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Turkish-US
Ties May Take Precedence
Over
Kurds’ Fate
by
Amal Hamdan
April
5, 2003
Not
for the first time in history, the Kurds see a glimmer of hope that after more
than 80 years they will gain a homeland of their own in a post-war Iraq.
But
in a bid to protect what it perceives as its critical strategic relationship
with Turkey, the “United States has an interest in keeping Kurdish aspirations
limited,” said Dr. Joost Hiltermann, Middle East project director for the
International Crisis Group and an expert on the Kurdish question.
Kurdish
dreams are Turkey’s nightmare. Ankara, which fought a bloody 15-year Kurdish
insurgency that left some 30,000 civilians dead, fears that a viable Kurdish
entity will motivate its own Kurdish population to split away.
“Turkey
is critically important to the United States,” explained Hiltermann. Washington
perceives Ankara as a gateway to Central Asia and the Middle East's rich
natural resources, he said.
“If
this wasn’t the case we would see Washington a lot angrier,” he added. But the
Jordan-based expert was quick to add that the situation was fluid and that the
US policy could change.
In
the run-up to the US-led war in Iraq Washington appointed Zalmay Khalilzad -
who was also responsible for shaping post-Taliban Afghanistan - as special
representative to the Iraqi opposition, which included Kurdish parties in
northern Iraq.
Numbering
some 20 million, the Kurds are the world’s largest nation-less people. Broken
promises and violence peppers their history.
After
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire following the First World War,
aspirations of an independent Kurdish state were dashed when the 1920 Treaty of
Sevres promising autonomy was never fulfilled.
Instead,
the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne was adopted and made no mention of the Kurds.
Turkish
soldiers stand next to a column of army tanks near the southeast Turkish town
of Cizre REUTERS/str
During
the 1970s the Kurds rose against the central government in Baghdad amid a
territorial dispute between Iraq and neighbouring Iran. They aligned themselves
with US-backed Tehran but when Iraq and Iran agreed peace, Washington halted
its support to the Kurds.
After
the 1991 Gulf War the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated an
uprising among the Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south in a bid to
overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. But when the Kurds launched the
insurgency Washington again turned its back on the combined opposition and
thousands were slaughtered by Baghdad.
Iraq’s
1988 Anfal campaign to stamp out the Kurdish uprising left an estimated 100,000
Kurdish civilians killed. Baghdad’s equally traumatising chemical attack
against Halabja left 5,000 Kurds dead.
In
a recent editorial, Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group and
Hiltermann drew the comparison of the attacks against Anfal and Halabja to the
impact of September 11 on the “American psyche.”
“It
is out of such deep emotions and national traumas that identities are forged or
reinforced and, sometimes, nations are born,” they wrote.
A
recent ICG report quoted a Turkish defence analyst as saying "one of the
country's primary interests in Iraq was preventing the establishment of a
Kurdish state".
"It
is unclear what the Kurds would settle for in a post-war Iraq", said
Hiltermann, adding that if they didn’t succeed in achieving autonomy and
significant representation in central Baghdad, in a few years they could return
to armed struggle.
An
ICG paper predicted the Kurds may gain a limited reward for their support of a
US-led war.
Last
Friday, a defiant Turkey went against US wishes saying it had deployed fresh
troops in northern Iraq. The announcement came shortly after weeks of political
wrangling culminated in a decision to allow Washington use of its airspace.
This is a critical corridor to US plans to launch a second front in the north
after Ankara’s parliament earlier rejected a US request to deploy 62,000 troops
on its soil.
Conflicting
reports on Saturday said Turkey had sent 1,500 troops into the Kurdish area, a
statement denied by Kurdish parties and later Turkey’s Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gul. Ankara already had several thousand troops in the Kurdish region
prior to the US-led war.
Turkey
insists the move is necessary to stem an influx of refugees and prevent
“terrorist elements” from spilling onto its soil. In 1991 Ankara claimed
thousands of armed Kurdish fighters entered its territory with refugees, sparking
an uprising among Turkish Kurds.
Washington
reiterated it opposed the move, stressing that the issues of overflights and
Ankara’s presence in the Kurdish areas should not be linked. US Defence
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Washington had advised Ankara its forces would
be perceived as “notably unhelpful” if they entered the north. US President
George W. Bush also warned his NATO ally earlier this month its troops would
face American troops if they were sent into the Kurdish areas.
A
British intelligence source was quoted recently as saying Ankara denied US
forces permission to use its territory in a bid to further its regional aims.
According to the source, quoted by the STRATFOR intelligence website, Turkey
would use the war as an opportunity to crush the Kurds before deploying at
least 250,000 troops around the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. This
strategy would allow Ankara to occupy some of Iraq’s richest oilfields.
While
Kurdish leaders have placed their troops under US command, they have also
repeatedly warned that a Turkish intervention would be met with resistance.
They
also voiced fears that a green light from Washington allowing Turkish troops to
enter northern Iraq would be yet another let down. This was most eloquently
expressed by the Kurdish Democratic Party’s Sami Abdul Rahman earlier this
month. “In my lifetime,” he said, “twice the United States government has
betrayed us [in 1975 and 1991]. Now, if this goes ahead, it will be a third
betrayal in one generation.”
Turkey
started building its policy position to justify intervention in northern Iraq
as war rhetoric mounted last fall in Washington based on fear. Ankara claimed
it feared refugees would spill over into Turkey, an establishment of a Kurdish state,
and a Kurdish-led massacre of the Turkomans, a minority group ethnically-close
to Turkey.
Ankara
harbours concerns that Kurdish troops will make a rush for the oil city of
Kirkuk, which Kurds want as the capital of a federation, as a step to bankrolling
a drive for independence. Turkey started beefing up its military presence along
the Turkish-Iraqi border, deploying troops and pre-positioning relief
materials.
A
Turkish intervention into the Kurdish areas would be tantamount to a “human
disaster,” said Hiltermann. The US also fears a “war within a war” between
Kurdish and Turkish troops which may de-rail their campaign to oust the Iraqi
leader.
Retired
US Army Colonel Scott Feil warned that security vacuums in the north will be
exaggerated by Turkish troops.
“The
worst problem is if there’s an area where there are grievances that people want
to settle and the local security forces decide because they don’t want to be
identified with the (Iraqi) government, they’re not going to be out and visible
and maintain order as the situation starts to change within Iraq but US forces
haven’t arrived yet. So therefore there’s a great potential for little pockets
with security vacuums to develop,” he explained.
Feil
was chief of the Role of American Military Power (RAMP), a post-conflict
reconstruction program for the US army. He described Turkish plans to enter
northern Iraq as very risky.
“What
the Turks will say, of course, is we want to stabilise the situation in
northern Iraq…That, I think, is one of the reasons why the US wanted to have a
heavy presence in the north, basically to reassure both sides that the Kurds
would not be taken advantage of by the Turks and the Turks would not be taken
advantage of by the Kurds.”
Amal Hamdan is an analyst
with Al Jazeera. This article first appeared in the English on-line version of
Al Jazeera (http://english.aljazeera.net).