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by
Edward Said
May
24, 2003
My
impression is that many Arabs today feel that what has been taking place in
Iraq over the last two months is little short of a catastrophe. True, Saddam
Hussein's regime was a despicable one in every way and it deserved to be
removed. Also true is the sense of anger many feel at how outlandishly cruel
and despotic that regime was, and how dreadful has been the suffering of Iraq's
people. There seems little doubt that far too many other governments and
individuals connived to keep Saddam Hussein in power, looking the other way as
they went about their business as usual. Nevertheless, the only thing that gave
the US license to bomb the country and destroy its government was neither a
moral right nor a rational argument but sheer military power. Having for years
supported Ba'athist Iraq and Saddam Hussein himself, the US and Britain
arrogated to themselves the right to negate their own complicity in his
despotism, and then to state that they were liberating Iraq from his hated
tyranny. And what now seems to be emerging in the country both during and after
the illegal Anglo-American war against the people and civilisation that is the
essence of Iraq represents a very grave threat to the Arab people as a whole.
It
is of the utmost importance that we recall in the first instance that, despite
their many divisions and disputes, the Arabs are in fact a people, not a
collection of random countries passively available for outside intervention and
rule. There is a clear line of imperial continuity that begins with Ottoman
rule over the Arabs in the 16th century until our own time. After the Ottomans
in World War One came the British and the French, and after them, in the period
following World War Two, came America and Israel. One of the most insidiously
influential strands of thought in recent American and Israeli Orientalism, and
evident in American and Israeli policy since the late 1940s, is a virulent,
extremely deep-seated hostility to Arab nationalism and a political will to
oppose and fight it in every possible way. The basic premise of Arab
nationalism in the broad sense is that, with all their diversity and pluralism
of substance and style, the people whose language and culture are Arab and
Muslim (call them the Arab-speaking peoples, as Albert Hourani did in his last
book) constitute a nation and not just a collection of states scattered between
North Africa and the western boundaries of Iran. Any independent articulation
of that premise was openly attacked, as in the 1956 Suez War, the French
colonial war against Algeria, the Israeli wars of occupation and dispossession,
and the campaign against Iraq, a war the stated purpose of which was to topple
a specific regime but the real goal of which was the devastation of the most
powerful Arab country. And just as the French, British, Israeli and American
campaign against Abdel-Nasser was designed to bring down a force that openly
stated as its ambition the unification of the Arabs into a powerful independent
political force, the American goal today is to redraw the map of the Arab world
to suit American, and not Arab, interests. US policy thrives on Arab
fragmentation, collective inaction, and military and economic weakness.
One
would have to be foolish to argue that the nationalism and doctrinaire
separateness of individual Arab states, whether the state is Egypt, Syria,
Kuwait or Jordan, is a better thing, a more useful political actuality than
some scheme of inter-Arab cooperation in economic, political and cultural
spheres. Certainly I see no need for total integration, but any form of useful
cooperation and planning would be better than the disgraceful summits that have
disfigured our national life, say, during the Iraq crisis. Every Arab asks the
question, as does every foreigner: why do the Arabs never pool their resources
to fight for the causes which officially, at least, they claim to support, and
which, in the case of the Palestinians, their people actively, indeed passionately
believe in?
I
will not spend time arguing that everything that has been done to promote Arab
nationalism can be excused for its abuses, its short-sightedness, its
wastefulness, repression and folly. The record is not a good one. But I do want
to state categorically that, since the early 20th century, the Arabs have never
been able to achieve their collective independence as a whole or in part
exactly because of the designs on the strategic and cultural importance of
their lands by outside powers. Today, no Arab state is free to dispose of its
resources as it wishes, nor to take positions that represent that individual
state's interests, especially if those interests seem to threaten US policies.
In the more than 50 years since America assumed world dominance, and more so
after the end of the Cold War, it has run its Middle Eastern policy based on
two principles, and two principles alone: the defence of Israel and the free
flow of Arab oil, both of which involved direct opposition to Arab nationalism.
In all significant ways, with few exceptions, American policy has been
contemptuous of and openly hostile to the aspirations of the Arab people,
although with surprising success since Nasser's demise it has had few
challengers among the Arab rulers who have gone along with everything required
of them.
During
periods of the most extreme pressure on one or other of them (e.g. the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, or the sanctions against Iraq that were designed
to weaken the people and the state as a whole, the bombings of Libya and Sudan,
the threats against Syria, the pressure on Saudi Arabia), the collective
weakness has been little short of stunning. Neither their enormous collective
economic power nor the will of their people has moved the Arab states to even
the slightest gesture of defiance. The imperial policy of divide and rule has
reigned supreme, since each government seems to fear the possibility that it
might damage its bilateral relationship with America. That consideration has
taken precedence over any contingency, no matter how urgent. Some countries
rely on American economic aid, others on American military protection. All,
however, have decided that they do not trust each other any more than they care
strongly for the welfare of their own people (which is to say they care very
little), preferring the hauteur and contempt of the Americans who have gotten
progressively worse in their dealings with the Arab states as the only
superpower's arrogance has developed over time. Indeed, it is remarkable that
the Arab countries have fought each other far more readily than they have the
real aggressors from the outside.
The
result today, after the invasion of Iraq, is an Arab nation that is badly
demoralised, crushed and beaten down, less able to do anything except acquiesce
in announced American plans to redraw the Middle East map to suit American and
obviously Israeli interests. Even this extraordinarily grandiose scheme has yet
to receive the vaguest collective answer from Arab states who seem to be
hanging around waiting for something new to happen as Bush, Rumsfeld, Powell
and the others lurch from threat to plan to visit to snub to bombing to
unilateral announcement. What makes the whole business especially galling is
that whereas the Arabs have totally accepted the American (or Quartet) roadmap
that seems to have emerged from George Bush's waking dream, the Israelis have
coolly withheld any such acceptance. How does it feel for a Palestinian to
watch a second-rank leader like Abu Mazen, who has always been Arafat's
faithful subordinate, embrace Colin Powell and the Americans when it is clear
to the youngest child that the roadmap is designed a) to stimulate a
Palestinian civil war and b) to offer Palestinian compliance with
Israeli-American demands for "reform" in return for nothing much at
all. How much further can we sink?
And
as for American plans in Iraq, it is now absolutely clear that what is going to
happen is nothing less than an old-fashioned colonial occupation rather like
Israel's since 1967. The idea of bringing in American-style democracy to Iraq
means basically aligning the country with US policy, i.e. a peace treaty with
Israel, oil markets for American profit, and civil order kept to a minimum that
neither permits real opposition nor real institution building. Perhaps even the
idea is to turn Iraq into civil war Lebanon. I am not certain. But take one
small example of the kind of planning that is being undertaken. It was recently
announced in the US press that a 32-year-old assistant professor of law, Noah
Feldman, at New York University, would be responsible for producing a new Iraqi
constitution. It was mentioned in all the media accounts of this major
appointment that Feldman was an extraordinarily brilliant expert in Islamic
law, had studied Arabic since he was 15, and grew up as an Orthodox Jew. But he
has never practiced law in the Arab world, never been to Iraq, and seems to
have no real practical background in the problems of post-war Iraq. What an
open-faced snub not only to Iraq itself, but also to the legions of Arab and
Muslim legal minds who could have done a perfectly acceptable job in the
service of Iraq's future. But no, America wants it done by a fresh young
fellow, so as to be able to say, "we have given Iraq its new
democracy". The contempt is thick enough to cut with a knife.
The
seeming powerlessness of the Arabs in the face of all this is what is so
discouraging, and not only because no real effort has been expended on
fashioning a collective response to it. To someone who reflects on the
situation from the outside as I do, it is amazing that in this moment of crisis
there has been no evidence of any sort of appeal from the rulers to their
people for support in what needs to be seen as a collective national threat.
American military planners have made no secret of the fact that what they plan
is radical change for the Arab world, a change that they can impose by force of
arms and because there is little that opposes them. Moreover, the idea behind
the effort seems to be nothing less than destroying the underlying unity of the
Arab people once and for all, changing the bases of their lives and aspirations
irremediably.
To
such a display of power I would have thought that an unprecedented alliance
between Arab rulers and people represented the only possible deterrence. But
that, clearly, would require an undertaking by every Arab government to open
its society to its people, bring them in so to speak, remove all the repressive
security measures in order to provide an organised opposition to the new
imperialism. A people coerced into war, or a people silenced and repressed will
never rise to such an occasion. What we must have are Arab societies released
finally from their self-imposed state of siege between ruler and ruled. Why not
instead welcome democracy in the defence of freedom and self- determination?
Why not say, we want each and every citizen willing to be mobilised in a common
front against a common enemy? We need every intellectual and every political force
to pull together with us against the imperial scheme to redesign our lives
without our consent. Why must resistance be left to extremism and desperate
suicide bombers?
As
a digression, I might mention here that when I read last year's United Nations Human
Development Report on the Arab World, I was struck by how little appreciation
there was in it for imperialist intervention in the Arab world, and how deep
and long-standing its effect has been. I certainly don't think that all our
problems come from the outside, but I wouldn't want to say that all our
problems were of our own making. Historical context and the problems of
political fragmentation play a very great role, which the Report itself pays
little attention to. The absence of democracy is partially the result of
alliances made between Western powers on the one hand, and minority ruling
regimes or parties on the other, not because the Arabs have no interest in
democracy but because democracy has been seen as a threat by several actors in
the drama. Besides, why adopt the American formula for democracy (usually a
euphemism for the free market and little attention paid to human entitlement
and social services) as the only one? This is a subject that needs considerably
more debate than I have time for here. So let me return to my main point.
Consider
how much more effective today the Palestinian position might have been under
the US-Israeli onslaught had there been a common show of unity instead of an
unseemly scramble for positions on the delegation to see Colin Powell. I have
not understood over the years why it is that Palestinian leaders have been
unable to develop a common unified strategy for opposing the occupation and not
getting diverted into one or another Mitchell, Tenet, or Quartet plan. Why not
say to all Palestinians, we face one enemy whose design on our lands and lives
is well-known and must be fought by us all together? The root problem
everywhere, and not just in Palestine, is the fundamental rift between ruler
and ruled that is one of the distorted offshoots of imperialism, this basic
fear of democratic participation, as if too much freedom might lose the
governing colonial elite some favour with the imperial authority. The result,
of course, is not only the absence of real mobilisation of everyone in the
common struggle, but the perpetuation of fragmentation and petty factionalism.
As things now stand, there are too many uninvolved, non- participating Arab
citizens in the world today.
Whether
they want to or not, the Arab people today face a wholesale attack on their
future by an imperial power, America, that acts in concert with Israel, to
pacify, subdue, and finally reduce us to a bunch of warring fiefdoms whose
first loyalty is not to their people but to the great superpower (and its local
surrogate) itself. Not to understand that this is the conflict that will shape
our area for decades to come is willingly to blind oneself. What is now needed
is a breaking of the iron bands that tie Arab societies into sullen knots of
disaffected people, insecure leaders, and alienated intellectuals. This is an
unprecedented crisis. Unprecedented means are therefore required to confront
it. The first step then is to realise the scope of the problem, and then go on
to overcome what reduces us to helpless rage and marginalised reaction, a
condition by no means to be accepted willingly. The alternative to such an
unattractive condition promises a great deal more hope.
Edward Said
is University Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia
University, and is a leading Palestinian intellectual and activist. Among his
books are The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (Pantheon, 2000),
Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace
Process (Vintage, 1996), and Out of Place: A Memoir (Knopf, 1999).
This article first appeared in Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt)