http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/

As I wrote before in response to the several other links you posted critical of Iran (rightfully), “I wrote an article about US policy towards Iran and its consequences. A number of people have responded pointing out the oppressive nature of the Iranian regime. I agree and also think it’s horrible. Iran is hardly alone in being worthy of our criticism. However, it’s irrelevant to the point, unless, of course, people are trying to argue that US policy is justified because of the lack of justice and democracy in Iran. I don’t assume anyone is making that argument, but otherwise I don’t see the relevancy to the point of the article.”

http://www.losangeleschronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=35885

As I already noted, the Ross map doesn’t show contiguous areas between settlments, areas Israel would maintain control over, or areas where Israel would continue to maintain a military presence, and is therefore not an accurate map of what was offered.

Bandar “Bush” wasn’t at Camp David. What you presented from Clinton was his proposal, which incorporated many of the Israeli demands but wasn’t identical to the Israeli proposal. Ross, as has been pointed out twice, isn’t honest about the reality of what was offered.

The interview I cited was Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was a participant in the negotiations at Camp David in 2000. This was what he spoke of in his interview.

There were also negotiations at Taba the following year.

As I said, we don’t know much about what occurred or what was really offered. The paricipants never put out any official record of the negotiations and we only know what various participants have discussed with the media. Accounts vary and are contradictory.

But we do know some things, and there are certain points which participants from both sides agree were part of the proposal. Among these are the points I listed above.

No self-respecting person in the same position as the Palestinians would accept what was “offered” by Isreal.

What was offered was not reflective of Palestinian rights under international law and was not a viable, contiguous state.

And, by the way, you have picked interviews that do not really relate to the December 2000 offer. You have focussed on other discussions – mostly before December. As a person who negotiates agreements, I note the obvious: the history of negotiations is really the last offer. And, the last real offer was in December of 2000, as that was the last offer that occurred under US auspices and when the Israeli government had real authority to negotiate. There was no excuse, as Bandar notes, for what Arafat did in response to the December 2000 proposal. Such led to unnecessary bloodshed.

That is nuts. What do you mean no one would accept such an offer. Arafat, in 2002, did accept the offer. However, it was too late. Too many people had died in his stupid war.

In any event, as the Ross map shows, it was contiguous territory and not divided as you alleged. The transcript speaks for itself about what was offered.

I gather that you are allergic to facts. But, frankly, Bandar has it correctly, so does Clinton and so does Ross. In any event, your argument that Israel did not offer a state is incorrect, as is most else of what you have been claiming in response to my writings.

In the end, we may debate what was negotiated at Camp David, but the facts on the ground don’t lie. The development of illegal settlements was ongoing throughout the entire so-called “peace process” of which you speak, despite the fact that Barak agreed that negotiations should be based on UN resolution 242, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, and that neither side should engage in “unilateral actions that prejudge the outcome of negotiations.” (8)

The facts on the ground–including the continuing illegal occupation, the ongoing settlement expansion, and the illegal construction of the wall that effectively annexes significant portions of the West Bank–demonstrate perfectly unambiguously the US and Israeli rejection of the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people.

Israel not only wanted to annex settlement blocs, but wanted contiguity between them, which would have effectively diced up the West Bank into non-contiguous bantustans. Furthermore, future development of Israeli settlements in the West Bank were included
in the Israeli plan. (2)

Israel demanded that “80% of the settlers”–by which is meant 80% of the settlements–be under Israeli sovereignty. (3)

Israel wanted to retain control over other areas of the West Bank for as much as 25 years. This would mean that the land returned to Palestine would only amount to about 70%, not 97%, according to the Foundation for Middle East Peace. This account is disputed by Dennis Ross, whose map fails to show contiguous areas between Israeli settlements and zones of “temporary” Israeli control. (4)

Israel wanted a non-militarized Palestine incapable of self-defense against armed aggression. Furthermore, Israel wanted to be
allowed to station a military presense at “emergency locations” within Palestine (the Jordan Valley), as well as additional “early warning stations” elsewhere. (5)

Israel wanted access to Palestinian airspace and management rights over water sources in the West Bank. (6)

Israel rejected the right of return for displaced Palestinian refugees and denied responsibility for the refugee problem. (7)

First of all, your first source isn’t “The Saudis”, as you misrepresent it, but The New Yorker magazine, which simply repeats the official myth offered by Washington. This isn’t surprising. It’s often enough repeated, but, as with claims of Iraqi WMDs, repeating a lie often enough doesn’t make it true.

I’m not particularly interested in Prince Bandar “Bush” bin Sultan’s opinion on the matter, and he wasn’t there, so I won’t comment on it.

What Clinton proposed and what Israel proposed are not necessarily one and the same, though he incorporated many of the Israeli demands.

Not much is actually known about what was discussed and accounts vary.

I’m not particularly interested in Prince Bandar “Bush” bin Sultan’s opinion on the matter, and he wasn’t there, so I won’t comment on it.

What Clinton proposed and what Israel proposed are not necessarily one and the same, though he incorporated many of the Israeli demands.

Not much is actually known about what was discussed and accounts vary.

First of all, we now that Israel wanted to annex significant portions of the West Bank (maps: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/rossmap2.html, http://www.mideastweb.org/Rossmap_7_camp_david.gif)

Israel not only wanted to annex settlement blocs, but wanted contiguity between them, which would have effectively diced up the West Bank into non-contiguous bantustans. Furthermore, future development of Israeli settlements in the West Bank were included in the Israeli plan (Moratinos Paper from the Taba negotiations summarizing Camp David: http://www.mideastweb.org/moratinos.htm).

Israel demanded that “80% of the settlers”–by which is meant 80% of the settlements–be under Israeli sovereignty (Shlomo Ben-Ami’s diary account: ttp://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benamidiary.html, Clinton Proposal: http://www.jmcc.org/documents/clintonprop.htm).

Israel wanted to retain control over other areas of the West Bank for as much as 25 years. This would mean that the land returned to Palestine would only amount to about 70%, not 97%, according to the Foundation for Middle East Peace. This account is disputed by Dennis Ross, whose map fails to show contiguous areas between Israeli settlements and zones of “temporary” Israeli control (http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid2.htm, http://www.mideastweb.org/lastmaps.htm)

Israel wanted a non-militarized Palestine incapable of self-defense against armed aggression. Furthermore, Israel wanted to be allowed to station a military presense at “emergency locations” within Palestine (the Jordan Valley), as well as additional “early warning stations” elsewhere. (Maratinos Paper).

Israel wanted access to Palestinian airspace and management rights over water sources in the West Bank. (http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid2.htm).

Israel rejected the right of return for displaced Palestinian refugees and denied responsibility for the refugee problem. (Schlomo Ben-Ami interview: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benamidiary.html, http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid2.htm).

No self-respecting person in the same position as the Palestinians would ever accept such a “generous offer”.

In the end, we may debate what was negotiated at Camp David, but the facts on the ground don’t lie. The development of illegal settlements was ongoing throughout the entire so-called “peace process” of which you speak, despite the fact that Barak agreed that negotiations should be based on UN resolution 242, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, and that neither side should engage in “unilateral actions that prejudge the outcome of negotiations.” (Trilateral Statement: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22698.htm).

The facts on the ground–including the continuing illegal occupation, the ongoing settlement expansion, and the illegal construction of the wall that effectively annexes significant portions of the West Bank–demonstrate perfectly unambiguously the US and Israeli rejection of the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people.

Actually, so that this nonsense comes to a factual end, here is the transcript of the meeting described in the Bandar article and by Dennis Ross. The source is the JMCC (i.e. The Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre), which is a Palestinian Arab website. Their version of the transcript bears a striking resemblance to what Ross states:

[QUOTE BEGINS] Clinton Proposal

Meeting with President Clinton
White House, 23.12.2000

Attendance!
us
President Clinton, Secretary Alright, John Podesta, Samual Berger, Steve Richetti, Bruce Reidel,Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller, Rob Maley, Gamal Hilal
Palestine:
Sa’eb Erekat, Mohammad Dahlan, Samih Abed, Ghaith Al-Omari.
Israel:
Shlomo Ben Ami, Gild Sher, Penny Medan, Shlomo Yanai, Gidi Grinstein

Minuets:
President Clinton:

Territory:
Based on what I heard. I Believe that the solution should be in the mid-90%’s, between 94-96% of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State.

The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3% in addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage.

The Parties also should consider the swap of leased land to meet their respective needs. There are creative ways of doing this that should address Palestinian and Israeli needs and concerns.

The Parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:

* 80% of settlers in blocks.
* Contiguity.
* Minimize annexed areas.
* Minimize the number of Palestinian affected.

Security:
The key lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by mutual consent. This presence will also monitor the implementation of the agreement between both sides.

My best judgment is that the Israeli presence would remain in fixed locations in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the International force for another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threats to Israel.

On early warning stations, Israel should maintain three facilities in the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The stations will be subject to review every 10 years with any changes in the status to be mutually agreed.
Regarding emergency developments, I understand that you will still have to develop a map of the relevant areas and routes. But in deleing what is an emergency, I propose the following definition:
Imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel’s national security of a military nature that requires the activation of a national state emergency.

Of course, the. International forces will need to be notified of any such determination.

On airspace, I suggest that the state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.

I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a “demilitarized state” while the Palestinian side proposes ” a state with limited arms” As a compromise, I suggest calling it a “non-militarized state”.

This will be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian security forces. Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrent purposes.

Jerusalem and Refugees:
I have a sense that the remaining gapes have more to do with formulations than practical realities.

Jerusalem:
The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli.
This would apply to the Old City as well. I urge the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both sides.

Regarding the Haram/Temple Mount, O believe that the gaps are not related to practical administration but to the symbolic issues if sovereignty and to finding a way to accord respect to the religious believes of both sides.

I know you have been discussing a number of formulations, and you can agree one of these. I add to these two additional formulations guaranteeing Palestinian effective control over the Haram while respecting the conviction of the Jewish people.
Regarding either one of these two formulations will be international monitoring to
provide mutual confidence.
1- Palestinian sovereignty over the Hara, and Israeli sovereignty over (the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part) (The Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part).

There will be a fine commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or Behind the Wall.
2- Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall as that mutual consent would be requested before any excavation can take place.

Refugees:
I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations and less to what will happen on a practical level.

I believe that is Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian People as a result of the 1948 war and the need to assist the international community in addressing the problem.

An international commission should be established to implement all the aspects that flow from you agreement: compensation, resettlement, rehabilitation, etc…

The US is prepared to lead an international effort to help the refugees.

The fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return. I know the history of the issue and how hard it will be for the Palestinian Leadership to appear to be abandoning this principle.

The Israeli side could not accept any reference to a right of return that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel’s sovereign policies and admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state.

Any solution must address both needs.

The solution will have to be consistent with the two-state approach that both sides have accepted as a way to end the Palestinian Israeli conflict: the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people
Under the two-state solution, the guiding principle should be that the Palestinian State would be the focal point for Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.

I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of return that will make clear that there is no specific right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.

In light of the above, I propose two alternatives:

1- Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to Historic Palestine, Or,
2- Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland.

The agreement will define the implementation of this general right in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list the five possible homes for the refugees:

1- The state of Palestine.
2- Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap.
3- Rehabilitation in host country.
4- Resettlement in third country.
5- Admission to Israel.

In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the return to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and areas acquired in the land swap would be right to all Palestinian Refugees.

While rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries and absorption into Israel will depend will depend upon the policies of those countries.

Israeli could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so that some of the refugees would be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel’s sovereign decision.

I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population in Lebanon.

The parties would agree that this is implement resolution 194.

The End of Conflict:
I propose that the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its implementation put and end to all claims. This could be implemented through a UN Security Counsel Resolution that notes that Resolutions 242 and 338 have been implemented and through the release of Palestinian prisoners.

Concluding remarks:
I believe that this is the outline of the fair and lasting agreement.

It gives the Palestinian people the ability to determine their future on their own land, a sovereign and viable state recognized by international community. Al-Quds as its capital, sovereignty over the Haram, and new lives for the refugees.

It gives the people of Israel a genuine end to the conflict, real security, the preservation of sacred religious ties, the incorporation of 80% of the settlers into Israel, and the largest Jewish Jerusalem in history recognized by all as its capital.

This is the best that I can do. Brief your leaders and tell me if they are prepared to come for discussions based on these ideas. If so, I would meet them next week separately. If not, I have taken this as far as I can.

These are my ideas, If they are not accepted, they are not just off the table, they also go with me when I leave office.

End [QUOTE ENDS]

Source: http://www.jmcc.org/documents/clintonprop.htm . It is exactly what Ross says was offered.

No offense, but not only do the Saudis claim that such is what the Israelis offered but, in fact, the State Department says the same thing. And so does President Clinton and so does Dennis Ross. And, by the way, I found the official State Department transcript of the offer on a Palestinian website.

Here is the version from the Saudi Arabian Embassy to the US (http://www.saudiembassy.net/StatementLink/03-ST-Bandar-0324-NewYorker.pdf). Please carefully read what follows:

[QUOTE BEGINS] Clinton, who continued to apply his considerable energy to finding a Middle East solution, came to believe, in December of 2000, that he had finally found a formula for peace; he asked once more for Bandar’s help. Bandar’s first reaction was not to get involved; the Syrian summit had failed, and talks between Barak and Arafat at Camp David, in July, had collapsed. But when Dennis Ross showed Bandar the President’s talking papers Bandar recognized that in its newest iteration the peace plan was a remarkable development. It gave Arafat almost everything he wanted, including the return of about ninety-seven per cent of the land of the occupied territories; all of Jerusalem except the Jewish and Armenian quarters, with Jews preserving the right to worship at the Temple Mount; and a thirty-billion-dollar compensation fund.

Arafat told Crown Prince Abdullah that he wanted Bandar’s help with the negotiations. “There’s not much I can do unless Arafat is willing to understand that this is it,” Bandar told the Crown Prince.

On January 2, 2001, Bandar picked up Arafat at Andrews Air Force Base and reviewed the plan with him. Did he think he could get a better deal? Bandar asked. Did he prefer Sharon to Barak? he continued, referring to the upcoming election in Israel. Of course not, Arafat replied. Barak’s negotiators were doves, Bandar went on, and said, “Since 1948, every time we’ve had something on the table we say no. Then we say yes. When we say yes, it’s not on the table anymore. Then we have to deal with something less. Isn’t it about time we say yes?” Bandar added, “We’ve always said to the Americans, ‘Our red line is Jerusalem. You get us a deal that’s O.K. on Jerusalem and we’re going, too.’ ”

Arafat said that he understood, but still Bandar issued something of an ultimatum: “Let me tell you one more time. You have only two choices. Either you take this deal or we go to war. If you take this deal, we will all throw our weight behind you. If you don’t take this deal, do you think anybody will go to war for you?” Arafat was silent. Bandar continued, “Let’s start with the big country, Egypt. You think Egypt will go to war with you?” Arafat had had his problems with Egypt, too. No, he said. “I’ll prove it to you, just to confirm,” Bandar went on. Bandar called the Egyptian Ambassador. Bandar reported that the Egyptian Ambassador, who was to join them shortly, was willing to support the peace process. “Is Jordan going to go to war? Syria go to war? So, Mr. Arafat, what are you losing?”

When Nabil Fahmy, the Egyptian Ambassador, joined them, at the Ritz-Carlton, Bandar repeated much of his advice. Arafat said that he would accept Clinton’s proposal, with one condition: he wanted Saudi Arabia and Egypt to give him political cover and support. Bandar and Fahmy assured him that they would, and Arafat left for the White House.

Arafat was supposed to return to Bandar’s house after his meeting with Clinton and, with the Egyptian Ambassador present, call the Crown Prince and President Mubarak. After three hours, when Arafat still hadn’t shown up, the Egyptian Ambassador told Bandar that something must have gone wrong. Bandar, too, was worried and called Arafat’s security detail. Arafat had left the White House twenty minutes earlier, he was told, and was back at the Ritz. When Bandar called, Arafat said that he needed to talk to him at once. George Tenet, the C.I.A. director, was on his way to the hotel to discuss the plan, and Arafat was then supposed to return to the White House. Bandar, accompanied by the Egyptian Ambassador, hurried to the Ritz.

Arafat said that the meeting with Clinton had been “excellent,” but Bandar did not believe him; he thought that Arafat’s staff looked as if they had just come from a funeral. The Egyptian Ambassador later privately remarked that Arafat looked dead. Bandar asked Arafat if he wanted to talk to the Crown Prince or President Mubarak. No, Arafat replied. He said that he’d had a great time with the President, but the meeting had turned sour when Dennis Ross joined them. Yet, he went on, he and Clinton were in agreement. Bandar, concealing his disbelief, said that was good news. Soon after this exchange, Bandar got a note from a security officer, which said, “Urgent. Call the President.” In the corridor, Bandar called the White House and reached Berger.

“Congratulations,” Bandar said, loudly and sarcastically, for he knew by then that the talks had failed. On what? Berger asked. “Arafat is telling me you guys have a deal.” Not true, Berger said, adding that he and Clinton had made it clear to Arafat that this was his last chance. Please, Berger said, tell Arafat that this is it. “It’s too late,” Bandar recalls saying. “That should have happened with the White House, not with me.” (A spokesman for Clinton recalled, “At one point, Clinton said, ‘It’s five minutes to twelve, Mr. Chairman, and you are going to lose the best and maybe the only opportunity that your people will have to solve this problem on satisfactory grounds by not being able to make a decision.’ . . . The Israelis accepted. They said they had reservations and Arafat never accepted.”)

Bandar believed that the White House had hurt its cause by not pressing an ultimatum. Arafat, though, was committing a crime against the Palestinians-in fact, against the entire region. If it weren’t so serious, Bandar thought, it would be a comedy. He returned to Arafat’s room and sat down, trying to remember: “Make your words soft and sweet.” Bandar began, “Mr. President, I want to be sure now. You’re telling me you struck a deal?” When Arafat said it was so, Bandar, still hiding his fury, offered his congratulations. His wife and children were waiting for him in Aspen, he said, and he wanted to go. Bandar could see the life draining out of Arafat. He started to leave, then turned around. “I hope you remember, sir, what I told you. If we lose this opportunity, it is not going to be a tragedy. This is going to be a crime.” When Bandar looked at Arafat’s staff, their faces showed incredulity.

The next evening, a White House spokesman said that Arafat had agreed to accept Clinton’s proposals, with reservations, only as the basis for new talks. Arafat said later that he had not been offered as much as had been described. When Bandar told all this to the Crown Prince, Abdullah was surprised, particularly about the offer on Jerusalem. A few months later, Abdullah asked Clinton, who was visiting Saudi Arabia, whether Bandar’s description of the offer was correct. Clinton confirmed Bandar’s details, and said that the failure of these last negotiations had broken his heart. Later still, the Crown Prince told Bandar he was shocked that Arafat had wasted such an opportunity, and that he had lied to him about the American offer. Bandar told associates that it was an open secret within the Arab world that Arafat was not truthful. But Arafat had them trapped: they couldn’t separate the cause from the man, because if you attacked the man you attacked the cause. “Clinton, the bastard, really tried his best,” Bandar told me last week when we met at his house in McLean. “And Barak’s position was so avant-garde that it was equal to Prime Minister Rabin”-Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated in November, 1995. “It broke my heart that Arafat did not take that offer.”

********************************

But as violence in the Middle East intensified and Barak blamed Arafat for the failure of the peace talks, Bandar began to worry. The Arab world was watching Al Jazeera, the satellite television network, which was constantly showing images of Israeli soldiers and suffering Palestinians. Bandar understood as well as anyone why Bush did not want to get involved. It was a mess, and Bush made it clear that he had no prestige to waste. Bandar was particularly angry with Arafat because if he publicly defended Barak’s account it would make him sound like an apologist for Barak and Israel. “I was there. I was a witness. I cannot lie,” he said privately. [QUOTE ENDS]

“The Prince – How the Saudi Ambassador became Washington’s indispensable operator,” written by Elsa Walsh and originally published in The NewYorker on March 24, 2003 and now still available on the Saudi Arabian Embassy to the US Website

According to Dennis Ross:

[QUOTE BEGINS] To this day, Arafat has never honestly admitted what was offered to the Palestinians—a deal that would have resulted in a Palestinian state, with territory in over 97 percent of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem; with Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of that state (including the holy place of the Haram al-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary); with an international presence in place of the Israeli Defense Force in the Jordan Valley; and with the unlimited right of return for Palestinian refugees to their state but not to Israel. Nonetheless, Arafat continues to hide behind the canard that he was offered Bantustans—a reference to the geographically isolated black homelands created by the apartheid-era South African government. Yet with 97 percent of the territory in Palestinian hands, there would have been no cantons. Palestinian areas would not have been isolated or surrounded. There would have been territorial integrity and contiguity in both the West Bank and Gaza, and there would have been independent borders with Egypt and Jordan.

“The offer was never written” is a refrain uttered time and again by apologists for Chairman Arafat as a way of suggesting that no real offer existed and that therefore Arafat did not miss a historic opportunity. Nothing could be more ridiculous or misleading. President Clinton himself presented both sides with his proposal word by word. I stayed behind to be certain both sides had recorded each word accurately. Given Arafat’s negotiating style, Clinton was not about to formalize the proposal, making it easier for Arafat to use the final offer as just a jumping-off point for more ceaseless bargaining in the future. [QUOTE ENDS]

“Think Again: Yasir Arafat,” by Dennis Ross, Foreign Policy July-August 2002.

Must I post the official transcript and make you look foolish? And, by the way, President Clinton’s memoirs support what is stated by Ross. So, are you calling all of the above people liars? You must be kidding.

As for the right to exist, if it is so unimportant, why does Hamas refuse to accept it? Obviously, it is very important to Hamas. And, it means exactly what I say it means.

As for your comment that no one would accept something akin to what the Israelis offered, that is nonsense, even on your Bantustan theory – which is basically a falsehood. In fact, the many countries have accepted such things, including Israel. But, as it turns out, the Clinton proposal was, in fact, a very good offer. Arafat chose to lie about it. But, the offer is what I say it is.

No self-respecting person in his right mind could ever have accepted such an “offer”.

The “right to exist”, as the phrase is used, means nothing like what you describe. It has nothing to do with a “state of war”. It’s a propaganda term used in an attempt to legitimize Israel’s confiscation of land.

The corresponding right–legitimately–is the right to self-determination, which is denied to the Palestinians. That is the fact on the ground, as Israel continues to illegally occupy the land and continues to build illegal settlements and continues construction of the illegal wall by which it effectively annexes large portions of the West Bank.

Those are the facts on the ground and the facts demonstrate perfectly clearly Israel’s rejection of the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people.

With due respect, Jeremy, the Israelis do not deny Palestinian Arabs the right to a homeland. That is shown by the fact that the Israelis agreed, in December of 2000, to cede 97% of the West Bank, 100% of Gaza, part of Jerusalem, to create a land bridge between the West Bank and Gaza and to pay $30 billion Dollar to compensate those Palestinian Arabs who were displaced. One may not like all of the details of the proposal but, frankly, your contention is objectively wrong. So says the Saudi Embassy to the US, not to mention President Clinton, which notes the above proposal on its website.

Now, right to exist means, more or less, that the state of war that exists between the nations would come to an end and the nations would have normalized relations, like the US has with Canada. That is pretty easy to understand.

Shabman makes what to me is the most relevant point insofar as that is concerned, which is that Israel denies Palestinians the right to self-determination (which is what is really meant by the “right” of a nation to “exist”). Israel is and long has been actively wiping Palestine off the map.

The facts on the ground are that the Iranian regime does not recognize Israel’s right to exist in any boundaries, not the Iran wants Israel to cede land for Palestinian Arabs to create a state alongside Israel. That, after all, is what Mr. Ahmadinejad means by a world without Zionism – Zionism being, after all, the national liberation movement of the Jewish people.