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How
Do You Like Your Elections - Fixed and Murky?
by
Toni Solo
September
16, 2003
Like
it or not, computer technology will be used for most elections in some way or
other before too long. Already, even in impoverished countries like Nicaragua,
centralized electoral systems use computers to manage the counting process.
Brazil votes using computerised systems. In the United States, people worried
about electoral fraud are becoming more vocal - with good reason. The Help
America Vote Act (HAVA), passed in 2000, and the Omnibus Appropriations Bill,
approved by President Bush in October 2002, will force electoral authorities
throughout the US to adopt computerised voting systems by January 2006.
But
the record of the leading companies supplying computerised electoral systems in
the United States is questionable. Companies like Diebold, ES&S, and
Sequoia - who have over 80% of the market for automated voting systems in the
US - have all been criticised as a result of problems associated with their
machines. Apart from software and machinery malfunctions, computerised
databases of voters also cause problems. The Choicepoint data systems company
subsidiary DBT was responsible for incorrectly purging over 90,000 registered
voters from Florida electoral lists in the 2000 presidential elections. [1] Additionally, the use of modems leaves the way open for
data flowing through these systems to be tampered with by anyone with the
necessary hardware and know how.
Three
main points of view prevail on these issues. Proponents of computerised voting
systems argue the need to modernise so as to facilitate voting and draw more
people into the electoral process. Other advocates such as Public Citizen's
Congress Watch say of HAVA, "In many ways, the new law marks a significant
step forward in improving the conduct of elections in the United States. At the
same time, however, the compromise sacrificed some additional steps that should
have been taken to ensure that every vote counts and contains some of the
ballot security measures that are not useful to the democratic process." [2]
Critics
disagree strongly. Rebecca Mercuri, a computer science professor at Bryn Mawr
College in Pennsylvania has researched computerised voting for over a decade.
She asserts, "Fully electronic systems do not provide any way that the
voter can truly verify that the ballot cast corresponds to that being recorded,
transmitted, or tabulated. Any programmer can write code that displays one
thing on a screen, records something else, and prints yet another result. There
is no known way to ensure that this is not happening inside of a voting system."
[3] Mercuri and other critics point out that electronic
balloting systems without individual print-outs for examination by the voters,
do not provide an independent audit trail. They also question the lack of
certification to international computer security standards of electronic voting
systems. Another main concern with these systems is the shift of control away
from election officials to computer personnel.
Peter
G. Neumann of Risks Forum, who monitors problems with computer technology,
writes, "We have reported election problems in Software Engineering Notes
and RISKS for many years..... We note that punched-card systems are inherently
flaky, and that even optical scanning is problematic, but that direct-recording
electronic systems tend to be subject to serious potentials for fraud and
manipulation. Internet voting is a disaster waiting to happen in light of the
inadequate security of the Internet, personal computer systems, and subvertible
servers. Proposals to vote from automated teller machines are also problematic,
and basically undesirable." [4]
Proponents
of computerised voting systems - often owned by large transnational businesses
- argue that security is good and machines conform to government standards. For
example the ES&S company web site states,"ES&S products are tested
by an independent testing authority, certified to meet or exceed the standards
of the U.S. Federal Election Commission, and have been proven and validated
through use in thousands of actual elections worldwide." [5]
Peter Neumann responds to these assertions, "The Federal Election
Commission standards that are in general use appear to be those from the
1990s. The review process that was used
for the REVISED 2002 standards was seriously flawed, and many of the review
comments were ignored almost completely.
As a result, the newly approved revised standards are fundamentally
inadequate."
To
adjudicate these competing claims a look at real world experience may help. In
August 2002 the results of at least 18 suburban Dallas County elections were
delayed through vote-counting problems using ES&S software. The Dallas
Morning News report on the glitch referred to "Election Systems &
Software, the company that sold the previously trouble-free equipment to the
county four years ago". [6] Trouble free?
Here's
what the Venezuelan national electoral authority had to say about ES&S in
May 2000. "We say ES&S has not been sufficiently efficient in testing
what it was supposed to have supplied... the National Electoral Council cannot
accept such a failure of responsibility by this North American company." [7] So the Venezuelan elections scheduled for May 28th that
year were cancelled. Back in November 1998 faulty ES&S voting machines used
in Hawaii on election day "led to Hawaii's first ever statewide election
review and a first in the history of the United States." [8]
The
practical problems with electronic voting are well documented. Peter Neumann's
Risks Forum posts a daunting list of errors and failures. The recent highly
publicised case of the Diebold company's electoral software, discovered by
chance on an open web site, downloaded and tested by computer scientists,
confirms that fears to do with security, use of databases and software
passwords are all too justified. [9]
But
apart from the technical aspects, computer voting raises old issues of undue
influence and interference in a new guise. Who owns these computerised
electoral systems companies? What are their sympathies and connections? The
answers to these questions are not comforting. Big money and shady
business-political connections threaten the integrity of computerised voting
systems procurement.
In
1999, 22 people were indicted in Louisiana and 9 admitted guilt in a huge
bribery scam involving the acquisition of Sequoia voting systems. Sequoia
Pacific's Regional Manager and a regional sales executive were indicted for
paying around $8 million in bribes to Louisiana Commissioner of Elections Jerry
Fowler. In all, 22 people were indicted. Nine pleaded guilty. Fowler was sentenced
to over 4 years in prison.
In
the US state of Georgia companies are vying for a US$54 million contract to
supply 18,000 touch screen voting machines. [10] Among
the competing contractors are Diebold Election Systems and Northrop Grumann
Diversified Dynamics. Diebold's CEO, Wally O'Dell, is a major fundraiser for
the Ohio republican party. (Ohio Democrat leaders are seeking to block
Diebold's bid to supply voting machines to the state.) Northrop Grumman
Corporation are a major defence contractor with links to the Carlyle business
group, a nest of eminent Republicans, including former President George Bush.
The
involvement of big business in the management of electoral databases and
computing of votes is inherently and profoundly undemocratic. Politicians have
come to see manipulation of the vote much as they see gerrymandering boundaries
of voting districts - all part of the electoral game. For many people
disenchanted with politics and politicians, the system has long been not one
person-one vote but one dollar-one vote. There is a growing sense that the
ruling plutocracy seem to find elections a pesky irritating ritual and fixing
them a necessary and legitimate route to power.
The
case of Senator Chuck Hagel exemplifies concerns in the context of questionable
business and political links. In 1996 Hagel won a totally unexpected victory in
an election his own company's computerised voting systems were counting. He was
the first Republican in 24 years to make the Senate in Nebraska. [11] In 2002, Hagel ran again and was elected with 83% of
the vote - a feat worthy of dictators like Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua or
Papa Doc Duvalier in Haiti in their prime. Thom Hartmann observes "80 percent
of those votes were counted by computer-controlled voting machines put in place
by the company affiliated with Hagel: built by that company; programmed by that
company; chips supplied by that company."
Against
the trend results swung the Senate for the Republicans in the 2002 elections.
In Georgia popular Democrat Max Cleland was leading the pre-election polls 49%
to 44%. Mysteriously, his lead evaporated on election day turning into a 53% to
46% win for his opponent Saxby Chambliss. In Georgia, Democrat Roy Barnes led
Republican Sonny Perdue in the opinion polls by 48% to 39%. Nonetheless, Perdue
won with 52% of the vote against Barnes 45%. In Minnesota, just days before the
election, veteran Democrat Walter Mondale - a late replacement after the death
in a plane crash of leading Democrat Senator Paul Wellstone - led Republican
Norm Coleman by 47% to 39% in opinion polls. But Coleman won, 50% to 47%. In
all these states computerised voting systems were used to count most of the
vote. It seems very strange, to say the least, that opinion polls in three
states should have goofed so badly.
The
available evidence indicates that the worst case may well be true and that the
2004 election will be spectacularly and in most cases undetectably rigged using
computerised systems supplied and managed by companies linked to the Republican
party. [12] Foreign involvement in those companies is
another issue. Sequoia is owned by De La Rue, the British security systems
transnational with a minority shareholding by the Dublin based Jefferson
Smurfit Group, another transnational company. A contract to record the votes of
the US military has been awarded to Accenture, a Bermuda based company formerly
part of the Andersen auditing group, so thoroughly discredited during the Enron
collapse. These transnationals work comfortably with the business interests
currently running the White House.
George
Bush and his advisers have almost certainly already put in place their plans to
fix the 2004 election. It will mean extending to other States the same chaos
that prevailed in Florida in 2000. Voting lists will be
"consolidated". New technology - vulnerable to tampering - will be
put in place under HAVA. The resulting mess will be adjudicated in the courts -
if disputed results ever get that far. No one needs reminding the last time
that happened, back in 2000 when George Bush was appointed President by a
Supreme Court divided on party political lines. Imagine that, but multiplied by
the number of States the Republicans will need to steal next time around after
four years of domestic economic, environmental and foreign policy catastrophes.
Four
protections are needed to prevent a wider repeat of the Florida voting
manipulation fiascos of 2000 and 2002. Effective monitoring of voter databases
to prevent purging of legitimate voters. A physical audit trail so
people
can be sure not only that their vote is registered correctly but that someone
can verify it. Strong, legally enforceable statutory standards for all
computerised voting systems and voter database systems (not contemplated in
HAVA which empowers Electoral Standards Boards to implement only vague
"voluntary guidelines"). And finally, open, non-proprietary
verifiable software for all these systems.
A
recent report from John Hopkins University on computerised voting systems
concluded: "...there is little difference in the way code is developed for
voting machines relative to other commercial endeavours. In fact, we believe
that an open process would result in more careful development as more
scientists, software engineers, political activists and others who value their
democracy would be paying attention to the quality of the software used for
their elections....such open design processes have proven very useful in
projects ranging from very focused efforts...through very large and complex
systems such as maintaining the Linux operating system." [13]
Phil
Hughes runs the WorldWatch web site [14] that addresses
social, political and economic aspects of Linux and non-proprietary open-source
software. He explains, "Linux is a free and open operating system standard
developed by people all around the world. Linux itself and many applications
programs written for Linux are produced under a public license agreement. No
one has a monopoly of the basic product information.
The
goal of electoral software is clear: namely to accurately collect and report
information. There's nothing secret about the task itself (as opposed to the
confidentiality of the information collected) so there's no reason to use a
system that depends upon or requires secrecy about how it works. Making the
implementation of electoral software open means that the integrity of the
software can be freely reviewed by any interested party.
The
cost of the system software will be lower because the software is free, with
all the benefits of Linux innate reliability. Also if we are using this open
development approach then even the already very low cost of development can be
shared by all of the jurisdictions that will be using the software.
It
would take about six months to develop viable free open source electoral
software in Linux. Obviously it would require testing. But much existing
commercially developed electoral software is still showing problems despite
many years of use. Linux will certainly do better and be more reliable because
it is open source, available to everyone."
Free,
open to everyone? Sounds just like what the computerised voting market needs.
And fast.
* Colombia:
The War on Terror as Waged by Outlaws: Interview with Caitriona Ruane
* Terrorists,
Their Friends and the Bogota 3
* Neo-liberal
Nicaragua: Neo Banana Republic
1. Greg Palast,
November 2nd 2002, "The re-election of Jim Crow: How Jeb Bush's team is
trying to steal Florida again."
2. Public Citizen
Congress Watch web site, 13th September 2003
3. "Rebecca
Mercuri's Statement on Electronic Voting" © 2001 by Rebecca Mercuri. See www.notablesoftware.com
4. "Risks cases
as of 22 August 2003,” Peter G. Neumann, SRI International EL243, Menlo Park CA
94025-3493. www.CSL.sri.com/neumann
5. ESS web site 11th September 2003
6. August 5th 2002, Ed
Housewright, The Dallas Morning News.
7. Press release. May
25th 2000, Venezuelan Tribunal Supremo de Justicia web site.
8. "Ghosts in the
Machines: The Business of Counting Votes", Jason Leopold, COUNTERPUNCH
September 2, 2003.
9.Bev Harris, "Black
Box Voting: Ballot Tampering In The 21st Century," www.blackboxvoting.com
10. April 22nd 2002
"Voting Machine Firms Enlist Lobbyists" by John McCosh, Atlanta
Journal-Constitution Staff Writer. www.ajc.com
11. 'The theft of your
vote is just a chip away', Thom Hartmann, July 31st 2003, www.smirkingchimp.org
12."The 2004
Election Has Already Been Rigged", by Schuyler Ebbets, September 2nd 2003,
www.thepeoplesvoice.org
13. "Analysis of
an Electronic Voting System" Kohno, Stubblefield, Rubin, Wallach, July
23rd 2003. John Hopkins University.
14. Visit www.Worldwatch.linuxgazette.com