Iraq: The Torrent of Deceit
by
Robin C. Miller
Dissident Voice
March 17, 2003
The
Bush team's campaign for war on Iraq would have made Nazi master propagandist
Joseph Goebbels proud.
Fabrications are announced
as facts. Lies are repeated until they displace the truth. Deception is the
order of the day. [1]
And demagoguery supplants
democracy.
Sadly, this deceit has born
fruit: At least 60 percent of Americans think Iraq is close to having, or
already has, nuclear weapons, [2] and more than half
believe Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the September 11 atrocities, [3] although there's no significant evidence for either
proposition.
Even proof of the Bush
team's duplicity doesn't derail the propaganda train.
Case in point:
Administration spokespeople have characterized testimony by Hussein Kamal, the
director of Iraq's weapons program prior to his 1995 defection, as proving that
Iraq still possesses chemical and biological weapons. [4]
Now a transcript of Kamal's
testimony has surfaced, and he actually said exactly the opposite--that he had
personally ordered the destruction of all of Iraq's non-conventional weapons. [5]
But Bush, Powell and the
rest didn't miss a beat.
Our government's propaganda
began with the first Gulf War. Americans were told that Iraqi soldiers were
pulling Kuwaiti babies from incubators to die, and that Iraq was massing
hundreds of thousands of troops to invade Saudi Arabia.
Both stories were
fabrications.
The "incubator
babies" ruse, in particular, galvanized America. In October 1990 a
15-year-old Kuwaiti girl, identified only as "Nayirah" and described
as a "refugee," appeared at a congressional hearing. She claimed that
Iraqi soldiers had pulled hundreds of babies from hospital incubators and left
them "on the cold floor to die."
It was all a lie cooked up
by public relations powerhouse Hill & Knowlton under a $12 million contract
with the Kuwaiti aristocracy. "Nayirah" was actually the daughter of
Kuwait's ambassador to the U.S. She had never been to the hospital she
described. [6]
(Of course, real babies died
during the Gulf War when U.S. bombing knocked out Iraqi electrical supplies. [7] And real babies die today in Iraq because U.N. sanctions
prohibit importing necessary medical equipment. [8])
And as for the first Bush
administration's dire warnings that Iraq had massed 250,000 troops preparing to
invade Saudi Arabia?
Another lie. Jean Heller, an
enterprising reporter for the St. Petersburg Times newspaper, persuaded her
employer to buy two photographs from a Russian commercial satellite.
Massed Iraqi troops were
notably absent from the photos' panoramic expanse.
The "intelligence
photographs" allegedly showing the Iraqi formations remain
"classified" to this day. [9]
Now, fast forward to the
present.
(Pause briefly, though, to recall
the "leaks" suggesting September 11 mastermind Mohammed Atta met an
Iraqi agent in Prague. [10] Richard Perle, now deeply
entrenched in Bush's circle, even claimed that Atta met Saddam Hussein himself
in Baghdad: "We have proof of that, and we are sure he wasn't just there
for a holiday." [11])
Today, the administration's
torrent of deceit flows unabated.
Bush claims Iraq presents a
nuclear threat, yet according to head U.N. nuclear weapons inspector Mohamed
ElBaradei, three months of intrusive inspections have found "no evidence
or plausible indication" of an Iraqi nuclear program--and documents
allegedly describing Iraqi attempts to buy uranium in Niger were fabricated. [12]
Bush calls Iraq's
disarmament a "charade," but Hans Blix, the chief chemical and
biological weapons inspector who has found no evidence of either, insists that
Iraq has undertaken "a substantial measure of disarmament." [13]
And South African
disarmament experts visiting Iraq maintain it's doing its best. [14]
Bush asks America to go to
war based on secret evidence, but weapons inspectors complain that the
"intelligence" given them by the U.S. has been "garbage after
garbage after garbage." [15]
Insisting that Resolution
1441 gives the U.S. authority to attack Iraq unilaterally, Bush seems to feel
he can wish away the historical record: After that measure was adopted, the
U.N. ambassador of every Security Council member--including the U.S. and
U.K.--affirmed that it didn't provide for "automaticity"--the resort
to force without a further vote. [16]
Nor does 1441 authorize
member states to use "all necessary means," the accepted language for
military force. [17]
(It should be unnecessary to
observe that neither 1441 nor any prior resolution authorizes, or could
authorize, forcible "regime change" in any country.)
Bush continues to link
Saddam with al Qaeda, even though the CIA, FBI and Britain's MI6 all disagree. [18]
Bush invokes the U.N.'s
failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda while concealing the reason for that
failure: Washington's own opposition.
(During his 2000 campaign,
Bush expressly rejected the use of U.S. troops in Rwanda, even "to stop
ethnic cleansing and genocide.") [19]
The "terrorist poison
and explosive factory" denounced by Colin Powell turns out to be a
dilapidated video studio. [20]
Iraq's "deadly"
drone has wings held together with tin foil and duct tape, and two wooden
propellers bolted to engines far smaller than those of a lawn mower. [21]
Iraq's Al Rafah missile
testing site, called "top secret" by Powell, has in fact been
inspected five times. [22]
U.N. inspectors have
rejected administration claims that Iraq's fabled aluminum tubes were linked to
nuclear weapons, [23] that Iraqi agents have impersonated
scientists, [24] that Iraq has spirited weapons away as
inspectors arrive, [25] and that Iraq has mobile
biological weapons laboratories [26] or hidden
underground research facilities. [27]
Even today, the
administration has no "specific information" about Iraq's alleged
weapons of mass destruction, according to the Washington Post. [28]
It's true that one party to
this conflict has been playing a shell game.
And it's clear that the only
limits on the administration's litany of lies are those imposed by the
imagination. [29]
What's less clear is why
Americans continue to believe them.
Robin Miller is a writer and
activist in New Orleans, Louisiana. She may be contacted via her website: http://www.robincmiller.com.
Copyright (C)
Robin Miller 2003. This commentary may be freely distributed -- and I encourage
that -- so long as it remains intact, including the authorship and copyright
statement.
NOTES
1) For
more commentary on the administration's propaganda on Iraq, see:
John Donnelly and
Elizabeth Neuffer, "Dubious Claims Erode US Credibility," Boston
Globe, March 16, 2003. This appears to be the first article in the
mainstream press acknowledging even partially the administration's string of
deceptions on Iraq.
Haroon
Siddiqui, "We Should Sit Out This War; U.S. Credibility on Iraq Has Eroded
to an Extent That It Is Becoming Hard to Believe Anything from the Bush
Administration," Toronto Star, March 13, 2003. This is slso available
on Common Dreams.
Dennis Hans,
"Lying Us Into War: Exposing Bush and His 'Techniques of Deceit,'"
Scoop, February 10, 2003.
Maggie
O'Kane, "This Time I'm Scared; US Propaganda Fueled the First Gulf War. It
Will Fuel This One Too--And the Risks Are Even Greater," The Guardian,
December 5, 2002. This is also available on Common Dreams.
John R. MacArthur,
"To Drum Up Rage Against Iraq, Bush Senior and Junior Have Been Known to
Tell Tall Tales," The Globe and Mail [Toronto], October 28, 2002.
Bush Iraq Evidence Lies
2) A Washington Post/ABC News poll released on February
6 reports that 61% of Americans believe that Iraq "is trying to develop
nuclear weapons." See "Washingtonpost.com
- ABC News Poll: Powell's U.N. Address," February 6, 2003.
An October 2002 poll from The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
pegged the figure at 79%. See "Americans
Thinking About Iraq, But Focused on the Economy," The Pew Research Center
for the People and the Press, October 10, 2002
3) A
poll released February 20 by The Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press found 57% agreed with this proposition. See "U.S. Needs
More International Backing," The Pew Research Center for the People and
the Press, February 20, 2003.
The question asked in the poll was "And what's your opinion, based on what
you've heard or read: Do you believe that Saddam Hussein helped the terrorists
in the September 11th attacks, or don't you think he was involved?"
However, a New York Times poll released on March 11 puts the figure at 45%. See
Adam Nagourney
and Janet Elder, "Growing Number in U.S. Back War, Survey Finds"
["The poll found that 45 percent of Americans said Mr. Hussein was
'personally involved' in the attacks, a number essentially unchanged from a
month ago."]
4) See the statements collected in Glen Rangwala, "The Interview
with Hussein Kamel."
5) News
of the transcript's existence was broken in John Barry, "The
Defector's Secrets," Newsweek (March 3 issue).
For analysis, see Glen Rangwala,
"The Interview with Hussein Kamel."
See also:
Tim
Cornwell, "Allies Hushed Up Weapons' Destruction," The Scotsman,
February 24, 2003.
Julian
Borger, "Iraqi Defector's Testimony Confuses Case against Iraq," The
Guardian, March 1, 2003.
6) On
the "incubator babies" story, see:
Maggie O'Kane,
"No Casus Belli? Invent One!" The Guardian, February 5, 2003.
Mitchel Cohen, "How the
War Party Sold the 1991 Bombing of Iraq to US," antiwar.com, December 30,
2002.
Lucy Komisar,
"HBO Recycles the Incubator Hoax," Pacific News Service, December 3,
2002.
Tom Regan,
"When Contemplating War, Beware of Babies in Incubators," Christian
Science Monitor, September 6, 2002.
The most detailed analysis of this episode can be found in John R. MacArthur,
Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, N.Y.: Hill and Wang,
1992, pp. 37-77.
7) Suzanne
Goldenberg, "Iraq's Vital Services Balance on a Knife Edge ... Even
Without a War," The Guardian, February 11, 2003 ("During the last
Gulf war, when hospitals went dark, patients died on the operating table, or in
intensive care units when the electricity ran out.").
8) Kathy
Kelly, "What About the Incubators?" Voices in the Wilderness, April
13, 2000.
9) On the "massed troops" hoax, see:
Interview
with Jean Heller, CounterSpin, February 14, 2003 (RealAudio).
Maggie O'Kane,
"No Casus Belli? Invent One!" The Guardian, February 5, 2003.
Maggie
O'Kane, "This Time I'm Scared; US Propaganda Fueled the First Gulf War. It
Will Fuel This One Too--And the Risks Are Even Greater," The Guardian,
December 5, 2002. Also available on Common Dreams.
Scott Peterson,
"In War, Some Facts Less Factual; Some US Assertions From the Last War on
Iraq Still Appear Dubious," The Christian Science Monitor, September 6,
2002.
Jon Basil Utley, "Questions
About the Supposed Iraqi Threat to Saudi Arabia in l990--Aerial Photos Were
Never Released," Americans Against World Empire, undated.
10) See the "Mohammed Atta in
Prague FAQ."
Right-wing columnists devoured this story; see, for example, William Safire,
"Mr. Atta Goes to Prague," New York Times, May 8, 2002.
11) Perle's
claim was reported by the Agence France-Presse in a story distributed on
September 8, 2002:
Mohammed Atta met Saddam prior to September 11: US official
Sunday, 08-Sep-2002 4:40AM
MILAN, Sept 8 (AFP) - Mohammed Atta consulted Saddam Hussein prior to leading
the suicide attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, according to
Richard Perle, an advisor to the US defense secretary.
"Mohammed Atta met Saddam Hussein in Baghdad prior to September 11. We
have proof of that, and we are sure he wasn`t just there for a holiday,"
Perle told Italy's business daily "Il Sole 24 Ore".
"The meeting is one of the motives for an American attack on Iraq,"
added Perle, who is chairman of the Defense Policy Board and consultant to US
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, a leading advocate of an attack on Iraq.
"The main objective of the American administration is to avoid weapons of
mass destruction falling into the wrong hands," said Perle.
A copy of the AFP
story is available here.
For commentary, see:
Gary Leupp, "Perle's
Bombshell in Milan," CounterPunch, September 10, 2002.
Bush Iraq Evidence Lies
(scroll down to "Atta Consulted Saddam...We Have Proof")
12) For a transcript of Dr. ElBaradei's March 7 report
to the Security Council, see Mohamed
ElBaradei, "Statement to the United Nations Security Council; The Status
of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update," March 7, 2003. For other
documents concerning his mission in Iraq, see the IAEA Website.
Dr. ElBaradei reached the same conclusion in his prior reports. See:
Mohamed
ElBaradei, "The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003
Update." ["We have to date found no evidence of ongoing
prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq."]
Mohamed
ElBaradei, "The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq," January 27,
2003. ["To conclude: we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has
revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in
the 1990s."]
As to the latter report, see Colum
Lynch, "U.N. Finds No Proof of Nuclear Program; IAEA Unable to Verify U.S.
Claims," Washington Post, January 29, 2003.
For more on the faked uranium purchase documents, see:
Ian
Traynor, "UK Nuclear Evidence a Fake," The Guardian, March 8, 2003.
Felicity
Barringer, "Forensic Experts Uncovered Forgery on Iraq, an Inspector
Says," New York Times, March 9, 2003.
Dana
Priest and Susan Schmidt, "FBI Probes Fake Evidence of Iraqi Nuclear
Plans," Washington Post, March 13, 2003.
The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) apparently was given the
fabricated documents in early February, as in his February
14 oral report Dr. ElBaradei stated "The IAEA recently received some
additional information relevant to this issue, which will be further
pursued," while in his January
27 oral report he had said that "A fourth focal point has been the
investigation of reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium after 1991. The
Iraqi authorities have denied any such attempts. The IAEA will continue to
pursue this issue. At this stage, however, we do not have enough information,
and we would appreciate receiving more."
13) For
a transcript of Dr. Blix's testimony, see Hans Blix,
"Oral Introduction of the 12th Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC," March 7,
2003.
All of Dr. Blix's statements, and much other related information, may be
accessed at the UNMOVIC website.
14) Niko
Price, "Experts Say Iraq Doing Best to Disarm," Associated Press,
February 27, 2003.
15) See the following, which appear to be two versions
of the same story:
Richard
Wallace, "Angry Arms Inspectors Hit Out," The Mirror, February 22,
2003.
Richard
Wallace, "U.N. Inspectors Trash Bush's Evidence," The Mirror, February
22, 2003.
16) On Resolution 1441, see:
"SECURITY
COUNCIL HOLDS IRAQ IN `MATERIAL BREACH' OF DISARMAMENT OBLIGATIONS, OFFERS
FINAL CHANCE TO COMPLY, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1441 (2002),"
November 8, 2002.
For the council members' statements, scroll down to the "Statements"
section at the end. U.S. ambassador John Negroponte's statement is described as
follows: "The resolution contained, he said, no 'hidden triggers' and no
'automaticity' with the use of force. The procedure to be followed was laid out
in the resolution." The description of U.K. ambassador Jeremy Greenstock's
statement is similar: "He said there was no 'automaticity' in the
resolution. If there was a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations,
the matter would return to the Council for discussion."
The statements are given in the third person because the text contains accounts
of the statements given, rather than the statements themselves.
Peter Willetts,
Index Page for Selected Documents and Speeches on the Crisis over Iraq, City
University, London.
"Joint
Statement by China, France and Russia Interpreting UN Security Council
Resolution 1441 (2002)," November 8, 2002. This joint statement is
also available
here.
17) U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing the
use of force always use this language. For example. Resolution 678 of November
19, 1990, authoring military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait, "authorizes
Member States ... to use all necessary means ... to restore international peace
and security in the area." Resolutions authorizing force in Bosnia and
Herzegovina were equally straightforward. Resolution 816, issued on March 31,
1993, "authorizes Member States" to take "all necessary
measures" to enforce a ban on flights over Bosnia. And Resolution 1031,
issued on December 15, 1995, "authorizes the Member States" to
"take all necessary measures" to enforce the Dayton Accords.
The operative paragraphs of these resolutions are as follows:
Resolution 678
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless
Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1
above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area.
[Resolution 660 was the first Security Council resolution passed shortly after
Iraq invaded Kuwait; it "demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and
unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1
August 1990."]
Resolution 816
4. Authorizes Member States, seven days after the adoption of this resolution,
acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take,
under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination
with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations
to ensure compliance with the ban on flights referred to in paragraph 1 above,
and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the flights;
5. Requests the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to
coordinate closely on the measures they are taking to implement paragraph 4
above, including the rules of engagement, and on the starting date of its
implementation, which should be no later than seven days from the date when the
authority conferred by paragraph 4 above takes effect, and to report the
starting date to the Council through the Secretary-General;
Resolution
1031
14. Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the
organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish a
multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in
order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace
Agreement;
15. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above to take all
necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance
with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall be held
equally responsible for compliance with that Annex, and shall be equally
subject to such enforcement action by IFOR as may be necessary to ensure
implementation of that Annex and the protection of IFOR, and takes note that
the parties have consented to IFOR's taking such measures;
16. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above, in accordance
with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure
compliance with the rules and procedures, to be established by the Commander of
IFOR, governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina
with respect to all civilian and military air traffic;
17. Authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of
IFOR, either in defence of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its
mission, and recognizes the right of the force to take all necessary measures
to defend itself from attack or threat of attack;
18) As to intelligence agencies' rejection of a link
between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, see:
James
Risen and David Johnston, "Split at C.I.A. and F.B.I. on Iraqi Ties to Al
Qaeda," New York Times, February 2, 2003.
Barnaby Mason,
"Analysis: Danger of Spinning Iraqi Case," BBC, February 5, 2003.
Paul
Lashmar and Raymond Whitaker, "MI6 and CIA: The New Enemy Within,"
The Independent, February 9, 2003.
19) Gerald
Caplan, "How Dare Bush Invoke Rwanda to Justify His War," The Globe
and Mail [Toronto], March 12, 2003. Also available on Common Dreams.
20) On the "terrorist poison and explosive
factory," see:
C.J.
Chivers, "Kurds Puzzled by Report of Terror Camp," New York Times,
February 5, 2003.
Borzou
Daragahi, "Media Tour Alleged 'Poison Site' in Iraq," Associated
Press, February 8, 2003.
21) On the "deadly" drones, see:
John
Daniszewski, "Iraq Shows Media Its Controversial Drone Aircraft," Los
Angeles Times, March 13, 2003.
David
Filipov, "Iraqis Display Drone And Some Surprise," Boston Globe,
March 13, 2003.
Scott Peterson,
"The Case of the 'Deadly' Drone," The Christian Science Monitor,
March 13, 2003.
Niko
Price, "Iraq Shows Drone Powell Called Dangerous," Associated Press,
March 12, 2003.
22) Regarding the Al Rafah missile testing site, see:
John
Daniszewski, "Iraq Opens Suspicious Sites to Eyes of Media; The
Rocket-Engine and Missile Facilities Played Key Parts in Powell's Speech at the
U.N.," Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2003.
Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, "Iraq Shows Facilities Cited by Powell; Missiles Within
U.N.'s Limits, Officials Assert," Washington Post, February 8, 2003.
23) According to chief nuclear inspector Mohamed
ElBaradei, "Extensive field investigation and document analysis have
failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81mm tubes for
any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets." See Mohamed
ElBaradei, "Statement to the United Nations Security Council; The Status
of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update," March 7, 2003.
Dr. ElBaradei previously expressed doubts about the the aluminum tubes' nuclear
connection in both his February
14 oral report and his January
27 oral report.
As to the aluminum tubes, see also:
Joby
Warrick, "Bush Evidence of Iraq 'Appetite' for Nuclear Weapons in
Doubt," Washington Post, January 23, 2003.
Richard
Wallace, "Angry Arms Inspectors Hit Out," The Mirror, February 22,
2003 ["US claims that aluminium tubes imported by Iraq were being used
for enriching uranium rather than to make rockets were bogus. One inspector
said: 'The Iraqi alibi on this is airtight.'"].
24) See Dafna Linzer,
"Inspectors Dispute Bush Iraq Allegations," Associated Press, January
29, 2003, which states:
On the Iraqi scientists, ElBaradei said it was unlikely his inspectors
"could be fooled in the nuclear area on who is a scientist and who is
not."
"We know all the scientists from the past and I think our people could
easily detect if that person is a scientist or not."
25) Dr. Blix rejected this assertion in his March 7 oral
report. See Hans
Blix, "Oral Introduction of the 12th Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC,"
March 7, 2003, in which Blix stated: "As I noted on 14 February,
intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are
moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile
production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such
activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and
undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing
mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large
containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities
have so far been found."
As Dr. Blix observed, he had previously rejected this charge in his February 14 oral
report to the Security Council, in which he stated: "Since we arrived
in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300
sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was almost
always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the
Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming."
In that same report, Dr. Blix dismissed Colin Powell's surveillance allegedly
showing chemical weapons being removed from one site: "The presentation of
intelligence information by the US Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had
prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of
proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on one case, which
we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for
chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it
was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have
noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart.
The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a
routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of
imminent inspection."
See also Dan
Plesch, "US Claim Dismissed by Blix," The Guardian, February 5, 2003.
26) See the sources cited in footnote 25, just above.
27) Dr. Blix rejected this assertion in his March 7 oral
report. See Hans
Blix, "Oral Introduction of the 12th Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC,"
March 7, 2003, in which Dr. Blix stated: "There have been reports,
denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted
underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure
suitable for the production or storage of WMD. During inspections of declared
or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures
for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar
equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for
chemical or biological production or storage were found so far."
28) See Walter
Pincus, "U.S. Lacks Specifics on Banned Arms," Washington Post, March
16, 2003, which states: "Despite the Bush administration's claims
about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, U.S. intelligence agencies have been
unable to give Congress or the Pentagon specific information about the amounts
of banned weapons or where they are hidden, according to administration
officials and members of Congress."
29) For essential analysis of the U.S. and U.K. claims
about Iraq's weapons, see the following documents by British academic and
activist Glen Rangwala:
Claims and Evaluations of
Iraq's Proscribed Weapons
Response to Powell,
February 16, 2003 (response to Powell's February 5 Security Council
presentation)
Review of Feb. 14
Blix and ElBaradei Reports