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by
George Monbiot
June
9, 2003
Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman were smart operators. They knew that the hegemony of the
United States could not be sustained without the active compliance of other
nations. So they set out, before and after the end of the Second World War, to
design a global political system which permitted the other powers to believe
that they were part of the governing project.
When
Franklin Roosevelt negotiated the charter of the United Nations, he demanded
that the United States should have the power to block any decisions the UN
sought to make. But he also permitted the other victors of the war and their
foremost allies - the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China and France - to
wield the same veto.
After
Harry Dexter White, Roosevelt's negotiator at the Bretton Woods talks in 1944,
had imposed on the world two bodies, the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, whose underlying purpose was to sustain the financial power of US,
he appeased the other powerful nations by granting them a substantial share of
the vote. Rather less publicly, he ensured that both institutions required an
85% majority to pass major resolutions, and that the US would cast 17% of the
votes in the IMF, and 18% of the votes in the World Bank.
Harry
Truman struggled to install a global trade regime which would permit the
continuing growth of the US economy without alienating the nations upon whom
that growth depended. He tried to persuade Congress to approve an International
Trade Organisation which allowed less developed countries to protect their
infant industries, transferred technology to poorer nations and prevented
corporations from forming global monopolies. Congress blocked it. But, until
the crisis in Seattle in 1999, when the poor nations were forced to reject the
outrageous proposals inserted by the US and the European Union, successive
administrations seemed to understand the need to allow the leaders of other
countries at least to pretend to their people that they were helping to set the
global trade rules.
The
system designed in the 1940s, whose ultimate objective was to ensure that the
United States remained the pre-eminent global power, appeared, until very
recently, to be unchallengeable. There was no constitutional means of
restraining the US: it could veto any attempt to cancel its veto. Yet this
system was not sufficiently offensive to other powerful governments to force
them to confront it. They knew that there was less to be lost by accepting
their small share of power and supporting the status quo than by upsetting it
and bringing down the wrath of the superpower. It seemed, until March 2003,
that we were stuck with US hegemony.
But
the men who govern the United States today are greedy. They cannot understand
why they should grant concessions to anyone. They want unmediated global power,
and they want it now. To obtain it, they are prepared to destroy the
institutions whose purpose was to sustain their dominion. They have challenged
the payments the United States must make to the IMF and the World Bank. They
have threatened the survival of the World Trade Organisation, by imposing
tariffs on steel and granting massive new subsidies to corporate farmers. And,
to prosecute a war whose overriding purpose was to stamp their authority upon
the world, they have crippled the United Nations. Much has been written over
the past few weeks about how much smarter George Bush is than we permitted
ourselves to believe. But it is clear that his administration has none of the
refined understanding of the mechanics of power that the founders of the
existing world order possessed. In no respect has he made this more evident
than in his assault upon the United States's principal instrument of
international power: the Security Council.
By
going to war without the council's authorisation, and against the wishes of
three of its permanent members and most of its temporary members, Bush's
administration appears to have ceased even to pretend to play by the rules. As
a result, the Security Council may have lost both its residual authority and
its power of restraint. This leaves the leaders of other nations with just two
options.
The
first is to accept that the global security system has broken down and that
disputes between nations will in future be resolved by means of bilateral
diplomacy, backed by force of arms. This means, in other words, direct global
governance by the United States. The influence of its allies - the collateral
against which Tony Blair has mortgaged his reputation - will be exposed as
illusory. It will do precisely as it pleases, however much this undermines
foreign governments. These governments will find this dispensation ever harder
to sell to their own people, especially as US interests come to conflict directly
with their own. They will also be aware that a system of direct global
governance will tend towards war rather than towards peace.
The
second option is to tear up the UN's constitution, override the US veto and
seek to build a new global security system, against the wishes of the hegemon.
This approach was unthinkable just four months ago. It may be irresistible
today.
There
are, of course, recent precedents. In approving the Kyoto protocol on climate
change and the International Criminal Court, other nations, weighing the costs
of a world crudely governed by the United States against the costs of
insubordination, have defied the superpower, to establish a global system in
which it plays no part. Building a new global security system without the involvement
of the US is a far more dangerous project, but there may be no real
alternative. None of us should be surprised if we were to discover that Russia,
France and China have already begun, quietly, to discuss it.
Of
course, one of the dangers attendant on the construction of any system is that
it comes to reflect the interests of its founders. There has, perhaps, never
been a better time to consider what a system based upon justice and democracy
might look like, and then, having decided how it might work in theory, to press
the rebellious governments for its implementation.
There
is no question that the existing arrangement stinks. It's not just that the
five permanent members of the Security Council can override the will of all the
other nations; the General Assembly itself has no greater claim to legitimacy
than the House of Lords. Many of the member states are not themselves
democracies. Even those governments which have come to power by means of
election seldom canvas the opinion of their citizens before deciding how to
cast their vote in international assemblies.
It
is also riddled with rotten boroughs. Many of the citizens of the United States
recognise that there is something wrong with a system in which the 500,000
people of Wyoming can elect the same number of representatives to the Senate as
the 35 million of California. Yet, in the UN General Assembly, the 10,000
people of the Pacific island of Tuvalu possess the same representation as the
one billion people of India. Their per capita vote, in other words, is weighted
100,000-fold.
Even
if all the world's nations were of equal size, so that all the world's citizens
were represented evenly, and even if the Security Council was abolished and no
state, in the real world, was more powerful than any other, the UN would still
fail the basic democratic tests, for the simple reason that its structure does
not match the duties it is supposed to discharge. The United Nations has
awarded itself three responsibilities. Two of these are international duties,
namely to mediate between states with opposing interests and to restrain the
way in which its members treat their own citizens. The third is a global
responsibility: to represent the common interests of all the people of the
world. But it is constitutionally established to discharge only the first of
these functions.
Its
members will unite to condemn the behaviour of a state when that behaviour is
anomalous. But they will tread carefully around the injustices in which almost
all states participate, such as using money which should be spent on health and
education on unnecessary weapons. They will do nothing to defend the common
interests of humanity when these conflict with the common interests of the
states. Nearly all the governments in power today, for example, are those whose
policies are acceptable to the financial markets: they are, in effect, the
representatives of global capital. Radical opposition parties are kept out of
power partly by citizens' fear of how the markets might react if they were
elected. So while it might suit the interests of nearly everyone to re-impose
capital controls and bring many forms of speculation to an end, an assembly of
nation states is unlikely to rid the world of this plague. The preamble to the
UN Charter begins with the words "We the peoples of the United
Nations". It would more accurately read "We the states".
That
the Security Council should be disbanded and its powers devolved to a body
representing all the nation states is evident to anyone who cannot see why
democracy should be turned back at the national border. That the UN General
Assembly, as currently constituted, is ill-suited to the task is equally
obvious. I propose that each nation's vote should be weighted according to both
the number of people it represents and its degree of democratisation.
The
government of Tuvalu, representing 10,000 people, would, then, have a far
smaller vote than the government of China. But China, in turn, would possess far
fewer votes than it would if its government was democratically elected.
Rigorous means of measuring democratisation are beginning to be developed by
bodies such as Democratic Audit. It would not be hard, using their criteria, to
compile an objective global index of democracy. Governments, under this system,
would be presented with a powerful incentive to democratise: the more
democratic they became, the greater their influence over world affairs.
No
nation would possess a veto. The most consequential decisions - to go to war
for example - should require an overwhelming majority of the assembly's
weighted votes. This means that powerful governments wishing to recruit
reluctant nations to their cause would be forced to bribe or blackmail most of
the rest of the world to obtain the results they wanted. The nations whose
votes they needed most would be the ones whose votes were hardest to buy.
But
this assembly alone would be incapable of restraining the way in which its
members treat their own citizens or representing the common interests of all
the people of the world. It seems to me therefore that we require another body,
composed of representatives directly elected by the world's people. Every adult
on earth would possess one vote.
The
implications for global justice are obvious. A resident of Ouagadougou would
have the same potential influence over the decisions this parliament would make
as a resident of Washington. The people of China would possess, between them,
sixteen times as many votes as the people of Germany. It is, in other words, a
revolutionary assembly.
Building
a world parliament is not the same as building a world government. We would be
creating a chamber in which, if it works as it should, the people's
representatives will hold debates and argue over resolutions. In the early
years at least, it commands no army, no police force, no courts, no departments
of government. It need be encumbered by neither president nor cabinet. But what
we would create would be a body which possesses something no other global or
international agency possesses: legitimacy. Directly elected, owned by the
people of the world, our parliament would possess the moral authority which all
other bodies lack. And this alone, if effectively deployed, is a source of power.
Its
primary purpose would be to hold other powers to account. It would review the
international decisions made by governments, by the big financial institutions,
and by bodies such as the reformed UN General Assembly and the World Trade
Organisation. It would, through consultation and debate, establish the broad
principles by which these other bodies should be run. It would study the
decisions they make and expose them to the light. We have every reason to
believe that, if properly constituted, our parliament, as the only body with a
claim to represent the people of the world, would force them to respond. In
doing so, they would reinforce its authority, enhancing its ability to call
them to account in the future.
We
could expect undemocratic states to wish to prevent the election of global
representatives within their territory. But if the General Assembly was
reconstituted along the lines I suggest, they would discover a powerful
incentive to permit such a vote to take place, as this would raise their score
on the global democracy index, and thus increase their formal powers in the
General Assembly. In turn, the parliament's ability to review the decisions of
the General Assembly would reinforce the Assembly's democratic authority.
We
might anticipate a shift of certain powers from the indirectly-elected body to
the directly-elected one. We could begin, in other words, to see the
development of a bicameral parliament for the planet, which starts to exercise
some of the key functions of government. This might sound unattractive, but
only if, as many do, you choose to forget that global governance takes place
whether we participate in it or not. Ours is not a choice between democratic
global governance and no global governance, but between global democracy and
the global dictatorship of the most powerful nations.
None
of this will happen by itself. We can expect the nations seeking to frame a new
global contract to do so in their own interests, just as the victors of the
Second World War did. If we want a new world order (of which a parliamentary
system is necessarily just a small part), we must demand it with the energy and
persistence with which the vast and growing global justice movement has
confronted the old one. But nations seeking to design a new security system
would discover that the perceived legitimacy of their scheme would rise
according to its democratic credentials. If it is true that there are two
superpowers on earth, the US government and global public opinion, then these
nations would do well to recruit the latter in their struggle with the former.
Now
is the time to turn our campaigns against the war-mongering,
wealth-concentrating, planet-consuming world order into a concerted campaign
for global democracy. We must become the Chartists and the Suffragettes of the
21st Century. They understood that to change the world you must propose as well
as oppose. They democratised the nation; now we must seek to democratise the
world. Our task is not to overthrow globalisation, but to capture it, and to
use it as a vehicle for humanity's first global democratic revolution.
George Monbiot is Honorary
Professor at the Department of Politics in Keele and Visiting Professor at the
Department of Environmental Science at the University of East London. He writes
a weekly column for the Guardian newspaper of London. The Age of Consent, George Monbiot's proposals
for global democratic governance, will be published in June. His articles and
contact info can be found at his website: www.monbiot.com