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The
Importance of Being Nuanced
A
Tragicomedy Of Media Manners
by
David Edwards and Media Lens
September
25, 2003
Andrew
Gilligan, it is reported, is on his way out of Radio 4's Today programme. The
BBC's director of news, Richard Sambrook, told the Hutton inquiry last week
that Gilligan had failed to appreciate the "nuances and subtleties"
of broadcast journalism, casting his reports in "primary colours” rather
than shades of grey. (‘Gilligan left out in cold by BBC’, Matt Wells, Richard
Norton-Taylor and Vikram Dodd, The Guardian, September 18, 2003)
Gilligan
has fallen foul of one of the unwritten rules of media reporting: journalism
that supports established power is waved through as obviously ‘balanced’ and
‘impartial’. Journalism that challenges established power is subject to minute
examination in search of the tiniest sign of ‘bias’.
No
one blinked an eye when Andrew Marr announced on the day that Baghdad fell that
Blair “stands as a larger man and a stronger prime minister as a result”.
(Marr, BBC 1, News At Ten, April 9, 2003)
This
was the same Marr who, during NATO’s assault on Serbia, had made some similarly
nuanced suggestions in the Observer:
“I
want to put the Macbeth option: which is that we’re so steeped in blood we
should go further. If we really believe Milosevic is this bad, dangerous and
destabilising figure we must ratchet this up much further. We should now be
saying that we intend to put in ground troops.” (‘Do We Give war a chance?’,
The Observer, April 18, 1999)
A
week later, Marr contrasted Western nations, which he claimed had been
“feminised” by the Cold War, with: “The war-hardened people of Serbia, far more
callous, seemingly readier to die” who were “like an alien race”. (Marr, ‘War
is hell - but not being ready to go to war is undignified and embarrassing’,
The Observer, April 25, 1999)
A
year after some 500 civilians had been killed by 11 weeks of NATO “surgical
strikes”, Marr underwent some surgery of his own prior to becoming the BBC’s
political editor:
“When
I joined the BBC, my Organs of Opinion were formally removed.” (‘Andrew Marr,
the BBC’s political editor’, The Independent, January 13, 2000)
No
inquiries were launched when the Guardian's David Leigh and James Wilson
described the evidence of mass death of Iraqi children under sanctions as a
"statistical construct" and "atrocity propaganda".
('Counting Iraq's victims’, The Guardian, October 10, 2001)
No
issues of ‘nuance’ were raised when Thomas Friedman of the New York Times spoke
last week of an Arab “bubble of terrorism”, and of how, “We need to go into the
heart of their world and beat their brains out, frankly, in order to burst this
bubble.” (Tim Russert Show, CNBC, September 13, 2003)
The
BBC, of course, has a long history of using “primary colours” in its reporting.
During the Falklands War, BBC executives directed that news coverage should be
concerned "primarily with government statements of policy". Achieving
an impartial style was deemed "an unnecessary irritation". (Quoted,
John Pilger, New Statesman, August 2, 1996)
In
1997, the BBC's Newsnight editor, Peter Horrocks, told staff: "Our job
should not be to quarrel with the purpose of policy, but to question its
implementation." (Quoted, Robert Newman, ‘Performers of the world unite’,
The Guardian, August 7, 2000)
More
recently, a Cardiff University report found that during the latest attack on
Iraq the BBC displayed the most pro-war agenda of any broadcaster.
Lack
of nuance nevertheless remains strictly a dissident problem. In reviewing one
of Noam Chomsky’s books, the Independent’s Steve Crawshaw expressed his
bewilderment at the fact that, "Chomsky knows so much but seems impervious
to any idea of nuance." (‘Furious ideas with no room for nuance’, Steve
Crawshaw, The Independent, February 21, 2001)
Likewise,
Joe Joseph lamented in the Times: “The world, according to Pilger, is pretty
much black and white: his journalistic retina doesn’t recognise shades of
grey”. (Joseph, The Times, March 7, 2000) Jon Snow added in the Guardian: “Some
argue the ends justify [Pilger’s] means, others that the world is a more subtle
place than he allows.” (Snow, ‘Still angry after all these years’, The
Guardian, February 25, 2001)
In
Parliamentary Brief magazine, Philip Towle judged author Mark Curtis’ work
“useful”, but added, “a more balanced and less paranoid analysis would be more
convincing".(Towle, Parliamentary Brief, November 1995)
Alas,
Media Lens is cursed by the same monomania. Last year, Bill Hayton, a BBC World
Service editor, advised us: "If your language was more nuanced it would
get a better reception." (Email to Editors, November 16, 2002)
Reality,
for much of the media, is defined by the needs of the powerful. Thus, "The
BBC must sack the hopeless hack Gilligan”, the Sun raged. (Editorial, September
18, 2003) The Scotsman regretted the BBC’s errors: “Successful investigative
journalism demands the highest standards of accuracy and precise reporting of
what can be proved.” (Editorial, September 18, 2003) "Gilligan's first
report on the dodgy dossier ... was wrong”, opined the Mirror, “And he will
probably pay a heavy price for that.” (Editorial, September 18, 2003)
Using
familiar code words, Guardian editor Alan Rusbridger wrote of Gilligan and the
BBC: “How much damage and tragedy could have been avoided if the organisation
had swiftly published a nuanced and careful clarification.” (‘If only we were
as tough on ourselves as on the BBC’, Alan Rusbridger, The Guardian, September
20, 2003)
And
how much damage and tragedy could have been avoided in Iraq if the media had
ditched red herrings of this kind and instead raised even the most elementary
objections to government propaganda. If the “hopeless hack” failed “the highest
standards of accuracy”, what can we say of the rest of the media, which, for
over a year, failed to challenge a government that was engaged in a systematic
campaign of deception?
The
challenges that could have been made are childishly obvious: Why attack when
Unscom inspectors achieved 90-95% success in disarming Iraq peacefully? Why
attack when inspectors were withdrawn from, not thrown out of, Iraq? Why attack
when any retained Iraqi WMD would have long since become “harmless sludge”,
according to Unscom inspectors, the CIA and others? Why attack when there was
no evidence whatever of links between the Iraqi regime and its mortal enemy,
al-Qaeda? Why attack when Tony Blair had said almost nothing about a dire
threat from Iraqi WMD between 1997-2001? Why attack when Blair had stood
alongside French President Jacques Chirac in November 2001 insisting that
“incontrovertible evidence” of Iraqi complicity in the September 11 attacks would
be required before military action would even be considered? Why attack when in
2001, months before the September 11 attacks, Colin Powell and Condoleeza Rice
both stated that Iraq had not rearmed and posed no threat?
Gilligan’s
‘offence’ was to report that senior intelligence officials thought the
45-minute claim on Iraqi deployment of WMD “risible”. Gilligan also dared to
suggest that the government must have known that the claim was “wrong”. And
indeed in a taped conversation with a BBC journalist, weapons expert David
Kelly had described how "lots of people" in the intelligence
community were concerned, that "people at the top of the ladder didn't
want to hear some of the things". (‘Beyond doubt: facts amid the fiction‘,
Vikram Dodd, Richard Norton-Taylor and Nicholas Watt, The Guardian, August 16,
2003)
Dimitris
Perricos, a Greek-born nuclear expert who replaced Hans Blix in June as the top
UN weapons inspector in Iraq has said:
"There
is no doubt that the phrase of 'within 45 minutes' that was included in the
British report did not correspond to reality. No one, of course, should go to
war for a (weapons) programme if they do not know if the weapons have been
created. From the inspections, no evidence was found that would justify a war."
(http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGAK2KWK1KD.html,
September 1, 2003)
But
the focus on the 45-minute claim is itself a red herring intended to draw
attention away from a far bigger deception. Senator Edward Kennedy last week
indicated the complete irrelevance of the discussion on the rights and wrongs
of Gilligan’s report:
"There
was no imminent threat. This was made up in Texas, announced in January to the
Republican leadership that war was going to take place and was going to be good
politically. This whole thing was a fraud." (Steve LeBlanc, ‘Kennedy says
war case a “fraud”’, Associated Press, September 18, 2003)
And
this whole fraud could have been exposed and possibly even stopped, but the
media were busy echoing and channeling government propaganda without subtlety
and without nuance.
David Edwards is the editor of Media Lens, and the author of Burning All
Illusions: A Guide to Personal and Political Freedom (South End
Press, 1996). Email: editor@medialens.org. Visit the Media
Lens website: http://www.MediaLens.org
Other Recent Articles by David Edwards
and Media Lens
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Should I Do? Selfishness, Happiness And Benefiting Others
* The BBC, Self-Glorification
And Disaster
* Adventures
in Media Surreality – Part 2: Global Climate Catastrophe – Mustn’t Grumble
* Adventures
in Media Surreality – Part 1: Blair’s Serious and Current Lies
* Biting the
Hand That Feeds – Part 2
* Stenographers
to Power: "Saddam Loyalists" Or "Anti-Occupation Forces"?
Ask The BBC