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A
Decade Too Late
Kosovo
Talks Begin
by
Jan Oberg
October
14, 2003
On
October 14, 2003, in Vienna, high-level Kosovo-Albanians and Serbs from
Belgrade met face-to-face. It was a historical meeting in more than one sense.
It provides an opportunity for anyone concerned about conflict-management and
peace-building to reflect on its philosophy, methods and politics. Did the
international so-called community do the right thing? Is there adequate
institutional learning? Are there parallels between Kosovo, Afghanistan and
Iraq that we should discuss self-critically rather than simply blame the
parties?
Dialogue
is fine but the 1999 bombing hardened everybody
It
is the first time since NATO's war on Yugoslavia in 1999 that Serbs and
Albanians meet this way. Indeed, with a few exceptions, it's the first attempt
at real negotiations since it all began in the late 1980s. Like in Iraq, the
main parties were prevented from meeting. As time has passed hard-liners have
taken over the scene and now they won't really talk.
Being
the clear victims of Milosevic' repressive policies, the Albanians rightly felt
that they had the support of the West and would be rewarded by sticking to a
maximalist position; thus no compromise about the goal of complete
independence.
Being
the largest people whose minorities in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo never really
felt any solidarity from the Western conflict-managers, the Serbs felt misunderstood,
treated without fairness and they were humiliated by the bombings. Why should
they not fight adamantly for the Kosovo province that they consider their
cradle? In addition, the Serbs as a people - and the Kosovo Serbs in particular
- have lost more than any other due to the policies of their own leadership.
The
Vienna process is not likely to bring the needed turning point or real peace to
Kosovo. Games keep on being played by all sides, while ordinary good-hearted
Albanians, Serbs, Turks etc. in the province keep on paying the high price.
These negotiations come about a decade too late. If there were acceptable
solutions in the eyes of the parties in the early 1990s, there is now too much
hate and distrust to identify even the least bad solution for all.
Present
in Vienna are also representatives of the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) led by
Special Representative Harri Holkeri, the contact group on Kosovo which
includes the United States, Britain, Russia, France, Italy and Germany as well
as the top leaders of the EU, Chris Patten and Javier Solana, NATO's
Secretary-General Lord Robertson and the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Dutch
Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.
At
least four aspects stand out as conspicuous:
A)
The absence of Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi, of the Provisional Institutions
of Self-Government, (PSIG) in Kosovo; the Albanian side is headed instead by
President Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.
B)
When Rexhepi refused to come, UN officials cancelled invitations to
representatives of the Serbs and Turks in Kosovo which angered Belgrade to such
an extent that it sent a Member of its Council of Ministers but neither its
prime minister nor his deputy, according to the BBC. Thus, all the relevant
local parties are not represented and neither is the PSIG and the Kosovo
Assembly. But
C)
The UN mission, EU, OSCE and NATO is present at their very highest levels.
D)
The future status of Kosovo is not on the agenda. The meeting cover issues such
as power shortages, car number plates, the 3,700 mostly Albanians still missing
in Kosovo, and the future of the more than 100,000 mainly Serb citizens who
fled Kosovo after the war in the reverse ethnic cleansing by extremist
Albanians.
Judging
from this, it seems that the Vienna talks are more important to the
international community than to the local parties. The international community
intervened in a most partial manner, sided with the Albanians, bombed Serbia,
showed a tacitly understanding for the Albanian extremists reverse ethnic
cleansing that forced more than 200,000 Serbs out of Kosovo after NATO's war.
It got Serbs but not Albanians to the war crimes tribunal in the Hague and
poured billions of dollars into Kosovo (not into Serbia). But in spite of all
that, the international community still does not seem to have the trust and
authority to tell certain Albanian leaders that enough foot-dragging is enough.
After
more than a decade of missed negotiation opportunities and four post-war years
of polarization and hardened attitudes between the parties, international
organizations have to give the impression that the Kosovo conflicts are moving
toward some kind of solution. But they are not. Secondly, they are probably
perfectly aware that the EU-NATO-mediated Ohrid Agreement in neighboring
Macedonia does not work as intended and that Macedonia's crisis is such that
new Albanian-Macedonian violence cannot be excluded - something that will once
again display the interconnectedness of extremist Kosovo-Albanian and
Macedonia-Albanian political and military forces.
Flash-back
on the conflict in light of conflict mitigation
TFF
published its first analysis on the conflict, “Preventing War in Kosovo,” 11
years ago based on on-the-ground fact-finding. Our team spent four years
between 1992 and 1996 providing the only sustained (written) dialogue between
three successive governments in Belgrade (and Slobodan Milosevic) on the one
hand and the moderate Kosovo-Albanian leadership under Dr. Rugova and his LDK
party which, as the only political leadership in former Yugoslavia, advocated
pragmatic non-violent means to achieve its long-term goals, an independent
Kosova.
This
Kosova would have open borders, no military forces and no military alliance
membership and it would never repress anyone but was destined to be based on
multi-ethnic, non-violent co-existence. I personally served during these years
as unofficial, goodwill adviser in conflict-resolution to Dr. Rugova and our
team suggested a number of these features and strategies to him and his fellow
leaders.
In
1996, TFF published “Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia” concerning a United Nations Temporary Authority for a
Negotiated Settlement, UNTANS, in Kosovo. It was formulated as an
internationally binding treaty by our experts and dealt with issues such as
relative demilitarization and the establishment of a government-cum-NGO
Professional Negotiation Facility staffed by experts experienced in conflict
and dispute mitigation. It was proposed that the Authority would take over
parts of the administration in Kosovo. It was violence-prevention and
principled negotiation in one, and it did not stipulate what the final
settlement should look like. It provided only a set of means and procedures
while proposing a comprehensive education of the people in conflict
understanding, negotiation, trust-building and reconciliation; Serb military
and police would be replaced by international Civil Police and monitors.
Multi-ethnic Civil Affairs Officers would help everybody run daily affairs. The
UN and the OSCE would be the main governmental actors.
We
took the two reports to the UN in New York and discussed them at the Yugoslav
desk, with HE Kofi Annan who at the time was heading the Peace-Keeping
Operation, PKO and with several others. Everyone told us that this was the type
of professional conflict analysis, early warning and constructive proposals in
line with the UN norm of "peace by peaceful means" that was dearly
needed in the international community. However, one assistant Secretary-General
also said, "excellent work, but I have to tell you that no one takes
action in this house before we have read on the front page of New York Times
for a couple of weeks that there is war. We are fully aware of the need for
early warning and action that you suggest and we do early listening, but the
whole global community is desperately overloaded with the ongoing hotspots and
wars. The sad fact is that no one has the extra capacity to also deal seriously
with potential wars."
So,
warfare broke out in Kosovo in 1997. The German intelligence first, then the US
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, and private mercenary companies, had done
their utmost to undercut Dr. Rugova - who Western governments never gave
anything but lip service - and made the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, a forceful
actor in the province from 1993 onwards.
Among
KLA's leaders was Agim Ceku, a Kosovo-born Albanian officer in the Croatian
army who in 1993 had been spearheading Croatian President Tudjman's politically
US-condoned and militarily US-supported Operations Flash and Storm in Krajina
and Western Slavonia. It drove out 250,000 Croatian Serbs from where they had
lived for centuries, most of whom have not returned. It also drove out the
marvelous UN peace-keeping mission from the UNPAs (the UN Protected Areas) in
Croatia, a first humiliation of the UN in a series that has so far ended in
Baghdad.
Years
ago, Agim Ceku told me that he went down to Kosovo from time to time to
"help" KLA develop into a formidable force of some 20,000 soldiers.
Later on Ceku was chosen by the international community to lead the so-called
civilian Kosovo Protection Corps, KPC, whose disarmament by NATO was nothing
but de facto make-believe. KPC and irregular forces carried warfare into both
Southern Serbia and Macedonia - where NATO once again allegedly disarmed the
Albanian insurgents from Kosovo and local paramilitary forces.
Then
US envoy Richard
Holbrooke who was assistant US Secretary for the Far East when the Kwangju
massacre on hundreds of students by Seoul in 1980 was endorsed by Washington -
made an agreement with President Milosevic to have an OSCE mission established
in Kosovo, apparently without any prior planning.
The
1200 monitors were never made available by OSCE members but the CIA did arrive
and infiltrated it. The head of mission was William Walker, a man who had
worked in Latin America - some sources relate his name to the CIA and death
squads there - and played a short, unimpressive role as head of the UN in
Vukovar. But he knew before any investigation had been made that the Belgrade
had committed the Racak massacre and said so on the spot. That served as the
final drop in the Clinton administration's decision to bomb Yugoslavia. Rather
than getting a new diplomatic assignment, Walker now heads the new privately
funded American University in Kosovo! [http://www.aukf.org/press/press_release_2.htm]
President
Clinton saw it fit to bomb. He was operating on assumptions and a level of
knowledge about as good as the Bush administration's about Iraq. He too was
told and retold invented stories that had no relation to reality - such as the
one about the thousands of people who Milosevic had burnt in the industrial
furnaces in Mitrovica or the "Horseshoe Plan" that allegedly aimed at
driving out every and each Albanian out of Kosovo. He was a Hitler as was
Saddam and he was an ally of the US and the West in general until priorities
changed.
And
there was this bothersome world media focus on the Monica Lewinsky affair that
was in need of diversion. Incidentally, the highest NATO commander of that
shameful war, fought without UN mandate and killing 600 innocent citizens on
the ground, was Wesley
Clark, the most popular presidential candidate - Democrat - now in 2003.
And the highest-ranking civilian responsible for the war was then NATO
Secretary-General, Javier Solana who is present in Vienna now as a EU peacemaker.
Such
was the background to the international community's de facto conflict
management policies in Kosovo. No government tried to achieve a political,
civil settlement when it was possible, i.e. in early 1990s. No international
organization made a serious attempt at getting Serbs and Albanians to sit down
and talk under some kind of professional mediation guidance in a sustained,
principled process.
True,
there were "negotiations" in Rambouillet outside Paris before the
war. But the parties never met face-to-face and the real American purpose seems
to have been to present a plan that would be receive a "yes" from
Albanians and "no" from the Serbs. It was achieved by adding a
military appendix that gave NATO carte blanche to be present anywhere in
Serbia, not take responsibility for accidents or other damage done and not
paying for the use of Serbian facilities, roads, harbors etc. No matter what
one thinks about Milosevic' leadership and Serb politics during these years, no
sovereign state would have accepted this sort of mediation. In its
consequences, Rambouillet was a de facto declaration of the war that followed.
The
relations between the Kosovo issue and the similar aspects of conflicts in
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia were never really taken into account. Kosovo was
not treated as anything but a unique conflict with no relations to anything
else. The problems facing yet another Serb minority was totally ignored by the
international community.
Few
ever asked whether Kosovo could be about something else, too - such as securing
various corporations' and consortia's projected oil and gas pipelines from the
Caspian and Black Seas through Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania to the Adriatic,
securing supplies to the West. Few bothered to investigated why the US built
the largest military base, Bondsteel, outside the US since the Vietnam War a
few kilometers outside Pristina, Kosovo's capital. Few have asked how the US
could carve out a province of a sovereign state and establish their organizations
- and the base - in buildings and on land belonging to that state without
negotiating compensation. Few asked whether Kosovo's enormous importance and
the prestige and billions of dollars poured into it had to do also with the
fact that this province seems to have Europe's largest metal deposits.
Indeed,
few have asked themselves why this tiny province received the proportionately
largest peace-keeping mission ever - some 43,000 soldiers at the outset plus
tens of thousands of staff members of the UN, OSCE and hundreds of NGO who
flocked to the place after the war on 1999.
This
is what ReliefWeb
tells you
General
security improvements have not, however meant that harassment and violence
towards ethnic minorities have stopped. A range of serious human rights
violations including grenade attacks, booby-traps, drive-by-shootings, arson,
physical assaults, stone throwing, vandalism and verbal insults continue. With
victims often afraid to report crimes and community leaders reticent to stop
them, perpetrators have rarely been held accountable, reinforcing a dangerous
cycle of impunity.
Kosovo's
young economy remains heavily reliant on international aid and development
assistance. The Kosovo Statistics Office (KSO) has put unemployment at an
alarming 57%, with even higher rates consistently found in minority and rural
areas as well as for women throughout Kosovo. With outside assistance expected
to decline sharply in 2003, unemployment - at least in the short term - is
likely to grow. At the same time, unregulated activities and organised crime
dominate many areas of economic interests and compromise prospects for private
investments and socio-economic advances.
Subjected
to various levels of ethnically motivated harassment and violence after the
1999 conflict, minorities who remained within Kosovo sought protection by
clustering in groups. As a result, enclaves requiring heavy international
monitoring to ensure the basic safety of residents became home to most of the
minority population remaining in Kosovo. Until recently, free movement outside
of these enclaves has been highly restricted.
Against
relatively positive developments, UNHCR registered 2,741 minority returns in
2002, boosting the 2000 - 2002 cumulative total to 6,094. Approximately a
quarter of a million of Kosovo's pre-war population - mainly Serbs, followed by
Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians - are still displaced.
The
vast majority - some 205,000 - mainly Kosovo Serbs, are in Serbia, while
Montenegro hosts approximately 29,000 IDPs, the majority of who are Roma. In
addition, an estimated 22,500 minority individuals remain displaced within
Kosovo proper and are scattered among five regions including the ethnically
divided municipality of Mitrovica.
Of
the eight organisations participating in the Kosovo 2002 CAP (the UN
Consolidated Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance), only four (UNHCR, OCHA,
UNICEF and WHO) received some funding for CAP projects. As of 10 February 2003,
31% or $8,428,254 out of a requested $27,255,6044 had been secured. Low donor
response resulted in major adjustments to and in some cases, cancellation of
CAP projects.
Jan Oberg is
the Director of the Transnational Foundation For Peace and Future Research in
Sweden (http://www.transnational.org). © Copyright Jan Oberg and TFF 2003
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