The UN from Qana
to Jenin
Why the Secretary General's Report Cannot Be Trusted
by Ran HaCohen
August 17, 2002
Last week, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan released a report on Israel's attack on Jenin in April. A reminder of the
highlights: After two weeks of heavy fighting in Jenin's refugee camp,
journalists and human rights organisations (including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International), who visited Jenin,
unearthed numerous accounts of atrocities. Some 150 houses demolished,
sometimes with their inhabitants inside. Civilians used as human shields.
Extrajudicial killings. A Palestinian nurse in full uniform shot through the
heart while trying to tend a wounded man. A fourteen-year-old shot dead by an
Israeli tank while shopping. A woman killed when Israeli soldiers blew open the
door of her house as she tried to open it for them. A man shot dead in his
wheelchair. And so on.
That's the controversial part. Uncontroversial is what
followed: UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution to send a
fact-finding team to Jenin (April 19). Israel promised to co-operate. Annan
established a fact-finding team and instructed it to proceed to the area. Now
Israel expressed concerns related to the composition of the team, the scope of
its mandate, how this mandate would be carried out, various procedural matters,
etc. etc. Negotiations took place and Annan seemed to satisfy Israel's demands.
Finally (April 30), the Israeli Cabinet issued a statement saying that as long
as its terms have not been met, "it will not be possible for the clarification
process to begin." It didn't bother to say what those terms were; but on
the phone with Annan, Israeli officials broached additional issues to those
raised before and indicated that this list might not be exhaustive. Following
this, Annan disbanded the team (May 3), ordered a report without visiting the
scene, and addressed letters to the Israel and to the Palestinians, requesting
them to submit relevant information. Israel didn't respond even to this
request. All along, then, Israel's very conduct clearly indicated it had a lot
to hide.
Now the UN finally released its report, based entirely on
evidence from secondary sources, written comfortably in Geneva. Human rights
groups immediately blamed the report of being "seriously flawed";
Israel's government, naturally, welcomed it. The Independent noted that the report was "carefully worded not to
give offence to Israel or its allies. It deliberately draws no conclusions, but
only compiles evidence from various sources."
Whom Should We Trust?
Since we cannot deal here with all the issues at stake,
let's examine just one: that of demolishing houses with their inhabitants
inside. The UN report says:
"IDF also used armoured bulldozers, supported by
tanks, to demolish portions of the camp. The Government of Israel maintains
that 'IDF forces only destroyed structures after calling a number of times for
inhabitants to leave buildings, and from which the shooting did not cease'.
Witness testimonies and human rights investigations allege that the destruction
was both disproportionate and indiscriminate, some houses coming under attack
from the bulldozers before their inhabitants had the opportunity to
evacuate."
So were innocent inhabitants given time to leave, or not?
The UN gives both sides equal space (24 words), and takes no stand. Israel
"maintains" they were, whereas witnesses (surely Palestinian) and
human rights investigations "allege" they were not.
Perhaps We Cannot Know?
Yes we can. We know very well. And the UN knows, or could
know, if it bothered to simply read Israel's most selling daily, Yedioth
Achronot, on May 31. Not a very clandestine source. An Israeli D-9
bulldozer driver, one Moshe Nissim from Jerusalem, described there in detail what he himself had done in Jenin. Here:
"For three days, I just destroyed and destroyed. The
whole area. Any house that they fired from came down. And to knock it down, I
tore down some more. They were warned by loudspeaker to get out of the house
before I come, but I gave no one a chance. I didn't wait. I didn't give one
blow, and wait for them to come out. I would just ram the house with full
power, to bring it down as fast as possible. I wanted to get to the other
houses. To get as many as possible.
"Many people where inside houses we started to
demolish. They would come out of the houses we where working on. I didn't see,
with my own eyes, people dying under the blade of the D-9. And I didn't see
house falling down on live people. But if there were any, I wouldn't care at
all. I am sure people died inside these houses, but it was difficult to see,
there was lots of dust everywhere, and we worked a lot at night. I found joy
with every house that came down, because I knew they didn't mind dying, but
they cared for their homes. If you knocked down a house, you buried 40 or 50
people for generations. If I am sorry for anything, it is for not tearing the
whole camp down."
So an evidence of an Israeli soldier clearly affirms
allegations of human rights organisations and refute the claims of the Israeli
Government. The report presented by Kofi Annan is unreasonably biased in favour
of Israel, at least on this crucial point. Why? To understand that, we'll have
to go six years back in time. It's an obvious link; strange that nobody seems
to remember it. Amazing how quickly things are forgotten when they contradict
our mental set.
The Massacre of Qana
We're precisely six years before Jenin, on April 18, 1996.
It is "Operation Grapes of Wrath", conducted by PM Shimon Peres and
"Defence" Minister Ehud Barak. The headquarters compound of the
Fijian battalion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) come
under fire by Israeli artillery. At the time, more than 800 Lebanese have sought
refuge inside the compound, which is located in the village of Qana. An
estimated 100 persons are killed and a larger number wounded, including four UN
soldiers.
Israel, obviously, claims that it was just an accident;
that it was not aware of the large number of Lebanese civilians in the
compound; that it had no aircraft flying above the area before or during the
shelling. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali orders an investigation,
headed by Dutch military advisor Major-General Franklin van Kappen.
Van Kappen's report dismisses Israel's outrageous claim about not being aware
of civilians, reminding that a UN compound was not a legitimate target, whether
or not civilians were in it. Moreover, the report stated clearly that "The
distribution of point impact detonations and air bursts makes it improbable
that impact fuses and proximity fuses were employed in random order, as stated
by the Israeli forces" and that "Contrary to repeated denials, two
Israeli helicopters and a remotely piloted vehicle were present in the Qana
area at the time of the shelling."
How very different from the present report on Jenin! A
clear-cut conclusion, stated in a diplomatic language, but in so many words
saying that Israel shelled and killed on purpose the 100 Lebanese civilians
seeking refuge in the UN compound.
And what happened then? Well, the US urged the Secretary
General not to publish the incriminating report. SG Boutros-Ghali insisted. The
Clinton administration put pressure on the UN to soften the language, hoping to
turn it into a useless "Israel-maintains-this-and-others-allege-that"
kind of paper like the one on Jenin. Boutros-Ghali refused, and published the embarrassing report as is. It was on the 7th of May,
1996.
US Imposes Reshuffle
A week later,
on the 13th of May, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher met Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali at his official residence in New York. He informed him of
the definite US decision that it would veto his re-election. Boutros-Ghali
later said this was the first time he had any direct indication from the US
that it was unhappy with him. Boutros-Ghali told Christopher that he hoped the
US would change its mind. It didn't. Though Boutros-Ghali was supported
unanimously by the African countries as well as by France, China, Russia,
Germany, Japan and many European countries, the US vetoed his re-election,
threatening African countries that loyalty to Boutros-Ghali would destroy the
chances of Africa to retain the Secretary General's post for a second term, and
threatening the UN not to pay the US assessments if Boutros Ghali remained.
Finally, the US imposed the election of Kofi Annan and did away with
Boutros-Ghali, described as "too independent" and "difficult to
control".
This is how SG Annan was elected, and this is the background
against which his report on Jenin should be read. The US did a good bargain:
Annan is not Boutros-Ghali. When Israel showed reluctance towards the
fact-finding team, Annan quickly lent it a hand and disbanded the team. Then,
without visiting the scene, Annan issued a shameful report, echoing Israeli
propaganda, ignoring even "embarrassing" material published in the
Israeli press. Considering the background of his own election, Annan can hardly
be expected to have behaved differently. The issue here is not personal: it is
how the US runs the world.
So whom should we trust on the Jenin events? Human rights
organisations and journalists who
visited the scene, and whose report of war crimes and atrocities are
corroborated even by the evidence of an Israeli soldier – or rather a
Geneva-based UN report of Kofi Annan, the man who replaced a predecessor
"too independent" regarding the Israeli massacre in Qana? Decide for
yourself.
Ran HaCohen teaches in
the Tel-Aviv University's Department of Comparative Literature, and is
currently working on his PhD thesis. He also works as a literary translator
(from German, English and Dutch), and as a literary critic for the Israeli
daily Yedioth Achronoth. HaCohen’s semi-regular “Letter from
Israel” column can be found at AntiWar.com,
where this article first appeared.