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Quest
to Reify Canada as a Middle Power
Iraq
and the Canadian Choice
by
Kim Petersen
Dissident Voice
May
10, 2003
States are not moral agents, people are, and can impose moral
standards on powerful institutions.
-- Noam
Chomsky
Canada
has for a long time pinned its foreign policy on an international order
regulated by multilateral institutions -- with an emphasis upon the UN and
militarily on NATO. Co-operating with a host of nations Canada has sought an
ill-defined status as a middle power. Simultaneously Canada is firmly
entrenched in the western orbit dominated by the US. Being under the aegis of
the world’s only superpower affects Canada’s sought-after status as an
independent middle power. The events transpiring on the heels of 9-11 and the
Persian Gulf War have exposed the frailty of a Canadian foreign policy based,
in large part, on the role of an honest broker between the hegemon and much of
the world.
Canada and the US
That
Canada is firmly within the economic sphere of the US is undeniable. The
preponderance of Canadian exports and imports is to and from the US. Canada is
in NAFTA, a so-called free trade pact with the US and Mexico. Yet even this
treaty status with its southern neighbor hasn’t prevented hostile trade actions
against Canada in lumber, wheat, and sugar goods.
Canada
shares many US interests militarily. Both are NATO member countries and the US
and Canada also co-operate on air defense in NORAD. Canada was part of the
US-led coalitions in the Korean War, Persian Gulf War, and the Kosovo War.
Despite support for many US military forays abroad, Canada has its own
jurisdictional disputes with the US. Canada was offended when the US declared
the Northwest Passage as international waters; there is also the dispute on the
demarcation of the boundary between BC and Alaska in the Dixon Strait. There is
even a dispute over which salmon are Canadian salmon and which are American
salmon; salmon have the exasperating tendency not to confine themselves to
territorial waters. Generally these disputes are handled relatively amicably.
The
relationship between Canada and the US is a friendly one. Canada is usually
receptive to American foreign policy. When Iranian students took Americans
hostage in Tehran, many Americans were concealed in the Canadian embassy and
eventually liberated to a grateful US. Following the US, Canada entered into a
free trade pact with Israel despite Israel’s egregious human rights record in
the Occupied Territories. At the Racism Conference in Durban, South Africa, a
meeting boycotted by the US, Canada shamefully tried to marginalize any
discussion of Israeli crimes against Palestinians.
Canada and the World
Canada
in recent history has been a firm supporter of the UN and international order.
But even Canada’s actions in the League of Nations worked to undermine its
existence. (1) Canada has a predilection for membership in
international institutions. Canada is a member of inter alia the
Commonwealth, la Francophonie, G8, OECD, OAS, CONCAF, APEC, IMF, WTO, and
others.
Canada
has not done badly by its support for the UN and Canadians have stood out.
Prime Minister Lester Pearson was granted a Nobel Peace Prize for his role in
mediating the Suez Crisis; this was a precursor to the formation of UN
Peacekeeping Units. Canadian diplomat John Peters Humphrey is acknowledged as
the main framer of the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights. Recently Canadian
UN emissary Maurice Strong has been mediating the standoff between North Korea
and the US.
Alex
Morrison wrote: “Support for the United Nations and its aspirations is
fundamental to postwar Canadian foreign and security policy and is heavily
endorsed by all Canadians.” (2) Thus active Canadian
participation in the UN was part of securing its place in the world system.
Former Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent proclaimed, “If there is one conclusion
that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this
country lies in the development of a firm structure of international
organization.” (3) Canadian prime ministers since have
echoed the Mr. St. Laurent line with the UN as the cornerstone of Canadian
foreign policy. An exception was the Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
who stated, “good relations, super relations with the United States will be the
cornerstone of [Canadian] foreign policy.” (4)
In
the early years of the Prime Ministership of Jean Chrétien, Canadian foreign
policy was characterized as veering toward neo-isolationism. (5)
The Mulroney years had seen a greater supportive role for the US in Canada’s
foreign policy and it was to be seen whether Chrétien’s ruling Liberal Party
would pull the foreign policy rudder back on its traditional post-WWII
internationalist course. It seemed axiomatic from Mr. Chrétien’s speech to the
Empire Club in Toronto as a then Liberal Party leadership candidate that Canada
would orient according to its standard internationalist path. “I want a foreign
policy that will pursue solutions to the emerging environmental crisis. I want
a foreign policy that will ensure Canada's independence and strength in a
multilateral as opposed to a continental framework. I want a foreign policy
that secures greater independence in our dealings with the United States.” (6)
Scholars
Rioux and Hay, however, maintained that Canada under Mr. Chrétien was actually
engaging in “selective internationalism.” A negative fiscal situation and
Canada’s having “no choice” but to align itself with the US position were
proffered as factors accounting for Canada’s selective internationalism. They
charged that while Mr. Chrétien’s Liberals pretended it was business as usual,
in fact this was “the most isolationist government since Mackenzie King’s in
the 1930s.” (7)
Middle Power Status
Rioux
and Hay questioned, “whether a foreign policy based purely on economic
self-interests befits a respected middle power of Canada’s status?” Without
much elaboration the authors opined that longer-term economic goals might be
more dependent on Canada’s diplomatic and military policies.
Since
the publication of Rioux and Hay’s paper, Canada under Foreign Affairs Minister
Lloyd Axworthy carried off a major diplomatic coup with important military
ramifications: the Ottawa Process, a treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines.
The Ottawa Process was an initiative rendered possible by Canada’s global
institutional connections. (8) This effectively sidelined
the selective internationalist hypothesis.
Definition of a Middle Power
If
middle powerism is a relevant concept then it is important to try and get some
kind of definitional grip on what being a middle power entails. In the context
under discussion, power per se refers to a status within a relationship,
geopolitically between two or more states. Power then reflects the influence
one state exerts over the behavior of another state. This power can stem from
economic, military, and/or political strength and it can be wielded benignly or
nefariously.
Somewhat
obviously Canada’s middle power status has been defined as simply indicating
that Canada is more powerful than a number of nations in the world but not one
of the great powers. At this juncture there is only one superpower nation and
arguably no great national powers but rather gradations of powers.
In
her defense paper, Mollie Royds views middle power status as “a certain content
and style of foreign policy.” She saw this Canadian middle power reflected as
human security and soft power under Mr. Axworthy. (9) The
concept of soft power poses another definitional construct.
Ms.
Royds averred that Canada is sensitive to the international system. This is
true more or less for every country differing only in degree of sensitivity.
Surely even the US felt the opprobrium of the world at its aggression of Iraq.
The US because of its power can shrug and continue on only suffering a
diminished moral standing in the world. The other powers don’t have this
luxury.
Canadian
diplomat Yves Fortier opined that Canada is no longer a middle power due to the
huge membership in the UN now. (10) If so then whether or
not Canada is a middle power is of minimal importance; therefore the
definitional consideration of middle powerism is largely irrelevant
Prelude
to the Re-intensification of the Persian Gulf War
Mr.
Axworthy’s foreign policy thesis was simply for Canada “to make a commitment,
because it is on this commitment that its very survival will depend.” (11)
This
commitment has been very much tested since 9-11. Canada did join a host of
nations with the US in the invasion of Afghanistan. There was a feeble argument
that the US was defending itself according to Article 7 of the UN Charter.
US
President Bush and his hawkish coterie next set their sights on Iraq. The
spurious rationale of self-defense to justify a pre-emptive attack on a
“fundamentally disarmed” Iraq defied all imagination. In the years since 1991
Iraq had also wilted economically from the genocidal UN sanctions regime that
claimed over half million lives. The US-UK attack was contrary to the UN
Charter and not explicitly provided for by UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR).
Canada
was fearful of the US acting unilaterally and the negative implications for
multilateralism. Mr. Chrétien cautioned, "The price of being the world's only
superpower is that its motives are sometimes questioned by others … Great
strength is not always perceived by others as benign. Not everyone around the
world is prepared to take the word of the United States on faith."
Canada’s UN Ambassador Paul Heinbecker thought that “Iraq is substantially
contained and that if it co-operates, the disarmament of Iraq can be had
without a shot being fired.” If the US had accepted such reasoning, it would
have spared Canada some diplomatic anguish.
Canada
was in the position of having to choose between it neighbor and its fealty for
the international system. Ottawa waffled, and procrastinated by deferring to
the outcome of a sought-after second resolution in the UNSC. Canada showed no
leadership on debating the issue on its merits. The implication was that the
second resolution made the issue not only legal but correct. This is a kind of
blind adherence to law: a conventional level of morality.
The
US sought a quick resolution declaring Iraq in material breach of UNSCR 1441.
France, Germany, and Russia countered that inspections should be given more
time and China also nodded its assent. It was feared that the US intended to
seize upon any second resolution as legitimating the waging of war on Iraq,
this despite the US insisting all along that 1441 already gave the US all it
needed to move against Iraq.
This
was completely disingenuous. The UN cannot give its imprimatur to a war of
aggression; it would subvert its own raison d’être as the opening
preamble of the UN declares its mission to spare future generations from “the
scourge of war.”
Into
this fray stepped Canada with its middle power proposal entitled “Ideas on
Bridging the Divide,” what Canada touted as a compromise to extend the US
deadline slightly. The UK picked up on this and did move the date to 17 March.
This was eight days shy of the Canadian deadline. Canada Foreign Minister Bill
Graham was quick to note that the UK’s proposed changes were similar to ideas
in the Canadian compromise: "The prime minister's and others' diplomacy is
bearing some fruit." Military analysts adduced the UK compromise to be
spurious as the US-UK forces wouldn’t be in place until 17 March. This new UK
deadline only reflected the military lacunae and could not truly be construed
as a compromise. Neither could the Canadian proposal properly be construed as
much of a compromise. The six holdout members of the UNSC had requested 45
days, France had asked for six months, and UNMOVIC head Hans Blix said he
needed months. Clearly the Canadian compromise was biased heavily to the US
timetable. Nevertheless diplomatic journalist Bhupinder S. Liddar suggested
that despite the failure of the Canadian initiative, it was a victory for
Canada in that it had gained notice at a time when Canada was not even on the
UNSC. (12)
When
it became clear the UNSC wouldn’t okay a second resolution, Canada had to
decide what to do.
Canadian
historian Jack Granatstein maintained that Canada “has no choice … Canadian
policy must be devoted to keeping the [US] elephant fed and happy.” (13) To this University of Toronto professor Stephen
Clarkson stingingly pointed out the “stunning self-contradiction” of
predicating Canadian sovereignty upon submission to US fiat. (14)
In
the end, however, Canada pursued its own path. Said Mr. Chrétien: "Canada
has its own international policy. Canada must follow its own approach. Our
approach is to support multilateral institutions. We will continue on that
path."
Canada Post-Invasion
Politically
the Liberal government’s decision not to support the US-UK invasion was
supported by the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois. The opposition
Alliance Party ineffectually attacked the government while the Progressive
Conservatives remained low-key. The Alliance Party had plummeted in the polls
and the Liberal decision was viewed at that time as representative of
Canadians.
In
a curious twist on diplomacy, the US Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci began
an aggressive démarche. Mr. Cellucci declaimed: "There is no
security threat to Canada that the United States would not be ready, willing
and able to help with. There would be no debate. There would be no hesitation.
We would be there for Canada, part of our family."
This
is a fallacious statement. The US is unabashed in pursuing its “national
interest.” The US subversion of the UN only highlights this. The Iraqi security
threat to the US was an act of conjuration. Furthermore there is no genuine
security threat against Canada; in fact, many Canadians perceive the US as the
major threat. Historically the threat of US expansionism had hastened the birth
of Canada and its incorporation of the western provinces. For Mr. Cellucci to
rabbit on about threats to Canadian security is to indulge in fanciful
speculation. Canadian foreign policy is accomplished through diplomacy.
Consequently Canada has not been a prime target of terrorists. The true
security threat to Canada most likely arises from the degree of support
accorded the US in its own state or state-sponsored terrorism wreaked abroad.
The
undiplomatic bombast reached such a level that Liberals considered sanctioning
Mr. Cellucci. Leader of the Opposition Stephen Harper was aggrieved upon
hearing of this and asked: "Why does the prime minister not grasp that his
stance is deeply injurious to our national interest?" (15)
The “national interest” is a curious term coming from the mouth of a Canadian.
It is something more commonly attributed to American politicians. Incisive
political critic Noam Chomsky defined the US national interest as “a
mystification devised to conceal the special interests of those with domestic
power.” (16) Another critic of the federal Liberal
refusal to support US adventurism in Iraq was erstwhile Ontario Premier Michael
Harris. Mr. Harris, in his address to the right-wing Fraser Institute think
tank, also spoke to Canadian national interest: "Canada's foreign policy
must stem from the very essence of what we stand for. Advancing freedom and
democracy is in our national interest." (17) That
all sounds very fanciful and proper but it is in hypocritical contradiction to
Canadian support for dictators such as Suharto in Indonesia and the Communist
Party in China.
Mr.
Harris saw fit to lambaste the “decision to keep Canada out of the effort to
disarm Iraq [which] is a betrayal of Canadian values, of our national interest
and of our closest allies." (18) This is insincere
as Canada supported UNMOVIC’s attempt to disarm Iraq. It was the US that pulled
the plug on UNMOVIC as it had pulled the plug on UNSCOM earlier. Now the
political heat is on Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair as to where the claimed weapons of
mass destruction are. The oft-shifting demands on Iraq fixated on regime
change, which accords with Mr. Harris’s other cynical definition of Canadian
national interest.
The
Bush administration approach to the UN diplomacy took the form of slipshod
intelligence, omitting exculpatory intelligence, power games, bribing, and
dirty tricks, all of which turned out to be unsuccessful. Mr. Chomsky said that
“[u]sually, the world succumbs” to the US position. The fact that it didn’t
this time represented “a failure of coercion.” (19)
Canada has witnessed similar bullying and threats in face of its refusal to
join the so-called “coalition of the willing.” To the Chrétien government’s
credit Canada remained committed to its chosen path.
Canada and the US Occupation of Iraq
Following
the fall of the Iraqi regime chaos ruled. Looting and pillage reached alarming
levels as the US and UK abnegated their legal obligation to restore order.
Embassies were emptied, even Iraq’s ancient history was pillaged, and the
hospitals, already with pitiful stocks, saw doctors take to carrying guns to
protect medical supplies. The US was either overwhelmed or insouciant. Judging
from the “Stuff happens,” remark by US Minister of War Donald Rumsfeld, it was
at least partially the latter.
The
US sought to shirk some of its financial responsibility in Iraq elsewhere. The
US suddenly realized the crushing burden of external debt on a developing country;
it wanted to have Iraq’s debts forgiven, meaning a large write-off for lending
nations such as debt-ridden Russia. Russia and other lenders were recalcitrant.
There was no US acknowledgement of the necessity to write off the crippling
debt of other countries with stifled development. The US focus was on its
“baby,” as NY Times columnist Thomas Friedman had derisively referred to the
cradle of civilization. In furtherance of its maternal responsibility, the US
then went cap in hand to the “irrelevant” UN to provide some humanitarian
nurturance for Iraq.
Canada
of course had always stated that it would help in the reconstruction of Iraq.
Mr. Cellucci took the unusual step of preemptively spelling out Canada’s
contribution while the government maintained it was still mulling over exactly
what form Canada’s contribution would take. (20) Not
surprisingly it took the form as pronounced by Mr. Cellucci.
Yet
still more was required for Canada to be welcomed back into the good graces of
Washington’s neocons. Ever since the wrap-up of the US do-good Operation Iraqi
Freedom Canada has seen fit to try and make amends and not be left looking in
the window from outside. Mr. Cellucci again jumps in and provides an opening
for Mr. Chrétien with his renewed call to join the US Missile Defense Shield
project -- Star Wars 2. The straining US economy has been looking for allies to
give the project legitimacy and offset the high costs. Canada, in an apparent
volte-face, is now mulling over the project with a renewed interest. Canadian
Prime Minister-in waiting Paul Martin is said to be unequivocally on the side
of participation. So it is just a matter of time. Never mind that Star Wars 1
was an abject failure and that tests done so far indicate likewise for the
sequel, Canada is about to partake in a project that turns tail on its
longstanding policy of pursuing disarmament through treaties. One way for states to counter Star Wars 2 is
to develop nuclear weapons or increase their nuclear missile arsenal.
Canada and the other Superpower
Canada
made its decision to stand by its commitment to the rule of international law
within the framework of the UN. Canada was involved but certainly didn’t lead
in the diplomatic phase. The US, UK, Russia, China, France, Germany, and a
gaggle of other countries declared their stance firmly and early on. Canada
gave out mixed signals. At one point Canada’s Defense Minister John McCallum
even appeared to indicate that Canada would provide a military contingent
without UN sanction to the US-UK invasion. (21)
Canada
did garner some respect for its role as a mediator and presented a so-called a
compromise to the UNCS, which was rejected by the US. Meanwhile Canada awaited
a UNSC decision on a second resolution that the US unceremoniously pulled off
the table at the prospect of abject defeat. It was Canadian fence-sitting
approaching the cancelled UNSC vote that was a blow to middle power
pretensions. The Canadian follow-through, however, on its commitment to
multilateralism restored a confidence in Canada’s willingness to pursue its own
foreign policy agenda outside the US vortex. This belated staunchness found
Canada, however, in a kind of geopolitical limbo during the Persian Gulf
debacle.
In
the lead-up to the aggression, the only real obstacle that arose to the US
superpower was dubbed “the second superpower,” the will of the citizenry. A
plurality of people took to the streets in many countries to express their
opposition to war. They united as a moral voice against what UK Prime Minister
Blair, in apparent desperation at earlier effete and failed casus belli,
risibly proffered as a moral war. The moral crusade of Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair
was in absurd antithesis to the moral weight of Mr. Blair’s own highest
clerics, the Pope, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, and a bevy of Nobel
Laureates.
In
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the despised Ba’athist regime, a
strutting Mr. Blair, ever quick to grab the political opportunity, has ridden
the momentum to surging polling heights. The jury is out on whether the
pro-peace movement squandered a chance to seize a worldwide phenomenon. The
pro-peace movement was a coalescing of other causes opting for a better world.
These groups fighting to abolish poverty, end famine and disease epidemics,
protect the environment, end racism, bring about real democracy and civil
rights united against the illogic of war. As a counterweight to the US
military-industrial superpower the pro-peace superpower arose as a superpower
of morality. How much of a superpower the peace movement was, or will be, still
remains to be seen.
As
for the nebulous concept of middle powerism, it is past time to reject such a
mediocre ambition. Semantically it is an aberration. Canada never has sought,
and doesn’t seek, a middle zone among world nations. Canada views middle powerism
as an elite international status, a status emboldened by it’s being a G7
member.
Canada
sided with the UN. Canada could have also allied itself overtly with the
network of pro-peace groups that unsuccessfully tried to stop the war. In the
contest between superpowers the US won this particular aspect of the battle. It
may well turn out to be a pyrrhic victory. The pro-peace movement can never be
a loser. It will emerge victorious in the battle for the moral high ground; and
that may be the most important battle to win.
Mr.
Granatstein nixed the notion of a superior Canadian morality. (22)
This is evinced by Canada’s muted response to a clear act of aggression by the
US-UK, what the Nuremberg Military Tribunal termed “the accumulated evil of the
whole.” Yet apparently Mr. Cellucci thought it very important to garner
Canadian support in the so-called “coalition of the willing.”
Canada
does have a relatively respected standing among the world’s peoples. Indeed
Americans abroad, now especially, find it convenient to masquerade as
Canadians.
Canada
could enhance its prominence through alignment with the pro-peace and global
justice movements. One country or group of countries must be first and serve as
a leader among nations -- a leader based on principle and not selfish national
interest. Members of such a moral alliance would not need to squirm or take
umbrage at diplomatic gadflies. It is the dream of people in the global justice
movement to see nation states rise above Machiavellian geopolitics and join
with the grassroots of the world. There is no need to strive to middle powerism.
Canada along with other nations could be part of the moral superpower, the
superpower of peace.
Kim Petersen is an English teacher
living in China. He can be contacted at: kotto2001@hotmail.com
References
(1) Yves Fortier, “Canada and the United Nations: A Half Century
Partnership,” Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 6
March 1996: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/skelton/lecture96-en.asp
(2) Alex Morrison, “Canada at the United Nations: Serving the
World (1897-1972),” Canadian Tributes: http://collections.ic.gc.ca/heirloom_series/volume6/196-201.htm
(3) Ibid
(4) David T Jones, “Canada and the US in the Chrétien Years:
Edging Toward Confrontation,” Policy Options, November 2000: www.irpp.org/po/archive/nov00/jones.pdf
(5) Jean-François Rioux and Robin Hay, “Canadian Foreign Policy:
From Internationalism to Isolationism,” The Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs, 1997: http://www.carleton.ca/csds/publications/npsia-16.pdf
(6) Jean Chrétien, “A Modern Foreign Policy,” The Empire Club of
Canada Speeches 1989-1990, Edited by Mary R. Byers, (The Empire Club
Foundation, 1990) pp. 246-256. Available on the Empire Club website: http://www.empireclubfoundation.com/details.asp?SpeechID=1545&FT=yes
(7) Rioux and Hay, Ibid
(8) Laurence Baxter and Jo-Ann Bishop, “Uncharted Ground: Canada,
Middle Power Leadership, and Public Diplomacy,” Journal of Public and
International Affairs, 1998: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~jpia/5.html
(9) Mollie Royds, “Canadian Security Policy under Axworthy,“ The
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 8 April 1999: http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/research/pubs_royds.html
(10) Yves Fortier, Ibid
(11) Quoted in Molly Royds, Ibid
(12) Bhupinder S. Liddar, “Canada's respectable compromise,” The
Hill Times, 10 March 2003: http://www.thehilltimes.ca/2003/march/10/liddar/
(13) J.L. Granatstein, “A friendly Agreement in Advance: Canada US
Defense Relations Past, Present, and Future,” Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute,
June 2002, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_166.pdf
(14) Stephen Clarkson, “No Choice but Further Continental
Integration,” 17 June 2002, http://www.ualberta.ca/GLOBALISM/pdf/clarkson%20article.pdf
(15) CBC News Online Staff, “Liberals considered recalling U.S.
ambassador,” CBC News, 26 Mar 2003: http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/03/26/libscellucci030326
(16) Noam Chomsky, “U.S. defense and corporate social
responsibility?” in C.P. Otero, Ed., Language and Politics (Black Rose, 1988).
Available on Monkeyfist website: http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/misc/responsibility_html
(17) Richard Mackie, “Harris rips into Chrétien's foreign policy:
Prime Minister betrays Canadian values with stand on Iraq war, ex-premier
says,” Globe and Mail, 2 April: http://www.globeandmail.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20030402/UMIKEM/TPNational/TopStories
(18) Ibid
(19) Noam Chomsky and VK Ramachandran, “Iraq is a trial run:
Chomsky interviewed by Frontline, Frontline India, 2 April 2003: http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/interviews/9901-frontline-iraq.htm
(20) CBC Staff Online, “Canada to train Iraqi police, judges: US
ambassador,” CBC News, 25 April 2003: http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/04/25/cellucci_030425
(21) CBC Online Staff, “Canada may back U.S. attack on Iraq
without UN,” CBC News, 10 January 2003: http://www.cbc.ca/storyview/CBC/2003/01/09/mccallum_030109
(22) Jack Granatstein, Ibid