Dangerous
Portents
India's Nuclear
War Plans
by N.D. Jayaprakash
Dissident Voice
January 20, 2003
Two concurrent
pronouncements made on 4 January 2003 - one, a major policy decision by the
Government of India's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and the other, a
pious wish expressed by the President of India, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam - are
ominous signs of the perilous future that lies ahead. The
brief Press Release issued by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) stated that
the CCS had "met today to review the progress in operationaizing of
India's nuclear doctrine."
One wondered
what "nuclear doctrine" the CCS was operationalizing? This doubt
arose because one was only aware of a 'Draft Nuclear
Doctrine' (DND) that was propounded on 17 August 1999, when the National
Security Advisor, Mr. Brajesh Mishra, in his capacity as Convenor of the
National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), had released "the document for public discussion and debate." The
observations that Mr. Mishra had made while releasing the DND document is very
significant especially in the present context.
Mr. Mishra had
then said: "I am happy to present to you the draft of the Nuclear Doctrine
prepared by the National Security Board…. We have decided to make this document
public in keeping with our position in favour of greater transparency in
decision-making. Please note that this is a draft proposed by the NSAB and has
not yet been approved by the Government. That will have to wait until after the
general elections." (Ibid.) Mr.
Mishra had explicitly stated that the Government favoured "greater
transparency in decision-making" and that the proposed draft had "not
yet been approved by the Government". Mr. Mishra was well aware that the
BJP-led Government then could not have approved the DND because it had lost its
mandate to govern and was holding office only temporarily. It was the duty of
the next elected government to set the process in motion.
No Debate
While analysing
the CCS' decision in the light of the statements that Mr. Mishra had made
earlier, three important questions follow: (1) When and in which forums and to
what extent has public discussion and debate taken place on this critical
national issue and what, if any, was the outcome? ; (2) If not, why did the
Government decide to finalise and approve the DND without public discussion,
debate or notice? ; and (3) Where is the promised transparency in decision
making when vital decisions having crucial bearing on the lives of the entire
population of the nation are taken surreptitiously? It is therefore incumbent
on the Government to explain its precipitate action on an issue of great
national importance and which is bound to have far wider ramifications. The
opposition parties in India are yet to take the Government to task on this
issue.
The promised
"public discussion and debate" on the DND did not take place probably
because the Government developed cold feet out of fear that the likely outcome
of such a debate would be quite contrary to their expectations. May be it was
apprehensive that the questionable proposals in the DND would have found few
takers. If the Government had any confidence at all that the proposals are just
and well-grounded, there was absolutely no reason why it should have shied away
from a public debate on the issue. It is becoming increasingly clear that in
the name of defending "national security" the right-wing
BJP-dominated Government is merely trying to pursue its sectarian agenda for
partisan ends. By surreptitiously approving what may be the propounded Draft
Nuclear Doctrine almost verbatim the Government has set a very dangerous
precedent both in terms of the procedure adopted for formulating the policy as
well as the substance of the policy itself.
The most
shocking proposal in the DND was about the necessity of cultivating "the will to employ
nuclear weapons and forces" (Para 2.6e, DND). This was the core
proposal around which rest of the DND had evolved. But any use of nuclear
weapons would necessarily result in wanton destruction of lives and property.
However, conscientious human beings would have found even a mindless thought of
committing such genocide absolutely revolting. So the authours of the DND have
come up with a bizarre solution: they thought it was imperative to inculcate
the much-needed pernicious will for perpetrating a horrendous crime against
humanity. Injection of insensitivity into the thought processes of sane human
beings was an intrinsic requirement for pursuing that objective. Essentially it
would entail de-humanisation of the individuals involved in the execution of
the dreaded decision, those who would have otherwise retained their humanness.
(Is this kind of moulding of the thought process any different from that of the
of terrorists who are conditioned to indulge in senseless killing of unarmed
and innocent civilians?) It may also entail taking of appropriate steps to
ensure that the pernicious "will" percolates down to the mass of
people so that they endorse despicable decisions as a matter of necessity or
inevitability. (At a micro level, the attempt to condone and accept the
unprecedented communal violence in Gujarat through a process of internalisation
is a classic example. Committing
large-scale atrocities - arson, rape and murder - were nothing to be ashamed
of; they are acts that have become a matter of "gaurav" or pride.)
The DND was, thus, essentially a document that sanctified and sanitised the use
of nuclear weapons. In short, it is a doctrine for fighting a nuclear war, not
for preventing one!
The
justification offered for formulating such a policy was that these weapons of
mass destruction would be used only in a retaliatory strike, which, in the
words of the CCS, "will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable
damage" (PMO, op cit.) on the adversary. If that is so, it is again an
admission that possessing nuclear weapons would neither deter the adversary
from launching a nuclear strike nor protect Indians from being victims of such
an attack. The utter fallacy of the doctrine of 'nuclear deterrence' thereby
stands completely exposed. None of the proponents of this doctrine have argued
that stockpiling of nuclear weapons can actually prevent a catastrophe. All
they are claiming is that they can compound such a catastrophe several times
over through a retaliatory strike! Deterrence is bound to breakdown at some
point because deterrence is always accompanied by nuclear one-upmanship, which
necessarily results in a never-ending upward spiralling nuclear arms race with
the spectre of a catastrophe remaining ever imminent. If India was likely to be
targeted in a nuclear first strike, why is the Government cagey about the huge
scale of death and destruction that Indians might suffer if such a calamitous
strike were to take place? Is there an acceptable level of damage that Indians
can be made to suffer? If possession of nuclear weapons cannot protect Indians
from being victims of a nuclear attack, what exactly is the purpose or
advantage in possessing these dreadful weapons of mass destruction?
Are the Indian
victims of a nuclear attack supposed to find solace in the fact that in a
retaliatory strike far greater number of people residing in the state of the
aggressor would be killed? Is a highly deplorable act to be avenged by carrying
out yet another equally deplorable act against a mass of people who had had
absolutely no role in the decision to initiate the first nuclear strike? Every
aggressor deserves to be punished stringently. But is the aggressor an entire
people or the decision-makers in the concerned state? Who has to be punished?
Retaliation is against whom? Moreover, there is a serious problem about
identifying the Aggressor State since India can be targeted from any point on
Earth with Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), which are in the possession of several nuclear
weapon states. (It may be noted that except China and India none of the other
nuclear weapon states have given even a No-First-Use pledge.) This being the
case, is Pakistan the fixed target for a retaliatory strike irrespective of who
the aggressor is? Any way, why is this undue emphasis on retaliation and
revenge instead of being more concerned about preventing a nuclear war and on
saving those millions of precious Indian lives (which will certainly be lost in
a nuclear first strike or subsequent strikes) in the first place?
An active UN and
the UN alone can effectively contain any potential threat from an irrational
power. The problem is that there is a concerted attempt to hijack the UN and to
prevent it from acting to its full potential. Unless this problem is urgently
remedied by the mass of UN members and a concerted attempt is made to uphold
the laudable goals enshrined in the UN Charter, the world will always be in the
grip of one crisis to the other.
India's current
nuclear war strategy is akin to the senseless policy of Mutually Assured
Destruction - or what was more appropriately called the MAD policy - that USA
and the Soviet Union (now Russia) have pursued. In fact, Mr. George Fernandes,
India's controversial Defence Minister, told newspersons on 7 January 2003
that: "...if the [Indian] deterrent is not adequate and Pakistan uses the
bomb, we will suffer a little but there will be no Pakistan left later"
(see 'The Hindu', Delhi, 8 January 2003). It may be recalled that Mr. Fernandes
had made a similar statement just a year back (see The Hindustan Times, Delhi,
30 December 2001). The shrill rhetoric from the Pakistani side too was almost on
the same lines.
Pakistan's Reaction
Pakistan, which
had set up its 'Nuclear Command Authority' on 2 February 2000, was never averse
to making boastful claims. Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, on
13 December 2002 gloated that his country's armed forces had earned the
distinction of "defeating the enemy without fighting a war" in the
recent escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan (see The Hindu, Delhi,
14 December 2002). Subsequently, while
addressing Air Force veterans in Karachi on 30 December 2002, President
Musharraf had reportedly said: "I personally conveyed messages to Prime
Minister Vajpayee through every international leader who came to Pakistan that
if Indian troops moved a step across the international border or the Line of
Control, they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan. I believe my
message was effectively conveyed to Mr. Vajpayee" (see 'The Hindu', Delhi,
31 December 2002). The mass media had immediately interpreted the President's
allusion as holding out a nuclear threat. While the spokesperson of the
Pakistan President, Rashid Qureshi, maintained that President Musharraf did not
talk about a nuclear war, the clarification later issued by the President
himself leaves little doubt about what he had actually meant.
Accusing the
media of misinterpreting his remarks on an "unconventional" war with
India, the Pakistan President told reporters in Islamabad on 3 January 2003
that: "This is a distortion and I have been misquoted. No one in his right
state of mind can talk of a nuclear war." (So far so good, but what he
said subsequently nevertheless betrayed his real intentions.) The President had
gone on to add that he was, in fact, at that time talking in the context of
Kashmir and had said that if any one tried to cross the Line of Control then
there would be a 'guerrilla warfare' (see 'The Hindu', Delhi, 4 January 2003).
President Musharraf's explanation hardly makes any sense since the Indian army,
which was ready to confront the regular Pakistani army, could not have been
deterred by the threat of guerrilla warfare! Any way the Indian army was
already fighting such a war on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Thus,
President Musharraf's claim that he was misquoted is not very convincing.
Indeed, if as
President Musharraf says 'No one in his right state of mind can talk of a
nuclear war', the best way for Pakistan to remove any such misapprehension is
by giving an undertaking of No First Use of nuclear weapons. This step can be
followed immediately by a No War Pact between the two neighbours in order to
prevent outbreak of any war - both 'conventional' as well as 'unconventional'
types, including what is called 'cross-border terrorism'. However, what is
happening today is that the leadership of both the nations is currently
indulging in the game of nuclear brinkmanship, which poses a grave threat to
the lives of the people of the two countries. Although India has unilaterally
given a No First Use pledge, in reality the pledge has become a mere mask
behind which feverish preparations are going on for conducting an all out
nuclear war (against Pakistan of course). This is apparent in the original DND
itself. (According to the "India Abroad" weekly, the Third NSAB has
recommended the abandonment of the No-First-Use pledge. This disturbing
news appears credible since the CCS has already sought to dilute the pledge.)
The fact that Pakistan refuses to follow a NFU policy also creates serious
doubts regarding its real intentions.
The only
difference in the approach of the two sides is that, on the one hand, the
Pakistani leadership practically appears to eulogise hara-kiri by claiming that
"the 140 million people of Pakistan are fully prepared to face all
consequences with all their might" (see 'The Week', Kochi, 6 January,
2002). On the other hand, the Indian side harps on the inevitability of winning
the nuclear war despite a "little" suffering in the process (see Mr.
Fernandes' statement of 6 January 2003 quoted above). In terms of numbers
"little" would actually mean several million Indian casualties. With
hundreds of millions of casualties on both sides what a victory that would be!
Thankfully, it appears that the Pakistani side is now trying to tone down the
rhetoric.
In response to
Mr. Fernandes' comment that India could absorb a nuclear hit and annihilate
Pakistan in return, Pakistan's information Minister, Mr. Sheikh Rashid Ahmed,
reportedly said: "We will not initiate nuclear war, and this is our
policy" (Associated Press report quoted in 'The Hindu', Delhi, 9 January
2003). If Mr. Ahmed's statement is the current stand of the Pakistani
Government, it indeed is a very welcome move. In that case Pakistan should have
no hesitation in formally adhering to the policy of No First Use, which would
be a major step towards reducing nuclear tensions between the two neighbours. A
No First Use pledge need not be anything more than an expression of intent. But
it would be a major Confidence Building Measure (CBM) that could open up the
possibilities of more meaningful preventive measures. The Pakistan President,
Gen. Musharaf, has also tried to discount the possibility of an accidental
nuclear war from the Pakistani side by claiming that "Missiles and [nuclear]
warheads are not permitted together. There is a geographical separation between
them" (see 'The Hindu', Delhi, 11 January 2003).
A New Twist
In the CCS'
statement, two new elements have been introduced into the No First Use posture.
Firstly, in the original DND retaliation would have been in response to
"any nuclear attack on India and its forces" (para 2.3b, DND, op
cit.) The same has now been modified to mean that nuclear weapons will be used
"in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian
forces anywhere" (PMO, op cit.). That Indian forces are going to be
"anywhere" is certainly a revelation. The Government owes an
explanation to the Indian people as to what it means. It certainly cannot mean
peacekeeping missions under the aegis of the United Nations, because Indian
forces during such missions have not so far been engaged in any peace breaking
activities unlike the US forces. There is absolutely no reason why Indian
forces, which engages itself in credible peace making activities, should come
under a nuclear attack. (But any likely military deployment abroad by India,
which is outside the pale of the UN, would be questionable and should not be
undertaken in the first place.)
Secondly, unlike
the DND, the CCS states that "in the event of a major attack against
India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will
retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons" (ibid.). This is
again a very questionable posture. Does this mean that if there is a major
chemical disaster for which say a US multinational company (e.g. Union Carbide
Corporation in the Bhopal gas leak disaster of December 1984) is culpable, will
the Government of India then consider the option of targeting the United States
with nuclear weapons? How will discretion be exercised? Effectively, this
posture would mean that India is going back on its No-First-Use pledge. When
chemical or biological agents are released by firing artillery shells it may
not be difficult to identify the aggressor. But the magnitude of the damage
that could be inflicted through such a process would be very limited and cannot
even theoretically justify a nuclear response. Under other circumstances,
identifying the aggressor is going to be quite problematic just as in the case
of a nuclear attack. A nuclear response to any situation might be a very
convenient belligerent stance but that would only compound the problem and can
never bring about any solution. All types of terrorism can be contained ones
its global links are severed. What is required is international co-operation in
eliminating the menace; there is no other short cut.
In an attempt to
tone down the bellicosity, the CCS has reiterated that it would remain
committed to: (1) "Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
states"; and (2) "A continuance of strict controls on export of
nuclear and missile materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the
moratorium on nuclear tests". That the Government has chosen to standby
these commitments is a sign of sobriety. The CCS also re-emphasised India's
"Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through
global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament" (ibid.).
However, if this laudatory pronouncement was not followed up with concrete
action, there is a high propensity that the same would become a mere cover for
concealing aggressive nuclear war plans. To assume that the onus of pursuing
the goal of global nuclear disarmament is that of someone else is a convenient
way of passing the buck and to quietly shy away from taking on the
responsibility.
Itching for War
The CCS, which
announced the setting up of a Nuclear Command Authority - a two-tier body
consisting of a Political Council and an Executive Council - has tried to imply
that India is a responsible nuclear weapon power. It has claimed that only the
"Political Council…chaired by the Prime Minister" (ibid) [hopefully meaning
the elected leadership] of the country can take the dreaded decision to
initiate a nuclear strike. But this announcement is hardly reassuring
considering the fact that it was an elected government in the United States
that took the reprehensible decision to use nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in August 1945 when an already defeated Japan was on the verge of
surrender. While the ultimate decision to use the horrendous weapon may rest
with the civilian leadership, the fact is that effective control over nuclear
weapons as expected would remain with the military. A Strategic Forces Command
has already been set up for the purpose and the CCS has appointed a
Commander-in-Chief for the same to manage and administer all strategic forces.
The CCS also
indicated that it has "reviewed and approved the arrangements for
alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all
eventualities" (ibid.). The way this statement has been formulated
underlines the cold and insensitive manner in which the proponents of the
nuclear doctrine are treating the issue. That the Prime Minister of the country
could get knocked out in the very first nuclear strike is presented as just a
matter-of-fact. That millions of Delhiites would perish along with the PM is
left unsaid because it is of little consequence. The whole emphasis is on
ensuring that there would be a 'next-in-command' who would be empowered to give
the deadly signal for a retaliatory strike. It is as though the authors of this
abhorrent doctrine are hoping that someone (preferably Pakistan) would carry
out a nuclear first strike on India so they can retaliate in a manner that
would "inflict unacceptable damage" on the aggressor. They are just
itching to retaliate because their entire focus is on retaliation and not on
initiating concrete steps towards preventing a nuclear war.
The saddest part
is that the urgency of preventing a nuclear war has become a non-issue as far
as the CCS was concerned. They are content to pay ritualistic lip service to
the cause of nuclear disarmament and to do little else. On the contrary, the
stress is on "overall preparedness" of the "existing command and
control structures, the state of readiness, the targeting strategy for a
retaliatory attack, and operating procedures for various stages of alert and
launch" (ibid.). Any reference to India's long held principled stand that
'the use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the UN Charter and a
crime against humanity' is consciously avoided. In fact the very phrase
"to prevent use of nuclear weapons" was completely missing from the
entire text of even the original DND! 'Nuclear war-fighting' is the strategy
that has now captured the imagination of the CCS'.
"Space Force"
Another matter
that has caused concern is the proposal put forward inadvertently by the
President of India, Dr. Abdul Kalam. In a speech titled "Vision
for the Global Space Community: Prosperous, Happy and Secure Planet Earth"
that was delivered at the Space Summit of the 90th Session of the Indian
Science Congress at Bangalore on 4 January 2003, Dr. Kalam, spoke of the need
for an "International Space Force". While it is very evident that the
President had not referred to the Space Force with any sinister motive, the
implications of his suggestion would actually be quite contrary to what he had
in mind. Dr. Kalam had correctly recognised "the necessity for the world's
Space community to avoid terrestrial geo-political conflict to be drawn into
outer space, thus threatening the space assets belonging to all
mankind". The President had also
expressed his eagerness "to
protect world space assets in a manner which will enable peaceful use of space
on a global co-operative basis without the looming threat of conflict on
earth". But the "International Space Force" that Dr. Kalam wants
to establish would itself become the biggest stumbling block in the way of
attaining the important objectives that he has highlighted. On the other hand,
what was required was not the setting up of a group of "protectors"
but the total de-militarisation of space so that all assets could be preserved
and shared in a co-operative manner for the benefit of all humankind.
The biggest
threat that is looming large today is the concerted attempt of the United
States to militarise space in a bid to impose its will over the rest of
humanity. Under the circumstances, the danger is that any attempt to create an
"International Space Force" may in the end just turn out to be a mere
euphemism for a "US Space Force".
The President's noble vision to enable "peaceful use of space on a
global co-operative basis" would then remain only a pipe dream. It is in
this context that the President's suggestion appears alarming. The apprehension
seems well justified considering the fact that India has held a two-day
official level talks with the United States on the so-called Missile Defence on
15-16 January 2003. These talks were a continuation of two rounds of
discussions held in May 2001 and May 2002. It may be recalled that in total
contravention of its principled stand against militarisation of space, the
Government of India on 2 May 2001 became the first major government to declare
tacit support to the "Missile Defence" system propounded by the US
Administration. It marked a major break from India's purported policy of
Non-Alignment. The "Missile Defence" system is very much an integral
part of the US strategic framework to militarise space through its preposterous
"Star War" plans. By opting to play second fiddle to the US in this
sinister programme, the Government of India has completely compromised the
vital interests of the country. If the grotesque plan ever gets going the mass
of humanity will be forced to pay a heavy price.
A Sharp Contrast
The questionable
policies that the Government of India is pursuing at home and at a bilateral
level is in sharp contrast to the forthright policies it has been upholding in
several international fora, especially in the United Nations. India's Permanent
Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr Rakesh Sood, while speaking
at the 57th Session of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 7
October 2002, had made the following announcement. He stated that the Indian
delegation was "bringing before this committee yet again, as it has done since
1982, the resolution calling for a convention to be negotiated for prohibiting
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances". Mr.Sood also said that:
"India’s resolution entitled “Reducing Nuclear Danger” will be presented
to this committee for the fifth consecutive year with the expectation that it
will receive wider support and convince those who are still skeptical of the need
for early concrete action.”
The UN General
Assembly adopted the two above-mentioned resolutions on 22 November 2002 with
the support of both India and Pakistan. The resolution for a 'Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons' (A/RES/57/94 -see
http://disarmament.un.org/) was passed by 110 to 45 votes with 12 abstentions
(with the entire NATO block and its supporters opposing it). While the
resolution on 'Reducing Nuclear Danger' (A/RES/57/84) was passed by 107 to 46
votes with 17 abstentions. Both India and Pakistan have extended support to yet
another important resolution titled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons'". The UN General Assembly adopted this resolution
(A/RES/57/85) also on 22 November 2002 by 161 to 4 votes with 1 abstention.
(Those who voted against were France, Israel, Russia and USA, while UK chose to
abstain - leaving little doubt that they are the five powers that constitute
the biggest stumbling block in way of global nuclear disarmament.) India and
Pakistan were also among the group of nations that sponsored and supported the
resolution (A/RES/57/57) on "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space", which was passed in the General Assembly by 159 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions
(Israel, Micronesia and USA).
However, it is a
little too premature to be euphoric about the support that these resolutions
have received. As India's representative, Mr.Rakesh Sood, has pointed out:
"The political will necessary to kick-start the negotiations of long
awaited and future oriented disarmament treaties has not been in evidence for
yet another year. If we do not get our act together, we are in danger of
engaging in activities “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing”. He further
added that: "we need to shake ourselves out of our stupor and take
concrete initiatives that address both the issues that have remained with us
for long and those that have emerged in the post 11 September 2001
context" (Mr. Sood's statement, op cit.).
Stem the Drift
It is time that
the Government of India itself first took heed of Mr. Sood's plea. The point is
that both India and Pakistan have on the floor of the UN General Assembly
unequivocally supported several resolutions in favour of global nuclear
disarmament and against the arms race. They both claim: (1) that they support a
convention on prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any
circumstances; (2) that they are ready to take all necessary steps to reduce
the nuclear danger; (3) that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is
the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (4) that they recognise the need to
commence negotiations for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a
specified framework of time; and (5) that they are against an arms race in
outer space. Then why is it not possible for the two nations to reiterate the
same at a bilateral level on a joint platform? Instead, what is happening is
that, outside the four walls of the UN and especially at home, the two neighbours
are constantly at loggerheads and rattling their nuclear sabre at each other.
(The rare exception is the 'Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against
Nuclear Installations and Facilities between India and Pakistan', which was
signed in 1988*. As to why similar agreements cannot be signed bilaterally to
prevent a nuclear war or, for that matter, any war between the two is
inexplicable.) [*The agreement came into force in 1991. Under the agreement,
the two countries are to inform each other on January 1 of every calendar year
of the nuclear installations and facilities to be covered by the Agreement. The
12th such exchange took place on 1 January 2003. See TheHindu, Delhi, 2 January
2003]
It may not be an exaggeration to say that the
leaders in both India and Pakistan try to conceal from their peoples as much as
possible about their common and often joint activities in the UN for furthering
the cause of world peace. Any way it cannot be denied that hardly any publicity
is given to these efforts. At home they are more pre-occupied with
rabble-rousing and little else. Demonisation of each other caters to the wild
passions of the religious right and conflating hatred of the other community
with defence of one's nation is done so as to extract good dividends in
domestic politics. By refusing to initiate concrete action on the numerous
issues on which they have a common position, the leadership of the two
countries are only deceiving their own peoples. Unless the concerned citizens
of India and Pakistan rise up to put an end to this mindless drift, a tragic
end might not be too far away for a sizeable section of humanity.
N.D.Jayaprakash is a member of the Delhi Science
Forum/Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace in New Delhi, India. Email: jpdsf@hotmail.com