Well, what would happen if this revolution doesn’t work? I think we are going to be destroyed with all means. I think they are going to target [us] one by one … whoever spoke against [the regime] will be targeted in the future. I believe it’s all about win or die.

– Sayed Ahmed Al-Wedaei

Since razing the Pearl monument in mid-March, the Bahraini ruling regime has launched a sweeping crackdown on protesters who took to the streets to voice their anger against the Al-Khalifa family and its oppressive mores. In the last few weeks, the situation on the ground has spiralled out of control and descended to a blatant and barren form of brutality with the regime’s security and military apparatus crossing all humane boundaries. The institution of martial law has taken the meaning of a sacrosanct endorsement for one and all forms of transgressions – even women and minors haven’t been spared in this state-sponsored violence spree. Whilst the attention of global media has been fixated on the Libyan stalemate, the Al-Khalifa regime has viciously suppressed the popular protests that began on 14th February.

Medical personnel have been systematically targeted and the injured deprived from receiving medical attention; midnight raids have become a norm with masked men forcing themselves into homes and carrying out multiple crimes; journalists and human rights activists have been silenced and threatened with government reprisal; Shia villages, dissenting or otherwise, have been cordoned off by military checkpoints where a policy of humiliation and intimidation is rife; political figures and critics of the regime have been bungled off to unknown dungeons; the long known¹ but always concealed practise of torture has reeked out of the royal dungeons with at least five confirmed deaths recorded in custody;² those who dared to venture out of their homes and partake in protests now find themselves booted out of their jobs, and plastered as traitors. The above description provides a fractional insight into the horrific state of affairs that has come to envelop Bahrain in recent weeks.

How it is that such brazen and inhumane conduct escapes media attention, and fails to raise international uproar says a great deal about the vast ground that we – collectively as human beings – must yet cover in order to sever the interests of power and its many unremitting obstacles that stand in the way of a truly universal human discourse. If it were only a case of neglect, perhaps it would not be so disheartening. The fact of the matter however is that the Bahraini uprising and its central demands have knowingly been adulterated by the leading rogue state, the United States, its numerous minions and a media infrastructure that has proven itself to be only too willing to assiduously toe the Empire’s line. The Al-Khalifa regime’s bloody transgressions have been put down to inexperience – a viewpoint aired by top EU advisor Robert Cooper – as if the lives of innocents were a matter of sport or chance.

The Obama administration has come to be distinguished by its seemingly limitless aptitude to summon vague, meaningless clichés. Although a comprehensive critique of this approach is beyond these pages, it is nonetheless clear that letting loose a rosary of flowery words is no permanent remedy to the Empire’s chronic penchant for propping dictators and tyrants. Multiple million-dollar arm deals and a political PR campaign, headed by the US Secretary of State, that is underpinned by the ipso facto criminalisation of one single state in the region has led to an unholy alliance between the primary imperial power and the last bastions of medieval tyrannical monarchies.

After the sights of jubilation witnessed on the streets of Tunis and in the Tahrir Square, it is quite easy to overlook the utter desperation that propelled the wave of uprisings that has taken grip across the Middle East. When Mohamed Bouazizi set himself alight on December 17th in Sidi Bouzid, he was exposing through a most desperate act the systemic violence that leaked through every institution connected to the central state, and also giving expression to the daunting helplessness experienced by thousands, if not millions, like him across the Arab world.

In Tunisia, the pervasive nepotism of the ruling family was documented in Wikileaks cables. The caustic nature of the familial rule gave rise to overwhelming frustrations with citizens lamenting that Tunisia was no longer a police state but had instead “become a state run by the mafia”. A similar situation could be observed under the Mubaraks in Egypt. Needless to state, both regimes were strongly supported to their last breaths by the US and leading western nations despite such damning profiles.

In the case of Bahrain, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state fall squarely within the purview of the ruling Al-Khalifa family. The extensive constitutional powers granted to the King include “the power to dissolve the parliament, impose martial law, alter the constitution, veto laws passed by the National Assembly, along with the power of appointment and removal of ministers and judges.”³ In addition to these sweeping powers, the Majlis Al-Shura – entirely comprised up of royally elected members – is provided with significant legislative capacities; notably, its president enjoys “a casting vote in the event of deadlock” in the bicameral system.⁴ The cabinet similarly consists of royally appointed members, with almost half of its twenty-four members belonging to the royal Al-Khalifa family.

The controversial figure of the Prime Minister and his almost ubiquitous stamp over all aspects of Bahraini politics is yet another illustration of the Al-Khalifa’s absolute control. During his more than 40-year uncontested reign as PM, Khalifa bin Salman has become an object of hate for an overwhelming majority of Bahrainis, and is widely viewed as the man behind the state’s repeated repressive crackdowns on opposition protests. Indeed, one of the major demands aired by protesters shortly after the chilling raid on the Pearl Roundabout in the early hours of 17th February was an unmistakable call for the removal of the PM. According to the 2008 FRIDE report on Bahrain, the PM’s orbit of influence is said to encompass the “courts, the security forces and the economy”. It continues to underline that this influence is greatly owed to “his control of the Economic Development Board.” Less than a month after protests first began, the ‘One Dinar Protest’ was organised outside the Bahrain Financial Harbour (BFH) after Al-Wefaq’s head, Sheikh Ali Salman, presented a purchase agreement which showed the PM’s procurement of the multi-million dollar real estate for 1 Dinar (approximately $2.6 USD).⁵ It is hard not to draw parallels between the endemic corruption of the Ben Alis and Mubaraks aside such instances of blatant plundering of national wealth.

At the judicial level, the King “continues to chair the Higher Judicial Council, appoints judges by decree and many members of the judiciary are members of the al-Khalifa family.” As a result of this level of blunt intervention in the judiciary system, the courts have assumed paradoxical and discernible politicised stances vis-à-vis crucial topics in Bahraini politics such as sectarianism. For instance, the judiciary has often passed anti-sectarianism legislation to censor newspapers and websites, whilst clandestine initiatives by the government such as the one highlighted in the Bandar report, give currency to explicit sectarian agendas including the promotion of anti-Shia material in the press. Such sinister plots enacted in coordination with judicial processes have together served to restrict public freedoms whilst also stoking sectarian tensions.

When Mohamad Bouazizi set himself on fire, he did so with full knowledge that the entire edifice of the state was firmly in the clasp of a tiny elite. He was confronted by a system that was putrefied to its core. Justice and due process were mere words that had no more than nominal value in an infested political system. In Bahrain, protesters are confronted by a ruling family which not only plays the role of judge, jury, prosecutor and hangman simultaneously, but also possesses overwhelming control over the socio-economic shape of the state. This level of absolute control over the functions of the state has emboldened the royal family to the extent that it has acquired the audacity to embark on the so-called Bahrainisation program i.e. the political naturalisation of foreigners with view to alter the demographic balance of the island state.

Bahrain’s systemic violence evinced by an invidious kleptocratic form of rule, absolute monopoly over the branches of authority, a discriminatory royal patronage system, crushing levels of corruption, growing unemployment and steadily declining standards of living leave little room for any serious observer to extricate the Bahraini uprising from the wider regional uprisings. The sectarian aspect of the crisis in Bahrain is incidental, and serves to obscure the extent of the abuse of power and authority by the Al-Khalifa family. Through the sectarian card, the ruling family stratifies its citizenry by pitching the nation’s woes in religious terms.

A further insult to the recent Bahraini uprising is achieved by an almost perfect political sleight of hand – or the ‘great deception’ – by the Al-Khalifa regime. In the sparse and heavily de-contextualised coverage by the news media, the underlying motives for the popular protests are almost entirely glossed over. Instead, focus is laid on a fictitious “Iranian threat”. In addition to playing into the sectarian narrative, the so-called “Iranian threat” also takes out the possibility of any violent reaction by protesters. Unlike in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, any attempts by Bahraini protesters to express their discontent through any quasi-violent means e.g. torching government buildings, would immediately be classified as a foreign act of sabotage orchestrated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, thus meriting an intensification of the violent crackdown – no doubt with added western political support dovetailed with an even greater volume of yellow journalism.

When Sayed Ahmed Al-Wedaie professed his deepest fears about the possibility of a failed uprising, he did so with full knowledge of the nature of the Al-Khalifa regime. His fate like many other Bahrainis is today unknown after his detention at the hands of state authorities. The resort to violence and the despicable level of fear-mongering and intimidation that the state has stooped to in recent weeks is far from shocking. Rather, it is merely the logical progression for a kleptocratic ruling system that has monopolised power, systematically suffocated the public space and civil society, and exploited religious sensitivities to obscure the corrosive nepotism that now pervades across the entire state structure.

International silence has sustained the brutal equation now unfolding in Bahrain. The increased number of corpses with visible signs of torture dumped in neighbourhoods over the last two weeks, and the growing number of detainees – including leading social and political figures – clearly suggests that the Al-Khalifa family is not about to settle for a political solution. In simpler words, the ruling family is not willing to entertain the thought of relinquishing some of its absolute monopoly over power. The hypocrisy of the United States in this regard is as clear as day. Having airlifted tens of thousands of troops from the other side of the world into Iraq less than a decade ago under belated pretexts of democracy-promotion, its Fifth Fleet already docked on the shores of Bahrain is now apparently ignorant of any conception of human rights and popular rule.

1. Torture Redux: The Revival of Physical Coercion during Interrogations in Bahrain, Human Rights Watch, 08 February 2010.
2. Suspicious Deaths in Custody, Human Rights Watch, 13 April 2011.
3. Bahrain: Reaching a Threshold, FRIDE, June 2008.
4. Fixing the Kingdom: Political Evolution and Socio-Economic Challenges in Bahrain, CIRS, 2008.
5. The One Dinar Protest, Global Voices Online, 07 March 2011.

To even the most seasoned in the art, piecing together the jigsaws is quite a delicate task. Much of the ambiguity that pertains to the political futures of Tunisia and Egypt for instance draws from a lack of clarity as regards the forces that propelled these uprisings, their political leanings, and whether or not these actors have the structural capacities to actualise their aspirations. It is thus fair to say that we are far from being in a position to present an analytical framework to comprehend the gripping dynamics of the Middle East’s uprisings.

The above said however, it is quite easy to discount some ridiculous interpretations of unfolding events that have been disseminated by decrepit monarchs and quarters that have an unvoiced proclivity to maintain the present status quo. For more than a month now, the courageous people of Bahrain have taken to the streets to voice their demands against a ruling monarchy that bears all the hallmarks of a classical mafia-like kleptocratic authoritarian dictatorship. In the face of flying bullets and unending billows of choking teargas smoke, both the young and old have descended to the streets with remarkable valour and upheld entirely peaceful methods of protest. Indeed one of the separating features of the Bahraini uprising is the ubiquitous slogan of “silmiyya, silmiyya” (peaceful, peaceful!). The narrative promoted by the ruling Al-Khalifa monarchy, neighbouring dynastic sheikhdoms and their US patrons has centred however on an entirely bogus claim of supposed Iranian interference.

In recent times, the above claim has been recycled many a time over across the Arabian Peninsula from Kuwait to Yemen. Without measuring the credibility of these claims, the mainstream media has often regurgitated accusations in spite of the most glaring contradictions. In the current context of Bahrain, the suggestion of foreign interference in the shape of an ethereal “Iran threat” (whose promotion has become Secretary of State Clinton’s single-most absorbing vocation) does not only represent a wholesale neglect of factual evidence, but in fact proceeds to insult the sacrifices of generations of Bahrainis tracing back to the birth of the nation.

The Constitutional Dream

Having formally attained independence from British rule in 1971, the political situation in Bahrain was characterised by a great deal of vibrancy and optimism. The archipelago state had witnessed organised political action throughout the British protectorate period, particularly in the decades immediately prior to independence. Precursors to the organised demands for political reform that eventually prompted the Emir to dissolve the National Assembly and brazenly violate the constitution less than two years after its promulgation could be found most notably in the mid-Fifties with the broad mobilisation achieved by the National Union Committee (NUC). The NUC represented the highest symbol of a truly nationalist reform project with demands centred upon the empowerment of an elected legislature, an end to British colonial interference, a fairer socio-economic order and a fundamental revision of state security laws.

Echoing calls made a few decades earlier, the demands raised by leading political figures shortly after independence similarly attracted a broad national, cross-sectarian constituency. The tide of political activism that swept through much of the Middle East at the time was keenly felt in Bahrain. The stoning of British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd’s, car in 1956 in protest against Britain’s continued interference in Bahraini affairs through the person of Sir Charles Belgrave, as well as regular strikes at the BAPCO petroleum refinery and organised protests during the Suez Crisis later in the same year are representative of the political mobilisation seen in Bahrain during the period. It also highlights the grassroots identification of political movements within the country with the wider Arab situation.

Bahrain’s first post-independence head of state, Emir Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa’s, decision to dissolve the National Assembly in 1975 set the tone however for a period that came to be defined by the jockeying for power between the Emir and his sibling, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa. According to most Bahrainis, much of the nation’s contemporary woes trace back to the birth of the nation and the unconstitutional steps undertaken by the first Emir. The popular political narrative thus begins with a great deal of discontent and mistrust towards the Al-Khalifa monarchy.

With a steady decline in the standard of living, rising unemployment and a suffocated public space resulting from years of absolute autocratic rule epitomised by the enforcement of the State Security Law of 1974, nationalist and leftist movements began a series of consultations in June 1990 to discuss the deteriorating situation in Bahrain. Leftists groups had been heavily weakened over the years due to the hard-handed crackdown by the monarchy for the industrial trade strikes of 1974.

These consultations climaxed with the formation of the People’s Petition Committee, and the open petition of October 1994 which was signed by more than 23,000 signatories. The demands set out therein underscored the primary need to restore the National Assembly, and highlighted the debilitating consequences of the Emir’s constitutional transgressions:

“The reality we now face dictates that we will fail our duty if we do not speak-out frankly to you. Your wise leadership witnesses the incorrect circumstances that our country is passing through amid the changing regional and international environment while the constitutional institution is absent. Had the banning of the National assembly been lifted, it would have enabled overcoming the negative accumulations which hinder the progress of our country. We are facing crises with dwindling opportunities and exits, the ever-worsening unemployment situation, the mounting inflation, the losses to the business sector, the problems generated by the nationality (citizenship) decrees and the prevention of many of our children from returning to their homeland. In addition, there are the laws which were enacted during the absence of the parliament which restrict the freedom of citizens and contradict the Constitution. This was accompanied by lack of freedom of expression and opinion and the total subordination of the press to the executive power. These problems, your Highness, have forced us as citizens to demand the restoration of the National Assembly, and the involvement of women in the democratic process. This could be achieved by free elections, if you decide not to recall the dissolved parliament to convene in accordance with article 65 of the Constitution…”

Akin to his reactions in 1975, the Emir now in the third-decade of his absolute rule brutally cracked down on nationalist groups and exiled leading figures including the current secretary general of Bahrain’s largest political group Al-Wifaq, Sheikh Ali Salman. Rather expectedly, the monarchy placed the finger of blame for the unrest on external forces, i.e., the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese resistance movement Hezbollah. In order to quell the popular uprising, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also dispatched two brigades of its National Guard (around 4,000 soldiers).

By the time of the Emir’s death in 1999, Bahrain boasted a horrendous human rights track record including widespread practise of torture under the instruction of British colonial officer Ian Henderson. The promises of reform made by the incumbent Emir Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa were partly inspired by the failure of the iron-fist policies to weigh in the discontent, and also in order to buttress his own standing against his uncle, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, who wielded a great deal of power acquired over three successive decades as Prime Minister; a position the latter continues to enjoy 40 years after his appointment.

The spirit of optimism was short-lived however, as the Emir reneged on his promises of meaningful reform. The “Bahrain model”, as it has condescendingly come to be known, essentially served to project an illusion of reform without altering in any substantive way, the pre-existing decision-making and power structures. Assurances made by the King in the National Action Charter (overwhelmingly supported by 98% of those who voted between 14-15 February 2002) to institute an assembly that would be elected through free and direct elections in effect gave veracity to the home-grown nature of the pro-democracy movement and its legitimate demands.

The Pearl Protests

As hundreds took to the streets on February 14 in their ‘Day of Rage’, the King’s henchmen had by then already settled on the solution of a violent suppression. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt where live ammunition was employed after a few days of protests, in Bahrain its resort was almost immediate with the first fatality, Ali Abdulhadi Mushayma, falling on the first day of protests.

The date for the protests, 14th February, was deliberately chosen to provide a clear message to the ruling Al-Khalifa family that the hollow reforms enacted as part of the National Action Charter process had been far from satisfactory. Just as with decades past, the demands of protesters drew from the fundamental frustrations of generations who aspired for real constitutional reforms and a substantive role for an elected national assembly with legislative powers.

The monarchy’s brutal resort to violence that has thus far resulted in the deaths of at least 25 innocents served to exacerbate hopes in the reform-driven process, and has in turn directed grievances at the highest symbol of the status quo, namely, the Al-Khalifa rule. In essence, the ruling family’s desire for an absolute monopoly of power presents an intractable quandary that cannot be permanently masked by the duplicitous reforms carried out since 2002. Faced with the alternative of relenting some of its power to more democratic institutions or to violently suppress the calls for change, the Al-Khalifa regime has clearly selected the latter choice.

Since the outset of protests more than a month ago, Bahrain’s phony veneer of a progressive, liberal form of rule has been crushed before the world. The systematic silencing of journalists, use of live ammunition against defenceless protesters, dozens of arbitrarily detained individuals including major political opposition figures, shameful attacks on hospitals and medical teams, and the targeting of entire villages and neighbourhoods have all served to disclose the reality of the Al-Khalifa monarchy.

The outdated tactic of brandishing the pro-democracy movement within Bahrain as foreign-backed is principally used to deflect attention from the consistent demands for constitutional reform. In this regard, the role of the US in obstructing meaningful reforms and allowing for the gross misrepresentation of the demands of the political opposition has been pivotal. For obvious geopolitical stakes, the continued hosting of the Fifth Fleet base and unequivocal support for successive US military operations stretching from the Gulf War, the Al-Khalifa monarchy has been looked upon by Washington as a key strategic ally. The hypothesized domino-effect and shared fate that connects Bahrain and Saudi Arabia also looms large, no doubt, for US and western officials.

Shortly on the heels of their participation in a seminar at the House of Lords in London to highlight the deterioration in human rights and freedoms, the detention of leading opposition figures in August 2010 was met with the blanket support of US ambassador Adam Ereli who censured them for taking their case outside the shores of Bahrain. Their subsequent torture and the wall of silence erected in the face of journalists also drew little comment from western capitals.

The developments in Bahrain in recent weeks are in fact symptomatic of the confluence of interests of local autocratic tyrannies and imperial powers who continue to hinge their hegemonic agendas to the nightmarish reigns of unpopular despots. For decades, the pre-eminence of geopolitical and energy interests in the foreign policy outlooks of the US and its allies has relegated the suffering of millions of Arabs to a footnote that merit the occasional remonstrations or hand-wringing. All the while, the warehouses of these military-autocratic establishments have been filled with western arms in deals that run into hundreds of billions of dollars.

Revolutions certainly do take a long time to be told, but the time it takes for long compressed frustrations to burst out and overpower the most dictatorial reigns is almost instantaneous in comparison. For the US and its allies, the experiences in Egypt and Tunisia should be reason enough to return to the drawing books.

But more importantly, the uprising peoples of the Middle East have definitively established that the aspirations of peoples cannot forever be ignored in the equations of power. They have proven that real change can only occur in the absence of western tanks and fighter jets. To these brave men and women, the free peoples of the world owe great admiration and respect. The annals of history are lit with the sacrifices of selfless martyrs, and in recent weeks more glorious epics have been added to its volumes. Over time, many have sought to deface the most honourable sacrifices; the least we can do from afar is to ensure that these uprisings are placed within their correct historical, political and socio-economic contexts.

The conduct of the regime in the last few hours is far from abnormal. In fact, the ruling Al-Khalifa regime has premised its rule on the wholesale deprivation and oppression of the nation’s majority Shia population. Since its inception, the tiniest Gulf state has witnessed cyclical calls for reform only to be met with escalating cycles of repression and stricter authoritarian rule. Shortly after formal independence, Emir Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa dissolved the national assembly and put into effect the State Security Measures Law in 1975 granting the government summary powers to detain and hold without trial all individuals suspected of expressing views “which are of a nature considered to be in violation of the internal or external security of the country”. The moves by the Kingdom’s first Emir were enacted in response to a growing sense of political activism and organised political mobilisation aimed at empowering the people through the national assembly.

In the mid-nineties, mass protests erupted once again as the majority demanded a restoration of the 1973 Constitution, and condemned the regime’s chronic discrimination against the nation’s Shi’a population. Akin to his reactions in 1975, the Emir viciously silenced protests as thousands were detained and opposition leaders exiled. Notably, it was during this period that several opposition leaders – including the widely popular Sheikh Abd Al-Amir Al-Jamri – began hunger strikes to highlight their political demands. Concurrent to this phase, the regime embarked on a systematic attempt to label the opposition-led protests as “foreign-backed” alleging that ‘dissidents’ were being trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and by the Lebanese resistance movement Hezbollah.

The Majority is the Enemy

Dr. Salah Al-Bandar exposed the deep-running sectarian, anti-Shia penchant of the Al-Khalifa monarchy in his widely distributed report published in 2006. The ‘Bandargate’ report as it came to be known highlighted a clandestine, well-orchestrated conspiracy by the government to further disenfranchise the country’s majority Shia population from influential governmental positions. Wreaking from decades of political and socioeconomic marginalisation, it would seem that the already hideous conditions affecting Bahraini Shias had to be dealt with a final blow.

Within the report, mention is made of promoting anti-Shia campaigns in the media arena, which is predominantly controlled and heavily monitored by the monarchy. The government’s undeviating devotion to a policy of sectarian discrimination does not stop at discriminatory agendas in the press. In line with this outlook, the 2009 report by the Bahrain Center for Human Rights revealed staggering statistics that show systemic discrimination against Shia citizens in various governmental institutions.

Even more alarmingly, the Al-Khalifa regime has strategically pursued a policy of marginalising Shias from the military and domestic security apparatuses. In its report issued in 2005, the International Crisis Group highlighted the endemic discriminatory practises of the government in this regard further noting that the security forces responsible for the clampdown on the 1995 protests were principally recruited from “the Balochi area of Pakistan, with officers from Jordan and other Arab countries”. The Bahrain Center for Human Rights notes that this policy has in effect created an equation in which “foreign mercenaries”, outwardly draped in the Red and White flag, exercise control of the security needs of the monarchy.

As a clear manifestation of the fundamental lack of mutual trust and confidence between the state and its majority population, the convergence of a policy of sectarian naturalisation aimed at altering the demographic balance of the country and the exclusionary make-up of key governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Defence and the security apparatus, has merely served to underline the inherent discriminatory outlook of the Al-Khalifa monarchy. Beyond smokescreens of reform and moves towards liberalisation, the monarchy has embarked on a silent war against its majority population gathering in its ranks a “mercenary” force tasked with implementing unjust policies.

The most recent acts of unwarranted violence by the Al-Khalifa monarchy give lie to the promises of change and reform oft-repeated by the government and its western allies. Beneath a veneer of political reform and economic prosperity, the ground truths reflect a reality that provides an almost perfect fit to the situation found in Third-world nations where the nation’s riches are exploited and placed at the disposal of an elite few. The major difference in the case of Bahrain, however, is the existence of a sectarian rationale underlying the distribution of political, economic and social opportunities. As the US Secretary of State was heaping praises on Bahrain as a model of reform and change in December, poverty and socioeconomic exasperation had by then already crept up the walls of Manama’s financial hub.

The Imperial Factor

The island kingdom of Bahrain is viewed as a pivotal geopolitical state in the foreign policy outlook of the United States government. Most visibly, the Fifth Fleet stationed in Bahrain serves as the headquarters for a US Marine Corps amphibious unit and a crucial base for U.S. Air Force jet fighter interceptors and spy planes. Strategically positioned at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, Bahrain has constituted an integral part of the openly hegemonial US project for the Middle East. Indeed in addition to oil-interests and being a so-called ‘bulwark’ against Iran, the kingdom has historically acted as the hub for logistical support and extensive basing for US military operations spanning from the First Gulf War to the most recent pillaging of Iraq. In accordance with this strategic outlook, the US designated Bahrain as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) in October, 2001.

An added incentive for the US to maintain the ‘status quo’ in Bahrain is owed to the stability of its key regional ally, Saudi Arabia. The oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia has a majority Shia population, who like their Bahraini counterparts, are systematically suppressed by the ruling Saud Kingdom. It is widely feared in Washington that any popular insurrection in Bahrain would necessarily create instability in Saudi Arabia due to similar political and socioeconomic realities prevalent in the Eastern Province. It is primarily for this reason that the US and Saudi Arabia have actively sought to quell the Houthi movement in the north of Yemen, as well as periodic uprisings in Bahrain such as in the mid-Nineties during which Saudi security personnel were dispatched to Manama to silence the political opposition.

The ‘demonstration effect’ achieved by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions has inspired a mood of self-confidence and optimism for those afflicted by years of deprivation and suffering. Peoples strangulated by decades of political and socioeconomic marginalisation have found a voice on each and every single street of the Arab world. With non-violent popular uprisings taking grip across various parts of the Middle East, the United States and its despotic allies have found no response except a ruthless form of violence and cold-blooded murder.

The recent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and currently ongoing in Bahrain speak out to the collective conscience of humanity, and more specifically to citizens whose governments have been responsible for buttressing brutal and oppressive dictatorships. Britain and the United States who are amongst the largest exporters of military equipment to Bahrain are directly implicated in the deaths of innocent civilians on the streets of Manama. Military ties between the United States and the Al-Khalifa regime which allow for EDAs (“excess defence articles”) such as 60 M60A3 tanks and an FFG-7 Frigate, to be handed over to a murderous dictatorship at no cost which are then employed to crush internal political dissent, reveal the vast dissonance between the rosy words of successive US administrations and their hellish actions.

The Bahraini people however are not holding their breath for Obama to finally acknowledge the legitimacy and rightfulness of their demands. They have torn down the walls of fear that have imprisoned them for decades on end in almost sub-human socioeconomic conditions with virtually no political and civil rights. With clenched fists and spirited hearts, they have descended to the streets of Bahrain; and just as in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the slogan reverberating across Manama today is: “The people demand the downfall of the regime”.

On 11th April, Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai Al-Aam broke the ‘scud missiles’ story. Relying solely on American sources, the author, Husain Abdul-Husain, claimed that both western and Israeli intelligence had uncovered the training of Hezbollah resistance fighters in Syria in the use of scud and surface-to-air missiles. This, we are told, occurred some time during last summer. Subsequent to the alleged discovery, the article adds, Israel threatened Syria through official Turkish and Qatari channels warning against the transfer of either of the two armaments to Hezbollah.

Western coverage of the story has been an unquestioned regurgitation of the original claims made in the Al-Rai Al-Aam article. Further signified by an overriding infatuation with Israel’s security, political commentators have even sought to draw parallels between Saddam and the alleged Syrian scud missiles delivery. Amidst the suffocating miasma of yellow journalism redolent in western reporting, the parallel was not lost on the Lebanese prime minister. Speaking to a group of Lebanese citizens in Rome, Saad Hariri noted: “All this is similar to what was said previously about the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, that were never found.”

Quite expectedly, not one mainstream media outlet dared make any mention of America’s pledge of roughly $3billion per annum in military aid to Israel. One does not require speculative reports published on Al-Rai Al-Aam to verify the above, nor does one require any superior intelligence to discern that the annual US ritual of rearming Israel constitutes an “equilibrium-breaking” military development. What is required, however, is the impossible: for leading western commentators to witness developments, even fleetingly, through the eyes of other than Israel.

And thus, one can produce a hefty list of ignored ‘strategic balance altering’ developments. The Obama administration’s decision in January of this year, for instance, to double US arms-stockpiles in Israel to a total sum of $800 million worth, which are to be used by the Zionist state in times of “emergency”, certainly fits the description of military “game-changers”.

All this is not surprising. As a rule of thumb, the media’s self-assumed monopoly of reserving big and frightening words like ‘WMDs’ for those classified as adversaries is to be assumed without need for explicit mention. Language in this sense is a tool to distort, not to explain; an instrument to erect separating walls, rather than build bridges of dialogue.

Notwithstanding issues of accuracy in the original article, a telling omission from western reporting was a clear failure to question the timing behind Syria’s alleged transfer of the scuds. Had leading media outlets adhered to even a diminished standard of objectivity, they would have no doubt stumbled upon Israeli provocations such as foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman’s impudent words directed at President Assad. In early February of this year, the harebrained right-wing zealot threatened Syria with regime change in a show of brazen chutzpah, which is, in fact, symbolic of how Israel views and applies itself in the regional context.

The brouhaha over Syria’s alleged transfer of scud missiles is designed to serve as one big smokescreen. It is now an open secret that Hezbollah is capable of striking Tel Aviv, and much further south. In mid-February of this year the resistance movement’s secretary-general, Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, stated in very explicit terms that should Israel bomb the Dahiye suburbs of Beirut, Hezbollah would respond with strikes on Tel Aviv; blow for blow. Virtually the whole of Israel is within striking range of Hezbollah, just as every inch of the entire Middle East and afar into Europe is within range of Israel’s missiles – including, I should add, its nuclear arsenal.

The principle motives behind arousing whipped up media-frenzy over the scud missiles issue are multi-fold, but have little to do with so-called “equilibrium-breaking” weapons in the hands of the Lebanese resistance.

Both Israel and the US are seeking to detach Syria from the resistance-bloc constituted primarily of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. Since the Clean Break strategy authored in 1996, Syria has been referred to as the lynchpin connecting Israel’s foes. Over the past year, US and Israeli experts have elevated the handling of the Syrian file to top-level priority within the Middle Eastern context.

On the precipice of Robert Ford’s confirmation as US ambassador to Syria, the emergence of the scud missiles allegations should be read as an instance of political arm wrangling. Admittedly, on this issue the Arab Center (alternatively referred to as the moderate-bloc) and Israel both share an interest in slowing down the rapprochement between Washington and Damascus, albeit for different reasons. Through the negative focus that has resulted from the alleged delivery of scud missiles, the US-Israeli axis aims to send a clear message to Damascus that its relationship with Hezbollah is a strategic liability. The thawing of ties between the west and Syria could in the future quite as easily regress due to its links to the resistance.

Secondly, Israel misses no chance to wave before the world the ubiquitous ‘S’ word in order to mask its repulsive settler-colonial project. By continually depicting itself as a nation terminally under threat, the Zionist state has sought to gain legitimacy and skewed sympathy.

In the trail of Israel’s ever-rapacious “security” appetite, western commentators have overlooked gross violations of human rights and, indeed, war crimes. In this vein, Israel passed a military order on 13th April, which legalizes the deportation of thousands of Palestinians from their West Bank homes. Instead of highlighting the woes of a displaced nation – time and again – inflicted by a racist settler-colonial project, western journalists have instead zoomed in on an alleged scud missile delivery. Note, the word is alleged. As if to say, the Zionist state’s daily ethnic cleansing in Al-Quds of its Palestinian population is of no importance when placed against an alleged scud-missile delivery.

To fair-minded individuals, the media’s handling of the scud missiles story is representative of a hereditary bias in western reporting of the Middle East. The notion of double standards no longer captures the sheer immensity of this overriding prejudice. It would seem politics in the western hemisphere is all about recycling misnomer clichés, advancing age-old power-politics paradigms and bringing to bear its own sacred cows on the field of global politics.

[I]t seems obvious that [the] effort to communicate fully, will continue to be blocked [...] so long as the possessors of power continue to carry on with impunity their policy of collective imbecilization through … the mass media.

– Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America

At the beginning of the new year, German weekly magazine Der Spiegel ran a controversial report claiming that the Lebanese movement Hezbollah was involved in drug trafficking to finance its “terrorist operations against Israel”. The article proceeded to allege that individuals involved in the cartel had contacts with the central nexus of the resistance movement including its Secretary-General. Needless to state, no factual evidence was cited in support of the claims as in the case of a growing list of previous smear-campaigns.

In his widely acclaimed book, Resistance is the Essence of the Islamist Revolution, director of Conflicts Forum, Alastair Crooke, argues that the West not only suffers from a “blind spot” when it comes to comprehending ‘political Islam’, but that it regularly employs a historically potent association of Islam with violence to drive in a perception of “reason capsized into madness” when depicting present-day resistance groups. As such, these groups come to symbolise everything that an idealised West isn’t; a big-toothed bogeyman of sorts. The recent allegations made by Der Spiegel touch on these historical stereotypes, and in tune with age-old precedent, they aim to influence policy patterns in one form or another.

Before examining potential policy implications, a brief survey of Der Spiegel’s coverage of Hezbollah over recent years is instructive:

“Again and again [Nasrallah] seeks to provoke: No mention is made without any incitement against Jews.” (18.08.2006); “Hezbollah’s high-tech weapons endanger Germany Navy” (15.09.2006); “Hezbollah is not Suppenküche! It is a war party that wants to destroy Israel!” (23.03.2007); “Israel must adjust to a new wave of terrorist attacks against “Jewish targets” overseas … Hezbollah [has] activated its “sleeper” cells.” (21.07.2008), et al.

These brief snippets do not even begin to take into account the derogatory imagery – bordering on outright racist – resorted to when portraying supporters of Hezbollah. If you’re on planet Der Spiegel, these individuals are nonsensical maniacs with “crooked teeth” whose sole aptitude is sloganeering, whereas their fellow Lebanese are cultured beings whose women don “Fendi handbag[s]”.

To suggest the description ‘asinine’ fits well with this variety of journalism, far from sounding harsh, would seem more like an understatement.

In the run-up to the June 2009 elections in Lebanon, Der Spiegel put together its most daring attack to-date against the Lebanese movement by linking it to the assassination of former PM Rafik Hariri. Less than two weeks from ballot day, the German magazine’s blinding front-page headline: “Breakthrough in Tribunal Investigation: New Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder”, had unmistakably clear motives. Despite the rapturous outburst, Der Spiegel was unbecomingly silent after the elections; the breakthrough that was glowingly pitched mere days earlier as an outcome of “serendipity à la Sherlock Holmes and the state-of-the-art technology used by cyber detectives” was deemed unworthy of further commentary. The story had satisfied its use.

Moving on to present, the timing for the explosive drug-cartel exposé is likewise edifying. In the US, “Israel Lobby’s War on Al Manar TV” reflects a re-energised penchant on Capitol Hill to plaster the Lebanese movement with the dreaded “T” word.¹

As with most, if not all, matters of relevance to the Middle East, one can trace the causes for Washington’s disposition to the not too distant Tel Aviv. The comments of Israeli Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, over the past week have heightened the possibility of a new war against Gaza, and increased the likelihood of another “July War” against Lebanon. Whilst the editors at Ha’aretz are making no secrets of an open inclination towards an inevitable war path, their suggestion that the Israeli political-military complex calculates war decisions on the basis of whether and when all its citizens feasibly possess gas masks is rather inane, amongst other things. All in all, the prospect of war looms large over the Middle East with Hobbes’ caveat ringing loud and clear, “the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto”. Within this context, smear-campaigns and fear-mongering have obvious ends in mind.

Far more importantly, however, Der Spiegel’s smear-campaign against Hezbollah is aimed at policy circles within the EU. Over recent months, there has been growing momentum to adopt “dialogue” as the preferred paradigm in coming to grips with resistance movements in the Middle East. Organisations that have consistently stressed the importance of mutual dialogue, such as the Conflicts Forum, will have been encouraged, no doubt, by the positive steps taken during 2009 to shift away from a “failed” policy.²

Of the more notable exchanges, former British Cabinet member MP Clare Short visited Damascus to hold talks with Khaled Meshal, as part of a small delegation of MPs after which she underlined the need to “talk to Hamas”. Later in the same month, MP Hussein Hajj Hassan from the Loyalty to the Resistance party affiliated to Hezbollah visited Britain to take part in a symposium dealing with issues concerning the Middle East. Three months later in June, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana met with Hajj Hassan in Beirut, marking the first time a senior EU diplomat held talks with the political party.

The end of 2009 saw further drama for Israel. Towards the close of its rotating EU presidency role, Sweden proposed a resolution to recognize East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. By this time, Tel Aviv had simply seen enough. Pro-Israeli lobby groups and EU allies (primarily France and Germany) frantically pushed their weight around, and heavily watered down the draft resolution which eventually called for Jerusalem as “the future capital of the two states”.³

Meanwhile, Israel’s foreign ministry, which has unsurprisingly shed all considerations for diplomatic courtesy under Avigdor Lieberman, lashed out at Sweden for putting forward the resolution. “The peace process in the Middle East is not like IKEA furniture,” remarked a foreign ministry official, in reference to the Swedish furniture chain. “It takes more than a screw and a hammer, it takes a true understanding of the constraints and sensitivities of both sides, and in that Sweden failed miserably”, he sarcastically went on to add.

Israel’s take on the happenings in Brussels – putting aside the childish rattle – was manifestly clear. The obvious lesson to be derived from 2009 for Tel Aviv, as far as EU involvement in the Middle East is concerned, was similarly evident.

One must underline at this point that despite consistent pressures exerted by Israel and co., the positions adopted by a growing number of EU parliamentarians vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict has been very honourable. Earlier on Friday, a 60-member strong delegation made their way into Gaza to assess the wide-scale damage caused by Israel’s brutal war last year, as part of a bid to mount pressure for an end to the Siege.

For Israel, this sort of involvement is clearly not welcome. And hence, the appearance of baseless slander and smear-campaigns in leading European media outlets, which aim to cast resistance movements as erratic, lawless, mafia-like entities whose “sleeper cells” and “networks” pervade across the heart of Europe. Der Spiegel’s recent claims, apart from being the usual, old vituperations, should rather be viewed in the context of a wider agenda to curtail dialogue between resistance movements and western officials.

Evidently thus, there are certain stakeholders who wish to see the EU mutate into some variant of a collectivised imbecile, which keeps a measured silence on all subjects whose implicit or explicit implications reach Israeli shores. Der Spiegel’s recent tirades have set the new strategy in motion. However, if the most recent words from Gaza are any indication, Israel will need to try much, much harder.

1. “The Israel Lobby’s War on Al Manar TV,” The Palestine Chronicle, 03 January 2010.
2. “Language – a tool to transform different into dangerous“, Conflicts Forum, 02 February 2008.
3. “Jewish settlers: We’ll burn you all!”, ChamPress, 26 December 2009.

“Operation Scorched Earth” – pitched as the sixth war between the Yemeni government and its Houthi citizens – has served to further cement the incompetence of Ali Abdallah Saleh’s government. Its failure to heed from the lessons of past has exposed it to charges of gross impudence within policy circles. Indeed, both Riyadh and Sana’a are condemned of committing the supreme crime in war designs: vanity.

Ever since its declared involvement in the war, the Saudi Kingdom has been frantically searching for an exit strategy. It took more than 70 confirmed fatalities and a growing list of soldiers ‘missing in action’ in the space of little over a month for the Al-Saud royalty to finally fling in the open its first give-away.

On 22 December, Deputy Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Sultan suggested that the Kingdom had all but done its job, and was therefore halting all major operations. Although he did also offer a sternly worded 48-hour ultimatum to the Houthis to withdraw from the border town of Al-Jabaliya, Saudi Arabia clearly ‘wanted out’; albeit attempting its sign-off with grandiloquent hubris. To Saudi warnings, the Houthis reaffirmed their central demands which have remarkably remained consistent from the outset: ‘Saudi Arabia must put an end to its aggressions, and mustn’t allow its territory to be used by Yemeni forces in the war’.

Such firmness from the Houthis obviously wasn’t quite expected in Riyadh. Wildfire rumours less than a week later reporting the death of the Houthi leader, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, and recent attempts to equate Yemeni Houthis with Al Qaeda can be viewed as the most recent manoeuvres by Riyadh to alter perceptions regarding the war; primarily, such propaganda is aimed at selling a romanticised image of the Kingdom.

As with all wars, peace-making is a complex business: the Saudis have to emerge victors, at all costs. Quite simply, the Kingdom has to project its forays into Yemen as a resounding victory at the hands of its brave, noble sons – the steadfastness of Houthis, however, has (up until present) given no occasion for victory speeches. One can be dead sure that a meticulous national-PR campaign recounting the heroic feats and victories is gathering dust on the shelves; fettered by the matchless bravery of the sons of Zayd.

The target of Riyadh’s PR-travails is not limited to driving in some sense of inflated national pomp or glowing praise for its countless Emirs, but is instead intended to reinforce a sense of invisibility about the Kingdom. In recounting the rashness of the decision to go to war, Saudi expert Dr. Mai Yamani stated:

“The dilemma for the Saudis is that now the damage will be much greater if they do not crush the Houthis, as this would embolden Al Qaeda. This is the biggest threat facing Saudi Arabia, but its rulers’ ill-considered war strategy has only brought that threat closer.”

Having walked itself into a minefield, Riyadh will now be measuring the backlash of its reckless decision. The increased optimism that militant Wahhabists now enjoy as a result of the Kingdom’s failures is, however, far from the real cost of war.

All wars exact a political price. In the immediate short-term, the Kingdom will in most likelihood have to pay a political price which will further eat into its fading regional influence. This cost of peace will be paid on the battlefield of mediation.

Over recent years, the Middle East has witnessed the unquestionable rise of Qatar and Turkey; two regional players who have pursued pragmatism in lieu of outright loyalty to specific ‘camps’. The steady rise of Qatar in regional equations has drawn the ire of both Riyadh and its close ally Hosni Mubarak. Successful brokering of the sensitive Lebanese Unity government package followed by an admirable stance during the Gaza war both served to build the persona of Doha.

Ankara’s rise on the other hand has been nothing short of astronomic. Following on from Erdogan’s famed Davos walkout, Ankara has focused on developing its stature on the Middle Eastern scene. The past few days witnessed the signing of hefty bilateral deals between Turkey and both of Syria and Lebanon; an indication of the country’s growing buoyancy within the region.

Therefore, in the context of the war in Yemen, any mediation deal brokered by either of Turkey or Qatar is simply an intolerable outcome for Riyadh; a result which would only deepen the wound of Saudi Arabia’s broken pride and signal its’ rapidly declining standing. Yet, the options before Riyadh are incredibly limited. Doha was responsible for brokering the last ceasefire deal between the Yemeni central government and the Houthis – from the view of pure qualification, Qatar is arguably in the best position to act as mediator. But the course of politicians is seldom chosen on merit.

What is certain is that Riyadh would regard Qatari mediation a bitterer pill to swallow than Turkish involvement on the same. In this vein, the visit of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to Riyadh early last week can be viewed as a tentative first-step towards an eventual Turkish mediation of the crisis. Indeed upon his return from the Kingdom, Davutoglu indicated that Turkey was ready to act as a “regional actor” in order to put an end to the clashes.

Riyadh thus seems set to pay a heavy price for its madness. In addition to bringing untold embarrassment upon the Kingdom, the prospect of Turkish mediation will have sizeable regional repercussions. Should it come to pass, yet another instance of marked Turkish movement on the Middle Eastern chessboard will madden Washington, Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Cairo. Before all, Israel and its thuggish Netanyahu-Lieberman team will be the more enraged for rather obvious reasons.

The only way out for Riyadh and its allies is another act of madness. The question thus looms; will Obama oblige?

Remember, the Al Qaeda that was in a very few countries — and most specifically in Afghanistan in September of 2001 — is now an Al Qaeda that is in about 58, 59 — who knows precisely, but we sort of peg it around 60 countries. It is a global network, which it wasn’t.

– John F. Kerry, 7 October 2009

If recent experience is anything to go by, the mere mention of any ‘Al Qaeda threat’ is enough to signal the swift exit of rational thought and/or due regard to definition in Washington. The superior military outfit in history whose sheer might none could aspire to ‘equal, let alone surpass’, has been madly spooked – as we are led to deduce – by a band of former cave-inhabiting, shoddy-bearded ragtags now transmogrified into a “global network”.

The media scene is abuzz once again as spinmeisters tap away in overtime mode to direct world attention to the latest frontier in the so-called Global War on Terrorism: Yemen.

With its fate arguably sealed on Christmas Day following the failed attack by the comically-named “underwear bomber”, the least-developed Gulf state positively checks all the tick-boxes required of a nation for it to qualify for greater US interference – leaking poverty, internally fractured, geopolitically pivotal and, fatefully, a nation that can feasibly be associated with a global terror threat. Just weeks earlier, connections to Yemen were apparently uncovered in investigations relating to the Fort Hood shooting.

In between the two incidents, the US military conducted a series of deadly airstrikes having received the go-ahead from Nobel-winner Obama. The target of the attacks (as with the case of routine deadly drone-strikes in northwestern Pakistan) was an ethereal Al Qaeda top figure who, unsurprisingly, seems to have escaped unscathed.¹

Following months of in-house policy talks, top figures in the US administration have added their voices to the mix by underlining the need to confront the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the troubled nation. With the stage seemingly set, and greater US involvement very much in the pipelines, there is a need to plumb through some unchartered territory surrounding the present situation and what it holds for the region as a whole.

Measuring the Al Qaeda Pretext

Obama’s AfPak strategy brought to surface the touchy issue of defining terms previously assumed to be self-evident such as ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘Taliban’. Despite Bush-era treatment of these terms as some kind of fixated Platonic archetypes, problems of definition have always been raised by observers and analysts who have cited the misuse of the Al Qaeda pretext in justifying the expanding imperial project, as well as in bolstering instruments of state authority and security in a number of countries. In this regard, the fictitious link tying Iraq to Al Qaeda in the prelude to the war on Iraq represents one of the more obvious examples. Yet, there are a number of other cases in which the same pretext has been falsely employed to serve as a ‘welcome!’ sign for direct US involvement.

In his book The Dark Sahara: America’s War on Terror in Africa, Professor Jeremy Keenan unveiled how the Algerian government theatrically staged operations beginning from 2003 (which it blamed on Al Qaeda), in order to secure US military support. The man running the ‘terror show’ whose group eventually renamed itself the ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’ (AQIM) was in fact an agent of the Algerian secret military intelligence service (DRS); a man operating with the pseudonym, El Para. The Bush administration duly obliged and entered into a marriage of convenience with the Algerian government; a relationship in which both sides, in the words of Professor Keenan, “wanted terrorism in that area.”²

The resource-rich Sahel subsequently became a “swamp of terror” and El Para, whilst still an agent of the DRS, turned into “Bin Laden’s right-hand man in the Sahel.” Similar blueprints were replicated in nearby Niger and Mali within the context of a wider militarization project in Africa.³ Invented Al Qaeda threats allegedly active in the “swamp of terror” conveniently functioned as “the early seeds” of AFRICOM.

Squarely under the purview of AFRICOM, Yemen seems to be the next country in line; quietly adamant not to lose out on a historic opportunity to shore up its strength and silence all internal dissent by simply throwing up the Al Qaeda card.

Broadening Definitions

In an interview to BBC Arabic, the comments of Yemeni Chief of Staff in the Central Security Forces, Brigadier Yehia Mohammed Abdallah Saleh, were revealing insofar as how he chose to define the nature of the threat: “the problem that Yemen is facing remains with Al Qaeda sympathizers rather than with Al Qaeda itself.” He went on to add, “Al Qaeda is trying to weaken Yemen thinking it could operate unchecked if it cooperated with the Houthis to undermine the country.”⁴

The import of the brigadier’s comments is instructive; in addition to being extremely vague, the business of tackling “sympathizers” inherently requires some form of extended commitment. Yet, as the brigadier would no doubt insist, this should be no cause for short-term complacency, for he immediately proceeds to sanctify the ongoing war on Zaydi Houthis by falsely associating it with the wider war on terror – a tactic that is being continually recycled in order to fit newer purposes all around the world.

As one would expect, a brief look at the facts brings forth an entirely different picture. Over the years, the government in Yemen has tried to play it both ways with Al Qaeda. By adopting a strategy of accommodation, and indeed signing a non-aggression pact in 2003, the Yemeni government has in the past solicited the support of Al Qaeda in its fight against the Houthis, as confirmed by counterterrorism expert Michael Scheuer.

In a recent news article that appeared on BBC Arabic, a Houthi official speaking to correspondent Bob Trevelyan declared that the government’s strategy to fight Al Qaeda was bound to fail since it was itself responsible for “sponsor[ing] these movements in the past.”⁵ Unsurprisingly, such stories or even implicit nuances to that effect are missing altogether in the BBC’s English coverage of Yemen – instead, analyses are teeming with talk of a symbiotic relationship between Houthi ‘rebels’ and Al Qaeda.

For a government that has no qualms with Machiavellian realpolitik and outright deception, one can safely assume that the vocal southern secessionist resurgence will likewise be confronted in the name of counterterrorism. The more pronounced involvement of figures like Tariq Al-Fadhli – a former member of Yemeni president’s senior council who also fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan – in the south⁶ will turn the “Al Qaeda sympathizers” criterion into quite a useful tool to justify more iron-fist policies towards the region.

At another level, the government’s tentative treatment of the Al Qaeda threat is indicative of both the complex social dynamic within the country, as well as the inability of the central government to effectively exert state control. Although a considerable number of Yemenis subscribe to a Wahhabist-Salafist version of Islam, they certainly do not advocate the militaristic outlook that is symptomatic of Al Qaeda.

Growing US involvement or perception of US-client status (as enjoyed by next-door Saudi Arabia) associated with Yemen however, will certainly serve to radicalise great swaths of the Yemeni population, and in turn intensify the nature of the threat from the country. Well aware of this dimension, foreign minister Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi stressed that any direct confrontation with Al Qaeda within Yemen should remain a strictly-Yemeni affair, adding that it is not “in the interests of the United States or western countries to send security forces to Yemen.”

The Saudi Connection

It is impossible to speak of an Al Qaeda threat in Yemen without accounting for the role played by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in giving rise to this threat, as well as determining how it is in turn affected by it. In a July testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Brigadier General James Smith – current US ambassador to Saudi Arabia – underlined the need to “bolster Yemen’s capacity to defeat violent extremism”; his mention of Yemen, tellingly, came before any mention of Iraq or Syria.⁷

During the 80s and 90s, Saudi Arabia embarked on a project to propagate a strong Wahhabist current in order to establish itself as the paramount power in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Billions upon billions of petrodollars were devoted to this global undertaking in which Yemen, a nation joined to the Saudi kingdom “through historical, ethnic and tribal ties,” was certainly not ignored. In Yemen, the kingdom created “a strong Wahhabi current that was politically and ideologically loyal to the ruling al-Saud,” as noted by Dr. Mai Yamani, an expert on Saudi Arabia. Earlier in May of last year, Dr. Yamani summarised the present dilemma with the following assessment:

the two largest countries on the Arabian peninsula – Saudi Arabia, the biggest in terms of landmass and oil wealth, and Yemen in terms of population, are now locked in life-and-death struggles with internal enemies. The paradox is that, though the threat to both countries is the same, each is worsening the outlook for the other by the policies it is pursuing.⁸

As President Ali Abdallah Saleh’s control over Yemen falters with popular movements in the north and south increasingly gaining momentum, the Al-Saud royalty is acutely aware that it would be the first to feel the after-effects of its backfired policy, as it comes under increasing threat from the same quarters it once funded and used to buttress its global standing. The US is likewise very cognisant of this threat, and acknowledges that any de-stabilization of the kingdom would immediately diminish the empire’s regional coult.

In conclusion, the recent focus on Yemen is primarily driven by geostrategic imperatives which revolve around preserving a pro-US configuration of the Middle East. Media hype and sensationalized analysis obscure the underlying dynamics which, in fact implicate the US’s closest regional clients most notably, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in engendering the Al Qaeda threat.

Further, the stakes in question for Ali Abdallah Saleh’s government are unmistakable: simple old-style survival. With a distinguished heritage in the vocation, the US is thus set to pursue a tradition of bolstering an unpopular, oppressive regime in Yemen. Indeed, Sana’a will be hoping for greater aid and extended commitment from the US (under the cover of the international community), to come out of the London conference called on by British PM Gordon Brown.

As officials from the Yemeni government sing the ‘give us more aid, we’ll deal with Al Qaeda’ tune,⁹ the message is clear: discreetly strengthen our armed counterterrorism capacity. Not in the least surprising, the head of Commander of Special Operations – the outfit that is responsible for counterterrorism – Ahmed Ali Abdallah Saleh happens to be the son of the Yemeni president. In connection, any international recognition of a vaguely defined Al Qaeda threat in Yemen will thus provide much needed ammunition to the Yemeni government to silence its internal foes.

For the US, the paramount objective is to secure the surrounding neighbourhood of its prime Gulf client and gradually build a stronger presence in Yemen. The geopolitical prizes on offer are significant: in addition to neighbouring Saudi Arabia, Yemen is the only country from which oil can potentially reach the open seas without passing through either the Strait of Hormuz or the Suez Canal. Should Yemen fall within the orbit of direct US influence, the above factor will ominously reduce the geostrategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz in formulating calculations surrounding any future ‘shock and awe’-type strikes on Iran. Further, with a greater presence in Yemen, the US will have almost secured the Bab el-Mandeb passing, since Djibouti already hosts a 2,000-man strong AFRICOM base. The only remaining quandary for the US in the war of access to the nerve-centre of global energy supplies will once more leave the Strait of Hormuz and Iran.

In the short-term, however, much rests on how the US will act in response to the ‘Al Qaeda threat’ in Yemen. Indeed, it could be said that Ali Abdallah Saleh’s fate is firmly chained to Washington’s decisions over the coming months. That perhaps, is in itself revealing as to the present status of regional equations, and how these will in turn pan out.

For individuals and groups concerned with issues of human rights, the most immediate task is to strongly press for a clear, rigid and measurable definition of ‘Al Qaeda’ and related terms such as ‘terrorism’ in the upcoming London conference – particularly with relevance to the Yemeni scene – in addition to a clear call for a binding ceasefire to the ongoing war against Yemeni Houthis. Furthermore, any commitment of aid to Yemen (regardless of its nature) must stand up to rigorous standards of transparency; encompassing in this regard, the ability to closely scrutinise how any such aid is (or will be) utilised by the Yemeni government.

1. “Awlaki: I’m Alive,” ABC News, 31 Dec 2009.
2. British Anthropologist Jeremy Keenan on “The Dark Sahara: America’s War on Terror in Africa,” Democracy Now, 6 August 2009. Also refer to: “America’s New Frontline: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” Al Jazeera English (accessible on YouTube).
3. “AFRICOM and America’s Global Military Agenda: Taking The Helm Of The Entire World,” Global Research, 22 October 2009
4. “Yemen faces Al-Qaeda sympathizers not the group itself,” Global Arab Network, 21 December 2009.
5. “Houthis: Strategy to fight Al Qaeda in Yemen will fail,” BBC Arabic, 6 January 2009.
6. “The Yemen Hidden Agenda: Behind the Al-Qaeda Scenarios, A Strategic Oil Transit Chokepoint,” Global Research, 5 January 2010.
7. See: “Statement of James B. Smith Ambassador-Designate to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before the Senate Committee for Foreign Relations,” 22 July 2009.
8. “Yemen, haven for Jihadis,” Guardian Online, 25 May 2009; Also refer to: “Saudi Arabia goes to war,” Guardian Online, 23 November 2009.
9. “Interview: Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi,” Financial Times, 6 January 2010.

The grand conceit of mass media in Afghanistan and Iraq is now an open-secret. From the initial engineering of entirely misleading narratives up to present day coverage of on-ground realities, the achievements of propaganda in battlefronts that have erupted in the post-9/11 world will make their way into history as some of the most eminent examples of wholesale deceit and deception.

One alarming development in this vein has been what some may call the ‘militarization’ of media warfare. Silencing the voices of journalists and media outlets (brutally, if needed), has become a feature of modern wars. It is not in the least surprising in this regard that 2009 marked the bloodiest year on record in terms of journalist fatalities. At one level, this ploy serves to pre-emptively counter the possibility of having to deal with ‘awkward’ questions about war conduct. Yet it is perhaps in its capacity to generate widespread fear and terror that this strategy attempts to circumscribe the role of reporting, and thus predetermine the contours of victory on the media scene.

In Iraq, we witnessed the rise of novel phenomena; from the notion of embedded journalists to the concept of RRMT (Rapid Reaction Media Teams). During Israel’s war on Lebanon in 2006, one of its first targets were the broadcasting headquarters of the Al-Manar television network and the Al-Nour radio station in its bid to settle the outcome of the media war at the outset. Two years later, we had a far more evolved strategy to block-out media coverage during Israel’s war on Gaza; the infamous ‘Hill of Shame’ brought about the notion of ‘spectator sport’ reporting. Journalists and TV crews were gifted with a “spectacular panoramic” overview of the bleeding warzone from a distance safely calculated by the party that was doing all the bombing.

For all these instances, the object is evidently clear: to shield the perceptions of the outside world from the scourges of war. All we witness after the censoring is a bite-sized version of all the suffering and pain, the ‘blood and gore’. Sights and sounds are packaged precisely in order to little arouse (if at all) the primordial human instincts of compassion and empathy.

Despite the tragic experiences and setbacks suffered in the last few years, the same trend continues with total impunity. As the adage confirms, the only thing we learn from history is that we never learn from history. In the provinces of north-west Pakistan, the empire carries out drone strikes at will whilst the dead remain faceless and fade away as disputed statistics. In the war-torn Yemeni province of Saada, the situation is arguably far more desperate.

During the last two months, the intensity of battle has taken a turn for the worst. With the advent of direct Saudi and US involvement in the war against Houthi ‘rebels’, the battlefront has seen relentless bombardment day after day. Still however, imagery out of Saada has been limited to rising smoke plumes from lifeless hills in a jagged terrain. Obvious questions arise on the intent of filters and newscasts by airing such images, which I leave to the reader.

Images of innocent children forcibly robbed of life are missing altogether in this de-sensitized version of war; the screams and squeals of the wounded, the sorrow-filled faces and abjectness of widows and orphans do not feature in this war. By associating lifeless images of bombed hills with the deadly loads of F-16s, our perceptions are not only conditioned but ultimately, it is our natural reaction to the deep agony and torment suffered by fellow humans that is curtailed. Newscasts and orchestrators of PR campaigns establish — albeit implicitly, through their coverage — that in the case of the ravaging war in Saada, the Saudi-Yemeni-US military alliance is only ‘wiping out’ rogue rebels whilst innocents remain untouched by the blind killing and destruction.

Similarly, at the propaganda level the Houthis have been variously branded as clients of Iran,¹ and more recently as noted by Jane Novak who is a long-time analyst and expert on Yemeni affairs, airstrikes on Al Qaeda are being conflated with strikes on Houthis to give a veneer of legitimacy to the ongoing bloodshed.² Whatever asymmetry that exists in the military firepower of the two sides is simply being carried forward and multiplied on the media battlefield.

Whilst the tools available for media and communication have greatly evolved, such a spectre of media warfare is neither arbitrarily unique nor modern at its heart. It is rather, merely another chapter in the age-old standoff between power and truth.

According to the Islamic tradition, our sense of duty towards the Divine firmly interlocks with securing the rights of the vulnerable and downtrodden. Silence in the face of oppression is akin to partaking in oppression. Human beings are thus individually and collectively established by faith as ‘monitors of power’; whenever power transgresses its natural confines as a tool to establish justice, it becomes incumbent for a Muslim to make a stand. Such sentiments are shared in one way or another by, dare I say, the majority of humanity.

For those who reject to live subject to the rule of whips and lashes, there is thus a need to wake up and make a dignified stand against the constant drive (by those in power) to immune us all from the agonies of our fellows as a matter of norm; carried out all the while, under the rubric of grand slogans in service of the meagre interests of a tiny elite.

1. ‘Emperors of Silent Wars,’ Dissident Voice, 14 December 2009.
2. ‘Airstrike Blowback,’ Armies of Liberation, 23 December 2009

As soon as the greatest military force in history stepped foot on Arabia – adamant to grab the will of Providence by the collar – flashpoints began to spark up left, right and centre. The scars and pains of millions were not to distract the emblem of freedom from its historic mission.

That is one chunk of the story.

The other begins with the view that it would be far too simplistic to presume that the actions of the global superpower triggered no hubris on the part of its regional clients and hirelings. It would be useful to recall after all, that the birth-pangs of a New Middle East were only proclaimed (albeit incredibly prematurely on hindsight) when the supreme client rained death over southern Lebanon.

Not only did the regional axis of moderate Arab clients – alternatively referred to as the Arab Center – have a part to play, but an incredibly important one too; especially after the realisation in the first, belated instance of sanity, that one required much more than state-of-the-art weaponry to effect any sort of ‘real’ change. Thenceforth, the geopolitical struggle for the Middle East has largely been re-packaged into a sectarian one, with regional moderates representing the “Sunni” bastion and the axis of evil led by “Shi’ite” Iran.

For the Arab Center, this constituted a high point as far as its relevance and stature are concerned on the Middle Eastern chessboard. As with all big lies,¹ the sectarian deception had its fair share of “success” stories, but the masses were never going to be fooled by it forever. It was only a matter of time before there were cries of, ‘enough, no more!’

In Lebanon, Sunnis and Shi’ites converged on downtown Beirut and offered their Friday prayers together in a show of indissoluble unity; an act of faith itself. The pillars of deception began to crumble and with it went the fading chances of “success”. But blind, morally corrupt rulers know no markers.

And so we witness the march of the Saudi monarchy into the ravaged Saada province in its attempts to renew once more, the sectarian myth.

Political commentary and media reporting is awash with talks of rebel “Shi’ite” Houthis – funded by Iran – warring against “Sunni” Yemen and Saudi Arabia. As evidenced by recent experience, very little needs to be done in the way of PR to draw the media to proffer the language of the elite.

An elementary ingredient of any successful war effort has to do with garnering support for your cause at the expense of adversaries. At another level, it is essential to draw a veil of silence on the crimes you commit in war in order to maintain that elusive saintly halo, whilst applying the reverse yardstick for adversaries. One can safely state that at both levels, the western media has been more than happy to oblige to the narrative of the Saudi monarchy.

Keeping aside news rooms, and trailing the buck to the top; the foremost accomplice to America’s imperial project, Britain, has been at the heart of the agenda to reinvent the sectarian card.

Take for instance, the words of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. David Miliband to the House of Commons on November 26, when he stated: “we have seen no evidence of external interference,”² and place these against the omniscient declarations of Mr. Ivan Lewis, Minister of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, in an interview to the Al-Arabiya Satellite Channel only two days earlier:

Of course (sic), there is a proxy war going on there [in Yemen]. There is no doubt (sic) there is Iranian interference, the size of which we are not yet aware of, and we do not know whether it is direct Iranian interference. However, it is clear that Iran nourishes and encourages rebels and terrorists, which is unacceptable.³

At a time when the Iraq Inquiry is ongoing, you might dare hope it would imprint some humility on a deceptive, mendacious political culture that has, and continues to, cost the lives of thousands. Nay; all vain dreams! Further, the level of disinterest across Western capitals to even consider the possibility of Saudi violations in Saada is truly shocking; less so perhaps, if one takes into account the overall context of a political climate that is geared to criminalize, ipso facto, only one state in the region.

Saudi government-funded media outlets on their part speak of an apocalyptic Iranian, Shi’ite takeover of the Arab heartland in an orchestrated media war which aims to “[paint] Iran as the troublemaker of the Middle East, a major threat to regional stability, and an agent of chaos in many Arab countries, including Iraq and Yemen.”⁴

Decades of political and economic marginalization have conveniently travelled down an Orwellian memory hole; instead, the cause of Yemeni Zaydis has been reduced to a ‘Saudi vs. Iran’ proxy war.

Away from the Saudi newspeak, the reality on the ground in Saada is heart-breaking.⁵ “Of the 3,000 under fives targeted by a recent screening in the camp”, IRIN reports “667 cases (22 percent) were severely malnourished.” According to the UNHCR, existing shelter and aid resources are being strained after the IDP population in the main Al Mazrak 1 camp more than doubled over the last month.

Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia not only persists with its blind targeting of innocent civilians, but also continues to deport displaced refugees fleeing from the fighting. As of 19 November, the number of deportations was estimated at 1,040.⁶

With the emergence of more unified motivations for justice amongst the global masses, and conversely, an intensification of injustice and arrogance amongst power elites, the muted response of ‘dissident culture’ to the carnage in Saada should evoke great concern. Adopting a paradigm of ‘selective solidarity’ risks exposing fundamental contradictions within antiwar movements, and inherently diminishes the efficacy of the wider movement on its more vocal and identifiable causes owing to the cross-relatedness of the various flashpoints in the Middle East.

Additionally, as pointed to above, the political elites in Western capitals equally resort to propaganda and untruths in order to re-package happenings on the ground in Saada as elsewhere across the Middle East. Keeping aside notions of selective impunity on usage of propaganda and lies, these propaganda campaigns are employed to fit into grander narratives. In this case, the renewal of the sectarian myth and the demonization of Iran, and all that these entail.

For the above reasons, and for the simple truth of the grave human suffering in Saada, we’ve got to move.

1. “The Myth of Sectarianism in the New Middle East,” Global Research, 27 April 2009.
2. See: House of Commons Daily Debates, 26 November 2009.
3. “Demonstrations in Sanaa demand expulsion of Iranian Ambassador,” Al Arabiya News Channel, 25 November 2009.
4. “The hidden war,” Al Ahram Weekly, 5-11 November Issue.
5. “Saada Under Siege,” CounterPunch, 23 October 2009.
6. See: Yemen Humanitarian Update, OCHA, 19 November 2009.

At a time in which the Middle East is facing critical challenges, there surely should be no room for public charades, yet, the recently concluded summit in Doha proved to be little different from the usual – albeit with a few exceptions. The text of the final communiqué, just as those of years past, did little except pay the usual lip-service and plastered even more sugar-coating over the deep rifts between Arab leaders.

By all accounts, the Middle East is currently undergoing dramatic change. Pre-existing contours in its geostrategic and socio-political environment are also experiencing rapid alteration. Whether these changes will amplify as to require the reshaping of political structures in this largely autocratic neighbourhood remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the Arab people have begun to realize an important tool in their sluggish and hurdle-ridden course for rights: namely, a “voice” that resonates with the majority of its peoples, and which commensurately impresses a readiness, on their part, to shape their own destinies. While it is easy to get ahead of ourselves, bearing in mind that such words were on many lips in the Fifties of the last century, there is no question that the present levels of movement on the Arab street have been most promising, by far, in recent decades.

In this respect, analyzing the postures taken by traditional strongholds of regional power provide a good indication of these underlying shifts, and show how the ‘old guard’ plans to go about reacting to these changes. The notable absence of Egyptian premier, Hosni Mubarak, from the recently concluded Arab League Summit in Doha was thus more revealing perhaps than his presence would have drawn attention to.

First, relations between Qatar, host of the Doha Summit, and Egypt have soured over recent months owing largely to the growing stature of Qatar as a pragmatic and effective mediator of regional crises as was observed by an independent Middle East commentator: “Hosni Mubarak of Egypt chose not to attend the summit altogether … His reasons were juvenile and partially borne out of jealousy for Qatar upstaging Egypt’s traditional role as powerbroker in the Arab world and mediator of its internal disputes”.¹ Furthermore, the brewing differences have not been purely due to the stepped up role of Qatar, but also borne out of disgust for the results from its’ mediation. Particularly in the case of Lebanon, where the Hizbullah-led opposition obtained a veto-power in the Lebanese cabinet as part of a reconciliation deal struck in Doha.

As a result of such outcomes, Qatar has been blamed for proximity to Iran by the likes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The snubbing of Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the Qatari Emir, from the recent four-way mini summit held in Riyadh, apparently upon strong Egyptian insistence,² was thus not a surprise.

Second, the coming together of Arab dignitaries in Doha for the Arab League summit came merely months after the brutal war on Gaza during which, the Qatari Emir called on an emergency summit. Not surprisingly, that summit was also boycotted by Egypt and Saudi Arabia among other US “allies” in the region. In response and in variance from the norm, Qatari-based television station, Al-Jazeera, reflected the anger of the Arab street against a fellow Arab-nation by reserving special criticism for Egypt’s role in the war on Gaza.

At a time when the world was up in arms, from South America to Europe, against Israeli brutality in the besieged Gaza strip, Egyptian silence and collusion in aggravating the humanitarian crisis by shutting off its borders, led to an inevitable collision course with the Arab masses. On its part, state-run Al-Jazeera intensified its criticism of the Egyptian stance, even more so, after Mubarak’s snub of the emergency Doha summit. With grievances against Egypt’s perceived treachery still fresh in memories, and the touchy Gaza case still on the agenda, Mubarak chose to avoid the summit altogether, and gave the hard shoulder to Qatar and regional critics who would have undoubtedly placed the Egyptian president in a somewhat difficult position.

Third, Mubarak’s absence from the Doha summit was in as much a show of disgust against Qatar, as it was a declaration of defiance to the Arab world. Egypt views the handling of its end of the Palestinian question as a strictly ‘no-go’ area. In a statement read out on behalf of the president, head of the Egyptian delegation Mofeed Shehab declared: “Egypt has respect for all Arab states, big and small … but none should attack it [Egypt] … nor should its role be subject to attack”.

It is important to highlight here an interesting relation between the declared messages of states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia regarding the Arab Initiative, and their concrete actions on the other hand. The Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance has been reading from the same script, without fail, for the last few months: a script that centres around the Arab Initiative, and its efficacy, above all other mediums, in achieving Arab-Israeli peace. Although much has been made of the initiative by the so-called “moderate” alliance, the explicit statements made by Mofeed Shehab clearly indicate that a collective Arab position — resulting from any dialogue or exchange of ideas — on the mood, approach and players involved in best putting the Arab Initiative into action, remains firmly out of bounds. All these variables appear to have been fixed; undoubtedly by the Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance and its masters.

Egypt further cemented its prejudiced interference in the Palestinian question (which should again not be subject to question) when it excluded the victims of Israeli brutality in Gaza from the Sharm El-Sheikh reconstruction conference. A writer in an Arab daily captured the farce of the conference by noting: “had it not been for a few side comments, you would have thought that Gaza had been struck down by a natural disaster”.

The Arab Initiative thus acts as useful leverage for the Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance to exclude non-partisans from the scene. At another level, the initiative acts a smokescreen to deal with regional “threats” and to settle scores while impunity is assured (even from any regional reprimand). This was most noticeable in the attempt to wipe out Hamas from the Palestinian equation during the recent war on Gaza, and also in the Summer of 2006 when the Saudis labelled Hizbullah’s operation as an “act of madness” whilst bombs rained on Lebanon.

Fourth, the simmering discontent on the Egyptian streets due to both internal and external factors, and the growing realization that the nation’s internal fate is intrinsically tied to its regional role, has led to renewed impetus to revise long-standing truisms in Egypt’s foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis Israel, amongst the public.³ The dictatorial ruling elite in Egypt on their part, have long identified the strong cross-relations between the rise of Hamas in the Gaza strip, and the amplification of the domestic threat posed by disconcerted masses. Wilful Egyptian collusion to the slaughter of Gaza therefore, did not raise many eyebrows on the streets of Cairo, for the masses are well aware of the price that needs to be paid to keep in place the vestiges of Mubarak’s power.

In a recent piece that appeared in the Badeel newspaper, the shocking levels of dilapidation in Egyptian society are exposed.⁴ Forty-four percent (44%) of the population find themselves below the poverty line with earnings of less than a dollar a day. Unemployment figures have soared to twenty-nine percent (29%) and the level of illiteracy presently stands at twenty-six percent (26%). The degradation in healthcare conditions and the prevalence of social ills have moved Egyptian society perilously close to the edge.

All these would seem unrelated without regard for a simple fact. Egypt has been the second largest beneficiary of US foreign aid since 1979 i.e. the year of the signing of the Camp David Accords. Since then, US foreign aid to Egypt has averaged about USD $2 billion annually in military and economic aid. To find the second largest beneficiary of US aid faced by such systemic squalor, even after three decades in power, says a great deal about the tick boxes that qualify one for being a recipient of US monies.

Fifth, as has become customary over recent months, no summit that includes any of Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Egypt is complete without a prescribed amount of Iranian-bashing. The head of the Egyptian delegation began his address in the name of the president by issuing a stark warning to “non-Arabs” who “feed differences [sic]” between Arab nations. If there ever was a more obvious target for an implicit warning, this one would surely rank close to the top. Of course, the president of Egypt had by this time had conveniently forgotten about his treachery against fellow Palestinian Arabs mere weeks earlier.

Hurling accusations at Iran is not without purpose. It has become a convenient deflector of attention from the evident failures of the Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance in forming any real, objective vision of a self-sufficient and sovereign Arabia. Additionally, the alliance hopes, through this deflection, to shift the Arabs’ principle adversary from Tel Aviv to Tehran.

Hosni Mubarak and his fellow comrades in Riyadh and Amman have tied the destinies of the Arab world to the feet of their thrones. The, now apparent, odium of the Egyptian premier for the Qatari Emir is not purely a personal issue, but is rather indicative of a strategic and fundamental schism that stands irreconcilable for the foreseeable future. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt find themselves in a precarious situation: they cannot disembark off the US ship (by extension Israeli) on which they have sailed for so long — suffice it to say, one that happens to be sailing over incredibly rough waters. As evidenced by the statistics, these leaders stand polarised and deeply unpopular in their own nations, reigning only by virtue of US military life support.

Looking to formulate a different approach in confronting the critical challenges that face the Arab world is totally unacceptable from the standpoint of the Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance. Yet, this alternate strategy, which is so feared and conspired against within the palaces of Riyadh and Cairo, was once again emphasised and succinctly captured by the Syrian president in his address to Arab dignitaries in Doha:

“The comprehensive change taking place now is similar, to a large extent, to the process of reshaping the world which happened towards the middle of last century, when we begged others for rights which were originally ours. We handed them those rights so that they return them to us.

They ignored us then and still ignore us now. Since we try not to make the same mistakes again, we need to realize that the world respects only those who respect themselves, does not concede a position except to those who take their positions with their own efforts, and does not return a right except to those who work hard for returning their rights, hold on to them, defend them and fight for them.

Only when we do that it means that we are at the beginning of the right road towards the future.”⁵

The Arab street has had enough of false promises and drawn out hopes. The realization that for one to be treated with respect and dignity by the world’s powers, one ought to first affirm their own dignity and practise self-respect, will inevitably put the Arab masses at odds with autocratic rulers who have forced them to internalize their indigence.

And so, the agitated masses will watch on with disgust as these public charades (termed as summits) carry on with their usual routines, hoping like never before for the curtain to fall.

1. ‘Arab League’s “Reconciliation” Summit A Bust’, Dissident Voice, April 4th 2009.
2. ‘Egypt’s president skips Arab League summit in Doha’, Gulf News, March 28th 2009.
3. ‘Egypt’s opposition wants Camp David shelved’, Daily Star, March 31st 2009.
4. ‘Exposing the President’s account’, Badeel, 1st April 2009.
5. ‘President Bashar al-Assad addresses the 21st Arab Summit in Doha’, Syrian Arab News Agency, March 30th 2009.

Despite being trailed closely by the starkest drift to the right in Israeli politics, the election of President Obama by American voters on the declared pledge of “change” has indeed led to a changed mood of diplomacy. The recent four-way ‘mini-summit’ concluded in Riyadh involving the heads of state of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and Kuwait, and an earlier visit by John Kerry to Syria, following which, he discussed the possibility of “loosening certain sanctions” on Syria “in exchange for verifiable changes in behaviour,”¹ are supposedly indicative of this new wave of diplomacy.

Given this milieu of unprecedented regional diplomacy, it is easy to be deluded into thinking that the much awaited departure of former US president Bush has not only invigorated a new dynamism into diplomatic forays, but has also changed the political set of cards in play. In this respect, an immediate threat that faces the global peace movement is precisely this self-consoling expectation of dramatic change that would at once signal an end to all the precedents set by the previous Bush administration.

If history is anything to go by, then promises of change should be viewed with a measure of suspicion. When these promises emanate from an edifice of empire, a level of mistrust given age-old historical experience to the contrary is justified.² Yet, the global peace movement and wider grassroots activist circles were never informed by the subjectivity of suspicion when they rose against the failed policies of Bush and his cohorts, rather, their principled stands for justice were driven by a pursuit and appreciation of reality. It is therefore necessary to objectively analyse the conditions surrounding the “New Middle East” experiment that was openly declared in 2006, and contrast its basic frameworks against the early moves of the Obama administration.

In the summer of 1996, an Israeli thinktank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, issued a paper entitled: ‘A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’.³ Contained in it was not only the blueprint for the invasion and overthrow of the Saddam regime but also a more comprehensive strategy of “redrawing the map of the Middle East”. Amongst the “prominent opinion makers” who contributed to the paper were the usual hawkish neo-cons and pro-Zionism advocates in the US: Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, James Colbert, David and Meyrav Wurmser, the latter of whom was a co-founder of the MEMRI project. More significantly, there remain three markedly relevant features in the substance of the so-called ‘clean break’ strategy that have the potential to decisively influence the shaping of the current Middle East.

Firstly, the ‘clean break’ strategy was specifically formulated for implementation by the Netanyahu-led Likud government, which has now been elected by the Israeli electorate. Its major premise of throwing aside the “land for peace” track for a romantically phrased “peace for peace” paradigm effectively dovetails with Netanyahu’s vision for how ‘peace’ is to be achieved in the Occupied Territories, with Syria and the wider Arab world.

Secondly, the paper places central importance on the role and strategic position of Syria. In it, its destabilization is suggested with the aim of undoing the nation’s perceived role as a lynchpin in this connected chain of “dangerous threats” in the region stretching from Iran to Southern Lebanon. Particular detail is given to this factor so much so that the paper moves from offering a geostrategic appraisal to providing a surmised methodological framework on how to destabilize and/or overthrow nations; suggesting an assortment of military direct/indirect strikes, using anti-Syrian proxies (both politically and militarily), embarking on a regional strategy to effectively ostracize the country, and finally launching a massive PR campaign that would demonize Syria and would thereby “remind the world of the nature of the Syrian regime”. As peace activists, it is worth storing the above points in our deeper recesses because in addition to being expressly illegal according to norms of international law — not that we are under any delusions about whether or not the neo-cons respect any law — they also outline the general methods that are employed by empires in dealing with adversaries.

Finally, the role and efficacy of regional neighbours that are allied with the US, in fostering the right conditions and pretexts for implementing this new strategy is to remain paramount in achieving the desired results. These regional players can play a significant aiding role in shaping the “strategic environment” by “weakening, containing, and even rolling back” the threats posed by the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah alliance.

Deconstructing the “New Middle East”

George W. Bush’s failed promise of a “global democratic revolution” following the “watershed event” of the “establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East”
⁴ did not only fail miserably, but instead led to several inescapable eventualities that remain a symbol of this grand strategy. Firstly, the politicization of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program in order to exert pressure on Iran and to contain its’ perceived threat to the stability of the region (read: desired geopolitical order). Secondly, the salience of sectarian and ethnic divisions on the Middle Eastern socio-political landscape. Thirdly, the formation of a so-called ‘Moderate-bloc’ of nations constituting regional players that act as a front against the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah alliance. Finally, the declaration of a “New Middle East” created an almost mythical worldview in the Israeli mindset, whether by design or accident, which believed that the Arab-Israeli question could not only be settled on unilateral terms but also decisively, once and for all, with sheer Herculean force. On all four accounts, the Obama administration has yet to hint at any significant “change” that requires the altering of these yardsticks which remain symbolic of the “New Middle East” agenda.

In spite of the deep economic crisis that has gripped world capitals, the historical ‘prerogatives’ (i. Natural resources, ii. Security of the state Israel, iii. Preservation of a certain regional geopolitical order which thereby realizes a significant chapter in wider US preponderance in the Eurasian space) held by the US for securing the strategic Middle East region remain firmly in place. The Middle East will thus remain a focal point of Obama’s foreign policy efforts. A recent talk by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a top foreign policy advisor to Obama, provides a keyhole premonition of the continuity of an age-old policy of confrontation and threat of military force against Iran.⁵ Writing for the Asia Times, Pepe Escobar disclosed this new US position, contained in a letter to Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, as follows: “if you help us get rid of non-existent Iranian nuclear weapons, we’ll get rid of our missile shield”.⁶

The verbose politics of “clenched fists”⁷ should not leave the peace movement under any illusions about the nature of things to come, just as much as new Secretary of State Ms. Clinton is under no illusions about the next steps on the empire’s to-do list: “We’re under no illusions. Our eyes are wide open on Iran.”⁸

Heightened sectarian saliency in Middle Eastern politics cannot be viewed independently from a strategy of isolating Iran from regional politics. Selling anti-Iranian rhetoric to Arab kingdoms necessarily determines the nature of discourse toward the sizeable and strategically positioned Shia populations across the Persian Gulf rim. When Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak pronounced in April of 2006 that “Shias are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries in which they live”, it was by no means a slip of the tongue but rather a well calculated move that even lead one of the ‘clean break’ strategy’s “prominent opinion makers” to label Shias in the Persian Gulf as “Iran’s Levant clients”.⁹

It is altogether not surprising on the back of this grand regional strategy, for the tiny emirate kingdom of Bahrain to accelerate a process of ‘demographic engineering’ by providing citizenship to extremist anti-Shia hotheads from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, to undercut its majority Shia population.¹⁰ Although the systematic marginalization of Shias reflects a deep-rooted policy of the Bahraini Al-Khalifa monarchy, nevertheless, one can neither ignore current justifications for this suppression on rationales of the “New Middle East” agenda, nor intentional American indifference to grave human rights violations which take place in a nation that hosts the central base for the Naval Command’s Fifth Fleet.

In the aftermath of recent clashes in Saudi Arabia, in which three Shia Saudi citizens were killed in the close precincts of the second-holiest site in Islam, a prominent Shia leader latched on to the occasion to highlight the deep-seated discrimination and marginalization of Shias. He also issued a resolute warning to the establishment by declaring in no uncertain terms that the “dignity” of the Shia population “is greater in worth than the unity” of the Kingdom.¹¹ Mai Yamani, a Saudi national and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, whilst writing about these clashes notes that the suppression of Shias constitutes “part of the Kingdom’s strategy to counter Iran’s bid for regional hegemony”.¹²

With respect to rising political sectarianism, the policy of the Obama administration has thus far been virtually identical in both respects, namely; in its sustenance of a political agenda that leads to heightened sectarian tensions on the one hand, and its deliberate disregard of sectarian-motivated agendas by regional ‘allies’ on the other, which effectively cement these divisions.

Late last December, Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal charted out his ‘path to peace’ for the Middle East in an op-ed piece in the Washington Post.¹³ The central concerns outlined in his vision for peace are not only symptomatic of those shared by the wider so-called ‘Moderate-bloc’ of Arab nations, but they in fact also provide a good indication of the changing tides in the Persian Gulf that have been the cause of much unsettling for the likes of Saudi Arabia. In particular, these concerns revolve around two core headings: i) the future of the Arab Initiative, and ii) the growing influence of Iran.

Viewed from another angle, the apparent urgent emphasis provided to the Arab Initiative and the closing window of ‘opportunity’ for its implementation, reveals an interesting reality that reflects the successes achieved by the path of Resistance; a path that evidently stands starkly at odds with the gifted job-roles given to the so-called ‘Moderates’ in the region. The highly agitated Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance views a resistance that has forced concessions upon a hereunto invincible Israeli adversary as a major threat to their own thrones. These realities are not hidden from the Arab street, and the growing grassroots support for Hizbullah and Hamas are a testament of this shift.

The second concern i.e., the growing influence of Iran or what Prince Turki Al-Faisal conveniently terms ‘Iranian obstructionism’, bears many commonalities with the first but transcends it in one vital respect: Iran symbolizes the possibility of the success of the ‘alternate path’. In the Arab consciousness, Iran provides a successful paradigm of a state that is self-dependent and stands up to imperialism in spite of long years of imposed wars and backbreaking sanctions. The findings in last year’s poll carried out by the University of Maryland and Zogby International hardly come as a surprise in this regard.
¹⁴ Additionally, Iran has not been shy to recognize the path of resistance and in showing its’ unreserved support for it, whereas the standard position of the so-called ‘Moderate-bloc’ of Arab nations has been to undermine the path of resistance. This factor has also played a major contributory role in developing a positive view of Iran on the Arab street.

On the basis of this outlook, the geostrategic importance of Syria as a nation that stands by the side of the resistance, as well as an Arab state that positions itself outside of the so-called ‘Moderate-bloc’ and its chosen political agenda, becomes not only apparent but very significant. When President Bashar Al-Assad announced in the Doha Summit (during the height of the brutal war on Gaza) that the Arab Initiative was “dead” and all that remained was to “transfer the registry of this Initiative from the registry of the living to that of the dead”,¹⁵ it left the likes of Saudi Arabia shuffling their cards as they weighed their next options.

In very crude terms, the death of the Arab Initiative would at once spell the exclusion of the Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance from the Middle Eastern chessboard or at least mark their modest insignificance. The recent overtures made to Syria by the US and the Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance thus need to be viewed against this context. From the standpoint of the US and its Arab allies, the popular ‘public anarchy’ on the Arab street — in support of resistance movements — can no longer be contained except by fragmenting the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah alliance, even if this were to require swallowing bitter pills.

The victory of the Netanyahu-Liebermann coalition in Israel presents an immense challenge to the Arab coalition’s attempts to effectively sell this façade of a viable ‘peace track’ to Syria and to the Arab world in general. Even by the shoddy standards of truth that we have become accustomed to in our times, the sudden metamorphosis of a racist-bigot like Liebermann, whose comments about the ‘transfer’ of Arabs are not concealed from the Arab world,¹⁶ into a ‘kingmaker’ for a track of peace comes across as simply ridiculous. In this respect, one of the salient but less spoken about roles that is presently being played out by the Saudi-Jordanian-Egyptian alliance, is its transformation into a mouthpiece replacement for Israeli silence.

Nevertheless, it is important to underline the mounting support within Israel for engaging in Syrian peace talks as evinced by the recent advice offered to Netanyahu by a panel consisting of “prominent figures who formerly served in key posts in the defense establishment, government and the business community”.¹⁷ Writing in a Ha’aretz op-ed, diplomatic editor Aluf Benn emphasised the need for Netanyahu’s government to accede to the track of the Arab initiative — a stance that is antithetical to the classical Likud position — by noting:

“Netanyahu can go further than previous prime ministers and announce that the Arab initiative is an unprecedented opportunity for closing ranks against the threat of Iran and the extremists in the region…”¹⁸

At any rate, selling an image of Israel as the sincere peacemaker at times and expansionist war-monger on others does little to straighten out any ‘path to peace’. On March 2nd 2009, the Israeli advocacy group Peace Now released a report saying that the Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing had plans to build 73,302 housing units in the Occupied West Bank — of which 15,000 units have already been approved. The report noted that if all the plans are realized “the number of settlers in the Territories will be doubled”.¹⁹ In a confidential EU report leaked to the Guardian, Israel was noted to be “actively pursuing the illegal annexation” of East Jerusalem with present settlements expansion progressing at a “rapid pace”.²⁰ In the face of these terminal threats to the two-state solution, the Obama administration has responded with a timid and pathetic characterisation of Israel’s actions as “unhelpful”.²¹

The Challenges Ahead

Whether this geopolitical tug of war to redraw the battle lines in the sands of the Middle East will end up in the favour of the US, Israel and their Arab allies is yet to be seen. Recent comments by Syrian top officials indicate that Damascus is not about to be moved by mere words and promises of change.

Foreign Minister Walid Moallem underlined that Damascus would not accept any less than a complete return to the 1967 borders and respect for the natural rights of Palestine: “Syria would be willing to renew only indirect talks, on two conditions: Israel’s commitment to withdraw to the 1967 borders, as well as its commitment that the Syrian channel will not be used to harm the Palestinians.”²² Muhsin Bilal, the Syrian Information Minister, was less reserved with his choice of words when he declared that the victories exacted by the Lebanese and Palestinian resistances against the “Zionist” entity had botched the “New Middle East” agenda.²³

Regional developments such as the growing mediating role of a pragmatic Qatar and increasing Turkish buoyancy, have also worked in the favour of the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah alliance by somewhat distorting the traditional ‘power blocs’. In addition to these regional changes, a sense of Syrian ‘realism’ in dealing with a ‘defeated’ Israel, augmented by the natural dynamism and unequal grassroots support for Iran and resistance movements in the region, present a formidable and hitherto undefeated opponent.

To peace activists, the success or failure of this political squabbling is insignificant when placed against the grave human price that is almost certain to result from the pursuit of such a political agenda. For Western politicians who still value rational strategic planning; the analysis of ‘facts’ — and not engineered ‘truths’ — and their synthesis in forming a balanced perspective of reality, the inescapable calamities that would be the necessary resultant of adopting this aggressive, confrontational political agenda cannot be overlooked.

At this juncture, it is important to highlight a common fallacy that is epidemic in the Western media and unfortunately, one that has also trickled into the discourse of certain sections of the peace movement. Neo-con and pro-Zionist voices were quick to highlight that any sort of engagement with the likes of Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas (collectively homogenized as radical ‘Islamists’) poses a high-risk to the ‘civilized world’. These radical Islamists, we were told, can simply not be engaged with; talks with Iran would run parallel to the building of the ‘bomb’, talks with Hizbullah would create a ‘state within a state’, engaging with Hamas would signal the exclusion of (the illegitimate) president Mahmoud Abbas.²⁴ Although the truth is far distant from these sensationally irrational spurts, unfortunately, the ‘radical Islamist’ tag has remained firmly embedded in building perspectives towards the likes of Hizbullah and Hamas within some quarters of the peace movement.

In addition to being a classical tactic to ‘otherize’ the enemy if a process to ‘dehumanize’ it fails, we should note that despite adhering to a different kind of politics, these entities are neither irrational political players nor is their existence qualified by a ‘culture of death’. For the sake of example, the Hizbullah resistance movement overlooks an extensive social programs network that is virtually unequalled throughout the entire Middle East. Its longstanding record of peaceful coexistence and a highly-advanced integration paradigm (infitah) within the public sphere of a multi-sectarian Lebanese topography are doubted by none. The same however, cannot be said of US-Saudi sponsored Salafist client groups in Lebanon for whom the tag ‘Islamist’ fits rather well.²⁵ All in all, resistance movements like Hizbullah and Hamas enjoy a great deal of popular support on the Arab streets. They have also shown a great degree of tolerance towards the West in spite of the long list of grievances that have resulted from negative Western interference in their countries. Here, it is highly beneficial to refer to a speech delivered by Nadine Rosa-Rosso at the ‘International Forum for Resistance, Anti-Imperialism, Solidarity between Peoples and Alternatives’ that was held earlier this year in Beirut.²⁶

In summary, the politicization of the Iranian nuclear programme and the recycling of pretexts by Israel to launch regional wars should not be viewed as haphazard aberrations, but rather as logical consequences of a grand regional geopolitical strategy. The “New Middle East” agenda is the infrastructure upon which an imperial superstructure of hegemony, sustained by the disregard of law and rule of brute force, is raised to control this region. Human rights activists and lawyers who advocate against the innumerable abuses that have occurred so far in this “War on Terror” cannot ignore this political agenda which is in fact the origin of all ills.

One cannot speak of dealing with the looming threat of military strikes against Iran without first dealing with the “New Middle East” agenda. Similarly, one cannot speak of a post-Bush era or lavishly mark “new beginnings” without first doing away with the lasting remnants of a policy that has brought on so much suffering to the region, and continues to leave it on a knife’s edge. Strangely, most would say criminally, the experiences of the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq appear to have done little to develop a more informed US foreign policy in its dealings with this region. If there is any special disgust within the global peace movement with respect to these failed wars, it lies in the fear that a repeat is as likely to occur.

With the proclaimed advent of a “new beginning” by the Obama administration, there is a pressing need for the peace movement to engage in a comprehensive study of the “New Middle East” agenda in its different aspects and dimensions. Our collective failure to critically examine this agenda on the one hand, and to circulate its underlying assumptions and necessary consequences to the Western public on the other, will inevitably expose the peace movement to accusations of adherence to an outdated, dogmatic discourse.

The “New Middle East” agenda is inherently confrontational and raises the spectre of war in the region. For as long as it remains on the table, the whole Middle East will teeter on the brink of unspeakable calamities.

1. ‘Kerry calls for easing US sanctions against Syria’, Boston Globe, March 5th 2009
2. ‘Generic Invader Nonsense – Obama on Iraq’, Media Lens, March 5th 2009
3. ‘A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, June 1996
4. ‘Bush demands Mid-East democracy’, BBC News, November 6th 2003
5. ‘US-Russian partnership will end shield row’, Press TV, March 16th 2009
6. ‘The Obama-Medvedev Turbo Shuffle’, Asia Times Online, March 5th 2009
7. ‘From ‘axis of evil’ to ‘clenched fist’’, Asia Times Online, February 28th 2009
8. ‘Hillary Clinton offers handshake of friendship to Syria’, The Times, March 3rd 2009
9. ‘The Iran-Hamas Alliance’, Hudson Institute, October 4th 2007
10. ‘Bahraini rulers importing extremism’, Press TV, February 15th 2009
11. ‘Thank Sheikh al-Nimr instead of imprisoning him’, Rasid News Service, March 17th 2009
12. ‘Saudi Arabia’s Shias Stand Up’, Project Syndicate, March 2009
13. ‘Peace for the Middle East’, Washington Post, December 26th 2008
14. ‘Nasrallah most admired Arab leader’, Press TV, April 17th 2008
15. ‘President al-Assad at Gaza Summit: Gaza Destiny is ours, Arab Peace Initiative Dead, Standing by our People and Resistance in Gaza with all Available Means’, Syrian Arab News Agency, January 18th 2009
16. ‘Liebermann, Avigdor – Israeli politician and deputy prime minister’, Electronic Intifada
17. ‘Netanyahu advisors tell him to push ahead with Syria track’, Ha’aretz, March 16th 2009
18. ‘A way out for Netanyahu’, Ha’aretz
19. ‘The Ministry of Construction and Housing is planning to construct at least 73,300 housing units in the West Bank’, Peace Now, 3rd March 2009
20. ‘Israel annexing East Jerusalem’, says EU, Guardian, 7th March 2009
21. ‘Criminal Unhelpfulness’, Agence Global, 18th March 2009
22. ‘Syrian FM: Still at war with Israel’, Ynet News, 22nd March 2009
23. ‘Bilal: Arab solidarity in confronting challenges’, Syrian Arab News Agency, 18th March 2009
24. ‘What do the financial crisis and US Middle East policy have in common?’, Jerusalem Post, 6th December 2008
25. ‘The Redirection’, The New Yorker, 5th March 2007
26. ‘The Left And Support For Anti-Imperialist Islamist Resistance’, Counter Currents, 11th February 2009

In order to come to terms with the motives for the recent clashes in Medina, it is crucial to highlight the ongoing geopolitical shifts in the wider region. The Middle East today stands at a unique crossroads; its peoples are witnessing the displacement of age-old power structures that have been the symbol of this region for decades. Naturally, the ‘old-guard’ is pitted against the forces of change, with dear life stuck between their teeth. As loyal and attentive students of history will no doubt attest to, power holds an incredible capacity to corrupt. An even more real but no less frightening concomitant of power lies in its longing for eternalness.

The distressing events in Medina over the last few days are not sectarian clashes, yet the principle motive of its agitators is to utilize these events to heighten regional sectarian tensions. Faced with a climate of growing Islamic solidarity and imperialist rejection, these provocateurs are placing their last hopes in heightened sectarianism to secure their loosening-grip on power. The process of awakening amongst the Arab masses throughout the Middle East is alarming the oil-sheikhdoms, and at their helm the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh and Cairo once stood tall as the nerve centres of the Middle East from where regional agendas, carefully calibrated in line with US imperialist interests, were set. Times have changed. Today, the simmering revolution in Egypt is being restrained thanks only to the firing guns of an ailing Mubarak. Saudi Arabia, which proudly lauded itself as the counter-balance to Iran can no longer maintain a steady footing and finds itself replaced by a far more pragmatic and conciliatory, Qatar. Arguably, the final nails in the coffins of these historical ‘powerhouses’ have also been hammered down by the growing role that is being played out by a Turkey that is increasingly turning eastward.

The House of Saud today faces a distinctive predicament. Over recent decades, the Saudi kingdom has single-handedly pumped millions upon millions of US dollars to fund the Wahhabi sect of Islam around the world. The Saudi monarchy, which came into power on the crest of Wahhabi fanaticism, resolved to export Wahhabi ideology from 1979 with the particular aim of countering the Shia, following the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Today, the godfathers of the Wahhabi and Salafist groups are haunted by the products of their very own making. Faced on the one hand with the return of their now matured brood and on the other by a resolutely passionate political agenda on the Arab street strongly against US imperialism in the region, the Saudi monarchy has chosen to kill both birds with the fire of sectarianism.

The impression of a wounded fox with no other weapon in hand except for its most primordial ability to fan the fires of sectarianism is thus the proper context against which these coordinated attacks by the Saudi army aided by the fanatical ‘moral police’ (the Mutawwa’ah) ought to be seen. From Nigeria to Pakistan, Saudi policy is operating with the single goal of obfuscating the ‘awakening’ of the Arab and Muslim populous through providing regional developments with sectarian overtones. Invented terminologies like the ‘Shia tide’ and the ‘Shia crescent’ are used in line with this agenda: an agenda to polarize the unifying Muslim ranks that stand against US imperialism in the Middle East into ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shia’ bastions.

Muslims around the world, especially those who are situated in the Middle East, should be cognizant of these underlying currents. They should not allow themselves to be utilized as instruments through which the waning power of client-states in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world is consolidated. In this regard, the primary onus falls upon Muslim leaders to refrain from pitching these clashes as ‘sectarian wars’.