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Uncertainty
in Saudi Arabia
by
Matthew Riemer
May
29, 2003
The
leadership in Saudi Arabia is in danger and, in fact, has been for some time.
The Arabian Peninsula, the heart and soul of the Islamic world since its genesis
1400 years ago, has now become the shelter for one of the Middle East's most
austere and traditional governments and societies. And it is because of this
that the opaque administration of an ailing King Fahd and his ostensible, yet
highly contested, successor, Crown Prince Abdullah, is coming under extreme
pressure from both without and within.
For
the last several months, factions within Washington's intellectual and foreign
policy circles have been calling for the reevaluation of the United States' relationship
with the desert monarchy. Many opine that the negative aspects of the existing
regime (the Kingdom's perceived social repression and complicity with
terrorists) now outweigh the positive ones (Saudi Arabia contains the largest
quantities of the most crucial resource on the planet: oil).
Usually,
most critics begin with the fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers involved in the
September 11th attacks were Saudi nationals. They then point to a political
system (or lack thereof) and society that most Westerners find a bit
repressive, if not backward and wholly unacceptable -- one which nurtures and
exports terrorism. When combined with the geopolitical significance of Saudi
oil reserves, the country becomes one over which Washington can't help but
exert a certain amount of control and, if need be, critics maintain, its
desires for the Kingdom can legitimately be realized through force or
"regime change."
In
July 2002, during a briefing given to the Defense Advisory Board, a group that
advises the Pentagon, an analyst with the Rand Corporation, Laurent Murawiec,
depicted Saudi Arabia as a terrorist state that should be considered an enemy
of the United States.
Murawiec
said, "The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from
planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldier, from ideologist to
cheerleader. Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies [and is
responsible for a] daily outpouring of virulent hatred against the U.S. from
Saudi media, 'educational' institutions, clerics, officials -- Saudis tell us
one thing in private; do the contrary in reality."
Towards
the end of the presentation, he added: "There is an 'Arabia,' but it needs
not be 'Saudi.'" A brief list is also given, outlining interests
Washington could target in order to pressure Riyadh: oil, economic security,
The Holy Places.
This
briefing caused a wave of anti-Saudi stories to flood the mainstream media in
the United States. From radio talk shows to cable news to political journals,
the U.S.-Saudi relationship was experiencing new levels of scrutiny. For
example, News Hour with Jim Lehrer ran a segment entitled "Friend or
Foe" in reference to Saudi Arabia. This despite the fact that many in the
Bush administration were quick to point out that this was not U.S. policy
(essentially calling Saudi Arabia evil and supporting regime change), and that
Washington maintained an excellent relationship with Riyadh.
Defense
Department spokeswoman Victoria Clarke said at the time, "Saudi Arabia is
a long-standing friend and ally of the United States. The Saudis cooperate
fully in the global war on terrorism and have the Department's and the
Administration's deep appreciation." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
made similar comments, and Secretary of State Colin Powell personally called
Saudi Arabia to advise Prince Faisal that nothing in the relationship between
the two countries had changed, though a heightened sense of Saudi Arabia's
terrorist connection persists to the present.
Additionally,
as Western opinion exerts pressure from without, many factors work on the Saudi
leadership's political control from within, hoping for their own kind of regime
change. Since Saddam Hussein's fateful invasion of neighboring Kuwait during
the summer of 1990 and Saudi Arabia's subsequent and close cooperation with
Washington, the Saudi royal family has become one of Osama bin Laden's and
al-Qaeda's chief targets.
Bin
Laden took exception when the Saudis rejected his offer of assistance to help
oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and, instead, turned to Washington. This
resulted in the stationing of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in the
region. Ever since, one of bin Laden's central conditions for a cease-fire in
the "war on terrorism" has been the removal of U.S. troops from the
Arabian Peninsula. Other hard-line, ideologically right movements within much
of the Middle East were also offended that King Fahd allowed foreign troops to
use Saudi soil to attack another Arab country. Riyadh's final split with bin
Laden occurred in 1994 when they revoked his Saudi citizenship.
The
recent bombings in Riyadh, targeting compounds where hundreds of foreign
workers involved in the training of the Saudi Arabian National Guard reside,
indicate that terrorist forces still have as their goal the destabilization or
ouster of the Saudi regime.
There's
also domestic pressure from a society that can only be kept sheltered from Western
influence and technological modernization for so long. Communications
technology alone is influencing societies and organizational potentials like
never before. Because of this, Saudi society has a greater window on the rest
of the world than at any other time in their history. People are simply now
more aware of what their country does not offer them.
This
greatly threatens the House of Saud's power because it has been this very
ignorance that has kept citizens indoctrinated in the monarchy's own version of
history, which emphasizes the legitimacy of the Saudi dynasty through the
mythologizing of the dynasty's founder, Ibn Saud. Wahhabism and its founder,
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, are also emphasized, but to a lesser degree,
creating another point of contention between the monarchy and its
fundamentalist critics; by stressing Saudi lineage more than Wahhabism, many
feel that Islam occupies a secondary role in official state history.
The
more Saudis know about the history of their region, other branches of Islam,
and alternative political systems, the less "royal" and God-given the
House of Saud will appear to be; they will become more illegitimate -- both
politically and religiously -- with each passing year. Moreover, communications
and information technologies will be instrumental in the dissemination of these
sentiments. The threat from religious fundamentalists, including those
militants fighting for more specific political causes, will complement the less
radical but more legitimate domestic dissent. Diplomatic ambiguity on the part
of the United States and widely consumed news that questions Saudi Arabia's
role in the war on terror will only assist in the creation of a global and
regional environment that threatens to irreparably destabilize Saudi Arabia and
possibly topple the House of Saud.
Matthew Riemer has written for
years about a myriad of topics, such as: philosophy, religion, psychology,
culture, and politics. He studied Russian language and culture for five years
and traveled in the former Soviet Union in 1990. He is a columnist and editor
with Yellow Times.org, where this
article first appeared. Matthew lives in the United States, and he encourages
your comments: mriemer@YellowTimes.org