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Dealing
with the Hydra?
Proliferation
and Full Spectrum Dominance
by
Ken Coates
October
4, 2003
"The
horror scenarios of the Cold War have disappeared, but the threat of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons has not.
Like the monstrous Hydra of Greek mythology, modern weapons of mass
destruction are sprouting new heads faster than anybody can cut them off."
So
wrote Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja, the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and
Finland respectively, in an article in The International Herald Tribune, whose
title gives their answer to the threat:
"Slaying the Hydra - together". As they conclude:
"Even
Hercules could not kill the many headed monster alone. Only by acting together will we safeguard
the security of all."
In
spite of strenuous combined efforts, the hydra of proliferation remains very
much with us, and it has certainly not been caged by the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). The most recent NPT
preparatory conference, held in Geneva, between April 28th and May 9th 2003,
resounded with reproaches, notably those of the United States against North
Korea and Iran. The Americans were also
most concerned about the possibility that Libya might become a
proliferator. Delegates in Geneva will
have been actively wondering how far these kinds of proliferation match the
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the phantasms for which the British-American
coalition went to war, and which have totally eluded the occupiers of Iraq.
None
of us should be surprised that the United States has been fixated by the
question of horizontal proliferation, and almost oblivious to that of vertical
proliferation, which is likely to provoke the sharpest concern when the next
Review Conference of the Treaty takes place in the year 2005.
At
the full-scale NPT Review Conference of 2000, thirteen practical steps for
nuclear disarmament had been agreed. These were designed to satisfy
non-proliferating objectors that the apparent immunity of the nuclear powers to
Treaty action for actual disarmament would, by agreement, be ended. But in 2002, at the earlier Preparatory
Conference in New York, the American Ambassador declared that he no longer
supported many of the conclusions which had been agreed two years earlier.
During
the two years of the Bush administration which had seen the modification of
American views on these thirteen practical steps, a marked swing to unilateralism
had affected numerous other areas of United States policy. Unilaterally, the United States withdrew
from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;
it declined to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which had been
signed by 164 nations; it had caused
the ousting of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons. In lesser disarmament
decisions, the United States had also rejected the Landmine Treaty of 1997,
endorsed by 122 Member-states, which meant that anti-personnel bombs, banned by
most countries, could be used by American forces in the bombardment of Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, and in the
second Iraq war. Additionally, the USA
had been alone among nations in opposing an agreement in the United Nations to
restrict international trade in small arms.
Of course, the Bush administration also rejected the Kyoto Agreement and
forced the resignation of the Chairman of the United Nations Panel on Climate
Change because his views were disapproved in the administration. And the United States not only opposed the
creation of the International Criminal Court, but demanded immunity from
prosecution for all American citizens.
The
thrust of unilateralism has intensified the continued proliferation of nuclear
weapons, especially in the development of smaller, "usable" weapons
designed to implement the new military doctrines which were being developed.
These consistently undermine the distinction between conventional and nuclear
weapons, partly by requiring ever more horrific conventional armaments. It
could be argued that the distinction is further undermined by the category
"weapons of mass destruction", which takes the focus off specifically
nuclear explosives. In this context, we now hear of a new generation of low-yield
and "bunker-busting" nuclear weapons, to match recent developments in
high-powered conventional bombs.
Unilateral
instincts have also been given free play in drafting the original United States
resolution on the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, somewhat satirically
entitled "To Assist the People of Iraq".
All
of these initiatives have attracted publicity, not excluding a great deal of
adverse commentary. But it is possible
that the most serious impact of unilateralism will be judged to have been the
decision to back-pedal on those NPT Review Conference decisions of 2000.
The
Non-Proliferation Treaty was fundamentally a voluntary engagement by signatory
States who foreswear the development of their own nuclear weapons, and reliance
on nuclear arms. But a significant part
of the shift in United States policy to "going it alone" has been the
abandonment of the language of non-proliferation, and the substitution of an
apparently similar, but in fact diametrically opposed, language of
"counter-proliferation".
Counter-proliferation
is not a voluntary engagement, but a policy of compulsion, which can be prayed
in aid against States which are, or are thought to be, considering the
acquisition of nuclear armaments or other so-called "weapons of mass
destruction", particularly chemical and biological weapons. Up to now, this policy has been slowly
crystallising. For example, although
the United States has expressed its disapproval of the decision of Pakistan and
India to acquire nuclear warheads, there has been no threat to compulsorily
disarm either country. Of course there
has also been scant recognition and no threat whatever, to effect the nuclear
disarmament of Israel, which is believed to have a very large nuclear arsenal,
including thermo-nuclear warheads. This
military commitment could have been challenged at the time that the related
South African move to nuclear disarmament was undertaken: but no such benign action took place. However, States designated by the United
States as rogue States have all been the subject of threatening messages,
outstanding cases being those of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya.
The
foundation of these threats will be more widely questioned in the wake of the
occupation of Iraq, which has yielded up none of the suspected weapons, and
appears rather unlikely to find them in future.
In
spite of these difficulties, the zeal of the American President for
counter-proliferation was not tempered by his victories in Iraq. At the Evian summit on the 1st June,
President Bush "injected a surprise element into what had been expected to
be an informal discussion on weapons of mass destruction". The Financial
Times (June 2nd 2003) reported:
"US-UK
officials said the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative would seek an
international agreement to intercept ships and aeroplanes suspected of carrying
shipments of arms, or nuclear, chemical and biological cargo."
This
appears to seek to legitimise unilateral action against proliferators, given
that the power of interception necessarily imposes quick decisions on those
exercising it. If interception were to
be the prerogative of a duly constituted international authority, working under
appropriate controls, then this might act equally promptly and effectively
against all proliferation, horizontal or vertical. There are no indications that such open-handedness is being
proposed by either the American or British sponsors of this initiative.
It
has been argued that the biggest shock to the non-proliferation regime has been
the formal repudiation, by North Korea, of its adherence to the NPT. But, in the words of one commentator:
"At
least as damaging as North Korea's departure have been successive moves by
Washington to distance itself from nuclear disarmament. In the run up to the Iraq war, the US
President, George Bush, signed National Security Presidential Directive 17,
which said: the United States will
continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming
force - including potentially nuclear weapons - to the use of weapons of mass
destruction against the United States …"
The
significance of this directive is not simply that it marks a higher level of
bellicosity than has been customary among nuclear powers: it also constitutes a serious undermining of
the non-proliferation regime, by removing the "negative security
assurances" made by all nuclear powers to NPT non-nuclear signatories in
1978. This was indeed strengthened in
1995 by the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 984, committing the
nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon
States.
These
commitments were of some considerable importance in encouraging what has been
perhaps the most positive step against proliferation, the development of
nuclear-free zones over wide areas of the earth's surface. Without the guarantee that nuclear weapons
will not be used against them, it may be increasingly difficult to persuade
non-nuclear States that they will gain any advantage by maintaining their
commitment to non-proliferation.
This
commitment had been strained already by the time of the NPT Review Conference
of 2000, which is why the thirteen practical steps which the US Government is
now questioning, were needed to keep the show on the road. Non-proliferators were absolutely impatient
with the continued assumption of the nuclear powers that their own weapons were
in a special category, beyond the reach of disarmament measures which would
only apply to lesser mortals.
Certainly
there have been various agreements between nuclear powers which have reduced
various kinds of deployment. But the
essential trend has maintained the predominance of nuclear States, even if the
number of States involved has been seen to increase. That increase has provided no reassurance, since the conflict in
the Indian Sub-continent has manifestly been made more dangerous by the
development of both Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons. And the possession of a hundred or two
Israeli nukes may give a sense of security to Israelis, or rather to some
Israelis: but it will do nothing to
improve the prospects in neighbouring Arab States.
To
the extent that the NPT, and reliance on voluntarism, have been weakened, it is
not surprising that we hear more and more talk about
counter-proliferation. This implies a
policeman, and only one such policeman has presented itself on the scene. The United States military preponderance is
intuited by all, and the various wars which have been launched in recent years
have all served to underline that message.
Military preponderance has in fact been codified in official American
military doctrine. In the years before
the recognition of President Bush's unilateral policies, it was already stated,
for instance in the US Space Command Vision for 2020, which opens with the
claim:
"US
Space Command - dominating the space dimension of military operations to
protect US interests and investment.
Integrating Space Forces into war fighting capabilities across the full
spectrum of conflict."
This
pretension is backed by some explicit reasoning:
"The
emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority, will
lead to Full Spectrum Dominance. Space
forces play an increasingly critical role in providing situational awareness
(e.g. global communications; precise
navigation; timely and accurate missile
warning and weather; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance to US forces.)
Space
doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and personnel will
evolve to fully realize the potential of space power. Space power is a vital element in moving towards the Joint Vision
goal of being persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and pre-eminent in any form
of conflict."
The
plain military version of Full Spectrum Dominance "implies that US forces
are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronised operations with
combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and
freedom to operate in all domains - space, sea, land, air, and
information. Additionally, given the
global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain
its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power
world-wide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance."
With
the visible and indeed spectacular augmentation of American military power,
even before the rise of overt unilateralism under the Bush administration, we
can easily see why there has been more talk about counter-proliferation, where
persuasion has been seen to give place to direct compulsion.
However,
military power is not everything, and subject nations in a complex and
integrated modern world can find a variety of ways of containing
militarism. One is reminded of the
Czech hero, the good soldier Schweik, who knew how to reduce the might of the
Habsburg Empire to gibbering impotence and rage, by assiduously obeying
orders. If for United Nations based on
persuasion, we seek to substitute Dominated Nations, we shall find a great
burgeoning of inventive ways of frustrating the dominators.
This
is why the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, only caught half the truth
when he tried to persuade his parliamentary colleagues in England, and the
French and German Governments, that they should go along with the wishes of the
United States in Iraq.
“[Y]ou
are right it is the United States which has the military power to act as the
world's policeman, and only the United States.
We live in a uni-polar world; the United States has a quarter of the
world's wealth, the world's GDP, and it has stronger armed forces than the next
27 countries put together. So its
predominance is huge. That is a
fact. No one can gainsay it; no one can
change it in the short or medium term.
The choice we have to make in the international community is whether, in
a uni-polar world, we want the only super-power to act unilaterally and we
force them to act unilaterally or whether we work in such a way that they act
within the multilateral institutions.
What I say to France and Germany and all other European Union colleagues
is to take care, because just as America helps to define and influence our
politics, so what we do in Europe helps to define and influence American
politics. We will reap a whirlwind if
we push the Americans into a unilateralist position in which they are the
centre of this uni-polar world."
However,
the lesson of the war in Iraq is that the world is very far from
uni-polar. New military alliances will
probably form because the material economic interests of France, Germany and
Russia will require a counter lobby to that of the USA. (In the wings, waits
China, not yet seen as a part of any axis of evil, but neither yet seen as an
acceptable world partner.)
But
the military cannot do many necessary things.
Often, it seems, it cannot maintain the basic fabric of civil
society. The civil power came first,
and may even have the last laugh. No
doubt the conflict between the United States and Iraq was exacerbated by the
decision of Saddam Hussein to trade oil for Euros instead of Dollars. The heightened tension in Saudi Arabia and
the continued pressure on Iran, may quickly persuade the two other major oil
exporters to do the same. Already Venezuela is moving in that direction. So, the good soldier Schweik may get his
revenge.
If
oil is traded in Euros, then petro-dollars will no longer bridge the yawning
gap in the United States balance of trade, and it will be necessary for the
Americans to vastly increase their exports, or reduce their imports, in order
to reach a balance. Full Spectrum Dominance
financed by petro-dollars will be a thing of the past, and the fate of the
Soviet Union, which over-reached itself because successive Soviet Governments
spent more and more on military technology at the expense of popular
contentment, may yet visit the United States.
Even
so, the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a serious danger. Yes, weaker nuclear powers may well be
visited by thieves and terrorists who wish to find the means of punishing their
adversaries. For some years the major
fear was that the Russians might not be able to control their crumbling nuclear
arsenals. If economic weakness
overtakes the world's solitary megapower, who dare argue that this pattern may
not recur?
But
all this is somewhat speculative. What
has already left the area of speculation is the fact that what Donald Rumsfeld
calls "old Europe" is finding a necessity for closer diplomatic and
military co-operation. An alignment
with Russia is already likely. Miscalled "new Europe" may well seek
closer affinities with the United States, based largely on ancient ideological
prejudice and modern nationalism. None of the parties threaten a "New Cold
War": ideology is absent, but conflicts of interest are not. For this
reason, the economic future of Rumsfeld's new Europe is far more likely to turn
on its relations with Germany and France than it is to prosper from
transatlantic aid. There is no pot of
gold or Marshall Plan which will relieve Eastern Europe's needs: so the resurgence of Nato on an Eastern
basis is likely to be more an affair of trumpets and drums, not to say flags,
of which there will be an abundance, than it is of serious and sustained
military power. Nato is founded on a Treaty, and its members therefore have
rights, which sit ill with unilateral policies by the senior partner. The
planting of impressive new bases will not consolidate, but aggravate, this
redivision of Europe's military space.
A new set of alignments is emerging, perhaps reluctantly, but driven by
a powerful sense of necessity, from the turmoil which has recently hit
Iraq. The effects of that turmoil are
likely to be even more profound than the dire effects of coalition policies on
Mesopotamia.
All
these speculations serve only to show that vertical proliferation is still both
possible and likely to continue. Horizontal proliferation may be thought to
have been deterred by the adoption of policies to "counter" it by the
megapower: but to the extent that these encourage duplicity, they will merely
make more difficult its detection. There can of course be endless attempts to
restrict the spread of nuclear technology, and its refinement into ever more
damaging areas, but so complex is this territory that more and more of us are
coming to the conclusion that the simple solution is the most practical one. In
the words of General Lee Butler, formerly of the United States Air Force,
"standing down nuclear arsenals requires only a fraction of the ingenuity
and resources that were devoted to their creation". General Butler was
following in the footsteps of another distinguished military man, Lord
Mountbatten.
"As
a military man who has given half a century of active Service, I say in all
sincerity that the nuclear arms race has no military purpose. Wars cannot be
fought with nuclear weapons. Their existence only adds to our perils because of
the illusions which they have generated. There are powerful voices around the
world who still give credence to the old Roman precept …if you desire peace,
prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense, and I repeat - it is a
disastrous misconception to believe that by increasing the total uncertainty,
one increases one's own certainty."
Butler's
conclusion is that "a global consensus that … nuclear weapons have no
defensible role … is not only possible, it is imperative."
It
is understandable that the investment of a prodigious treasure gives an
institution the semblance of permanence and indestructibility. To imagine all that to be dispensable, indeed
to think we could be better off without it, is widely described as
"utopian". But this utopian decision is more practical by far than
the endless pursuit of lesser agreements to regulate powers, which continually
escape all efforts to confine them. The price of establishing a controlling
agency strong enough and extensive enough to enforce counter-proliferation
could all-too-easily be the price of universal enslavement, and the
enthronement of one power over all. A movement to disarm all, by contrast,
enfranchises all who participate, and is by its nature pluralistic and
inclusive.
Of
course, if such a great human resistance begins to emerge, Anna Lindh and Erkki
Tuomioja will remain right throughout all the interregnum before it takes
effect. Short of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation cannot be
abandoned without enthroning brute force. But real disarmament is the
overcoming of force.
Hercules
had the very great advantage that he was a God. But some of us think it is a
disadvantage that he is also a myth. If we want to solve our problems we must
do it ourselves.
Ken Coates is
an Associate of the Transnational Foundation For Peace and Future Research in
Sweden (http://www.transnational.org). © Copyright Jan Oberg and TFF 2003