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The
Hydra’s New Head: Propagandists,
and
Selling the US-Iraq War
by
Paul de Rooij
May
14, 2003
Just as weapons have gotten “smarter,” so
too has the military gotten more sophisticated about how to use the media to
meet military objectives.
-- Jerry Broeckert, Lt. Col., public affairs officer in the US Marines
Corps. [1]
As
the fog of war lifts, the propaganda model followed by the United States to
sell the US-Iraq War is now clear, and the best way to understand this campaign
is to consider it as psychological warfare against the US population. [2] From the
beginning, the propagandists opted for a “sports show” metaphor as the overt
image for this campaign. There are
numerous features of this propaganda campaign that are worth examining since
they are innovations, and sometimes contravene previously held assumptions
about such campaigns. There remain
questions about its long-term effectiveness, and whether the same formula can
ever be used again.
The
US-Iraq war started years ago, but it was only in Sept. 2002 that a decision
was made to finish the job, and the hot war phase started on Mar. 19, 2003. [3] It was in
mid-September that the US sought to pass a UN resolution with onerous
conditions attempting to elicit an outright Iraqi rejection, and thus create a
trigger for war. [4]
Unfortunately for the US, several Security Council members objected to
the purpose of the proposed resolution and forced its watering down, resulting
in UNSCR 1441. It is important to view
the ongoing bombing campaign against Iraq in this context.
The
bombing campaign beginning in September 2002 was meant to provoke the Iraqis to
reject the UN resolution – which would have given the US the needed pretext for
the war. (See Graph [5]). Once UNSCR 1441 was passed early in Nov.
2002, then the level of provocation escalated again in an attempt to get the
Iraqis to reject the UN inspectors.
However, it is also clear that once the decision to go to war was made
the propaganda machine was set in motion.
This was evident because key propagandists initiated their campaign at
the Pentagon in Nov. 2002. [6] A deliberate use of bombings seems to have been made to justify
the war; the propagandists seem to have found a new implement for their
toolkit. The Pentagon has officially
integrated the propagandists into its ranks; but it is also evident that
propagandists may be using the military for their own ends.
Prior
to Nov. 2002, one witnessed a remarkably inept attempt to justify the war. This so-called public diplomacy failed to
deliver a credible justification for it, and made it very difficult for the
subsequent propaganda campaign, the one meant to herd the population and squash
dissent. The war-drummers not only had
to stoke up the usual levels of jingoism, but also required a search for a
pretext. This job was made even more
difficult by the unwillingness of the UN to play along and the unprecedented
opposition to the war in Europe. This
is one of the unusual aspects of this war.
After
Nov. 2002, public diplomacy sputtered along until it was completely replaced by
the war drummers after Feb. 6, 2003 -- when Powell ineffectively accused Iraq
of violating UNSCR 1441 in his address to the UN Security Council. From that point, it was clear that war was
inevitable, and no further attempts were made to justify the war in a serious
way. The justification phase was simply
over, and it was time for the war-drummers to take over.
When
one thinks of “psychological warfare operations” (psyops), one thinks of
airplanes dispensing leaflets over Iraqi army positions, but it also
encompasses threatening, starving, and even terrorizing the enemy population. Psyops is meant to instill deep fear and
defeatism. The implements of such
psyops are blunt, transparent, and of questionable effectiveness. One generally doesn’t think of psychological
warfare as something waged against the home population; but this is perhaps the
best way to appreciate the US experience during the past few months. The objective of such a campaign was to
stifle dissent, garner unquestioning support, and rally people around a common
symbol. Americans, and to a lesser
extent Europeans, have been subjected to a propaganda barrage in an effort to
neutralize opposition to the war, and this fits directly into a psyops
framework.
Psyops
appeal to the base human behavior of large groups. In the case of the enemy, fear and even terror are likely to
achieve the desired results. In the
case of the home population, it is the stoking of jingoism, the “we-ism” in the
crowd, the intimidation of dissent-- and the fear factor is there too. The American flag acreage on display
everywhere is a clear manifestation that we are dealing with psyops targeting
the home population.
Psyops
specialists know that one of the strongest human tendencies is to try to
conform to a group. Their objective is to
create a din of jingoism pushing for “our” team intimidating others, and at the
very least causing dissenters to lay low.
It is not a good idea to go against the grain in the middle of a riled
crowd. This is achieved by filtering
the news so that it fits in with the desired message by, e.g., “embedding” of
journalists, incorporation of censors within the main media networks, and
shutting out alternative news sources.
The result was stoking rampant jingoism in the US – and a mostly
silenced anti-war movement.
In
the current military jargon, there is a distinction: psyops are targeted at the
enemy, and “military-media relations” are meant to target the home core
population. But the people involved in
these different operations tend to be the same, and there is a certain amount
of overlap. Jerry Broeckert, the US
Marines media specialist, wrote about “coordinat[ing] our information
management campaign” with the psyops officer. [7] And stated: “[using the media] blurs the line
between public relations and psychological operations”. The integration of propaganda specialists in
the military, and in turn, their coordination with the media during this war
means only one thing: the home population is specifically targeted, and is
probably the primary target of this campaign.
This raises disturbing questions for the media on whether they want to
become an implement in psyops against the home population.
A
great part of the media campaign post Feb. 6, 2003 entailed restricting the
information emanating from Iraq. Robert
Fisk wrote about the censorship built into the major networks where all
incoming news items would be made propaganda-compliant. [8] The major American networks complied
willingly and seemed to have become part of the propaganda structure. BBC’s Gavin Hewitt, an embedded journalist,
claimed recently that no restrictions were placed on his reporting, and that he
could beam out whatever he pleased. [9] It just means that the filtering took place
with his embedded editors in London, or that he only saw what the army wanted
him to see.
A
second important aspect was the cleansing and control of the news flow. As the BBC’s Jonathan Marcus wrote on April
17th: “You had this absolute avalanche of material from our colleagues in
Baghdad and with the actual units in the field. But in a strange sort of way a lot of it was like looking through
a key-hole at a very small piece of the war.”
All the blood and gore were expunged, and there were only hints of Iraqi
suffering. During the 1991 Gulf War the
video of bombings played a central role, but this time, its usage was toned
down. Some at the Pentagon must have
been upset at this because the US armory had upgraded much of the video
capability of its weapons. The “smart
weapons” had been upgraded to “smart multimedia weapons”. Alas, the images generated from these weapons
are now mostly meant to make Rumsfeld chuckle.
Ah! one can only imagine him watching these with Wagner playing in the
background!
Propaganda
campaigns usually follow a theme or have a flavor-of-the-month. The propagandists borrow from product
advertising campaigns that are conducted in a similar fashion. During the 1991 Gulf War, the theme was the
“video game”, which was evident due to the number of demolition video
clips. This theme couldn’t be reused
because the video-game scenes raised some uncomfortable questions about this
enterprise especially among opponents of the war. It was therefore necessary to conjure a new theme, and all
indications are that this campaign followed a “sports show” metaphor. The main advantage of this approach is that
Americans are very comfortable with the “sport show” -- it is part of their
daily diet, it is intelligible to them, and it gives them a passive
“entertained” role. Casting propaganda
in such a known, comfortable framework makes people adjust favorably to the
message.
Given
that the war didn’t have an accepted justification, the propagandists opted to
stress the “support our troops” refrain, paralleling the “support our team”
chant. It doesn’t matter if people
opposed the war; they could still understand supporting the troops in the
current context. This proved to be a
very effective ploy. Erstwhile
opposition groups changed their stance overnight when the “hot” phase of the
war started. The Liberal Democratic
party in the UK switched from an anti-war stance to “support our troops” mode
overnight. Although base political
calculations may have come into play, opposing British troops once they went
into action was not tenable even if the party continued to oppose the war.
Presenting
the war as a sports event enabled the propagandists to circumvent the thorny issue
of why the US was so eager to engage in this war in the first place. When one watches a sports game, there is no
need to think about the “why” of anything; it is only an issue of “supporting
our team”. You are also only supposed
to root for the “good guys” team, and hate the “Iraqi meanies”. Dissident voices are also drowned out – you
are only supposed to cheer for the home team.
Cheering for a team in the opponent side’s benches is a dangerous
proposition – which can even entail mortal danger. [10]
Equally
important is that sports fans are supposed to react on cue, and otherwise are
expected to be quiet. This passivity is
ideal for the propagandists, and possibly this can be imbued in the war
spectacle.
Sports
matches are informal events, and the presentation of this war followed a
similar setup. There was no need for a
formal declaration of war. Just the
starting whistle was necessary for the game to begin. Even the non-recognition of the Iraqi “regime” was part of this –
the US was playing against Saddam, and we refer to the other players by their
first names. If this game is informal,
then no appearance is given that the whole enterprise may have any serious
consequences.
The
24-hour Newscast networks portrayed the “war as sports show” splendidly. The networks constantly fed news snippets
without context. In sports, context
isn’t necessary, and carrying this through to the war circumvented awkward
questions. Context is a dangerous thing
because it raises questions, and propagandists don’t want to foster that. The newscasters also showed the “good guys”
in action from many angles, and only slow motion replays were missing. Exposed to this spectacle, one is only meant
to cheer, drink beer, and release one’s jingoistic id. Truculent slogans like “shock & awe”
conveyed the might of our team, and appealed to primitive behavior; the name of
the putative American strategy resembled the name of a wrestler, and is something
that can be ignored due to its artificiality.
The
“play-by-play” military analysts incorporated the sports analogy completely –
with maps/diagrams, advice to players, and making the audience think about the
marvelous strategy. The military
analysts in CNN certainly were portrayed as retired football coaches. In the morning, these “Xs”
(ex-military-so-and-so) would congregate for Pentagon briefings. One can only speculate what briefings they
received and from whom, but their uniform terminology indicates that the
propagandists had a major say. “Once
our troops go over the red line…” and similar nonsense was sports talk
generated by the propagandists.
Sportsmen
in the US have their names inscribed on their shirts. Before the war, all tanks had names stenciled -- in large, black,
easy-to-read letters -- on the barrels of the gun. The tank commanders were encouraged to write an evocative name on
their tanks, and the sporting analogy is obvious. The staged nature of this activity was also evident since all
tanks had the lettering on the same spot.
This is the first time known that tanks have been labeled in such a
fashion.
Lies
don’t matter in sports events. If you
are told that your team is the best and eat poodles for breakfast – no harm is
done. Planting lies, semi-truths and
deceptions is useful for the propagandists, and in the current context, it is
necessary because no viable justification has been found. So it is not surprising to find even war
supporters making statements like: “Everyone knows he [Bush] lied about weapons
of mass destruction being the point of the war.” But then it doesn’t matter that Bush lied! [11]
The
war even had a trophy – covering Saddam’s face with the American flag that hung
outside the Pentagon on 9-11 was a salute to the propagandists themselves. Now that they work for the military, they
will certainly earn medals for this!
The
toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue on April 9th was certainly a propaganda
coup. (NB: The same propagandists who
fabricated the throwing-the-babies-out-of-incubators story in 1991 produced
this event. [12])
These scenes certainly had an impact around the world, and it briefly
seemed that it justified the war.
However, US Marine Corporal Edward Chin admitted that he was ordered to
wrap the face of Saddam in the US flag before toppling the statue – nothing
spontaneous about this. Furthermore,
some Iraqis were bused in for the occasion, to join the small crowd that was
mostly made up of journalists. The
crowd wasn’t even able to topple the statue by themselves, but an engineering
vehicle was handily available on site to finish an American operation.
Mark
Damazer, the BBC’s deputy director of news, accepted that they were carried
away in broadcasting this event, and only later “did questions arise about
it”. Nevertheless, he justified its
broadcast because it symbolized a defining moment in the demolition of the
regime. Unfortunately, it was a defining
moment for propaganda since the event was entirely staged, and major media
unquestioningly broadcast this message.
Now
that the war is almost over, and that the search for a justification of the war
continues apace, there is a need to be skeptical of many of the “discoveries”
taking place. Anyone who remembers the
“discovery” of stashes of whiskey and the like after Salvador Allende was
killed in Chile should not have been surprised to see the discoveries in Uday’s
lair. [13] Uday
Hussein may not have been a nice guy, but it is highly unlikely that stashes of
pornography were left lying around. On
the face of it, there is a high probability that many such items were indeed
planted.
Another
dubious claim is that regarding the discovery of a “suicide-belt factory” –
with the suicide outfits neatly hung in dry cleaner’s plastic. This is a rather absurd story, for the
simple reason that suicide bombing was a concept foreign to Saddam Hussein’s
“regime”. Some of the foreign
volunteers fighting in Iraq may have been so disposed, but it is difficult to
imagine their setting up such a factory.
The propagandists seem to want to have it both ways: on the one hand
Iraqi soldiers must be threatened by enforcer squads in order to coerce
soldiers to fight, but on the other hand, some people are so motivated that
they are willing to die for the “regime”.
It is highly unlikely that this story is legitimate, and it was produced
to provide another after the fact anti-terrorism justification.
There
is perhaps a simple proof that the suicide-belt story was a sham. If the story were true, then we would have
heard it repeated many times over.
Journalists would have been allowed to inspect this a bit closer. But the story disappeared in no time, and
indicating that it had served its purpose.
It is also curious to see the faces of some of the same soldiers
reappear in several of these seemingly staged events. One of the soldiers in the suicide-belt factory seems to be the
same one showing off a tacky poster in one of the palaces.
The
emergence of a general rule: If a “news” item about a grotesque aspect
of the regime, WMD, or terrorism, appears on TV for a day or two and then
disappears, it is safe to bet that it is a fabrication. Similarly, if the reporter from such a story
is not identified, then you are watching another fabrication.
It
is certainly taking a long time to find chemical weapons – the staging of such
an event must take some time. By 1998
UNMOVIC/UNSCOM had demolished “95 to 98%” of all weapons of mass destruction
and their infrastructure, and therefore there may be precious little proof
lying around. The propagandists may
have to ship in barrels of the stuff, and maybe even entice an admission out of
Dr. Ammash, known to the propagandists as “Dr. Anthrax”. For her cooperation, she may end up getting
a position at a mediocre Texas university.
The
word embedded itself suggests a carnal relationship with the Pentagon. Questions arise about who is using whom, and
about the journalists’ integrity while riding along in a tank. Any illusions of retaining independence are
entirely dispensed with. In fact, the
Pentagon used the embedded journalists, and not the other way around. NB: the Pentagon views the media as a “force
multiplier”. These journalists were
stitched onto the military machine to sell its war, and perhaps unwittingly
they became part of the machine. As
Tony Jenkins, President of the UN Correspondents Association, recently remarked
about the embedded journalists: “But boy were they played like a musical
instrument by the Pentagon.” Or Kenneth
Bacon, a former Pentagon spokesman, wrote in the Wall Street Journal recently
that: “You couldn’t hire actors to do as good a job as the press has done” from
the Pentagon’s point of view. [14]
There
is an issue of guilt by association.
Some of the embeds were dubious reporters to begin with. Alexander Cockburn has recently analyzed the
pathetic role played by the permanently embedded Judith Miller of the New York
Times. [15]
Similarly, an embedded journalist from the Jerusalem Post spewed
pernicious propaganda, e.g., the March 23rd
“chemical weapons factory discovery”.
Some other so-called journalists even participated in the looting
spree. Unfortunately, there were many
other such examples of dubious reporters.
The key question is if any legitimate reporting can take place when so
many are implicated in dubious and uncritical reporting.
The
modus operandi of the embeds was to be busy reporting on some of the action
directly in front of the units they were attached to; but they never asked any
of the obvious questions. Often
embedded journalists would “interview” one of the military officers who would
utter dubious statements. The
journalists usually played along, and didn’t question the previous statements
that by then had proven to be false. For
example, “there is an uprising in Basra” was repeated several times by British
officers, regurgitated by the embedded journalists, but then no questions were
posed when this proved to be a deception.
Journalists cannot play along with so much deceit without tarnishing
their credibility.
Several
journalists pointed out targets to the soldiers they were traveling with. No sooner had the BBC’s Gavin Hewitt pointed
out an enemy truck than it was shot to pieces and several Iraqis were
killed. One CNN crew had an armed
escort who shot some Iraqis. Once
journalists start taking part in a war in this fashion their objectivity and
purported neutrality is compromised, and they become legitimate targets too.
Some
of the embeds reported from the field as if they were the main attraction of
the story. ITN’s Juliet Bremner posed in
front of the camera to report a story, and it seemed that her presence was more
important than the scene behind her – often there was nothing else to
report. She was copying the “I am the
story” style of CNN’s Christian Amanpour.
When the journalist becomes the story and not the one who puts images
and stories into context, then again, journalism is diminished.
The
embedded journalists didn’t direct the military where to go, and the military
only showed the embeds what it wanted them to see. The troops seldom passed the areas that already had been laid
waste by B52s or artillery, and thus the embeds didn’t see much blood and
gore. One also wonders if the embeds
would broadcast any blood and gore scene even if they were given the
opportunity. Most of these so-called
journalists manage to conjure dozens of justifications on why not to broadcast
such images. In the process, the image
of this war is kept antiseptically clean, and the horrors of war aren’t apparent
to the TV-viewing public. Painting such
a clean image makes war more palatable, doesn’t raise awkward questions, and
makes future wars even more likely.
Besides
the publicized embedded journalists there were “other” reporters. When the army crossed the “red line”,
unidentified reporters shot the video footage of a Colonel talking about the
“level two chemical weapons alert”, but the reporter didn’t appear on the video
footage. Similarly, an unidentified
camera team filmed the “suicide-belt” factory.
It is therefore highly likely that there were dedicated propagandists
among the embedded reporters. It was
very easy to hide some propagandists among the 810 embedded reporters. The propagandists’ reportage or deception
gained credibility because an impression was given that it was the embedded
journalists doing the reporting. It is
an old game played anew: the wolf masqueraded in the journalist’s
clothing.
In
total, the role of the embedded journalists in this war was a disgrace. It is clear that the participation in this
Pentagon propaganda program will have deleterious effects on journalism in
general, and the media’s role in reporting during the next war in
particular. Journalists have a clear
choice: to retain their independence and objectivity, or to drag the second
oldest profession into the realms of the oldest one. [16]
After
the hot war started, the British troops stationed in the Gulf complained that
the BBC coverage of the war was not getting them into the festive mood. They wanted to have bloody red meat, but
instead they got porridge. To instill a
bellicose spirit required switching to CNN or Fox News.
By
any standard, the BBC coverage of the war was more subdued than CNN’s, and
another characteristic is that it restricted its output over time. That is, while CNN devoted almost all its
programming to the war, the BBC reduced its output to the extent that at the
beginning of April the war coverage amounted to about an hour per day on the
major BBC channels. To understand this
one must remember that the opposition to this war in the UK was
overwhelming. Polls before the war
suggested that around 70-80% of the population opposed a war without a UN
mandate. The BBC could hardly beat the
war drums like Fox News in the US because of domestic sensibilities. Instead, it opted for a toned down CNN
formula, and it sought to make it bland – a BBC specialty. And just like CNN, dissenting voices were
entirely squeezed out of TV programming.
Jacques
Ellul has analyzed propaganda extensively, and has distilled some key points
for it to be effective. Some of those
points are relevant when analyzing the current propaganda campaign.
Ellul
postulates that propaganda must have a monopoly and drown out everything
else. In the current context, it is
remarkable that the major media are nearly homogenous and with no critical
edge. So, although there are thousands
of independent channels and newspapers, it is remarkable how uniform they were
in the message conveyed, and this is especially noticeable in the US. To obtain such uniformity must be deemed a
clear victory in this propaganda campaign.
The same cannot be said for the UK, where some media remained critical
throughout. It also indicates that
although the propagandists have sold the war to the American people, spreading
the message elsewhere has been a less than stellar job.
Propaganda
is usually thought to make a population act in a certain manner, whereas the
current campaign seems to have had passivity as its main goal. Its major challenge was to shut out the
dissident voice, and to stifle criticism.
This seems also to have been a great success since the peace movement
seems to have gone mostly into hibernation during the war.
Finally,
propaganda has moved from a big lie repeated often enough to one where a
barrage of deception is put forth. The
credibility of the propaganda media has been tarnished in the process. The US-Iraq war strained the propaganda
campaign because it lasted longer than expected. Everyone assumed it would be over in a matter of days, and we
believed the propaganda on this issue.
When this didn’t happen the propaganda mill required pushing more
deception, and it is likely that this cannot be sustained for a protracted duration.
[17] It is also
likely that this formula cannot be repeated often.
There
are lessons for all in the current experience.
For those seeking to avert future wars, there must be a realization that
organizing marches or using the political process is not enough. Besides these means, it is essential to
obtain independent media outlets, so that the power of the established media
conglomerates may be challenged. This
war exposed the corporate media networks as adopting a unified role in selling
this war by shutting out dissent and beating the war drums. Such a media structure will not in itself
challenge the new American Imperial role, and it has equally disturbing implications
for democracy everywhere.
We
must realize that we are dealing with extremely cynical people who think that
entire populations can be herded and cajoled.
They think journalists can be used for their own ends. Their success, at least in the US, is a dark
omen. It is a very dangerous development
that such people have joined forces with the mean-spirited neocons. Democracy, freedom of speech and peace are
under threat if these groups are not challenged vigorously now.
For
the first time, the US military has fully integrated the media into its wars;
this integrated propaganda is seen as part of its arsenal – this is the “force
multiplier”. It is also evident that
the propaganda weapon in this war has been highly sophisticated and effective. After all, it managed to sell the war in very
difficult circumstances. Part of their
success entailed commandeering most media channels and journalists to sing
their tune. The Hydra has acquired a
new head.
*
This article is a refinement of Arrogant
Propaganda and the Glossary
of Warmongering
Paul de Rooij is an economist living in
London and can be reached at proox@hotmail.com
(NB: All attachments will be deleted automatically)
[1] Jerry Broeckert, “Loose Lips Float
Ships!: How the military uses the media
today”, www.rakemag.com, April 2003. Good account of the history of “military
media relations” and how it has evolved in the. It contains some discussion of the US-Iraq War: http://www.rakemag.com/printable.asp?catID=46&itemID=2136&pg=all
[2] Propaganda also determined the name
of this war. “Gulf War II” is deceptive
because it conveys the impression that the attack was part of an
internationally sanctioned coalition – just like the 1991 Gulf War. In the current war, it is only the US and
the UK that are clearly involved, the main components of the meager
“coalition”. However, the UK’s
contribution to the war is less than 10%, and after the recent US troop
increases, the UK’s contribution to the force is closer to 7%. It is therefore clear that this is an
American war; thus the “US-Iraq War” is the most appropriate name. How can a war be “in Iraq” and then be
called “Gulf War”?
[3] See “War: It's Already Started”: www.counterpunch.org/rooij01302003.html
[4] The US has engineered other such
diplomatic traps, e.g., the Rambouillet Agreement that sought to impose onerous
conditions on Serbia. Its rejection
provided the desired trigger for war.
US diplomacy doesn’t seek to avert war, but on the contrary, it seems to
engineer wars even where they could be avoided.
[5] Colorado Campaign for Middle East
Peace [CCMEP] has an excellent website, www.ccmep.org. It has a sizeable record of US-UK bombings
of Iraq. The graph only refers to the
incidents that were confirmed by the US.
A date when there was one or more bombings is classed as a one, and zero
otherwise. NB: this is an underestimate
of the bombing activity since the US military sometimes refused to confirm or
deny an action. From independent
accounts by activists in the area, two other incidents were added. Some confirmations were obtained from the
BBC (unfortunately, online BBC reports scroll and disappear as a record).
Although CCMEP’s data is very useful, it
excludes some important features. It
doesn’t reflect the number of flights over Iraq. These flights may not have damaged anything, but they are part of
the same provocation campaign. The
level of over flights went from dozens per day earlier in the year to several
hundred. The data available is spotty,
but on two occasions, the US acknowledged up to 500 over flights on a given day
in February 2003. Even one over flight
over the US would be considered a serious hostile act.
[6] Jerry Broeckert, ibid. The Nov. 2002 date cited stems from: “the
move of Jim Wilkinson was sent from the White House Office of Communications to
head strategic communications at the Pentagon’s U. S. Central Command with
General Tommy Franks.”
[7] Jerry Broeckert, ibid.
[8] www.corkpsc.org/db.php?aid=1811.
It is remarkable that censors are embedded.
NB: CNN deny such a setup except on their text services.
[9] Gavin Hewitt talking at a conference
“Journalists at War”, City Univ., May 2, 2003.
[10] In Brazil some sports fans were
found cheering the opposing team in the supporters’ benches. They were set upon and one was killed. Moral of the story: supporting a team in the
middle of a hostile crowd is dangerous.
[11] Robert Steinback, “Did Our Leaders
Lie to Us? Do We Even Care?,” CommonDreams, April 29, 2003.
[12] David MacMichael and Ray McGovern, “Ex-CIA
Professionals: Weapons of Mass Distraction: Where? Find? Plant?,” Common
Dreams, April 25, 2003.
[13] A few days after president Allende
was killed in 1973 soldiers exposed stashes of whiskey and other things that
suggested Allende was a closet bourgeois.
Similarly, Noriega’s house was raided after the US invasion of Panama to
reveal stashes of pornography and cocaine.
Both incidents were staged.
Sources: Veja magazine in the 1980s ran a story about a Brazilian
intelligence officer involved in the operation in Chile. About the action against Noriega, his lawyer
has stated as much. Even the furniture
of his house was changed and “frogs” were introduced everywhere – supposedly
one cannot respect a person who loves frogs.
[14] Tony Jenkins speech transcript and
audio: www.corkpsc.org/db.php?aid=2777;
Kenneth Bacon reference comes from the same source.
[15] Alexander Cockburn, “The Decline and Fall
of American Journalism (Part LXV): the Case of Judy Miller,” CounterPunch,
April 25, 2003
[16] Broeckert, ibid.
[17] See my Arrogant
Propaganda