Countdown: Lunatic Timetable
by
Milan Rai
Dissident Voice
February 25, 2003
SUMMARY
The
US schedule for war on Iraq has been delayed again, possibly to the third week
of March—23/24 March is a strong possibility. The plan seems to be to press for
a negative inspectors’ report in early March, secure a second Resolution in
mid-March, and then go to war either in mid- or late- March.
AVOIDING WAR IN THE SUMMER
The US timetable for war is
looking distinctly shaky. The basic
assumption has been that the US does not want to fight during the Iraqi summer.
Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent for the Daily Telegraph pointed out last
Nov. that it would be months before British tanks and other armoured units were
ready for war: ‘If they began moving now, it would be early Mar. before a
British land force was ready for action... to ensure the campaign does not last
into the Iraqi summer. This is because they will have to wear gas masks and
nuclear, biological and chemical warfare suits. Even on Salisbury Plain in the
winter they are impossibly hot to work in, so the belief has always been that
any campaign in Iraq should be waged in the cooler first four months or last
three months of the year.' (22 Nov. 2002, p. 16)
Smith noted that ‘defence
sources have recently begun to prepare the ground for a summer war, saying
British troops would be able to fight in Iraq whatever the temperature.’ Some
US military planners even pretend to prefer the summer, ‘since the rivers and
desert wadis that flood in winter would less of an obstacle to US
tanks.’(Newsweek, 27 Jan., p. 23) But this is probably whistling in the dark.
For example, ‘The planes have been designed for the cold war. They start losing
lift, carry lighter loads and must make shorter runs when the temperature goes
over 35’, according to a British official involved in the Anglo-American
debates about the timing of an attack. (Guardian, 24 Jan., p. 1) More water has
to be transported to soldiers, etc.
WHY NOT AN AUTUMN WAR?
The war could be delayed
until the cooler autumn. This may be Britain’s preference. A senior British
official said in Jan., ‘There is an assumption that there will be a campaign
before the summer because of the heat. The autumn would be just as sensible a time
and in the meanwhile Saddam would be thoroughly constrained by the inspectors.’
(Telegraph, 9 Jan., p. 1)
The delay would create more
time for inspectors to find incriminating materials. However, the British
military has warned Mr Blair ‘that any proposals to postpone an attack until
the autumn could mean having to bring our forces home again’. A senior
Whitehall source said in Jan., ‘In practical terms you cannot keep such a large
number of troops throughout the summer months on enhanced stand- by. The Prime
Minister risks total meltdown if troops are recalled. His credibility would be
shot to pieces.’ But a big delay was ‘becoming a very real possibility.’
(MIrror, 10 Jan., p. 5)
REPORT. RESOLUTION. REVENGE.
So, for reasons of political
credibility in London and Washington, the war must come soon. The preferred
sequence seems to be: hear Hans Blix’s report in early March (having pressured
him to make a negative report); a few days later, ‘persuade’ the UN Security
Council to pass a new Resolution that can be presented as ‘authorising’
military action; then shortly afterwards proceed to a massive aerial
bombardment and then a ground invasion.
‘Mr Powell says a vote
should shortly follow a meeting expected in the first week of Mar., after Mr
Blix’s next report.’ (FT, 24 Feb., p. 6) The US Secretary of State added, ‘It
isn't going to be a long period of time from the tabling of the resolution
until a judgement is made as to whether the resolution is ready to be voted on
or not. Iraq is still not complying and time is drawing to a close when... the
Security Council must show its relevance by insisting that Iraq disarm or that
Iraq be disarmed by a coalition of forces that will go in and do it.’
(Independent, 24 Feb., p. 1)
Hans Blix is due to make a
quarterly UNMOVIC report to the Security Council on 1 Mar., ‘but the text could
be delivered earlier’ on paper. (FT, 22 Feb., p. 6) ‘Blix is scheduled to meet
security council members by 7 March [for an oral presentation]. A vote on the
second resolution is likely to follow soon afterwards. The “final” deadline for
Iraqi compliance could be March 14, the date proposed by the French for a
ministerial meeting of the security council.’ (Sunday Times, 23 Feb., p. 2) So
there will be a Security Council meeting to hear Blix, then a second meeting to
vote on the US/UK Resolution.
The schedule is slipping
around. The Resolution, which has been tabled by the US and UK ‘is likely to
[to be voted on] no earlier than March 7 and no later than March 14, The Times
learnt last night.’ (Times, 21 Feb., p. 1) ‘Number 10 sources’ said there would
be ‘a vote taken in mid-March’ (Observer, 23 Feb., p. 1), ‘before March 14’
(Financial Times, 21 Feb., p. 5), ‘probably on 14 March’ (Independent, 24 Feb.,
p. 14).
It seems likely that ‘The
proposed US-UK timetable attempts to pre-empt French efforts to delay decisions
until as late as March 14’. (Guardian, 24 Feb., p. 1) Blair’s foreign policy
adviser Sir David Manning is reported to have pressed Condoleeza Rice, Bush’s
National Security Adviser, ‘for a short delay to give diplomacy three more
weeks—until mid- March—as the French had suggested.’ Rice was less patient.
(Sunday Times, 23 Feb., p.13)
THE ROLE OF THE MOON
‘Military analysts and
officials familiar with war planning said that the uniformed leadership,
particularly the US Air Force, have been pushing for an assault to begin with
the new moon, when allied technological advantages in the dark will be at their
highest. According to the US naval observatory, the new moon will occur on the
night of Mar. 3, with the first quarter not fully lit until Mar. 11.
‘The next new moon will not
occur until Apr. 1, a date that would push an invasion increasingly close to
the heat of the summer in the Arabian desert. The average high temperature in
the southern Iraqi town of Basra is 88F (31C) in April and hits 98F (37C) in
May. The weather and moon phases have led military analysts to believe that an
attack will occur in the first week of Mar.
‘But that timetable is
looking increasingly pressed by the contentious debate at the UN. The UK has
continued to insist it wants a second resolution before an invasion, and US
officials have recently conceded it would be almost impossible to buck British
demands.’ (FT, 19 Feb. 2003, p. 7) The problem is that the resolution is likely
to be passed at the worst point of the lunar cycle.
AN EXPERT VIEW
General Wesley Clark,
Supreme Allied Commander Europe 1997-2000, and leader of NATO forces during the
Kosovo campaign (Times, 19 Feb., p. 11.): ‘Washington has not given up its
preference for early [March], but here is why the attack might slip three
weeks. First, the diplomatic game is only now shifting into high gear. Britain
needs another UN resolution, and the US needs Britain. Getting the resolution
may well take another four or five weeks. Then there will be a final diplomatic
spasm involving the European states. The better part of wisdom would be to
delay as long as necessary to pick up additional support and the UN resolution,
so long as we can see an acceptable end-game. The greater the consensus for
going in, the easier the fight and postwar occupation will be. But one warning:
if Washington feels the diplomatic momentum faltering amid rising anti-war
protests and uncompromising French opposition, the President would elect to
attack early, UN resolution or not.
‘Second, this is a very
complicated military operation. Special forces... could always use more time...
[For the air attack] additional squadrons and aircraft carriers are on the way.
These deployments may take another three weeks. The main problem, however, is
the ground forces: with tens of thousands of vehicles, trailers and oversize
pieces of equipment, they are complicated to deploy, time-consuming to receive
and difficult to sustain... the logistics are tough... the deployment appears
well behind schedule for an early Mar. attack, especially if going through
Turkey is an essential part of the plan. The Turks have not yet approved the
flow of major forces, and that will entail an arduous 435 miles (700km) supply
line across Anatolia. ‘The full
ground forces deployment, including the British elements and a couple of US
divisions, is probably at least a month from completion. The more complete the
deployment the lower the risks when the attack begins.
‘Thirdly, the optimal
environmental window for the attack is approaching. Ground troops want to
finish the fighting before the heat of approaching summer.
‘If Saddam were to prepare
to strike pre- emptively against American forces concentrated in Kuwait, we
would be likely to launch early. Nor could allied forces stand by if the Shia
in Iraq rise up against Saddam's army. Without our prompt intervention, they
would suffer losses so devastating that it might compromise our campaign. ‘Despite these unpredictable factors, the
diplomatic and military logic is beginning to argue for mid to late March...
While I lean towards March 24 as the more appropriate start date, place your
money on it at your own risk.'
RECENT INDICATIONS TEND TO
SUPPORT CLARK
Military strikes ‘could be
launched in the first week of March. A more likely date would be later in the
month.’ (Independent, 21 Feb., p. 1) ‘An invasion could begin any time, perhaps
around 23 Mar., when moonless conditions will provide maximum advantage of US
forces.’ (Independent on Sunday, 23 Feb., p.11) ‘[I]t is possible that Mr
Powell has allowed room for last-minute diplomacy, perhaps even a formal
ultimatum to Baghdad. A war might then start towards the end of Mar., when the
darker nights before the new moon on Apr. 1 would favour an Allied air
campaign.’ (Telegraph, 24 Feb., p. 14)
War is not inevitable: the timetable for war has been delayed many times
already—in large measure because of popular pressure—it can be again.
Milan Rai is author of War
Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons Against War (Verso, 2002) and a member of Active Resistance to the
Roots of War (ARROW). He is also
co-founder of Voices in the Wilderness UK, which has worked for the lifting of
UN sanctions in Iraq.