbying to declare Venezuela a “state that sponsors terrorism,” “a narco-state” (view which is specially strong in SOUTHCOM and the US Congress — and which, therefore, seem to favour a ‘military’ solution to the US ‘Venezuelan problem’. SOUTHCOM has been busily installing US military bases everywhere in the region and has even resuscitated the IV Fleet (which was decommissioned in 1950). The US has deployed 20,000 soldiers in Haiti after the earthquake and has also stationed massive military forces in Costa Rica (7,000 soldiers, 200 helicopters and 46 warships until the end of December 2010). Thus, labeling Venezuela a ‘sponsor of terrorism’ is not just right-wing rhetoric, it may have very serious military consequences. Regional leaders are very alarmed about these developments and have expressed serious concern.

A normally omitted dimension of Colombo-Venezuelan relations is the attitude of Venezuela’s right wing. In every Venezuela-Colombia spat under Uribe’s two presidential mandates, they have sided enthusiastically with Uribe. They did so again this time but were unwittingly wrong-footed by Santos’ announcement. When it comes to opposing President Chavez, Venezuela’s right wing seem to have no sense of proportion, thus, for instance, the governor of the state of Táchira, Cesar Perez Vivas, a member of COPEI, went as far as to appeal to Chavez not to make the US military bases in that country a precondition for the normalisation of relations with Colombia. Venezuelan TV broadcaster, Alberto Nolla, suggested that during the crisis unleashed by the Uribe’s actions, the Venezuelan right wing media was more strident in their support for Uribe than the Colombian media had been during the same period. Any cursory look at the main right-wing newspapers such as El Universal and El Nacional and TV channels such as Globovision confirm this conclusively.

What is totally unprecedented is the fact that the US administration was de facto reduced to the role of spectator (specialists confirm this). The U.S. were supportive of the accusations against Chavez at the OAS (…”our concerns about the links between Venezuela and the FARC that we have not certified Venezuela in recent years as fully cooperating with the United States and others in terms of these antiterrorism efforts,” stated U.S. ambassador to OAS) but were clearly sidelined by UNASUR’s brinkmanship which managed to bring the rapprochement between Colombia and Venezuela. It is Santos, Chavez, and UNASUR (especially Brazil) who have been doing the running (“Brazil’s government has made it clear that it would like the matter to be taken up within UNASUR, without the influence of the United States. It proclaimed South America a “region of peace” and affirmed that problems between countries should be first dealt with bilaterally.) This reality shows first the growing assertiveness and independence of the region from U.S. influence, but secondly, it shows that underlying this political reality there is the growing independence of the region from traditional economic centres and a steady distancing from the U.S. The Tectonic plates have dramatically shifted and most Latin American leaders feel they have averted an almost certain Uribe-US driven war.

It remains to be seen how far this summit takes the two countries. They have decided to fully restore their relations in every field and the two presidents have established five commissions within the framework of a statement of principles signed by them. They include a commission for debt; another for the economic collaboration between the two countries; one for the development of a plan of investment in their common border; another for the joint undertaking of infrastructural works; and a security commission. Both heads of state undertook a commitment to collaborate in the struggle against drug trafficking, paramilitary and illegal armed activity. Colombia has sent the President of Colombia’s Congress, Armando Benedetti, to assist the process of full restoration of relations between the two countries. The OAS reacted by applauding the diplomacy of Santos and Chavez. There has been popular rejoice in both countries. Not all the issues pending between the two nations were, however, addressed, such as the U.S. military bases in Colombia, the urgent need for a peace process in Colombia, and the charges leveled by Uribe against Venezuela to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and against President Chavez personally to the International Criminal Court.

The dogs of war have been kept at bay, at least temporarily. Peace has broken out. The full restoration of relations between Venezuela and Colombia is indeed very positive. However, the array of forces set against the implementation of such a broad peaceful agenda is also pretty formidable. For start it is led by the U.S. and it also involves powerful economic groups in most countries in the region, such as the separatists in the Eastern of Bolivia, that nearly overthrew Morales’ government in 2009; the Venezuelan right which managed to actually oust Chavez in 2002 -but who the people returned to power-; the Colombian oligarchy itself; the extremely wealthy and powerful Chilean Pinochetista bourgeoisie; the right in Argentina; the very wealthy Guayaquil entrepreneurs; and so forth. All of whom in one way or another favour the US militarisation of the region as a solution of last resort in the face of radical social movements and progressive governments in the continent. In the meantime the U.S. militarisation of the region continues apace.

It is in the interest of Latin America, very well represented on this historic occasion by UNASUR, to help the Colombian oligarchy to loosen the too uncomfortable US embrace in which Uribe got them into. On the other hand there are the U.S. hegemonic interests in the region and its growing oil dependency from fiercely nationalist governments which are asserting their independence collectively. Washington’s political and military strategists must be stunned by the extraordinary rapprochement between Santos and Chavez.

Uribe’s insane efforts to bring about a war with Venezuela, underscores the ‘predicament’ the U.S. finds itself in: faced with the rebellion of its Southern neighbours, unable to win politically, and incapable of offering anything such as development, progress, investment or even the American Way of life (which is crushingly coming to an end in the United States itself), has decided to resort to war to maintain its backyard under subjection. Latin America has opted for democracy, social progress, national sovereignty and peace. On this occasion even the staunchest pro U.S. Colombian oligarchy have sided with the South, not the North. We shall see who beats the other in the historic arm-wrestling underway.

Venezuela is far from the “dictatorship which has a facade of democracy” described by General Raúl Baduel, who has been accused of corruption. What kind of tyranny oversees a 70% increase of participation in presidential elections, as Chávez has, or the government holding 13 free and fair elections in 10 years?

Of course, Venezuelan society and democracy is imperfect. One example is that corruption remains a very real problem. Opponents have tried to use this issue to disparage the government, though it pre-dates the Chávez era. It is therefore ironic that when measures are taken to tackle it, as is the case in legal prosecutions, these are cited as examples of a clampdown on political freedoms. Many Chávez-supporting politicians are under investigation and it paints a distorted picture to focus only on prosecutions against those opposed to Chávez.

Taking the two most prominent cases of those aligned with the opposition. With Baduel, the military prosecutors investigating the disappearance of more than $18.6m in 2006 and 2007 while he was minister of defence have decided to prosecute. He has had all the rights to a defence lawyer and transparent trial, yet so far his defence has not produced any evidence to counter the charges of corruption.

Manuel Rosales, infamously a signatory to the decree backing the 2002 military coup against Chávez, is one of the most notorious cases. He has allegedly been unable to show the source of millions of dollars in assets both in Venezuela and abroad. He fled to Peru and requested political asylum, but being given asylum by Peru is not proof of innocence. Recently Bolivia nearly broke diplomatic relations with Peru for granting asylum to three ministers from a previous government charged with responsibility for the October 2003 massacre in which 67 people were killed by the Bolivian army.

What cannot be said of Venezuela is that the right to protest is threatened. This year alone, the opposition have staged dozens of marches free from state harassment. On numerous occasions opponents and marchers have been invited to address the nation from the National Assembly.

In contrast, it was only 20 years ago that protests were met by brutal repression in Venezuela, with the Caracazo massacre by state security forces leaving 276 dead according to official figures and up to 3,000, according to claims, once mass graves were uncovered.

The opposition’s hostile views of the Chávez government dominate the Venezuelan media. But that is not the reason why some radio stations were recently closed. These were operating illegally without proper licences and continued to refuse to comply with the law. More than 200 radio stations, most of which identify with the opposition, that were also operating irregularly but did renew their franchises continue to operate freely.

Respect for democracy is intrinsic to the particular model being followed by the Chávez government. It does not resort to violence – it wins elections. In contrast, it is noteworthy that the notable elements of the Venezuelan opposition have broadly sympathised with the illegal de facto government of Micheletti in Honduras. Maybe in Honduras we have a serious glimpse of what “democracy” would have been like in Venezuela had its violent attempts to overthrow Chávez been successful?

The piece “Bolivia’s divisive president. The Permanent Campaign” does not even pretend to be ‘even-handed’ or ‘balanced.’ Some of the statements in it are simply unalloyed anti-Morales propaganda. Putting the blame squarely on Evo Morales, for example, for the diplomatic difficulties Bolivia has been having with the US (without informing the readers that Bush unilaterally had ended Bolivia’s export preferential treatment on some exports or that Bolivia expelled US ambassador Mr Phillip Goldberg because he had been actively supporting secessionist efforts in Santa Cruz), and with Peru (without telling readers that Peru gave asylum to Bolivian Cabinet minister indicted for civilian deaths resulting from military repression of protests six years ago during the government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada), but explaining them as a deliberate Morales drive to isolate Bolivia because, according to The Economist, “Many in the government dream of an economic autarky, powered by gas.” The article goes even further by quoting government’s opponents in Santa Cruz, who describe Morales as an “indigenous fascist” with The Economist accepting such a highly inflammatory label with no qualification whatsoever. And, if there was any doubt as to where The Economist stands on the Morales government, the piece ends by sympathetically paraphrasing one pundit who says “Bolivia is suffering a classic bout of Latin American populism: personalised politics, mild paranoia, bad economic policy and a weak opposition.” No journalistic objectivity or even the pretension of it.

Venezuelan Ambassador to the United Kingdom, HE Samuel Moncada, responded to the allegation regarding the participation of Venezuelan troops in the suppression of a rebellion in Santa Cruz in 2007, with letter to Michael Reid, The Economist‘s Latin American editor, in which he stated that “Unfortunately, dangerous and negative consequences in the region may arise due to this blunder published in your magazine. I would therefore demand a correction of such fallacy”. (The Ambassador’s letter can be found in full here).

Subsequently Ambassador Moncada wrote again to Michael Reid who had responded to the first letter by saying that The Economist stood by their story. In his second letter Ambassador Moncada wrote: “As we believe that the videos in your possession are absolutely false, this matter can only be settled with evidence. Therefore, either you publish your data in order to prove your point, or our request in the first letter stands. Then, you will have no choice but to correct the statement in your article issued on the 18th of July.”

A campaign of letter writing to Michael Reid was initiated so that he published the video material in his possession and proved his story or correct the false statement made about Venezuelan troops having participated in quelling a rebellion in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

On its July 25, 2009, edition, The Economist did publish a ‘correction’ on its story “Clarification: Bolivia and Venezuela.”

See also the video footage on which the allegation was based.

The full text of the ‘correction’ is:

Clarification: Bolivia and Venezuela
Jul 30th 2009
From The Economist print edition
In our recent story on Bolivia (“The permanent campaign”, July 18th), we stated that “Venezuelan troops helped quell a rebellion centred on the airport at Santa Cruz in the east in 2007”. Both the Venezuelan and Bolivian governments deny this (see Letters), and Venezuela’s government has publicly asked us to retract this assertion. We based our statement on television footage aired at the time which shows a Venezuelan air force plane and uniformed Venezuelan personnel at Santa Cruz airport shortly after it had been seized by the Bolivian government from the local authorities. No official explanation has been given for their presence. However, we are happy to clarify that this footage does not prove Venezuelan troops played an active role in quelling the rebellion. We have placed the television footage on our website.

The explanation, “we are happy to clarify that this footage does not prove Venezuelan troops played an active role in quelling the rebellion”, not only TOTALLY contradicts the assertion made in the July 18 story — defended by Latin American editor, Michael Reid in correspondence with Venezuela’s ambassador — but also shows the type of bias The Economist tends engage in when it comes to covering developments in Venezuela in particular but also in Latin America in general.

The fact is that the assertion “Venezuelan troops helped quell a rebellion centred on the airport at Santa Cruz in the east in 2007” was based on the flimsiest of ‘evidences’ which no serious editor should use to make such a grave assertion. Furthermore, the facts themselves, as presented by The Economist ‘correction’ speak for themselves. The footage which Latin American editor Michael Reid was forced to made public NOWHERE shows anything of any kind whatsoever that could be construed as “Venezuelan troops [having] helped quell a rebellion” in Bolivia in 2007 as affirmed in the July 18 article.

The footage comes from a TV channel which is clearly opposed to President Evo Morales, at a time when the Bolivian government faced a serious destabilisation threat from a radical opposition to the Bolivian government whose epicentre was/is the Department of Santa Cruz and the capital city of the same name. The Half Moon ‘autonomist’ movement in Bolivia has strenuously tried to demonstrate in its propaganda that Morales is a puppet of Hugo Chavez and falsely claim that it is Venezuelan ‘domination’ they have been fighting against.

The Economist ‘explanation’ as to why it had asserted that there had been Venezuelan military participation in the quelling of an anti-government rebellion at the Santa Cruz airport is that the TV “footage aired at the time [...] shows a Venezuelan air force plane and uniformed Venezuelan personnel at Santa Cruz airport shortly after it had been seized by the Bolivian government from the local authorities,” adding, “No official explanation has been given for their presence.” None was asked. Mr Reid, as the Latin American editor, ought to have corroborated the story by requesting confirmation or otherwise from the Bolivian and Venezuelan authorities as to the alleged participation of Venezuelan troops in repressive activities against Bolivian citizens on Bolivian soil. It is just incredible that such grave assertion could have been made on the bases of the video footage published in The Economist and without this elementary safeguard of sound journalism.

Furthermore, of the original list of 386 individuals affected by the measure only 260 will actually be affected, due to the fact that the penalisation — i.e., the length of time which individuals found guilty will be barred from standing for public office — has already expired. The reason for this is that the length of the investigation carried out by the Comptroller Russián began back in 2005, showing the exhaustive nature of the investigations. Additionally, the Office of the Comptroller General issued a statement which shows that of the 428 individuals in the original list, 236 did not sign the petition back in 2004 to force a recall referendum on President Chavez, whereas 192 did;² and pro-government figures have come out to express their disagreement with the decision (such as Calixto Ortega MP3), thus showing that the decision was taken exclusively on legal grounds and was applied fairly.

THE FACTS

1. Comptroller General Clodosbaldo Russian, Venezuela’s top anti-corruption watchdog, submitted a list of 368 individuals (the ‘inhabilitados’) to the country’s National Electoral Council (CNE) asking it to implement a decision to prohibit them from running for public office in the upcoming regional elections in November, because they were being investigated for or had been found guilty of corruption and misuse of public funds.

2. The type of investigation conducted by the Comptroller General, is an obligation of its office, but it applies only to individuals who hold public office. The office of the Comptroller General has the legal authority to carry out administrative investigations into allegations of corruption and misuse of public funds against individuals holding public office.³

3. Although those affected have argued that the measure/decision is unconstitutional because it has not been taken by a court of law (penal or civil), the Comptroller General has argued that Art 65 of the Constitution makes it clear that “Persons who have been convicted of crimes committed while holding office or other offenses against public property, shall be ineligible to run for any office filled by popular vote, for such period as may be prescribed by law after serving their sentences, depending on the seriousness of the offense.” It continues: “Those who have been condemned for crimes committed during the exercise of their functions, which affect the public patrimony, cannot stand for office in any popular election for a period of time, fixed by the law, until the completion of the sentence, and in accordance with the gravity of the crime,” and establishes that sanctions can be applied as a result of civil, penal or administrative investigations.

4. After receiving the list from the Comptroller General (19 June 2008) on the grounds of the provisions in Art 105, the National Electoral Council (CNE) took the decision to approve the list, thus making those on it unable to hold or stand for public office for specified periods which could be up to 15 years. The CNE must be formally informed about this so that, should those individuals register as candidates, the CNE has the legal obligation to reject them. Furthermore, the CNE immediately requested Venezuela’s Supreme Court (TSJ) to pass judgment on those listed who had been put forward as candidates for governorships or mayoralties in the forthcoming elections on 23 November, 2008. Constitutionally, these individuals have the right to appeal to the TSJ against their disqualification to stand for or hold public office and it is on these grounds that the CNE requested the pronouncement of the TSJ. The CNE made it clear that the TSJ must rule on the issue before the period for the registration of candidacies, which is between 5-12 August. On 27 June the National Assembly (AN) discussed the matter and approved the decision by the Comptroller General to disqualify the individuals on the list. The decision by the AN was arrived at on the grounds of the legal and constitutional correctness of the process.

5. The Comptroller General’s Office instigated the investigations against the ‘inhabilitados’ on the list by virtue of Art 105 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General Office, which predates the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution up to 15 years (it was introduced in 1984 under the presidency of Jaime Lusinchi and was reviewed and confirmed under the administration of President Rafael Caldera in 1995). Therefore, the legal instrument to apply sanctions against individual whose probity as holders of public office was under question was already in existence, but was simply not being applied. The current form of Art 105 was adopted in 2002 by Venezuela’s National Assembly in an almost unanimous vote, with those infavour including the opposition parties that had, at that time, a substantial presence in the Assembly (COPEI, MAS, Socialdemocrats, MVR, Convergencia, AD, COPEI, Alianza Bravo Pueblo, Podemos and Primero Justicia — at the time the chavista alliance had 192 MPs and the opposition had 100 seats in parliament.⁴ The Organic Law in relation to the Comptroller General’s Office gives competence and authority to the Comptroller General to instigate investigations on holders of public office at all levels about any deviation from the performance of their duties according to existing rules, regulations and laws (Arts 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13), and Arts 91, 92 (see full text of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General Office). Additionally, the Office of the Comptroller General’s attributions is also stipulated in the 1999 Constitution in Arts 25, 274, 287, 288 and 289.⁵ Furthermore, Art 105 gives the Comptroller General Office the authority to bar individuals from holding office, once the investigation on their probity as holders of public office, regardless of political affiliation.

6. The final list of the individuals affected can be found here. The Comptroller General, Clodosbaldo Russian, formally handed in the list to the CNE on 25 February. At the time, Russian said that the names placed on the list had been based on decisions taken by the TSJ and the Sala Constitucional, through a sentence made in 2005. However, Russian explained that these people had the right to appeal to the TSJ to contest the decision and call for their case to be reviewed.

7. Therefore, in summary, the process of disqualification to hold or stand for office in the case of the 368 individuals on the list produced by Venezuela’s Comptroller General has been:

a) conducted strictly on legal and administrative grounds and taken on the basis of lack of probity or irregularities in the performance of public duties;
b) carried out as part of the constitutional and legal obligation of the duties of the Office of the Comptroller General;
c) taken following decisions of the TSJ back in 2005;
d) made under the authority of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General Office
and of the Constitution of Venezuela;
e) the individuals affected were fully informed throughout.
Furthermore:
e) Art 105, the main — although not the only — legal authority for the disqualifications, precedes the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999; and was in fact introduced in 1984, reviewed and approved in 1999, and again perfected in 2002 (this time) almost unanimously by Venezuela’s National Assembly including the political parties of the opposition COPEI, MAS, Socialdemocrats, Convergencia, AD, COPEI, Alianza Bravo Pueblo, Podemos (on the chavista camp at the time) and Primero Justicia;
f) the individuals on the list have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court (TSJ), they have not made use of this prerogative;
g) the CNE and the National Assembly (both within their specific legal and constitutional competencies) have approved it; the CNE has requested an official constitutional pronouncement by the TSJ;
e) the full implementation of the law in the fight against corruption where every elected public official is accountable is central to the democratic nature of the Bolivarian Revolution.

1. “Blacklisted-Candidates List,” International Herald Tribune, July 8, 2008.
2. “Mayoría de los inhabilitados son de tendencia chavista,” Ultimas Noticias, 13 July, 2008.
3. Usted lo vio: Calixto Ortega: “El Contralor no debería tener facultad para proclamar inhabilitaciones”
4. See CNE official results of 2000 parliamentary election.
5. Full text of the Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela,
   Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela