Powell at the UN
Another Step
Forward on the Road to Baghdad
by Ian Williams
Dissident Voice
February 5, 2003
Colin Powell's
presentation did not immediately effect any road to Baghdad conversion in the
UN Security Council, but it was not intended to. As advertised, the evidence
contained no smoking guns, and since much of what Powell said was sourced to
anonymous defectors, it lacked the dramatic conviction of a named and visible
witness. However, it was more effective in reinforcing the existing suspicions
of Security Council members that Iraq was hiding weapons programs from
inspectors.
He was much less
effective in persuading other members of Iraqi links with al -Qaeda. Most of
the speakers in the Security Council politely ignored that part of his
presentation, presuming it was aimed for internal American consumption, since
it clearly has strictly limited export potential. Even Tony Blair has been
backpedaling on this version of "Six Degrees of Separation," since he
seems to listen more to his own intelligence agencies than does President
George W Bush--and he has to confront a skeptical House of Commons.
Ironically,
Powell's speech certainly also convinced many members that the U.S. had been
holding back information from the UN inspectors, leading to a gently implicit
rebuke to Washington. Council members repeatedly called on "all
countries" to share immediately any evidence they have with Messrs Blix
and El Baradei. What they were asking in a timorously polite way was, "why
did you not tell the inspectors?" After all Powell himself had said that
they were "inspectors, not detectives," so why not provide the occasional
clue?
Others noted the
usual mismatch between what the Washington rumor-mill promised and what
actually appeared. Powell did not substantiate the allegations that the Iraqis
had learned hours ahead of surprise inspections and cleared the sites. That had
led to allegations of leaks from the UN, since some people in Washington, even
when the organization is doing their bidding, can never resist a kick at it.
While the
presentation, unsurprisingly, added to British Foreign Minister Jack Straw's
conviction that the time had run out for Iraq, all other delegates drew
different conclusions: the need for multilateral consensus and to work through
the United Nations. They called for stronger support for the inspectors,
enhancing and reinforcing their teams, and called upon Iraq for cooperation.
Significantly, though, only the Iraqi ambassador actually tried in anyway to
rebut what Mexico's Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez called the
"valuable information" offered by Powell.
However, it is
almost certainly misreading Powell's intention to judge his performance by
whether or not he convinced the Security Council, or indeed the outside world,
of Iraq's guilt. The real message being presented was that Washington is on a
short fuse, and that while it would like the United Nations to go along, the
United States is prepared to go it alone.
This message
should be parsed in the context of last year's threat to close down all
peacekeeping operations if the U.S. did not get its way over exemptions for the
International Criminal Court. Powell's presentation was not an ultimatum to
Iraq--but to other Council members. The U.S. is prepared to wreck the
organization if it does not get its own way on this.
Winds of War
And through the
fog of diplomacy, there were noticeable signs of the way the wind is blowing. A
visible line in the sand is being drawn on the issues of Iraqi acquiescence on
overflights by U2 spy planes and on unaccompanied interviews of scientists.
Several speeches by "Old Europeans" and other opponents of quick war
endowed these two issues with increased significance, while it is also clear
that results of the upcoming visit of Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei to
Baghdad this weekend will be closely evaluated.
Although Iraq
may well capitulate on the U2 front, it is unlikely to permit its scientists to
be interviewed inside or outside the country by UN or U.S. officials. Powell's
sources for his statement that Saddam Hussein threatened death to any scientist
who divulged information or left the country for an interview may be anonymous.
But if anything, he probably understated the case. Following r recent regime
practices with dissidents, the families of any Iraqi scientist who fully
cooperated would suffer as well.
In the end, if
Baghdad allows scientists to leave the country to be interviewed, and they
speak, the game is up. If the Hussein regime does not meet the demand for
unaccompanied interviews with Iraqi scientists, then the indications now are
that this failure to cooperate will be used by many Council members to give the
U.S. the war vote it wants. When Blix and El Baradei make their scheduled
report to the Security Council on February 14, there will be a draft resolution
hovering in the wings. Blix has pointed out that he does not have enforcement
capability, nor the capacity to subpoena the scientists. At the very least, he
may have that after his next report.
Apparently, the
formerly recalcitrant members of the Security Council believe that they have
pushed Washington and its "willing coalition" as far as possible.
Despite their expressed preference for peaceful means, there are now signs that
they are in the process of adjusting themselves to give Colin Powell what he
has asked for--which is, effectively, a go ahead for war before the tanks need
extra air conditioning.
Ian
Williams writes extensively on the UN for publications including
The Nation and Foreign Policy in Focus. His regular column, The Deadline
Pundit, can be found at the Globalvision News Network: http://www.gvnews.net/html/pundit.html.
Email: uswarreport@igc.org