The Dangers
Caused by a Policy of Preemption
by
Ash Pulcifer
Dissident Voice
March 1, 2003
Soon
after September 11, the Bush administration labeled North Korea as a member of
an "axis of evil." Then, in September of 2002, the Bush
administration released the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America. In this policy paper, the administration wrote, "To forestall or
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively." Due to this policy, North Korea became
concerned over the increasing militarism of the Bush administration. The
strategy that North Korea devised to counter this perceived threat highlights
the danger of preemption.
Kim Jong-il's government in
Pyongyang, after learning that they were being targeted due to the American
accusation that they were "evil," decided that the most effective way
to keep the United States at bay was to create a military force powerful enough
to deter the United States from aggression. After all, the Bush administration
showed their respect for treaties by abrogating them one by one; it was not
surprising that Pyongyang was nervous that the U.S. might also act in defiance
of the 1953 armistice. In order to combat this perceived threat, the North
released information that it was attempting to create more nuclear weapons,
implying that it already had a few ready to launch.
Their nuclear weapons
admission, or bluff, sent fear through the United States and caused a public
relations calamity for the Bush White House. In the middle of planning an
attack on Iraq, under the pretense of eliminating Saddam Hussein's weapons of
mass destruction, suddenly North Korea came out actually admitting they had
nuclear weapons! This statement by the North was smartly released only after
the U.S. was becoming bogged down in the Middle East.
The crisis worked
effectively, as the United States began to have to consider the grievances of
North Korea. More importantly, North Korea was able to bring its political
issues to the forefront of the world press at a time when the United States
could only wave a threatening stick at Pyongyang.
Furthermore, North Korea
jabbed the sword even deeper into the heart of White House rhetoric when they
claimed that Pyongyang reserved the right to preemptively attack hostile
nations! Pyongyang's clever strategy turned Washington's preemption policy on
its head and left the Bush administration without an adequate response.
Since then, the
administration has offered some economic incentives to the North, in exchange
for Pyongyang's disarmament. So far, the North has refused to budge and
continues to head down the path of creating nuclear weapons. Because the United
States is preoccupied with Iraq, Pyongyang seems to be holding out for the best
deal possible. Through their nuclear weapon bargaining piece, they are trying
to squeeze lucrative concessions out of the United States in exchange for
Pyongyang's silence. In fact, this is such a concern to the administration that
it has caused Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to constantly reassure that the
United States is capable of fighting a war in Korea and Iraq at the same time;
however, as we have seen through history, tough words such as Rumsfeld's are
usually used to cover up falsities.
This is where the danger
lies in the Bush administration's policy of arm bending diplomacy. North Korea,
knowing that the Bush administration is trying to keep the North's issues on
the backburner right now, will attempt to pressure the White House into giving
up great concessions to Pyongyang. If the Bush administration refuses to meet the
North's demands, then the North will probably just continue to work on building
their nuclear arsenal. The North figures it is a no-lose situation. Either
Pyongyang will secure large economic concessions from the United States, or
they will increase their nuclear forces.
In the case that North Korea
creates or increases their nuclear arsenal, it will simply provide them with
even more bargaining chips for the future. It is more difficult for a powerful
nation like the United States to manhandle a nuclear capable country,
especially when 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed on its border. Even in the
case of a conventional war, the North would not only be able to cause massive
U.S. casualties, but would be able to decimate the South Korean capital of
Seoul within hours since it lies so close to the border, well within the range
of North Korean firepower. The South is well aware of this and is no doubt
putting pressure on the United States to refrain from creating another crisis
on the Korean peninsula.
So, while to the outside
observer it may look as if North Korea is following an irrational policy, it is
actually coherent and follows the model set forth by the Bush administration.
That policy is the theory of power politics, where states use threats to coerce
other states into diplomatic concessions. The simple danger is that the threat
of preemption, intertwined in the general theory of power politics, can often
lead to unexpected conflicts that quickly spiral out of control.
Ash Pulcifer is a U.S. based analyst of
international conflicts and a human rights activist. This article first
appeared in YellowTimes.org. Ash encourages
your comments: apulcifer@YellowTimes.org