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	<title>Comments on: Behind Cautious Signal, a Decision for Afghan Peace Talks</title>
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	<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/behind-cautious-signal-a-decision-for-afghan-peace-talks/</link>
	<description>a radical newsletter in the struggle for peace and social justice</description>
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		<title>By: Maryb</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/behind-cautious-signal-a-decision-for-afghan-peace-talks/#comment-64249</link>
		<dc:creator>Maryb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 Jan 2010 18:26:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=13991#comment-64249</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[New postcodes for Guantanamo?

&#039;Night raids are only the first step in the American detention process in Afghanistan. Suspects are usually sent to one among a series of prisons on US military bases around the country. There are officially nine such jails, called Field Detention Sites in military parlance. They are small holding areas, often just a clutch of cells divided by plywood, and are mainly used for prisoner interrogation. 

In the early years of the war, these were but way stations for those en route to Bagram prison, a facility with a notorious reputation for abusive behavior. As a spotlight of international attention fell on Bagram in recent years, wardens there cleaned up their act and the mistreatment of prisoners began to shift to the little-noticed Field Detention Sites.&#039; 

OBAMA&#039;S SECRET PRISONS... In AFGHANISTAN ...
January 30, 2010, 4:01 pm
South Asia 

Terror comes at night in Afghanistan 
By Anand Gopal 
 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LA30Df01.html]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New postcodes for Guantanamo?</p>
<p>&#8216;Night raids are only the first step in the American detention process in Afghanistan. Suspects are usually sent to one among a series of prisons on US military bases around the country. There are officially nine such jails, called Field Detention Sites in military parlance. They are small holding areas, often just a clutch of cells divided by plywood, and are mainly used for prisoner interrogation. </p>
<p>In the early years of the war, these were but way stations for those en route to Bagram prison, a facility with a notorious reputation for abusive behavior. As a spotlight of international attention fell on Bagram in recent years, wardens there cleaned up their act and the mistreatment of prisoners began to shift to the little-noticed Field Detention Sites.&#8217; </p>
<p>OBAMA&#8217;S SECRET PRISONS&#8230; In AFGHANISTAN &#8230;<br />
January 30, 2010, 4:01 pm<br />
South Asia </p>
<p>Terror comes at night in Afghanistan<br />
By Anand Gopal </p>
<p><a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LA30Df01.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LA30Df01.html</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Maryb</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/behind-cautious-signal-a-decision-for-afghan-peace-talks/#comment-64221</link>
		<dc:creator>Maryb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Jan 2010 11:07:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=13991#comment-64221</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Will a musical be made next - Springtime in Kabul?

The Financial Times -

Allies rally their forces for spring offensive 
By Lionel Barber in Helmand 

Published: January 29 2010 02:00 

With the planned allied counter-offensive against the Taliban just weeks away, Camp Bastion, the main British military base in Afghanistan, is heaving with activity. 

Hercules C-17 heavy transport aircraft roar in and out, while Chinook, Merlin and Puma helicopters kick up clouds of red dust. A deserted airstrip three years ago, Camp Bastion, located in the violent Afghan province of Helmand, is today handling more cargo than London&#039;s Gatwick airport and more traffic than Luton. 

There is a renewed sense of confidence in the Nato mission after a year of drift in which the US and UK-led coalition, by their own admission, lost the initiative across the whole theatre. In the past year the number of Nato casualties has doubled, with British forces sustaining heavy losses in the south. 

Officials speak of &quot;hubris&quot; in underestimating the enemy. Now, despite reports of daily casualties, largely from deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the coalition appears to have clarified its mission. 

At least this was the impression this visitor took away after a three-day trip to Afghanistan. 

The mood in the British camp is cautiously upbeat. The Americans are arriving in force (30,000 extra troops by August), and the favourite Chinooks are now on stream - delays were, say officers, due to a lack of trained crew rather than cuts or incompetence. 

General Stanley McChrystal, the charismatic allied commander, has changed the weather. &quot;Gen Stan&quot; has switched focus from simply killing insurgents to protecting and winning the support of the Afghan people. Crucially, the plan assumes that Hamid Karzai, Afghan president, is ready to take on the role of wartime commander-in-chief. 

Mr Karzai is described by a western official in Kabul as &quot;Clinton without the sex&quot; - a consummate politician with a vast network of contacts among the country&#039;s tribes. But he is also seen as vacillating and a weak administrator torn between loyalties to his own Pashtun tribe and the knowledge that the conflict is, at heart, a Pashtun insurgency. 

contd/ 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dff3dfda-0c75-11df-a941-00144feabdc0.html 

(Registration needed)]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Will a musical be made next &#8211; Springtime in Kabul?</p>
<p>The Financial Times -</p>
<p>Allies rally their forces for spring offensive<br />
By Lionel Barber in Helmand </p>
<p>Published: January 29 2010 02:00 </p>
<p>With the planned allied counter-offensive against the Taliban just weeks away, Camp Bastion, the main British military base in Afghanistan, is heaving with activity. </p>
<p>Hercules C-17 heavy transport aircraft roar in and out, while Chinook, Merlin and Puma helicopters kick up clouds of red dust. A deserted airstrip three years ago, Camp Bastion, located in the violent Afghan province of Helmand, is today handling more cargo than London&#8217;s Gatwick airport and more traffic than Luton. </p>
<p>There is a renewed sense of confidence in the Nato mission after a year of drift in which the US and UK-led coalition, by their own admission, lost the initiative across the whole theatre. In the past year the number of Nato casualties has doubled, with British forces sustaining heavy losses in the south. </p>
<p>Officials speak of &#8220;hubris&#8221; in underestimating the enemy. Now, despite reports of daily casualties, largely from deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the coalition appears to have clarified its mission. </p>
<p>At least this was the impression this visitor took away after a three-day trip to Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The mood in the British camp is cautiously upbeat. The Americans are arriving in force (30,000 extra troops by August), and the favourite Chinooks are now on stream &#8211; delays were, say officers, due to a lack of trained crew rather than cuts or incompetence. </p>
<p>General Stanley McChrystal, the charismatic allied commander, has changed the weather. &#8220;Gen Stan&#8221; has switched focus from simply killing insurgents to protecting and winning the support of the Afghan people. Crucially, the plan assumes that Hamid Karzai, Afghan president, is ready to take on the role of wartime commander-in-chief. </p>
<p>Mr Karzai is described by a western official in Kabul as &#8220;Clinton without the sex&#8221; &#8211; a consummate politician with a vast network of contacts among the country&#8217;s tribes. But he is also seen as vacillating and a weak administrator torn between loyalties to his own Pashtun tribe and the knowledge that the conflict is, at heart, a Pashtun insurgency. </p>
<p>contd/<br />
<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dff3dfda-0c75-11df-a941-00144feabdc0.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dff3dfda-0c75-11df-a941-00144feabdc0.html</a> </p>
<p>(Registration needed)</p>
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		<title>By: Maryb</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/behind-cautious-signal-a-decision-for-afghan-peace-talks/#comment-64203</link>
		<dc:creator>Maryb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2010 18:13:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=13991#comment-64203</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There was a big conference on Afghanistan in London today with 69 nations represented including the US of course. Clinton and Karzai have had much publicity during their visits.  The BBC report is here. 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8485861.stm

The Taliban have already said that the whole thing is a propaganda ploy so there seems little promise of this flim flam taking off. Brown is electioneering and would like to be seen as a leader on the world stage.  I laughed when I saw the title of the High Office of Oversight mentioned in the report. It sounds like something out of Gilbert and Sullivan.

COMMUNIQUE&#039;S KEY POINTS
 
- Handover security duties in Afghan provinces starting in late 2010 or early 2011
- Funds to reintegrate Taliban who cut ties with al-Qaeda
- Hold a 2010 summit in Kabul to develop concrete plans for the Afghan government programme
- Backs start of discussions on a new Afghan-led IMF programme
- Increase share of aid delivered through the Afghan government to 50% in two years
- Increase Afghan military strength to 171,600 and police numbers to 134,000 by October 2011]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There was a big conference on Afghanistan in London today with 69 nations represented including the US of course. Clinton and Karzai have had much publicity during their visits.  The BBC report is here. </p>
<p><a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8485861.stm" rel="nofollow">http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8485861.stm</a></p>
<p>The Taliban have already said that the whole thing is a propaganda ploy so there seems little promise of this flim flam taking off. Brown is electioneering and would like to be seen as a leader on the world stage.  I laughed when I saw the title of the High Office of Oversight mentioned in the report. It sounds like something out of Gilbert and Sullivan.</p>
<p>COMMUNIQUE&#8217;S KEY POINTS</p>
<p>- Handover security duties in Afghan provinces starting in late 2010 or early 2011<br />
- Funds to reintegrate Taliban who cut ties with al-Qaeda<br />
- Hold a 2010 summit in Kabul to develop concrete plans for the Afghan government programme<br />
- Backs start of discussions on a new Afghan-led IMF programme<br />
- Increase share of aid delivered through the Afghan government to 50% in two years<br />
- Increase Afghan military strength to 171,600 and police numbers to 134,000 by October 2011</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Josie Michel-Bruening</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/behind-cautious-signal-a-decision-for-afghan-peace-talks/#comment-64198</link>
		<dc:creator>Josie Michel-Bruening</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2010 16:37:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=13991#comment-64198</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I feel somehow relieved by reading about the more often remarked intentions for negotiaton with Taliban leaders by the Obama administration.
However, why does nobody mention the following?
According to an  interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1998, the CIA&#039;s intervention in Afghanistan preceded the 1979 Soviet invasion. This decision of the Carter Administration in 1979 to intervene and destabilise Afghanistan is the root cause of Afghanistan&#039;s destruction as a nation, 
Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998 
Posted at globalresearch.ca 15 October 2001
see: http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html 
According to that the CIA had supported the insurgent Taliban and Mudjahedin against the democratically elected Nadjibullah regime having begun with an agricultural reform and opening the universities for women.

Well, I wish the Obama administration good luck and all of us for winning peace as soon as possible.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I feel somehow relieved by reading about the more often remarked intentions for negotiaton with Taliban leaders by the Obama administration.<br />
However, why does nobody mention the following?<br />
According to an  interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1998, the CIA&#8217;s intervention in Afghanistan preceded the 1979 Soviet invasion. This decision of the Carter Administration in 1979 to intervene and destabilise Afghanistan is the root cause of Afghanistan&#8217;s destruction as a nation,<br />
Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998<br />
Posted at globalresearch.ca 15 October 2001<br />
see: <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html</a><br />
According to that the CIA had supported the insurgent Taliban and Mudjahedin against the democratically elected Nadjibullah regime having begun with an agricultural reform and opening the universities for women.</p>
<p>Well, I wish the Obama administration good luck and all of us for winning peace as soon as possible.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Phil</title>
		<link>http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/behind-cautious-signal-a-decision-for-afghan-peace-talks/#comment-64160</link>
		<dc:creator>Phil</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 18:58:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dissidentvoice.org/?p=13991#comment-64160</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;Some U.S. officials have argued that the Taliban leader should be barred from participation because of his ... refusing to hand over the al Qaeda leader in the weeks that followed the attacks.&lt;/i&gt;

I remembered the Taliban leadership willingly offering to try Osama or hand him right over into custody. Funny how fast that piece of history got rewritten, isn&#039;t it....]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>Some U.S. officials have argued that the Taliban leader should be barred from participation because of his &#8230; refusing to hand over the al Qaeda leader in the weeks that followed the attacks.</i></p>
<p>I remembered the Taliban leadership willingly offering to try Osama or hand him right over into custody. Funny how fast that piece of history got rewritten, isn&#8217;t it&#8230;.</p>
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