Blair-Powell UN Report Written by Student
by William Rivers Pitt
Dissident Voice
February 9, 2003
"My colleagues, every statement I
make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions.
What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid
intelligence."
-- Secretary of State Colin Powell before
the United Nations, 2/5/03
The veracity of
Colin Powell's report on Wednesday before the United Nations Security Council
was dealt a serious blow when Britain's Channel 4 News broke a story that
severely undermines the credibility of the intelligence Powell used to make his
case to the UN.
Powell's
presentation relied in no small part upon an intelligence dossier prepared by
the British Government entitled, "Iraq - Its Infrastructure of
Concealment, Deception and Intimidation." That report plagiarized large
swaths of an essay written in September of 2002 by a graduate student from
California named Ibrahim al-Marashi. Al-Marashi's essay appeared in the
September 2002 edition of a small journal, the Middle East Review of
International Affairs.
The British
intelligence report can be read here. The essay by
Ibrahim al-Marashi can be read here.
According to the
story from Channel 4 News, which was later augmented by an Associated Press
report by Jill Lawless, the duplicate text was first spotted by a Cambridge,
England academic named Glen Ranwala. Apparently, Ranwala read the British
dossier when it became available and believed he had seen it before. As it
turns out, he was correct. Entire sections of the al-Marashi essay, including
six full paragraphs in one section, had been cut and pasted into the British
dossier, including several spelling and grammatical errors that are identical.
According to the
Associated Press, al-Marashi had no idea his paper was being used by the
British. "It was a shock to me," he told the Associated Press, and
expressed the hope that the British would credit his work "out of academic
decency."
A line-by-line
comparison of the two documents clearly shows one example of the plagiarism:
From the British
report -
"Saddam
appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri as head during the 1991 Gulf War. After
the Gulf War he was replaced by Wafiq Jasim al-Samarrai.
After Samarrai,
Muhammad Nimah al-Tikriti headed Al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya in early 1992 then
in late 1992 Fanar Zibin Hassan al-Tikriti was appointed to this post.
These shifting
appointments are part of Saddam's policy of balancing security positions. By
constantly shifting the directors of these agencies, no one can establish a
base in a security organisation for a substantial period of time. No one
becomes powerful enough to challenge the President."
From the
al-Marashi essay -
"Saddam
appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri(80) as head of Military Intelligence
during the 1991 Gulf War.(81) After the Gulf War he was replaced by
Wafiq Jasim al-Samarrai.(82)
After Samarrai,
Muhammad Nimah al-Tikriti(83) headed Military Intelligence in early 1992(84) then
in late 1992 Fanar Zibin Hassan al-Tikriti was appointed to this post.(85)
While Fanar is from Tikrit, both Sabir al-Duri and Samarrai are non-Tikriti
Sunni Muslims, as their last names suggest.
Another source
indicates that Samarrai was replaced by Khalid Salih al-Juburi,(86)
demonstrating how another non-Tikriti, but from the tribal alliance that
traditionally support the regime holds top security positions in Iraq.(87)
These shifting
appointments are part of Saddam's policy of balancing security positions
between Tikritis and non-Tikritis, in the belief that the two factions would
not unite to overthrow him. Not only that, but by constantly shifting the
directors of these agencies, no one can establish a base in a security organization
for a substantial period of time, that would challenge the President.(88)"
After a close
analysis of the identical text from both reports, it is also clear that Britain
altered key words to give their report a more sinister and ominous twist. The
British report states that the Iraqi intelligence agency is "spying on
foreign embassies in Iraq." The al-Marashi essay's version states that the
Iraqi intelligence agency is "monitoring foreign embassies in Iraq."
The rhetorical leap from "monitoring" to "spying" is
evident.
In another
portion of the British dossier, Iraq is accused of "supporting terrorist
organizations in hostile regimes." The al-Marashi essay's version states
that Iraq is "aiding opposition groups in hostile regimes." The
insertion of the word "terrorist" is manifestly provocative.
A disturbing
series of questions is raised by this matter. Mr. Powell relied heavily upon
"facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence," often from
foreign intelligence services such as the British. His presentation was meant
not only to establish the fact that Iraq is in possession of prohibited
weapons, but also that Iraq enjoys ties to terrorist groups like al Qaeda. In
light of this data, the factual basis for these claims is in doubt. Britain's
report was touted as an up-to-the-minute intelligence review of the situation
in Iraq. In fact, much of it is based upon the work of a graduate student who
published his essay five months ago.
Furthermore, if
the al-Marashi essay was worthy of plagiarizing, why did the British feel it
necessary to alter certain key phrases so as to make it seem that Iraq is
spying on foreign embassies and aiding terrorist groups? The manipulation of
the original data appears, on the surface, to have been done in bad faith.
An analysis of
the footnotes for the al-Marashi essay clearly demonstrate that his work was
meant to describe Iraq's intelligence apparatus and military situation in the
1990s. The British dossier was presented as an up-to-date report on the status
of Iraq's weapons and terrorist ties. There are 106 reference footnotes in the
essay. 103 of these footnotes reference reports and articles from 1988 to 2000.
Only three are from this century, and all of them reference reports from 2001.
This is not current data in any context.
Clearly, Mr.
Powell cannot be held responsible for the veracity of data given to him by the
British government. The fact remains, however, that the British intelligence
data, which comes from the most steadfast ally of the Bush administration, has
been severely undermined by this report. This calls into question the veracity
of virtually every aspect of Powell's presentation to the United Nations.
If the American
Secretary of State was given such shoddily-assembled data from its most loyal
ally, how can the rest of the data be considered dependable? The data on
Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam came from Jordanian intelligence, a source much less
trustworthy than the British. Many of the "human sources" cited by
Powell were, in fact, detainees in Guantanamo, Cuba. These sources are suspect
at best, yet were a significant part of the basis for Powell's accusations that
Iraq is working with al Qaeda and developing a wide variety of prohibited
weapons. Between these sources and the unreliable data from the British, it
seems all too clear that Powell's entire presentation was based upon
information that is questionable to say the least.
Finally, and
most significantly, is the question of intent. The United States will have soon
placed approximately 150,000 troops in the region surrounding Iraq with the
full intention of going to war. Such a conflict is almost certain to cause
destabilizing upheavals in the Middle East which could threaten the global
community. More ominously, the CIA and FBI have reported that a war in Iraq
will definitely lead to terrorist attacks in America and a number of European
nations, including Britain. This matter must now be framed in a new light. Does
the British government believe it acceptable to assist the United States in
going to war on the word of a graduate student from Monterey?
The revelation
of this data could conceivably come to do significant harm to the Bush
administration's attempt to assemble a "Coalition of the Willing" for
an attack upon Iraq. Tony Blair and Britain have been, since the beginning, the
most fundamentally important members of whatever international coalition Mr.
Bush is able to assemble.
This report
could shake Blair's standing with his government and his people. Blair's
relationship with his own party, and with the British citizenry, has already
proven rocky on the subject of his alliance with the Bush administration over
this conflict. If Blair's ability to stand with Mr. Bush becomes undermined,
Mr. Bush would find himself almost completely isolated on this issue.
William Rivers Pitt is a teacher from Boston, MA. He is the
author of War On Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You To Know (Context
Books, 2002) with Scott Ritter, and The Greatest Sedition is Silence
which will be published in May by Pluto Press. Scott Lowery contributed research to this report.