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Patriot
Gore
The
Fatal Flaws in the Patriot Missile System
by
Jeffrey St. Clair
April
19, 2003
Once the rockets are up
Who cares where they come down?
That's not my department
Says Wernher Van Braun.
"Wernher van Braun" by Tom
Lehrer
This
time around it was going to be different. This time around the Patriot missile
was going to live up to all the hype, unlike in the first installment of the
Gulf War when the missiles nearly struck out against Iraqi Scuds, the softballs
of the ballistic missile world.
There
was a lot riding on the Patriot missile system's success. Not just the safety
of American and British troops and journalists or Kuwaitis and Israelis, who
fear they might have been targets of Iraqi Scud missiles (assuming the regime
had any left.) The new and improved Patriot missile also was going to
demonstrate the efficacy of the Bush administration's mad rush to deploy a
revamped Ballistic Missile Defense System, the Star Wars of Reagan's fantasy.
Billions in defense contracts were riding on the backs of those missile
batteries.
As
in the first Gulf War, the initial reports on the new Patriots were
breathlessly glowing. As missile sirens went off in Kuwait, embedded reporters
ritually donned their chemical gas masks, descended into bunkers, then emerged
minutes later to announce that they'd been saved by the mighty Patriot missile.
The
mobile missile batteries supposedly knocked down several Iraqi Scuds headed
toward US Army positions and Kuwait City. Later, it turned out that the
missiles weren't Scuds and they may have been brought down in the Kuwait desert
on their own volition not by US missiles.
Then
came the really bad news. On March 24, a Patriot missile battery near the
Kuwait border locked onto a British Royal Air Force Tornado G-4 jet that was
returning from a raid on Basra. Four Patriot missiles were fired and one hit
the jet, destroying the plane and killing two British pilots.
Two
days later, the radar for another Patriot missile battery locked on to a US
F-16. The pilot of fighter jet located the radar dish and destroyed it.
Then
on April 2 an U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornet was shot down by another Patriot missile,
killing the pilot.
"They're
looking into a software problem," said Navy Lt. Commander Charles Owens.
"They're going to check everything out. When they do find a fault, they'll
put it out to the rest of the world."
But
Pentagon watchers aren't holding their breath. Based on past experience, it's
more likely that Pentagon brass will attempt to obscure the cause rather than
reveal a fatal design flaw in a revered centerpiece in the Army's new arsenal
of smart weapons.
Indeed,
there's plenty of evidence that the Pentagon and the Patriot's contractors
(Raytheon and Lockheed) have known for nearly a decade that the missile has
difficulties discriminating incoming missiles from friendly aircraft.
The
target discrimination problem was first revealed during testing at Nellis Air
Force Base in 1993. During that test an U.S. aircraft simulating a return home
from a mission was flying in a corridor reserved for friendly aircraft but
still would have been "shot down" by the Patriot were it a combat
situation.
Over
the years, billions had been poured into the program with little sign of
improvement in this fundamental and lethal defect. Subsequent exercises and
tests have revealed that the Patriot radar discrimination problems were not
fixed, according to Philip Coyle, former Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, the Pentagon's independent testing office. Coyle says the problems
were identified in so-called Joint Air Defense Operations/Joint Engagement
Zones exercises during the mid-1990s.
Despite
this, the Pentagon pushed to increase production of the Patriot III in the
months leading up to the invasion of Iraq. In November of 2002, Lt. Gen. Ronald
Kadish, the head of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, told Congress that
the Army needed to dramatically step up production of the new Patriots, not
only for use in Iraq but also "to counter threats in North Korea, Iran and
Libya."
"My
recommendation is to buy PAC-3s as fast as we are able to buy them,"
Kadish said. When asked about problems with the system, Kadish brushed them
off, saying they merely "minor" and "annoying." Congress,
ever anxious to peddle Pentagon pork, consented, boosting Patriot missile
production by more than 10 percent.
As
usual with the Pentagon, cost is no object. But the Patriot is a very expensive
system and it's getting costlier all the time. Raytheon and Lockheed originally
promised to deliver the new Patriot system for $3.7 billion dollars. Now the
cost has soared to $7.8 billion. Each Patriot missile costs about $170 million.
In the first Gulf War, four missiles were launched against a single incoming
Scud.
The
old PAC-2 is seriously flawed. But the new version of the Patriot has struggled
through field testing, although this didn't deter the Pentagon's rush to
increase production. Through the summer of 2002, the new Patriot missile had
failed more than half of its field tests.
From
the beginning there were signs of serious glitches in the software program that
guides the missile. The program was two years behind schedule and the costs
soared from $557 million to $1.1 billion for the software alone. And it still
never worked right. By 2001, the cost overruns for the system had topped $10
million a month.
You
simply can't trust the Pentagon to be honest about the performance of its big
ticket items. During the first Gulf War, the generals crowed about the success
of the Patriot, saying that it hit more than 80 percent of its targets. In
fact, the missile scarcely hit any incoming missiles, as was revealed in a
General Accounting Office investigation. The GAO audit concluded that the
Patriot missiles hit less than 9 percent of the Iraqi Scud missiles that were
launched during the first Gulf conflict.
"The
results of these studies are disturbing," said Theodore Postol, the MIT
scientist who studied the Patriot missile's kill rate in the first Gulf War.
"They suggest that the Patriot's intercept rate during the Gulf War was
very low. The evidence from these preliminary studies indicates that the
Patriot's intercept rate could be much lower than 10 percent, perhaps even
zero." The Pentagon went after Postol with a vengeance, accusing him of
using classified documents for his conclusions on the ineptitude of the Patriot
missile system.
What's
more disturbing is that the Pentagon knew all this and covered it up. So did
the Patriot's prime contractor, Raytheon. In the immediate aftermath of the
Gulf War, the US Army issued two assessments on the Patriot missile system's
performance: one on Patriot Scud kills in Israel and another in Saudi Arabia.
Initially, the Pentagon claimed a success rate of 80 percent in Saudi Arabia
and 50 percent in Israel. A few months later, the Pentagon scaled those back to
70 percent and 40 percent. A year later, the Pentagon admitted that they had a
high degree of confidence in only "ten percent" of the kills.
Why
the slow comedown? American wars have served as live fire arms shows. The hype
on the Patriot, which the US media eagerly gobbled up, was designed to help market
the missile system to other nations. In the immediate aftermath of the first
Gulf War, more than a dozen nations placed orders for Patriot missile systems.
The contracts were signed before the purchasers (including Turkey, South Korea,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) learned of the Patriot's weak batting average.
There
were lethal consequences to the Patriot's failures during the first Gulf War,
which the Pentagon glossed over. On February 25, 1991, a Patriot missile
battery in Dharan, Saudi Arabia missed an incoming Iraqi Scud. The Scud hit an
Army barrack housing US soldiers. The rocket attack killed 28 people and
injured more than 100 others.
The
Patriot missile is based on 1970s technology and was originally designed for
use as an anti-aircraft weapon, a role it reverted to with tragic consequences
in the latest Gulf War. In the 1980s, the Patriot was modified to serve as an anti-ballistic
missile system for use against short-range rocket attacks.
"The
Pentagon has known for a decade that the Patriot cannot distinguish its targets
from our own aircraft," says Danielle Brian, Executive Director of the Project on Government Oversight, a Pentagon
watchdog group. "It is an outrage that they have not fixed this
fundamental flaw, yet continue to buy it and sell it to our allies, and have
the gall to promote this weapon in both Gulf Wars as a star when they've known
it is a dud."
Jeffrey St.
Clair's new book, Been Brown So Long, It Looked Like Green to Me: The
Politics of Nature, will be published in September by Common Courage Press.
He is co-editor of CounterPunch with Alexander Cockburn, the nation’s finest
muckraking newsletter, where this article first appeared (www.counterpunch.org). He can be
contacted at stclair@counterpunch.org