The Saddam in Rumsfeld’s Closet
by Jeremy Scahill
August 2, 2002
“Man and the turtle are very much alike. Neither
makes any progress without sticking his neck out.”
-- Donald Rumsfeld
Five years before Saddam Hussein’s now infamous 1988 gassing
of the Kurds, a key meeting took place in Baghdad that would play a significant
role in forging close ties between Saddam Hussein and Washington. It happened
at a time when Saddam was first alleged to have used chemical weapons. The
meeting in late December 1983 paved the way for an official restoration of
relations between Iraq and the US, which had been severed since the 1967
Arab-Israeli war.
With the Iran-Iraq war escalating, President Ronald Reagan
dispatched his Middle East envoy, a former secretary of defense, to Baghdad
with a hand-written letter to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and a message that
Washington was willing at any moment to resume diplomatic relations.
That envoy was Donald Rumsfeld.
Rumsfeld’s December 19-20, 1983 visit to Baghdad made him
the highest-ranking US official to visit Iraq in 6 years. He met Saddam and the
two discussed “topics of mutual interest,” according to the Iraqi Foreign
Ministry. “[Saddam] made it clear that Iraq was not interested in making
mischief in the world,” Rumsfeld later told The New York Times.
“It struck us as useful to have a relationship, given that we were interested
in solving the Mideast problems.”
Just 12 days after the meeting, on January 1, 1984, The Washington
Post reported that the United States “in a shift in policy, has
informed friendly Persian Gulf nations that the defeat of Iraq in the
3-year-old war with Iran would be ‘contrary to U.S. interests’ and has made
several moves to prevent that result.”
In March of 1984, with the Iran-Iraq war growing more
brutal by the day, Rumsfeld was back in Baghdad for meetings with then-Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. On the day of his visit, March 24th, UPI
reported from the United Nations: “Mustard gas laced with a nerve agent has
been used on Iranian soldiers in the 43-month Persian Gulf War between Iran and
Iraq, a team of U.N. experts has concluded... Meanwhile, in the Iraqi capital
of Baghdad, U.S. presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld held talks with Foreign
Minister Tarek Aziz (sic) on the Gulf war before leaving for an unspecified
destination.”
The day before, the Iranian news agency alleged that Iraq
launched another chemical weapons assault on the southern battlefront, injuring
600 Iranian soldiers. “Chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been
used in the areas inspected in Iran by the specialists,” the U.N. report said.
“The types of chemical agents used were bis-(2-chlorethyl)-sulfide, also known
as mustard gas, and ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate, a nerve agent
known as Tabun.”
Prior to the release of the UN report, the US State
Department on March 5th had issued a statement saying “available evidence
indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons.”
Commenting on the UN report, US Ambassador Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick was quoted by The New York Times as saying, “We think
that the use of chemical weapons is a very serious matter. We've made that
clear in general and particular.”
Compared with the rhetoric emanating from the current
administration, based on speculations about what Saddam might have,
Kirkpatrick’s reaction was hardly a call to action.
Most glaring is that Donald Rumsfeld was in Iraq as the
1984 UN report was issued and said nothing about the allegations of chemical
weapons use, despite State Department “evidence.” On the contrary, The New
York Times reported from Baghdad on March 29, 1984, “American diplomats
pronounce themselves satisfied with relations between Iraq and the United
States and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been restored in all but
name.”
A month and a half later, in May 1984, Donald Rumsfeld
resigned. In November of that year, full diplomatic relations between Iraq and
the US were fully restored. Two years later, in an article about Rumsfeld’s
aspirations to run for the 1988 Republican Presidential nomination, the Chicago
Tribune Magazine listed among Rumsfeld’s achievements helping to
“reopen U.S. relations with Iraq.” The Tribune failed to mention
that this help came at a time when, according to the US State Department, Iraq
was actively using chemical weapons.
Throughout the period that Rumsfeld was Reagan’s Middle
East envoy, Iraq was frantically purchasing hardware from American firms,
empowered by the White House to sell. The buying frenzy began immediately after
Iraq was removed from the list of alleged sponsors of terrorism in 1982.
According to a February 13, 1991 Los Angeles Times article:
“First on Hussein's shopping list was helicopters -- he
bought 60 Hughes helicopters and trainers with little notice. However, a second
order of 10 twin-engine Bell "Huey" helicopters, like those used to
carry combat troops in Vietnam, prompted congressional opposition in August,
1983... Nonetheless, the sale was approved.”
In 1984, according to The Los Angeles Times,
the State Department—in the name of “increased American penetration of the
extremely competitive civilian aircraft market”—pushed through the sale of 45
Bell 214ST helicopters to Iraq. The helicopters, worth some $200 million, were
originally designed for military purposes. The New York Times
later reported that Saddam “transferred many, if not all [of these helicopters]
to his military.”
In 1988, Saddam’s forces attacked Kurdish civilians with
poisonous gas from Iraqi helicopters and planes. U.S. intelligence sources told
The Los Angeles Times in 1991, they “believe that the
American-built helicopters were among those dropping the deadly bombs.”
In response to the gassing, sweeping sanctions were
unanimously passed by the US Senate that would have denied Iraq access to most
US technology. The measure was killed by the White House.
Senior officials later told reporters they did not press
for punishment of Iraq at the time because they wanted to shore up Iraq's ability
to pursue the war with Iran. Extensive research uncovered no public statements
by Donald Rumsfeld publicly expressing even remote concern about Iraq’s use or
possession of chemical weapons until the week Iraq invaded Kuwait in August
1990, when he appeared on an ABC news special.
Eight years later, Donald Rumsfeld signed on to an “open
letter” to President Clinton, calling on him to eliminate “the threat posed by
Saddam.” It urged Clinton to “provide the leadership necessary to save
ourselves and the world from the scourge of Saddam and the weapons of mass
destruction that he refuses to relinquish.”
In 1984, Donald Rumsfeld was in a position to draw the
world’s attention to Saddam’s chemical threat. He was in Baghdad as the UN
concluded that chemical weapons had been used against Iran. He was armed with a
fresh communication from the State Department that it had “available evidence”
Iraq was using chemical weapons. But Rumsfeld said nothing.
Washington now speaks of Saddam’s threat and the consequences
of a failure to act. Despite the fact that the administration has failed to
provide even a shred of concrete proof that Iraq has links to Al Qaeda or has
resumed production of chemical or biological agents, Rumsfeld insists that “the
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.”
But there is evidence of the absence of Donald Rumsfeld’s
voice at the very moment when Iraq’s alleged threat to international security
first emerged. And in this case, the evidence of absence is indeed evidence.
Jeremy Scahill is
an independent journalist. He reports frequently for Free Speech Radio News
and Pacifica Radio’s Democracy Now!
In May and June 2002, he reported from Iraq.
Email: jeremybgd@yahoo.com