The Race Against Time
Defining
What Iraq Has To Do Before War Comes
by
Milan Rai
Dissident Voice
March 12, 2003
The
rejection of a bill to allow US access to Turkish bases by the Turkish
parliament has thrown US war plans into turmoil. 'The surprise rejection by the
parliament in Ankara made the planning "more complicated", Ari
Fleischer, the White House spokesman, said. Some military analysts predicted
that an attack of the speed and decisiveness President George Bush wants might
have to be delayed until late March or even early April.' (The Independent (UK),
4 Mar., p.1)
'Even if the troops of the
US 4th Mechanised Infantry Division were to be allowed into Turkey, they would
probably need at least two to three weeks before they were ready to fight. With
the parliamentary delays, that could postpone the launch of an invasion of Iraq
well into April.' (Independent, 5 Mar., p. 4)
If the planned start of war
is being delayed into April, this would have two significant effects: the war
would be scheduled to take place in the much hotter weather of April, and it
would be scheduled to take place after AFTER 27 Mar., the deadline for the UN
weapons inspectors to define Iraqs "key remaining disarmament tasks".
In other words, it would
take place just after UN weapons inspectors had started the properly-laid down
process of verified disarmament in Iraq.
This would make war politically
impossible.
Thus the pressure to find
alternative strategies: 'Instead, planners are looking at much riskier
alternatives, including an airborne assault on Mosul and Kirkuk or switching
the 4th Infantry Division to Kuwait, from where they would be asked to make a
long and dangerous dash around Baghdad to reach Republican Guard divisions
protecting President Saddam’s home region of Tikrit.' (The Independent, 5 Mar.,
p. 4) It's not clear that the delay can be avoided.
60 DAYS TO DEFINE KEY
DISARMAMENT TASKS
The proper timetable for
disarmament was set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1284, passed in Dec.
1999 (which also created the inspection agency UNMOVIC - UN Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission headed by Dr Hans Blix).
Para. 7 of Resolution 1284
says that UNMOVIC and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency, which
handles nuclear disarmament in Iraq), 'will each draw up, for approval by the
Council, a work programme for the discharge of their mandates.' This will be
done 'not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq.'
This work programme will
include 'the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq': 'what is
required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined
and precise.' (You can find Resolution 1284 at www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/.
WAR COULD HAVE BEEN
DE-RAILED IN JANUARY
As the weapons inspectors
returned to Iraq on 27 Nov. 2002, one would have expected them to present their
work programme on 27 Jan.
If this had been done, and
if the 'key remaining disarmament tasks' had been defined on that day, we
probably wouldn't be talking about a war right now, because it would be very
hard for the US to shut down an open-ended disarmament process with clearly defined
benchmarks for measuring the progress of Iraqi disarmament. There would be
tasks still not yet dealt with.
Importantly, Resolution 1284
does not set a deadline for inspectors to finish their work in Iraq. The reason
there are no deadlines for disarmament is that when Britain and the US drew up
the Resolution, they wanted a way of stringing out the inspection process in
order to string out the economic sanctions on Iraq.
Then, they wanted inspectors
to have all the time in the world. Now, they want the inspectors rolled up
ASAP.
AN EXTRAORDINARY AND FATEFUL
DELAY
The 'key disarmament tasks'
weren't defined on 27 Jan. War wasnt derailed. For a very peculiar reason.
UNMOVIC spokesperson Ewen Buchanan, interviewed by ARROW on 24 Feb. 2003,
explained that although inspectors had returned to Iraq on 27 Nov. and started
doing things (clearing up the long- deserted office, carrying out inspections,
etc.), it had decided not to define this as 'starting work', but as a 'build-up
period'. The inspectors had decided to define the 'starting of work' as 27 Jan.
This meant the 60 day deadline moved back another 60 days, so that the key
remaining disarmament tasks now have to be defined by 27 Mar. instead of 27
Jan.
What made this decision so
very very strange was that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 asked the
inspectors 'to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of
this resolution' on 8 Nov. So if the inspectors had been consistent, they would
have failed this test, because they they only 'started work' (in the sense of
Resolution 1284) on 27 Jan. They got around this by deciding that they had
'resumed inspections' (but not started work) in Iraq within the required 45
days. Mr Buchanan acknowledged that you could say the inspectors were 'having
their cake and eating it'. When the inspectors looked at themselves through
1284 spectacles, they started work at the end of Jan. 2003. When they looked at
themselves through 1441 glasses, they 'resumed inspections' before mid-Dec.
2002.
US INTERFERENCE SUSPECTED
It is hard to believe that
the inspectors came up with this contorted logic all by themselves. It is
extremely hard to believe that the inspectors were not pressured to define the
two start dates differently by the superpower which was intent on going to war
with Iraq by mid-Mar. 2003, and which therefore needed to make sure the
disarmament process mandated by Resolution 1284 was kicked into the long grass
beyond any likely date for the start of war.
ANOTHER TWIST TO THE TALE
Let's go back to Resolution
1284. Para. 33 states that the Security Council will, after four months of
verified cooperation with disarmament, suspend economic sanctions on Iraq on a
rolling basis, 'with the fundamental objective of improving the humanitarian situation
in Iraq and securing the implementation of the Councils resolutions'.
The clock starts ticking on
this once the Security Council 'is in receipt of reports from both UNMOVIC and
the IAEA that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification
[OMV] is fully operational.' This OMV system itself cannot become 'fully
operational' until its design has been approved as part of the 'work programme'
agreed by the Security Council.
So the schedule should go
like this: by 27 Mar., the Security Council approved a long-term system which
can continuously monitor Iraq's capacity to make weapons of mass destruction
and ensure that these factories and facilities are used only for civilian
purposes. Then UNMOVIC and the IAEA set up the system. Once its 'fully
operational', the clock is ticking. If Iraq 'has cooperated in all respects
with UNMOVIC and the IAEA' (para. 33 again) for four months after OMV goes
'fully operational', economic sanctions are suspended (in July or Aug.). (From
Iraq's point of view, the phrase 'cooperated in all respects' has a lethal
vagueness. It means trusting the US and UK to recognise and reward a high level
of cooperation.)
THE FRENCH PROPOSAL
France, with Russian and
German support, has proposed the implementation of Resolution 1284: the
definition of 'key remaining disarmament tasks', the setting up of the OMV
system, and following the four- month schedule laid down in the Resolution. (24
Feb. 2003, http://www.un.int/france/)
Mr Blair was furious: 'This
is not a road to peace but folly and weakness that means conflict, when it
comes, will be greater in its devastation.' So if the inspectors carry out a
process of verified disarmament in Iraq, this means that Iraq will be able to
carry out 'greater devastation' in the future. 'The issue is not time. The
issue is will.' By which Mr Blair meant Iraq's willingness to disarm, rather
than US determination to go to war. (The Independent (UK), 26 Feb., p. 2)
THE CHOICE BETWEEN WAR AND
DISARMAMENT
At the time of writing, the
US and UK are giving up on their draft resolution (Briefing 34 Last Push For
War critiques that draft), and trying an amendment with a deadline: In London,
officials indicated the ultimatum would be short - measured in days rather than
weeks - and would make clear that if Mr Hussein failed to disarm he would face
the consequences. (Financial Times, 7 Mar.)
'The US and its allies are,
however, said to be unenthusiastic about setting explicit benchmarks to measure
Iraqi compliance, an idea recently floated in a Canadian attempt to broker a
compromise. They fear Mr Hussein could comply with specific demands while
retaining his overall weapons capability.' (Financial Times, 7 Mar.)
In other words, if the UN
says clearly (as it should do under Resolution 1284) what Iraq has to do to
prove it has disarmed its weapons of mass destruction, there is a danger that
Iraq might just do those things, and prove it has disarmed. If the US can no
longer move the goalposts, it might not be able to carry out a war which it
desires regardless of Iraq’s weapons status.
The US military is racing to
start a war before 27 Mar. despite the fact that the logistics are currently
unfavourable (courtesy the Turkish anti-war movement). The rest of the world is
racing to force the Security Council to implement Resolution 1284, and to start
the verified disarmament process in Iraq by defining the 'key remaining
disarmament tasks.' All voices should be raised to support this process, which
may be the only way to derail war.
Milan Rai is author of War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons Against War (Verso, 2002) and a member of Active Resistance to the Roots of War (ARROW). He is also co-founder of Voices in the Wilderness UK, which has worked for the lifting of UN sanctions in Iraq.