Responding To Colin Powell
by Rahul Mahajan
Dissident Voice
February 6, 2003
If one believes
everything Colin Powell said to the Security Council yesterday, one's first
response ought to be that there's no reason to fight a war, since U.S.
surveillance capabilities are so awesome that Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) can easily be found. And one's first question should be why
has the United States for over two months withheld this apparently damaging
evidence from those weapons inspectors, who could have verified conjectures and
destroyed WMD stocks and production facilities.
If indeed the
evidence presented is of the character claimed by Powell, then the United
States has chosen to sabotage UN Security Council Resolution 1441, clause 10 of
which "Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the
IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information
related to prohibited programmes."
The actual
evidence may not even warrant that conclusion. What Powell served up to the
Council was a sorry mess of fuzzy aerial photographs of buildings, a cute
"organizational chart" of supposed al-Qaeda operations in Iraq, a
couple of tape recordings that are capable of multiple interpretations and, as
before, a large number of undated reports by unnamed Iraqi defectors.
Given the
history of U.S. government use of disinformation to drum up support for war,
from relatively subtle measures like doctoring satellite photos to convince the
Saudi government that Iraq was massing troops for an invasion of Saudi Arabia
in 1990 to incredibly crude ones like the continuing claims by officials from
George W. Bush on down that Iraq "expelled" weapons inspectors in
1998 (as covered in the press at the time, the inspectors were withdrawn at the
behest of the United States), a skeptic need not actually accept any of the
evidence as presented. Even so, it's useful to go through it.
Evidence about Iraq and al-Qaeda
The weakest part
of the whole presentation, and the most important, was the claims trying to
link Iraq with al-Qaeda operations. In the past, the link depended on the
claims about one man, Mohammed Atta, meeting with Iraqi intelligence in Prague
(we've since found out that he was almost certainly in the United States at the
time of the alleged meeting); now it depends on one man, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Al-Zarqawi is
apparently a high-level operative of an Islamist group called Ansar al-Islam,
which is operating in northern Iraq (currently an autonomous region with a
provisional Kurdish government that is aligned with the United States).
Although there is no evident link between this organization and the Government
of Iraq (GOI), Powell claims that the GOI has a high-level agent in Ansar, who
"offered al-Qaida safe haven" - although apparently few if any
accepted the offer, since the supposed presence is in the part of Iraq not
controlled by the GOI. The full extent of the connection between al-Zarqawi
himself and the GOI is apparently that he got medical care in a hospital in
Baghdad, hardly an indication of high-level Iraqi complicity in terrorist attacks
against American targets.
There is no
attempt to link Ansar itself to the 9/11 attacks. In fact, while apparently the
mere presence of al-Zarqawi, a subordinate in Ansar, in Iraq is sufficient
reason for war, the head of Ansar, known as Mullah Krekar, is living unmolested
in Norway, and the United States has not even made an extradition request.
Krekar denies any connection of Ansar with al-Qaeda.
Powell also
claims that one al-Qaeda detainee has told them that Iraq provided information
about biological and chemical weapons to al-Qaeda members. Given the condition
al-Qaeda detainees are being held in and the obvious incentives for them to
tell a story the U.S. government wants to hear, this is very far from being
actual evidence. The claim also flies in the face of common sense. Saddam
Hussein has always been seen by al-Qaeda as an enemy and has himself seen
Islamists as the biggest internal threat to his rule. To give them the ability
to make chemical or biological weapons, weapons he sees as essential to the
survival of his regime (many analysts think the primary reason the United
States didn't implement "regime change" in 1991 was the threat that
the GOI would use its stocks of chemical weapons in self-defense), potentially
destabilizes his own rule.
Evidence about Iraq's WMD
The heart of the
presentation, however, was claims about Iraq's violation of UNSCR 1441 and
about its attempts to acquire WMD. This included evidence like a photograph of
a shed and a truck next to a bunker, followed by a claim that such a
configuration of truck and shed (the truck is apparently a
"decontamination" truck) is an infallible indicator that the bunker
has chemical weapons in it, and even a photograph of what an Iraqi UAV
(unmanned aerial vehicle) "would look like."
Powell claimed
that Iraq was reviving attempts to acquire a nuclear weapon, telling us that
two out of three elements were in hand. The third element, fissile material, is
and has always been the stumbling block. According to Powell, "we have
more than a decade of proof that he [Hussein] remains determined to acquire
nuclear weapons," but no acknowledgment that in more than a decade he has
been entirely unable to do so.
Nor was there
acknowledgment of the assessment that Mohammed el-Baradei, chief of the IAEA
team charged with Iraq's nuclear disarmament, delivered to the Council:
"No
evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities has been
detected to date. Nor have the inspections thus far revealed signs of new
nuclear facilities or direct support to any nuclear activity. The IAEA expects
to be able, within the next few months, barring exceptional circumstances and
provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, to provide credible
assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme."
He also
resurrected claims that Iraq's attempts to acquire certain aluminum tubes show
that it is trying to make centrifuges for production of fissile material,
disputing the IAEA's conclusion that those tubes are better suited to
conventional artillery.
Most of the
other "evidence" was unsourced or from one of the legion of defectors
that has always conveniently cropped up when the United States has needed them.
The most
compelling evidence was audio recordings of two conversations apparently
showing Iraqi attempts to conceal evidence from inspectors. It's not possible
to know whether the tapes are real, whether they are recent or from the
previous inspection regime, or what exactly they are referring to. Forgetting
all of these caveats, it's quite likely that the Iraqis are trying to hide not
actual WMD but minor things that didn't make it into the December 7 declaration
(for example, the empty chemical munitions that were recently discovered) and
are trying to eliminate those discrepancies surreptitiously instead of letting
the inspectors find them.
In the whole presentation,
there was no acknowledgment of the true state of affairs regarding chemical and
biological weapons, as concluded by the UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 and confirmed
by UNMOVIC more recently. That is simply this:
There are
records of how much in the way of chemical agents, biological growth medium,
and other components Iraq imported from Western firms (particularly American
and German ones). There is evidence of how much inspectors destroyed. There are
Iraqi claims about how much was used in the war with Iran and how much was
unilaterally destroyed by them. Iraq is unable to produce sufficient evidence
for the inspectors to match up those different numbers. So there is some
discrepancy in terms of chemical munitions - for example, Iraq claims 550 mustard-filled
shells were lost after the Gulf War, but it can't prove this. There is
discrepancy in terms of biological growth medium and if you take this
discrepancy and make the entirely unrealistic stipulation that Iraq's
fermenters were constantly and continually used for all these past years, you
can get high numbers for the amounts of biological agents like anthrax that
Iraq theoretically might have.
These
discrepancies are enough that inspectors could not close the book on chemical
or biological weapons (although they essentially did on nuclear weapons). They
presumably owe at least in part to the fact that Iraq, after undergoing eight
years of war with Iran, the most devastating air bombardment in history in the
Gulf War, and twelve years of crippling sanctions, doesn't have all of its
records nicely intact.
Is there an
Iraqi threat?
It is
undoubtedly true that in the past Iraq went to considerable lengths to avoid
cooperating with inspections. It's possible that that is happening again - some
of Powell's evidence might be real.
But missing from
the entire presentation was any serious talk about a threat posed by Iraq,
either to the United States or even to any country in the region. Mere
possession of WMD, even if established, is not exactly evidence of aggressive
intent. And in fact Iraq has been the recipient of aggression frequently since
the Gulf War (bombings by the U.S. and U.K., periodic invasions in the north by
Turkey, virtual Kuwaiti annexation of Iraqi land in the south), but has not itself
seriously threatened any.
The evidence
about Iraq's intent to attack seems to run something like this - Saddam
"gassed his own people" in 1988, therefore there is an imminent
threat that he will attack us in 2003. The imminent threat is not, however, so
severe as to keep us from having a full year of warmongering and bellicose
rhetoric before we actually attack.
This
conveniently ignores the central fact about Hussein's record of aggression.
Without exception, his worse crimes were committed with full U.S. support, both
material and diplomatic. The war on Iran, the massacre of Kurds in the Anfal
campaign of the late 1980's, even the bloody suppression in 1991 of the
"Iraqi intifada" all involved explicit measures of support from the
United States - providing military intelligence, approving export of chemical
and biological agents, providing "agricultural" credits, disarming
rebels, and much more. The invasion of Kuwait was done in the deliberately
fostered belief that the United States would not mind. Without U.S. support,
Hussein knows well that he can only be a threat to his internal political
enemies.
Powell did not
deal with these facts, but essentially admitted the lack of any evidence of a
real Iraqi threat when he fell back on the "pre-emption" argument -
"should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a
time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is
in a much weaker position to respond?" Of course, in the absence of
concrete evidence, any country can make this argument against any other, which
is why "pre-emption" is clearly not consistent with international
law.
What if Iraq isn't cooperating?
If Iraq is not
cooperating fully with inspections right now, it's important to understand why.
The first round of weapons inspections started to fall apart in 1998 for one
reason - the United States refused to commit to lifting the sanctions once Iraq
was disarmed. This refusal was an abrogation of its own commitment under UNSCR
687.
This time, it's
even worse. The United States is steadily bombing Iraq, in an escalating
pattern that is no longer even vaguely linked to enforcement of the illegal
"no-fly zones" but is clearly part of the suppression of air defense
with which U.S. wars begin. It is building a massive military presence in the
Gulf. And it is declaring openly, to all with the ears to hear it, that it will
go to war with Iraq no matter what Iraq does, whether the Security Council is
with it or against it.
In fact, at
least one columnist, Bill Keller ("What to Expect when you're
Inspecting," New York Times, November 16, 2002) has pointed out that
inspections are a wonderful prelude to war because they "can significantly
diminish Saddam's arsenal," thus making it easier for the United States to
fight without fear of retaliation and because "inspections immobilize Iraq
while we deploy."
So Iraq is in
the bizarre position of being called on to disarm while being attacked by
another country, and then being reviled by the "international
community" for partial compliance.
It is becoming
increasingly likely that the United States will obtain a Security Council
resolution authorizing war. And if it does, its main argument will be that it
must go to war with Iraq to uphold international law. It's important to
understand ahead of time just how obscene that argument is. It's not just
because the United States has systematically undermined international law with
regard to Iraq, by refusing to acknowledge the basis (disarmament) for lifting
the sanctions, by committing repeated acts of illegal aggression against Iraq
(like the Desert Fox bombing), and by deliberately making the sanctions bite
Iraqi society as hard as possible for purely political reasons (see
"Economic sanctions as a weapon of mass destruction," Joy Gordon,
Harper's, November 2002). It's not just because the United States enforces a
double standard, in which itself and favored allies are exempt from legal
requirements while states it decided to target are not.
It's
because this war is a violation of the ultimate international law. It is a
"crime against peace," a war of aggression. It was decided on long
ago in the White House, and the only reason other countries may vote in support
of it is the repeated statements that the war will happen whether they want it
or not. It is the United States holding not just Iraq but the entire world
hostage.
Rahul Mahajan is a member of the Nowar Collective (www.nowarcollective.com). His book, The New Crusade: America's War on Terrorism, (Monthly Review Press, 2002), has been described as "mandatory reading for anyone who wants to get a handle on the war on terrorism." His forthcoming book, Axis of Lies: Myths and Reality About the U.S. War on Iraq is due out in April. More articles by Rahul Mahajan can be read at: http://www.rahulmahajan.com. Email: rahul@tao.ca