The Nuclear Bomb Hoax
by Imad Khadduri
Dissident Voice
February 7, 2003
In his speech in
front of the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003, Colin Powell did not offer
any viable new evidence concerning Iraq's nuclear weapon capability that Bush
and his entourage continue to wave as a red flag in front of the eyes of the
American people to incite them shamefully into an unjust war.
On the contrary,
the few flimsy so-called pieces of evidence that were presented by Powell
regarding a supposed continued Iraqi nuclear weapon program serve only to
weaken the American and British accusations and reveal their untenable attempt
to cover with a fig leaf their thread bare arguments and misinformation
campaign. The false and untrue pieces of evidence follow:
Powell, in a
theatrical query, asked why the Iraqi scientists were asked to sign
declarations, with a death penalty if not adhered to, not to reveal their
secrets to the IAEA inspection teams. Exactly the opposite is true. The four or
five, as I recall, such declarations, which I read in detail, held us to the
penalty of death in the event that we did not hand in all of the sensitive
documents and reports that may still be in our possession! Had Powell's
intelligence services provided him with a copy of these declarations, and not
depended on "defector's" testimonies who are solely motivated by
their self-promotion in the eyes of their "beholders," and availed
himself to a good Arabic translation of what these declarations actually said,
he would not, had he any sense been abiding by the truth, mentioned this as
"evidence."
This is exactly
the cause of the second untruth brandished by Powell: that Iraq is hiding or is
still working (it is hard to discern from the tangle of his word what is really
meant) on its "third" uranium enrichment process by referring to the
cache of documents seized in the house of Faleh Hamza.
Faleh, according
to my explanation of the above declarations, did not consider the reports on
his work to be covered under this declaration for the following reason: Faleh
did dabble during the eighties at the Physics Department in the Tuwaitha
Nuclear Research Center itself -- but not under the nuclear weapon program
activities which came under the label of the PetroChemical 3 program -- with
the uranium laser enrichment process using a couple of medium range copper
lasers.
His low-key
research concluded that it was not yet viable to pursue this line of enrichment
on a production scale and the whole project folded up after it reached its
cul-de-sac in 1988. He packed up and then joined the PC3 working on the
Calutron enrichment method in 1989. Furthermore, this was well documented and
explained in our final report to the IAEA inspectors in late 1997, which they
confirmed and referred to in their own final report on the matter.
Yet, fully aware
of this fact, the James Bondian and insulting manner with which UNMOVIC
(following in the footsteps of their CIA infiltrated UNSCOM predecessors)
invaded the home of Faleh and searched it, even the private belongings of his
family to the glare of the cameras, added insult to injury and exponentially
increased Faleh's position vis-à-vis the authorities who were trying to protect
the scientists from such American theatrics.
Arrogantly, the
Americans are wondering why other scientists are not coming forward. Even
worse, Blix chose to wave this torn flag in front of the Security Council in
his report on Monday January 27, 2003. This fact alone was one of the reasons I
have decided to come out. Even Mohamed Baradei, the head of the IAEA, chided
Blix the following day for not taking into account IAEA's knowledge on this
matter, which was that the 3000 pages of documents were financial statements
and Faleh's own lifetime research work, and had nothing to do with the nuclear
weapon program. That is why he kept them at his home. It was becoming apparent
that Blix was succumbing to the American pressure tactics and leaned backwards
to provide them with flimsy "proof" at the expense of his supposed
fairness and mandate as a U.N. official. Powell grasped even this straw.
Powell only
accused but did not provide any evidence that Iraq had tried to get nuclear
grade fissile material since 1998. He vainly gave the impression that
everything was set and readily waiting for just this material to be acquired
and the atomic bomb would be rolling out the other door. He did not bother to
ask himself the following questions:
Where is the
scientific and engineering staff required for such an enormous effort when
almost all of them have been living in abject poverty for the past decade,
striving to simply feed their families on $20 a month, their knowledge and
expertise rusted and atrophied under heavy psychological pressures and dreading
their retirement pension salary of $2 a month?
Where is the
management that might lead such an enterprise? The previous management team of the
nuclear weapon program in the eighties exists only in memories and reports. Its
members have retired, secluded themselves, or turned to fending for their
livelihood of their families.
Where are the
buildings and infrastructure to support such a program? The entire nuclear
weapon program of the eighties has been either bombed by the Americans during
the war or uncovered by the IAEA inspectors. It is impossible to hide such
buildings and structures. Powell should only take a look at North Korea's atomic
weapon facilities, or perhaps even Israel's, to realize the impossibility of
hiding such structures with the IAEA inspectors scouring everything in sight.
Powell need only
ask those on the ground, the IAEA inspectors delegated by the U.N. upon
America's request, to receive negative answers to all of the questions above.
Instead, he chose to fabricate an untruth.
Finally, the
infamous aluminum pipes that are supposed to be used in a centrifugal
enrichment process. Powell and Bush should be able to relax regarding this
point, for they would have at least a ten-year attack period before Iraq would
be able to militarize these pipes. According to the "American
experts" themselves, such a process would need kilometers of strung out,
highly tuned, delicately controlled spinners to fulfill their ill-wish for
Iraq. Not to be noticed by their satellites, PowerPoint presentations and
colored arrows would then be an intelligence folly. This is not even mentioning
the lack of a stable electric power supply in Iraq or the phantom of highly
technical staff to run these kilometers long "very high grade and
expensive" mortar casings that are not made to U.S. military standards.
Perhaps Powell's grievance was, "How dare Iraq think of such expensive
mortars?"
Powell said:
"Let me now turn to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam
Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program." This verges on
being humorous. But as the Arabic proverb goes: The worst kind of misfortune is
that which causes you to laugh.
Imad Khadduri has an MSc in Physics from the University of Michigan
(United States) and a PhD in Nuclear Reactor Technology from the University of
Birmingham (United Kingdom). Khadduri worked with the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission from 1968 till 1998. He was able to leave Iraq in late 1998 with his
family. He now teaches and works as a network administrator in Toronto, Canada.
Email: imad.khadduri@rogers.com. This article first appeared at Yellow Times.org
* Reuters
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