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The
Iraq War and Contempt for Democracy
by
Noam Chomsky
Dissident
Voice
November 3, 2003
First
Published on ZNET
Establishment
critics of the war on Iraq restricted their comments regarding the attack to
the administration arguments they took to be seriously intended: disarmament,
deterrence, and links to terrorism.
They
scarcely made reference to liberation, democratization of the Middle East, and
other matters that would render irrelevant the weapons inspections and indeed
everything that took place at the Security Council or within governmental
domains.
The
reason, perhaps, is that they recognized that lofty rhetoric is the obligatory
accompaniment of virtually any resort to force and therefore carries no
information. The rhetoric is doubly hard to take seriously in the light of the
display of contempt for democracy that accompanied it, not to speak of the past
record and current practices.
Critics
are also aware that nothing has been heard from the present incumbents -- with
their alleged concern for Iraqi democracy -- to indicate that they have any
regrets for their previous support for Saddam Hussein (or others like him,
still continuing) nor have they shown any signs of contrition for having helped
him develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when he really was a serious
danger.
Nor
has the current leadership explained when, or why, they abandoned their 1991
view that "the best of all worlds" would be "an iron-fisted
Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein" that would rule as Saddam did but not
make the error of judgment in August 1990 that ruined Saddam's record.
At
the time, the incumbents' British allies were in the opposition and therefore
more free than the Thatcherites to speak out against Saddam's British-backed
crimes. Their names are noteworthy by their absence from the parliamentary
record of protests against these crimes, including Tony Blair, Jack Straw,
Geoff Hoon, and other leading figures of New Labour.
In
December 2002, Jack Straw, then foreign minister, released a dossier of
Saddam's crimes. It was drawn almost entirely from the period of firm US-UK
support, a fact overlooked with the usual display of moral integrity. The
timing and quality of the dossier raised many questions, but those aside, Straw
failed to provide an explanation for his very recent conversion to skepticism
about Saddam Hussein's good character and behavior.
When
Straw was home secretary in 2001, an Iraqi who fled to England after detention
and torture requested asylum. Straw denied his request. The Home Office
explained that Straw "is aware that Iraq, and in particular the Iraqi
security forces, would only convict and sentence a person in the courts with
the provision of proper jurisdiction," so that "you could expect to
receive a fair trial under an independent and properly constituted
judiciary."
Straw's
conversion must, then, have been rather similar to President Clinton's
discovery, sometime between September 8 and 11, 1999, that Indonesia had done
some unpleasant things in East Timor in the past twenty-five years when it
enjoyed decisive support from the US and Britain.
Attitudes
toward democracy were revealed with unusual clarity during the mobilization for
war in the fall of 2002, as it became necessary to deal somehow with the
overwhelming popular opposition.
Within
the "coalition of the willing," the US public was at least partially
controlled by the propaganda campaign unleashed in September. In Britain, the
population was split roughly fifty-fifty on the war, but the government
maintained the stance of "junior partner" it had accepted reluctantly
after World War II and had kept to even in the face of the contemptuous
dismissal of British concerns by US leaders at moments when the country's very
survival was at stake.
Outside
the two full members of the coalition, problems were more serious. In the two
major European countries, Germany and France, the official government stands
corresponded to the views of the large majority of their populations, which
unequivocally opposed the war. That led to bitter condemnation by Washington
and many commentators.
Donald
Rumsfeld dismissed the offending nations as just the "Old Europe," of
no concern because of their reluctance to toe Washington's line. The "New
Europe" is symbolized by Italy, whose prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi,
was visiting the White House. It was, evidently, unproblematic that public
opinion in Italy was overwhelmingly opposed to the war.
The
governments of Old and New Europe were distinguished by a simple criterion: a
government joined Old Europe in its iniquity if and only if it took the same
position as the vast majority of its population and refused to follow orders
from Washington.
Recall
that the self-appointed rulers of the world -- Bush, Powell, and the rest --
had declared forthrightly that they intended to carry out their war whether or
not the United Nations (UN) or anyone else "catches up" and
"becomes relevant." Old Europe, mired in irrelevance, did not catch
up. Neither did New Europe, at least if people are part of their countries.
Poll
results available from Gallup International, as well as local sources for most
of Europe, West and East, showed that support for a war carried out
"unilaterally by America and its allies" did not rise above 11
percent in any country. Support for a war if mandated by the UN ranged from 13
percent (Spain) to 51 percent (Netherlands).
Particularly
interesting are the eight countries whose leaders declared themselves to be the
New Europe, to much acclaim for their courage and integrity. Their declaration
took the form of a statement calling on the Security Council to ensure
"full compliance with its resolutions," without specifying the means.
Their
announcement threatened "to isolate the Germans and French," the
press reported triumphantly, though the positions of New and Old Europe were in
fact scarcely different. To ensure that Germany and France would be
"isolated," they were not invited to sign the bold pronouncement of
New Europe -- apparently for fear that they would do so, it was later quietly
indicated.
The
standard interpretation is that the exciting and promising New Europe stood
behind Washington, thus demonstrating that "many Europeans supported the
United States' view, even if France and Germany did not."
Who
were these "many Europeans"? Checking polls, we find that in New Europe,
opposition to "the United States' view" was for the most part even
higher than in France and Germany, particularly in Italy and Spain, which were
singled out for praise for their leadership of New Europe.
Happily
for Washington, former communist countries too joined New Europe. Within them,
support for the "United States' view," as defined by Powell --
namely, war by the "coalition of the willing" without UN
authorization -- ranged from 4 percent (Macedonia) to 11 percent (Romania).
Support
for a war even with a UN mandate was also very low. Latvia's former foreign
minister explained that we have to "salute and shout, 'Yes sir.' . . . We
have to please America no matter what the cost."
In
brief, in journals that regard democracy as a significant value, headlines
would have read that Old Europe in fact included the vast majority of
Europeans, East and West, while New Europe consisted of a few leaders who chose
to line up (ambiguously) with Washington, disregarding the overwhelming opinion
of their own populations.
But
actual reporting was mostly scattered and oblique, depicting opposition to the
war as a marketing problem for Washington.
Toward
the liberal end of the spectrum, Richard Holbrooke stressed the "very
important point [that] if you add up the population of [the eight countries of
the original New Europe], it was larger than the population of those countries
not signing the letter." True enough, though something is omitted: the populations
were overwhelmingly opposed to the war, mostly even more so than in those
countries dismissed as Old Europe.
At
the other extreme of the spectrum, the editors of the Wall Street Journal
applauded the statement of the eight original signers for "exposing as
fraudulent the conventional wisdom that France and Germany speak for all of
Europe, and that all of Europe is now anti-American."
The
eight honorable New European leaders showed that "the views of the
Continent's pro-American majority weren't being heard," apart from the
editorial pages of the Journal, now vindicated. The editors blasted the media
to their "left" -- a rather substantial segment -- which
"peddled as true" the ridiculous idea that France and Germany spoke
for Europe, when they were clearly a pitiful minority, and peddled these lies
"because they served the political purposes of those, both in Europe and
America, who oppose President Bush on Iraq."
This
conclusion does hold if we exclude Europeans from Europe, rejecting the radical
left doctrine that people have some kind of role in democratic societies.
Noam Chomsky is an internationally renowned Professor of Linguistics at MIT, and is
America's leading dissident intellectual. He is the author of many books
including Power and Terror (Seven Stories Press, 2003), 9-11
(Seven Stories Press, 2001), A New Generation Draws the Line (Verso,
2000), The New Military Humanism (Common Courage, 1999), and The
Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians (South
End Press, new edition 1999). His latest book is Hegemony or Survival:
America's Quest for Global Dominance, from which this commentary is
adapted. For more information on the book, published by Metropolitan Books, see
http://www.hegemonyorsurvival.net.
This essay first appeared on ZNET (www.zmag.org/weluser.htm)
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