I only take issue with your charge that my claim to have been associated with the finest wildfire fighters in the world is false. You are quite right that the Forest Service is an America-wide organization (“Yankee”), and I may even agree that your use of the term “self-aggrandizing” applies. And indeed what I knew as indisputably true when I was active in the labor union in the Forest Service in 1982 or so — that more USFS firefighters trained more non-US firefighters worldwide than anyone else — may have reflected merely the atrociously wealthy condition of this country, or may even be no longer true. That said (I love THAT EXPRESSION), my fondestm bravest, memories of the Forest Service are of those experiences, and no amount of personal radical conviction on my part can efface them.

If you are interested. There follows the article I referred to in the same sentence I used the words “the greatest wildfire fighters in the world.” It has more to do with management than firefighting, but such was and is the world. I think we can agree.

T H E F O R E S T S E R V I C E M O N I T O R

Voice of a Nationwide Bargaining Unit of
the National Federation of Federal Employees

January, 1982

From the Editor

AVOIDING FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS IN R5
– THE 24 HOUR FIRELINE —

By memorandum dated August 10, 1981, the Washington Office approved Region 5’s request to experiment with 24-hour fireline workshifts during the 1981 and 1982 fire seasons. The closing paragraph of that memorandum read:

“Project Proposal #7021 (the 24-Hour Workshift) has been reviewed by
the W.O. Personnel Management staff. Their opinion is ‘the decision
to establish a 24-hour work shift versus a 12-hour work shift would not
require Union negotiation in and of itself.’ On the other hand, the Union
probably would request to be involved in determining how the trial test
would be carried out on the Forests with organized unions.”

This opinion that establishing 24-hour fireline workshifts is a management right not subject to Union negotiation is doubtful (a challenge to management on the point, however, must await R-5’s decision to establish such shifts as policy, if it so decides, sometime after the 1982 fire season). That the experimental use of 24-hour shifts in R-5 is a matter of “impact and implementation” and subject to Union negotiation was obvious, even to the W.O. The only question the W.O. left R-5 to decide in this regard was whether the experiment would involve Regional Fire Teams, and hence be subject to regionwide negotiations, or involve only smaller fires suppressible at the Forest level, and hence be subject to negotiations only if involving a Forest with a union local.

For good reasons, R-5 decided on the regionwide alternative. By Speed Memorandum dated September 4, 1981, R-5’s labor Relations Specialist officially notified R-5 NFFE Vice President Vela McBride of the proposed 24-hour Fireline Workshift Experiment, and said the experiment would be used only on large fires involving Regional Fire Teams. This Speed Memorandum, containing the first draft of R-5 Fire Management’s directive to the field on implementation of the experiment, ended with the following request for “Union input”:

“UNION INPUT: We would of course like your input as soon as possible,
recognizing that this is an experimental program and that we will again
seek your involvement in the evaluation of the experiment and possible
future revisions. Please contact (Fire Management) to discuss any
questions, concerns and suggestions which you may have, and give us
your final input by September 18 if at all possible (we’d like to give a
try on the next big fire that comes up, so the sooner the better!)”

Of note in this initial notification from management to R-5 NFFE were two things. First, as usual, management was in a big hurry to get the show on the road. And secondly, although management was following Article 9 of the Master Agreement (“Negotiations”) and notifying the Union above the Local level in writing of a proposed change in working conditions subject to negotiations, the memorandum contained no reference to the Master Agreement and no use of the word “negotiations” anywhere. Instead, NFFE was asked for “input” and “involvement in the evaluation.” “Discussion with NFFE” at the regional level was referred to.

Of note in the first draft of Fire Management’s field direction on the experiment, accompanying this initial notification of the Union, was the complete absence of any provision for breaks during the 24-hour workshifts.

By letter dated September 24, 1981, Vela McBride responded to management’s Speed Memorandum, beginning: “I must request the opportunity to impact bargain on the ’24 on 24 off’ proposed policy. The amount of input I have received is rather extensive.” This was a clear and simple request for formal negotiations following the procedures of Article 9 (“The Union at the appropriate level will advise management that they wish to negotiate a policy or the impact and implementation of that policy”).

When management received Vela’s written request for negotiations, it was the last week in September and well into R-5’s 1981 fire season. At any moment a big fire appropriate for experimentation with 24-hour workshifts could have broken out. Management’s first priority, then, was to avoid formal negotiations, and further, to get R-5 NFFE to agree the experiment could proceed immediately. So instead of responding to Vela’s request, management simply ignored it and responded to her concerns, by telephone call on October 5, 1981. Management’s written summary of this telephone conversation records a classic in negotiation avoidance:

“The Region recognizes that you have legitimate concerns and desires
to include the Union’s input into the experimental guidance. We
anticipate receiving your locals’ concerns, either typed or hand-
written, from you ASAP, and will address as many of them as we can
at this time in the current experimental guidance. Others, including
any which may not be apparent now but which may surface after
some experience with the system will be addressed when the
experiment’s progress is examined before the start of the next fire
season. The Region will furnish the Union with the results of any use
of the 24-hour experiment during the remainder of the calendar year.
Recognizing that the experiment will be evaluated both prior to and
after the 1982 fire season, with Union involvement in the evaluation,
the Union does not object to the Region’s experimental use of the
24-hour system during the remainder of 1981, so long as the results
of any such use are shared with the Union.”

The request for written concerns from Vela in the second sentence of this summary would have been appropriate if made in preparation for formal negotiations. Instead, the request was made in the course of avoiding formal negotiations. Consider: the subject of negotiations is mentioned nowhere in the summary and was never discussed during the conversation (as Vela subsequently verified); mentioned again, however, were Union “input” and “involvement.” R-5’s Labor Relations Specialist was most accommodating in assuring Vela that the second draft of Fire Management’s field directives on the experiment (then in preparation) would address her concerns; and in return for those assurances, according to management’s written summary, Vela okayed going ahead with the experiment. Finally, by mailing Vela a written summary which recorded “. . .the Union does not object to the Region’s experimental use. . .etc.” (see italicized portion of the summary, above), the Union’s request for formal negotiations prior to experimentation was rendered completely inoperative, as far as management was concerned.

Vela’s memory of the October 5 telephone conversation differed, however, from that of R-5’s Labor Relations Specialist. She heard management say that there would be no experimentation until further agreement was reached over her concerns, including rest period during the 24-hour workshifts. And by memorandum dated October 10, 1981, Vela recorded her summary of the October 5 telephone conversation as it related to immediate implementation:

“Per our telephone conversation, the Union wants no experimental use
UNTIL rest periods are agreed upon. Some of the concerns surfacing
are the safety of the personnel: the fatigue factor is of great concern to
most of those calling me. They feel the 24 on/off is just too much. Also
great concern concerning what one individual called ‘security.” He felt
the 24 hour off was too much. The employees would get restless and
bring liquor, etc. Fights would erupt. Another thing not clear to me is
the treatment of overtime. Also holiday.”

Although she did not revive her demand for formal negotiations, by writing and mailing this memorandum, Vela put the ball back in management’s court in the event of a big fire in R-5. Instead of one written record (management’s) that NFFE had verbally authorized the experiment on October 5, there were two written
records. And NFFE’s written record of not authorizing the experiment was the later one in time.

(At some point between October 5 and October 14, 1981, R-5 Fire Management completed the second draft of its field direction for the 24-Hour Fireline Workshift Experiment. This draft more clearly addressed NFFE’s concerns – as management had verbally assured Vela that it would. . . .)

Vela McBride’s October 10 memorandum to management also appointed me, Gentry Rowsey, to be R-5 NFFE’s representative for dealing with management on the 24-Hour Experiment. I saw the issue as getting good direction about rest periods into the third draft of Fire Management’s field direction. Specifically, I picked up the communication with management by writing R-5’s Labor Management Specialist: “I regret it if you have told Fire Management personnel that they have a green light from the Union on the experiment as long as they furnish us information. Our position is (still): no agreement on work periods, no experiment. . . .the current direction contains no minimum duration times for rest periods and no maximum duration times for work without rest breaks. To repeat Vela’s last statement, the Union wants no experimental use UNTIL rest periods are agreed upon. The sooner we can get such agreement, the sooner will we endorse the experiment.”

This was dated October 21, 1981, six weeks after the original notification to R-5 NFFE of the proposed 24-Hour Fireline Workshift Experiment. Discussions followed between Fire Management and myself, one outcome of which was (the third revision) . . .of the field (rest period) directives. . . .There was also agreement reached in these discussions on the wording of the Regional Forester’s formal notification of all R-5 employees of the 24-Hour Experiment; . . .and there was agreement reached that the experiment would not precede receipt of the Regional Forester’s notification by the field. What there was not, then, before then, or after then, was formal negotiations over the 24-Hour Fireline Workshift Experiment in R-5.

What are the lessons in all this? Certainly the first lesson is that management will go to great lengths to avoid formal negotiations, including being very accommodating informally while completely ignoring Union initiatives toward formal negotiations. Why? Obviously, because formal negotiations take time and money and elevate the status of the Union in the eyes of employees. The second lesson is also clear: NFFE representative must demand formal negotiations in writing every time we are notified of proposed substantial changes in working conditions. And we must not let management avoid formal negotiations by “settling the issues” informally. Why? The answer is the real lesson in all this: in the time frames management gives us to respond to their proposals informally, it is not possible to represent our membership adequately. Only by requiring formal
negotiations can we gain the time and stature necessary to do our duty as NFFE
representatives. We flatter ourselves to think we have good and representative
ideas, and can do our representational duties informally. We flatter ourselves, fool ourselves, and behave like management.

I ‘m still very proud to have been associated with the greatest wildfire fighters in the world, and for the short while the rag survived, editor-in-chief of the Forest Service Monitor in 1982, the national newspaper of the National Federation of Federal Employees, bargaining unit for Forest Service nationwide. And I’m likewise proud to have authored that year in the Monitor, “Avoiding Formal Negotiations in R5 — the 24-hour fireline workshift.” There was a union then, and there’s the same union now, good old NFFE. A tiny ring in the Circus.

Thank you Joshua Frank for calling up these memories. And thank you, Resie. Certain memories of a passed Forest Service friend, an archaeologist who literally gave up his career trying to force the Agency to comply with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, would have been much more on point. But those memories are still just too damn real.

Maybe next time.

Thanks Norman Schwarzkopf, for going on national tv in ’94 & saying that Creede was the most pristine & beautiful places in America- it no longer is that.

Enormous!! congratulations!! all!!

My apologies, Mr. Frank. I’ll try to become unemotional enough to read this piece. Today!

moc.liamtohnull@yeswordyoll