Powell's Dubious Case
by Phyllis Bennis
Dissident Voice
February 6, 2003
U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council on February 5 wasn't
likely to win over anyone not already on his side. He ignored the crucial fact
that in the past several days (in Sunday's New York Times and in his February
4th briefing of UN journalists) Hans Blix denied key components of Powell's
claims.
Blix, who
directs the UN inspection team in Iraq, said the UNMOVIC inspectors have seen
"no evidence" of mobile biological weapons labs, has "no
persuasive indications" of Iraq-al Qaeda links, and no evidence of Iraq
hiding and moving material used for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) either
outside or inside Iraq. Dr. Blix also said there was no evidence of Iraq
sending scientists out of the country, of Iraqi intelligence agents posing as
scientists, of UNMOVIC conversations being monitored, or of UNMOVIC being penetrated.
Further, CIA and
FBI officials still believe the Bush administration is "exaggerating"
information to make their political case for war. Regarding the alleged Iraqi
link with al Qaeda, U.S. intelligence officials told the New York Times, "we
just don't think it's there."
The most
compelling part of Powell's presentation was his brief ending section on the
purported al Qaeda link with Iraq and on the dangers posed by the al Zarqawi
network. However, he segued disingenuously from the accurate and frightening
information about what the al Zarqawi network could actually do with
biochemical materials to the not-so-accurate claim about its link with
Iraq--which is tenuous and unproven at best.
A key component
of the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda link is based on what Powell said "detainees
tell us…". That claim must be rejected. On December 27 the Washington Post
reported that U.S. officials had acknowledged detainees being beaten, roughed
up, threatened with torture by being turned over to officials of countries
known to practice even more severe torture. In such circumstances, nothing
"a detainee" says can be taken as evidence of truth given that people
being beaten or tortured will say anything to stop the pain. Similarly, the
stories of defectors cannot be relied on alone, as they have a self-interest in
exaggerating their stories and their own involvement to guarantee access to
protection and asylum.
In his
conclusion, Powell said, "We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war, we
wrote 1441 to try to preserve the piece." It is certainly at least
partially true that the UN resolution was an effort to "preserve the
peace," although it is certainly not true that the U.S. wrote 1441 to
preempt war. Rather, the Bush administration intended that the resolution would
serve as a first step toward war.
Finally, the
"even if" rule applies. "Even if" everything Powell said
was true, there is simply not enough evidence for war. There is no evidence of
Iraq posing an imminent threat, no evidence of containment not working. Powell
is asking us to go to war--risking the lives of 100,000 Iraqis in the first
weeks, hundreds or thousands of U.S. and other troops, and political and
economic chaos--because he thinks MAYBE in the future Iraq might rebuild its
weapons systems and MIGHT decide to deploy weapons or MIGHT give those weapons
to someone else who MIGHT use them against someone we like or give them to
someone else who we don't like, and other such speculation. Nothing that Powell
said should alter the position that we should reject a war on spec.
Phyllis Bennis is the author of Calling the Shots:
How Washington Dominates Today’s UN (Olive Branch Press, 1996) and Before
and After: US Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis (Olive Branch
Press, 2002). She is a Middle East analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org) and a senior analyst at the
Institute for Policy Studies. Email: pbennis@compuserve.com